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ABSTRACT 
`THE SHI'A MUSLIMS OF THE UNITED PROVINCES, c. 1890-1940. ' 
This dissertation examines religious, social and political change among the Shia 
Muslims of the United Provinces of colonial India, c. 1890-1940. Focusing especially, 
upon the towns of Lucknow and Amroha but discussing the region as a whole, it traces 
the formation of a community identity among Shia Muslims, and questions how 
disparate Shi'a populations were able to construct a consciousness of solidarity. The 
dissertation is based on a combination of archival and printed sources in English and 
Urdu. 
The first chapter assesses processes of sectarian organisation and the formation of a 
number of Shia institutions and societies in Lucknow in the thirty year period from 
1890, including several madrasas and the All India Shi'a Conference. The second chapter 
examines manifestations of religious renewal among Indian Shi `as. Forms of religious 
proselytisation are discussed, particularly the contribution of the printing press and the 
changing role of preaching. The development of religious conflict is outlined, through 
examinations of religious debates and the reformation of Muharram rites. 
A third chapter examines Shia responses to the so-called "Aligarh movement, ' 
considering reactions to educational reform and the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental 
College at `Aligarh. A fourth chapter discusses Shia responses to the campaigns of jihad 
and pan-Islamism current among many Muslims in the early twentieth century. Together, 
these two chapters demonstrate the expansion and politicisation of sectarian differences, 
and the attempts by some Shi'as to organise separately from wider Muslim institutions. 
The final chapter assesses a series of Shi'a-Sunni conflicts in Lucknow in the 1930s. It 
examines some of the contributory factors and discusses the conflicts in the light of the 
processes of sectarian organisation discussed in earlier chapters. The conclusion 
evaluates the implications of the thesis for our understanding of Indian Shia Muslims 
and, more generally, of sectarian identities and conflicts in Indian Islam. 
Statement of length and on ing ality 
This thesis totals 79,963 words (excluding footnotes, references and bibliography) 
and does not exceed the stated word limit of 80,000 words. 
This thesis is entirely the result of my own work. While it includes a small amount of 
research also used in my M. Phil thesis, `Sectarianism and identity politics among the 
Shia Muslims of Lucknow in late colonial India' (Faculty of History, Cambridge, 
2003), its contribution is minor, and none of the material presented here remains in 
the same form. 
ýw 
Justin Jones 
15 January, 2007. 
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`Islamic revival' and sectarian revivalisms 
Considerable research has been conducted upon the supposed `Islamic revival' that took 
place in India from the late-nineteenth century onwards. ' The cradle of this Islamic 
renewal has generally been identified as a number of Muslim institutions and inadrasas 
(religious schools), which emerged among the Muslim ashraf (nobility) and elites in the 
United Provinces (U. P. ) of India. Such examples of the re-crafting of the religious life of 
Indian Muslims were numerous; among them were prominently included the scriptural 
Sunni dar-ul- `ulum (college) of Deoband and its multiple successor schools; the 
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College of Aligarh and its related efforts at acculturation 
with western and secular knowledge; voluntarily administered anjwnans (organisations) 
seeking the renewal of Muslim culture or faith, prime among them the Anjuman-i- 
Himayat-i-Islam, the Anjuman-i-Islamia and the Central Muhammadan Association; and 
additionally the origination or expansion of various new sects or schools, such as the Ahl- 
i-Hadis, Bareilvis and Nadva`t ul-`Ulama. 2 Of course, these various organisations 
outlined a diversity of approaches and directions for Islamic reform, and communications 
between them were often characterised by debate and antagonism. Despite this, however, 
such organisations are considered to have together contributed to a broad contemporary 
re-assessment of Muslim identity, and a common invigoration of Muslim faith and 
communal solidarity. As has been argued in one of the most accomplished studies on the 
subject, despite the differences in approach and the frequent disagreements between these 
organisations, all possessed so-called `continuities' which fed into the overarching sense 
of an 'Islamic revival' in north India: 
I Barbara Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982), passim. 
2 Some of the literature in this regard includes: ibid; Usha San\al, Devotional ISIam and politics in British 
India: 
. 
lhmad Riva Khan Burel«'i and his movement, 1870-1920 (Delhi, 1996); Yoginder Sikand, The 
Origins and development cif the Tablighi-Jumu'at: a cross-comparative study (Ness Delhi, 2002); David 
Lelvscld, 
. "Iligur/t'. v 
first generation: (Muslim solidarity in British India (Princeton, I978): Yohanan 
Freidnmann, Prophecy continuous: aspects (It . 
4liinadi religious thought sind its medieval background (Ne'ý 
Delhi, 1989); Nlasroor Hashnti, Muslim response to Western education: a study cif four pioireer institution. 
(Delhi, 1959): Y. B. Mathur, . 
1luslim. % and changing India (Nevv Delhi, 1972); Gail Minault, Secluded 
`Ali contributed to the substantial religious self-consciousness of the 
period; all reflected and encouraged the growing sense that Muslims 
resident in India were tied together in a separate comnmunity; and all fostered the use of Urdu among educated Muslims. '3 
Such scholarship has recognised the distinctions between these many reform movements. 
However it could be suggested that since these studies of such movements have generall\ 
focused upon their role as responses to Muslim subordination under, respectivel\, 
colonial rule or the Hindu majority, they have been understood as efforts to speak for 
`Islam' or `Muslims' more widely. This focus has thus tended to cloud the extent to 
which these various movements were, in fact, often motivated by competition and 
confrontation between themselves. Rather than framing themselves as branches of a 
common Islamic campaign, such movements frequently perceived and presented 
themselves as independent and autonomous `sectarian revivals. ' They were often 
adversarial movements, primarily delineated not against non-Muslim communities but 
against other Islamic reformist efforts, and attempting to maintain separateness from 
them. 
This study will examine the Shia Muslims of the United Provinces of colonial India. 
Few efforts to discuss Indian Shi`ism in any detail have been conducted; perhaps the 
concern with the broader notion of an 'Islamic revival' has led scholars to focus upon the 
majority community, hence the Sunni-dominated concerns of the historiography of Indian 
Islam. However, it is clear that only with a full consideration of India's Shi as, the 
Muslim minority most distinct and distant from the predominantly Sunni reform 
movements listed above, and by exploring Shia reactions to and involvement in 
processes of transformation within Indian Islam, can we discern the viability of 
discussing a broad 'Islamic revival' manifested through these various particular 
movements. The thesis is concerned only with the `Isna 'Asharia branch of Shi'ism (also 
known as Twelvers, for their belief in the Twelve imams), bypassing communities such 
as Isma'ilis and Khojas with whom the former shared few associations of famil\. re; ýion, 
scholars: women's education and Muslim social reform in colonial India (New Dclhi, 1998). 
Barbara Nlelcalf, Islamic revival in British India, p. 315. 
3 
religious belief or political action. 4 It will also confine itself tightly to the swathe of north 
India latterly known as the United Provinces where `Isna `Asharia Shi'as were most 
numerous and influential, and in particular to Lucknow and other specified localities. The 
reason for this is that the thesis intends to examine the interaction of the Shia religion 
with the loyalties of the individuals who professed it, such as one's family, kinship, 
muhalla (neighbourhood), qasba (town), region and nation. 
The thesis has two key and interlocking objectives. The first is to present the first detailed 
and sustained history for India's Shi'as during the given period, examining their activities 
and responses during a time of rapid national social and economic change. Assessing the 
impact of local, provincial and national transformation in various forms, the thesis asks 
how Shia families and populations were affected religiously, socially, educationally, and 
how they responded. During this period, it is argued, numerous exclusively Shi'a 
organisations and associations were established. These brought about a new 
consciousness of religious identity and solidarity among disparate Shia co-religionists 
and developed a new organisational network enabling their religious reform, social 
organisation and political intervention during the colonial period. The second aim is to 
chart and discuss the consolidation of difference and growth of conflict between Shi'a 
and Sunni Muslims, focusing on the way in which `sectarianism, ' as these broad 
processes are together termed in the thesis, was transformed and expanded during the 
colonial period. It is argued that a growing awareness of religious difference among Shia 
and Sunni Muslims alike prompted the growth of more particular and differentiated forms 
of Islam which eventually transmuted into the delineation of Shi'as as a separate 
community more broadly in society and politics. Neither of these stories has received 
adequate attention in scholarship. Before embarking on these questions, however, the 
introduction will outline the current condition of historiography on the subject of Indian 
Shi `ism. It will ask why Shi `ism has received little attention in the scholarship of South 
Asian Islam, and will outline some of the common assumptions of this historiography in 
need of redress. 
4 The transliteration of words used in Western scholarship to denote this religious community and system 
vary considerably, but for the sake of simplicity this thesis uses the terms 'Shi'a' and 'Shi'ism' respectkely 
throughout. 
4 
Writing a Shia history for colonial India 
Comparatively few works have been produced on Indian Shi`ism. While some accounts 
have opened up our knowledge of their beliefs, ritual customs and sociolo` y, fewer have 
looked into the historical development of these communities. Cole's expert telling of the 
history of Shi`ism in Awadh ends with the collapse of the Nawab's rule, after which the 
field has been almost entirely forsaken. 6 While work on Shi'ism has continued apace for 
the Iranian lands since 1979, and more recently for Iraq, 7 India's Shi'as have not yet 
received the same levels of attention for the post-1857 period. 
Why has the Shia Muslim minority of India gone so apparently unstudied" One reason is 
the continuing placement of Shi `a Islam in the international context. In contrast to studies 
of the Deobandi and Aligarhist experiments, which took place almost exclusively in the 
national arena, the most authoritative scholarship upon Indian Shi `ism has emphasised 
the early roots of the Nawabi dynasty in the shrine cities in Iraq and the Persian origins of 
the most senior `ulama (religious scholars) in India. 8 Moreover, while religious learning 
sank in former Awadh in the second half of the nineteenth century, the shrine cities of 
Najaf and Karbala of southern Iraq emerged unequivocally as the nexus of the Shia 
world. A number of factors, including immigration of `ulaina from Iran, the relative 
autonomy of southern Iraq from the Ottoman administration in Baghdad, the growth of 
pilgrimage to the shrine cities, generous patronage and an expansion of popular Shi'ism 
among the Mesopotamian tribes all established Najaf in particular as the foremost 
establishment of Shia knowledge and jurisprudence. 9 The subsequent tendency to view 
` These include John Norman Hollister, The Shia of India (London, 1953): Nadeem Hasnain and Sheikh 
albrar Husain, Shies and Shia Islam in Irrdia: a study in society and culture (New Delhi, I988). 
`' Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'isrn in Iran and Iraq: religion and state irr Awadh, 1722-1859 
(California, 1988): Saiyid Athar 'Abbas Riz\ i's two-volume .4 socio-intellectual 
history oo/ the Isrru 'Ashari 
Shi'i. ss in India (Delhi, 1986) is broad in its historical and geographical scope and rich in detail. Hovve\er, 
the way in which Shi'ism and Shia communities were affected by interaction. ýý ith Iiitoriral 
developments is little discussed in this work. 
7 On Iran, see especially 'Michael N1. J. Fischer, Iran: frorrr religious dispute to revolution (\Iassaehu"etts, 
I980); Nikki R. Keddie, cd., Religion and politics in Iran: Slii'ism from quietism to revolution 
(Massachusetts. 1983). On Iraq, see especially NIcir Litvak, Slri'i scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq. the 
ulanrn u/ ; ý'ýrjý{/ crrtd Karbala' (Cambridge, 1998): Yitzhak 
Nakash. The Shi'is at Iraq (Princeton. 2003. 
Cole. Roots a/ rlort/t Indian S/ri'isnr in Iran and Iraq (California. 1988), passinm. 
9 Litz ak, S/ri'i scholars at nineteenth century 
Iraq, p. 17. 
1 
Shi'ism in India as somehow secondary to such international centres has meant that 
significant indigenous Indian developments have not received the attention sometimes 
deserved. 10 
A further reason for the lack of attention devoted to India's Shi'as is the intractable 
association of Shi`ism with its Nawabi incarnation and thereafter its assessment in terms 
of the continuity of its past. Sarojini Ganju's assessment of the Muslims of Lucknoww, for 
instance, focuses upon `the extent to which elements from the historical and religious 
background of the city continued to affect the fabric of society [and]... how the past 
asserted an influence on the perception of the Muslim citizens of themselves. ''' She 
argues that in Lucknow `the structure of Muslim society... maintained a considerable 
influence from the past, ' thus attributing the community identity of Lucknawi Shi `as to 
memories drawn from the community's historical background. 12 On account of this 
identification with Lucknow, Shi `ism more widely has been associated with pre-colonial 
religious structures rather than the modern processes of innovation and experimentation 
which characterised reform movements in other religions and north Indian metropolitan 
centres. 
One of the most important reasons for the neglect of distinctively modern change among 
Shi`as, however, has been that many studies have continued to theorise South Asian 
Islam largely in terms of aspirations to communal unity. Scholarship has long focused 
upon the creation of a communal `Muslim' identity which managed to supersede 
alternative personal ties of kinship, class and gasba and recast affiliation to a broadly 
defined Muslim community as a primary basis for organisation. It has frequently been 
supposed that a combination of colonial-era factors, among them aggressive Hindu 
10 For instance Mushirul Hasan, writing on the twentieth century, claims that 'the Shias... did not have any 
ad anced theological schools to match Firangi Mahal, Deoband or Nadwa... so the best among them, 
especially those aspiring to become mujtahicls, were educated in Iran and Iraq. ' Mushirul Hasan, 
'Sectarianism in Indian Islam: the Shia-Sunni divide in the United Provinces. ' in The In(lia,, Economic and 
Social Hisrorr Review X27,2,199O), p. 224. Francis Robinson also writes that 'ideas b% and taruC travelled 
from the Shi'a heartlands to India' rather than vice versa. Francis Robinson, The 'ulania L/ Farangi 11, chall 
and Islamic culture in South. "4sia (Delhi, 2001), p. 26. 
Sarojini Ganju, 'The Muslims of' Lucknoww - 1919-1939, ' in K. Ballhatchet and J. Harrison, The (-i., \ in 
South. -Isla: /)re-modcr/i and modern (London, 1980), p. 
279. 
12 Ibid. pp. 294-5. 
6 
revivalism, the communalisation of the Urdu-Hindi language controversy, a widespread 
perception of collective Muslim `backwardness' and a government policy which tended 
to understand India's `Muslims' as a largely unified and composite communit\. 
encouraged India's varied and multifarious Muslim groups to perceive and project 
themselves according to the notions of a singular Islamic identity. By this interpretation, 
a number of organisations including Aligarh College, the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference and ultimately the Muslim League, all thus encouraged various communities 
among the Muslim ashraf to organise on the basis of common religious affiliation rather 
than along the alternative lines of kinship, class, region or sect. '3 Some subsequent 
scholarship has further expanded these ideas, locating the deeper roots of this Muslim 
`separatism' in the long-standing religio-cultural distinctiveness of Islam in India. 14 
On first appearance, it seems reasonable to assume that Shi'as engaged with the same 
debates and concerns as wider Muslim communities. The shock of the Mutiny, often 
interpreted as widely signifying for Muslims the humiliation of Islam, loss of state 
patronage, and the inevitable onset of backwardness, were all arguably more acute for the 
sect who had long held political and cultural hegemony in Awadh. Additionally, the 
presence of many prominent Shi'as in institutions such as Aligarh College, the 
Muhammadan Educational Conference and the Muslim League, and other such 
organisations and institutions of this supposed Muslim `separatism, ' has long suggested 
Shia engagement with these wider dialogues of Muslim identity. It is thus not surprising 
that Shi'as have largely been treated in scholarship alongside wider shat-if (noble) 
Muslim communities during the social, economic and political transformations of the 
13 Especially important works in this regard are Francis Robinson, Separcitism among Indian ; %Irrslirns: the 
politics of'tlte United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974); Paul R. Brass, Language, religion 
and politics in north India (Cambridge, 1974); Lelyveld, Aligarh's first generation; Lance Brennan, 'The 
illusion of security: the background to Muslim separatism in the United Provinces, ' in Mushirul Hasan ed., 
Inc/ia's partition: process, strategy and mobilisation (New Delhi, 1993), pp. 322-60. 
14 Robinson has cited a 'fundamental connection between Islam and political separatism, ' borne of long- 
standing cultural distinctiveness and 'the religio-political ideas of Islam, in particular those that stress the 
importance of the existence of a Muslim community. ' Francis Robinson, 'Islam and Muslim separatism' in 
Francis Robinson cd., Islam and Muslim history' in South Asia (Neww Delhi, 2000), p. 204. yleamOile 
Fariana Shaikh. interpreting the aspiration for communal exclusivity as dra\ý ing frone the notion of the 
u1nmuh (Islamic brotherhood) and the jurisprudential tool of ijma' (consensus), has suggested that the 
projection of 'communal identity [and]... the communal group as the basic unit of representation' was 
drawn from an 'Islamic' understanding of representation itself. Farzana Shaikh, 'Muslims and political 
colonial era. Whenever biographical narratives of eminent Shia individuals of U . 
P. have 
been offered by historians, they have generally been framed primarily not aý 
representatives of Shi`ism but of the wider Muslim ashraf, engaging with the same issues 
and questions as preoccupied numerous distinguished Muslims during the colonial 
period. 15 This was most bluntly asserted by the Oriental scholar William Cantwell Smith 
in the early 1940s, who suggested that influential Shia individuals were largely those 
who established their reputations as Muslims rather than as Shi'as. Leading Shi'as, he 
stated: 
'take their places in the development... not of the Shi'ah as a group 
but of Islam in general... these men have functioned not qua Shii but 
qua Muslim. In so far as a Shi'i is Shi `ah-community conscious, he is 
ipso facto less advanced. ' 16 
On account of these factors, there is a clear need for a historical reassessment of India's 
Shia communities for the colonial period. This will mean a sustained examination of 
how Shi`as responded to factors as diverse as the growth of western education, the 
growth of a `public sphere' in U. P. cities, and the growth of Muslim separatism and 
Indian nationalism. 
Sectarianism in Indian Islam 
Alongside a re-examination of Shi'ism and Shia communities, this thesis will discuss the 
apparent increase in so-called Shia-Sunni sectarianism during the colonial period. The 
term `sectarianism' is used in this thesis to refer to numerous forms of dispute and 
disagreement between particular Muslim individuals and groups. The term is of course 
representation in colonial India: the making of Pakistan, ' in Modena . Asian 
Studies (20,3.1986), p. 341. 
15 This is the case with prominent educationalists such as Sayyid Karaniat Husain, the Arahic-cducated 
pioneer of western education for Muslims who founded the Muslim Girls' School in Lucknow. in 
cooperation with the Raja of Mahnludahad. Gail Minault, `Sayyid Karamat Husain and education for 
wwomen' in Violette Graff cd.. Lucknow: memories of a citv (Delhi. 1997), pp. 155-64. The case is similar 
for Badr-Lid-din Tvahji, the Shi'a Congressite and founder of the Anjurnan-i-Islam. Husain B. Tyahji, 
Bw /rudclin Tvabji: a biogi-aphv (Bombay, c. 19522). An evocative account of the changing meaning of being 
a sliarif MIuslim in north India in from the 1860s, and the adoption of modern education and integration as a 
landed and administrati\c gentry under colonial government as a wwaý of preserving 'izzat. is offered in 
Lelvvcld, Aligarh '. c first geirrrcrtioti, pp. 35-101. 
16 \ti'Illlarll Can(\\cll Srlrith, Ifodern Is/ain in India: a social analysis (Lahore, I947), p. 345. 
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problematic, and demands some initial elaboration and justification. It has been used in 
wider scholarship primarily in one of two ways. For one, and in a primarily Christian 
context, it been used in the dichotomy of `church' and 'sect, ' with the former a large, 
conservative religious body assimilated within its environment and associated with social 
and political authorities; and the latter, which denotes a smaller, exclusive, peripheral 
group situated outside its social context. 17 Second, and particularly in colonial readings 
and historiography of the Middle East, `sectarianism' has been understood as an ideology 
antithetical to state-led national co-existence: to `ifiya as opposed to to `vush. 18 Neither of 
these definitions applies here. The term `sectarianism' is here largely adopted for 
convenience, to distinguish inter-Muslim conflict from 'communalism, ' which has been 
used in South Asian historical writing to denote various conflicts primarily between 
Hindus and Muslims, for it is an argument of this thesis that inter-Muslim sectarianism 
needs to be understood as a phenomenon distinct from Hindu-Muslim communalism. 19 
Conversely, I have used the term `sectarian' to refer to associations and projects which 
were organised exclusively among or for specific Muslim (primarily Shi'a) groups or 
schools. One difficulty with the use of such terminology is that it implies unintended 
comparisons between the categorisation of different religious groups within Christianity 
and Islam. One advantage of the terminology, however, is that it conveys something of 
the essentially competitive nature of 'sectarian' identity-formation in colonial-era Islam, 
an argument which underlies much of this thesis. 
Where Shi'a-Sunni sectarianism in India has been discussed in scholarship, it has 
generally focused upon sporadic conflict during Muharran, the annual commemoration 
of the third Imam Husain, which is seen to represent both the cause and ultimate 
manifestation of sectarian conrlict. 20 The implication of such assessments is that Shi'a- 
17 Rodney Stark and Sims Bainbridge, 'Of churches, sects and cults: preliminary concepts for a theory of 
reliýcious nmovements. ' in Journal in the Scientific Solds' of'Religion (18.1979). pp. 
I 17-33. Cole's studs of 
Indian Shi' isrn uses this dichotomy successfully to explain its evolution from 'sect' to 'church' 
during the 
Nawahi period. Cole. Roots oj'nor-tlz Indian Shi'isrn in Iran and Iraq, especially pp. 123-7. 
" For elaboration on such ideas, sec Ussama Nlakdisi. The culture of sectarianism: ('o fl lunit , 
hi. titorv" and 
i"ioleric, e in nineteenth-centurv Ottoman Lebanon (London, 2000). pp. 
166-7. 
For the use of the %wrd 'sectarianism' in a similar context. sec Haan, 'Sectarianism 
in Indian l lam, ' 
passim; Theodore Wright, 'The politics of NlosIim sectarian conflict 
in India, ' in Journal of South Asian 
and . 1lid(flr 
Eastern Studies (Spring, 1980), pp. 67-73. 
For instance. Imtiaz Ahmad. 'The tibia-Sunni dispute in Lucknom. I905-11)80, ' in Milton I'. racl and 
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Sunni conflict in India, however forceful, was simply a deviation around the time of 
Muharram from a norm in which Shi'a-Sunni relations were generally harmonious, a 
view held, it seems, by some Muslims at this time as well as in later historiography. `' 
What explains these distinctly limited terms by which Shi'a-Sunni sectarianism has been 
assessed? Part of the reason is certainly the intractable association of Shi'ism with 
Lucknow. Since the essayist-journalist `Abdul Halim Sharar's account of Lucknow as the 
centre of a composite, sharif-led culture that integrated its inhabitants, 22 the city has long 
been depicted as a seat of communal harmony and is widely assumed to have risen above 
the inter-community conflagrations of much of the province. 23 A further factor 
contributing to the scholarly neglect of the salience of sectarianism rests upon the long- 
standing tendency to emphasise the pervasiveness of Hindu-Muslim conflict in all areas 
of public life, with the volumes written on such conflicts somewhat concealing the 
existence of inter-Muslim tensions. Muslim sectarian conflict in India has often been 
implicitly interpreted as a secondary undercurrent to Hindu-Muslim communalism in a 
wider process of community-formation in colonial India; sectarianism, according to one 
analyst, `tap(ped) the range of organisations and ideological appeals that had been created 
for the political expression of Hindu-Muslim competition. ' 24 
Perhaps the overriding reason for the neglect of Muslim sectarianism in colonial north 
India, however, has been the dominant narrative of the consolidation of communal 
solidarity among Muslims in colonial India, as discussed above. The fact that sectarian 
conflict increased simultaneously with Muslim communal organisation, and in the latter's 
Narendra K. Wagle eds., Islamic society and culture: essays in honour of Professor A: iz Ahmad (Delhi, 
1983); Mushirul Hasan, 'Sectarianism in Indian Islam'; Mushirul Hasan, `Traditional rites and contested 
meanings: sectarian strife in colonial Lucknow, ' in Graff ed., Lucknow, pp. 114-35; Sandra Freitag, 
Collective action and community: public arenas and the emergence of communalism in colonial north 
India (Berkeley, 1989), pp, 249-79. 
21 For instance, one zamindar of a qasba in Azamgarh, recording Shi'a-Sunni riots during Muharram in the 
1830s, presented them as an aberration from a norm in which Muslim 'tradition' and 'unity' were held 
dear. Gyanandra Pandey, "'Encounters and calamities": the history of a north Indian qasba in the 
nineteenth century, ' in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern studies 111: writings on South Asian history and society 
(New Delhi, 1984), pp. 256-8. 
22 Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an Oriental culture (London, 1975). passim. 
23 For instance, the argument of Laws that `the city's history was characterised by.... a continuation of the 
communal harmony of the Nawabi period. ' Rama Amritmal Laws, 'Lucknow: society and politics 1856- 
1885' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of South Wales, 1979), p. ii. 
2' Freitag, Collective action and community, pp. 249-S0. 
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assumed heartland of U. P., is a convergence that requires explanation. yet it has received 
little comment in scholarship. The insinuation of such works is that, while Shia-Sunni 
sectarianism may have been present or even intense at the local level in riot'; or quarrels. 
it remained bound by the constraints of the local arenas in which it appeared. It had little 
resonance in higher spheres of provincial Muslim discourse or political life where cross- 
sectarian unitary dialogues were in the ascendant. Other discussions have taken this 
argument yet further, arguing that Muslim communal mobilisation did not simply 
circumvent sectarian controversy, but actually served to unite different Muslim sects. The 
politics of Muslim nationalism, argues Mushirul Hasan, actively 'overwhelmed sectarian 
allegiances. 25 
This notion that `modernist' currents in Islam facilitated a sectarian rapprochement, 
common to many studies, was evident in the discussions of colonial observers. One, in a 
declared `study of the changes wrought in Islam by modern social processes, ' appeared to 
convey exactly this supposition: 
`We have not given the Shi`ah group separate treatment... because 
there is nothing in the[ir] differences... fundamentally relevant to 
these processes. The two groups diverge over... questions which 
today do not arise... as far as modern religious development is 
concerned, the Shi'ah has shown precisely the same trends as have the 
Muslims generally., 26 
This statement alludes to the widespread presumption that the issues on which Shi'as and 
Sunnis differed, based around the debates over the Khilafat and Imamate emerging in the 
first century of the Islamic calendar, were somehow `traditionalist, ' pre-modern, of 
limited relevance in modern times. Self-declared Muslim `progressives' in colonial India 
were quick to condemn the raising of Shi'a-Sunni questions, as have historians after 
them, as 'sectarian claptrap. '27 Simply, there was little room for Islamic sectarianism 
in 
the 'modern' history of South Asia. 
Interestingly, this perspective compares strongly with the way in which colonial 
25 Niushirul Hasan, Sectarianism in Indian Islam, ' p. 226. 
'`' Smith, 11o)tjt, r» Ishurni in ! iulia, p. 345. 
27 Haan, 'Traditional rites and contested meanings, ' p. 121. 
observers and historians have observed Islamic reform and Shia-Sunni relations more 
broadly in the Islamic world. The rough period between 1870 and 1940 into which this 
thesis falls has long been identified in particular as that of 'modernist' or, as the great 
Orientalist scholars called it, `liberal' Islam. 28 Despite the difficulties of clustering 
together the achievements of the various reformists of the colonial period. such as 
Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Riza and Jamal-ud-din Afghani, into a singular programme, 
scholars have long emphasised the common efforts of these thinkers to construct forms of 
Islam better adapted to the modern world. 
Discussions of `modernist' manifestations of Islam originating, in this period have 
generally focused upon their engagement with such projects as the formation or 
renovation of educational institutions, and the establishment of religious newspapers and 
periodicals. The impact of supposedly modern or Western values of rational enquiry' 
initiated a great trend of reform in Islamic jurisprudence and practice, as the 
unquestioning submission to established scholars was surrendered and substantial 
reinterpretations of religious faith and practice thus permitted. It has frequently been 
argued that such efforts were partly inspired by the encounter with the colonial 
environment, which at once demonstrated the need and offered the opportunity for a 
reconciliation of Islam with the modern values and media of the modern world. 
Frequently, modernist Islam took up the issues of nationalism and agitation for political 
liberalisation. Important for this study is the fact that many such assessments have 
concluded that these 'modernist' trends in Islam tended to diminish the salience of Shi'a- 
Sunni differences, especially in matters relating to social and political action. One studs 
of Islamic political thought notes that from the late nineteenth century 'the barriers 
between Sunnis and Shi'is gradually became less insuperable, allowing a good many 
cross-sectarian currents, ' due to a series of interrelated and internationall\ apparent 
conditions. 29 Three of these in particular are worthy of examination. 
,' Charles Kurzuran, . 11cºderni., t 
Islam, 1840-1940, a sourcebook (New York, 2002); David \Vaaines, An 
intr0[hlcticººi to Islam (Cambridge. 1995), pp. 2I9-20. The great Arahist Albert Hourani described this same 
period as marked by 'Iiheral' thinkers who sought to reintepret Islam so as to make it compatible %%ith 
Ii% inc in the modern \w orld, and c\ en a source of strength in it. ' Albert Hourani, Arabic tho ught in the 
liberal cºge. 1798-19. ßy (London, 1902), hp. vvi-vii. 
Hamid Enavat, . 
tiod/rrn Islamic political thought: the response cif the Shi'i and Sunni iluslims to the 
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One of these was the revival of ijtihad, independent jurisprudential authority. Taglid, the 
submission to the decisions of earlier authorities, was increasingly interpreted as 
parochial traditionalism by Indian thinkers from the eighteenth century onward, " 30 as ww ell 
as reformists in the Middle East such as Muhammad Abduh. The latter's prescription 1 'or 
religious education and his interpretative methods of scholarship inspired Shia as \vell as 
Sunni reformists; some Iraqi and Iranian `ulama in the first half of the t\ý entieth century 
even proposed that Shia seminaries be reformed on the model of Abduh's plans for the 
Sunni Al-Azhar madrasa of Cairo, while others called for the coming of a 'Shi'ite 
Muhammad Abduh. '31 
A second factor in the building of Shia-Sunni bridges during this period was the 
cultivation of a phenomenon termed pan-Islamism, the identification of Muslims with 
their co-religionists across national borders. Jarnal-ud-din Afghani, an individual of 
partially Persian origins and himself educated in the Shia shrine cities of Iraq, 
contributed greatly to the cultivation of themes of cultural greatness and military prowess 
which formed the basis of this consciousness. In India especially, his evocation of a 
single Islamic state under the implied reign of the successor of the Khilafat fostered a 
viable alternative to secular nationalism in the 1870s-80s. He spoke little of Shia-Sunni 
differences, and his notion of the spiritual Khilafat and his vision for the Islamic rnillat 
have long been considered as drawing from a number of distinctly Shi'a influences, and 
inspiring sections of both Shi'as and Sunnis. 32 
A final crucial factor in Shia-Sunni rapprochement in the wider world during this period 
to entiet/r century (London, 1982), p. 41. 
311 Saiyid Athar 'Ahhas Rizvi, Shah '. 4/hc/ puritanism, . sectarian polemics cued 
Jihad (Canherra. 
1982): M. Mujecb, The Inclian Muslims (London, 1967), pp 271-82. 
On this brand cri modernism amon-, Shi'as, sec Said Amir Arjomand. 'Idcolociral revolution in 
Shi'ism, ' in Said Amir Aºjomand cd., Authority and political culture in Shi'ism (. \lhan). I988), p. 183; 
Yiti. hak Nakash. The S/ui'is of Iraq pp. 262-268; Sabrina Mervin, 'The clerics cif' Jahal 'Anil and the reform 
01' reliiziuu. teaching in Najaf' since the beginning ui the twentieth century. ' in Rainer Brunner and Werner 
Ende eds., The Tu eii rr Shia in modern times (Leiden, 2000), p. 82. 
The Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul Hamid II stated that 'Jamaladdin kindled a rah of' hope for Shii-Sunni 
unite... this ýwuld he an enormous accomplishment for Islam. ' Nikki R. Keddie. Sar id Jamal acf-Din 
. -1/ý'lrcrrii: ,I political 
hicýýýraphy (Landon, 1972), pp.: S0-I, cf. pp. 10-22. 
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was the cultivation of themes of Islamic unity in the face of colonial power. As in post- 
Mutiny India, attempts to foster a united response to colonial rule among Muslim. have 
been interpreted as cultivating new will for sectarian reconciliation. For instance, it 
primarily the threat of the Christian West that motivated `Abdul Hamid II to engage in 
the service of Shia-Sunni unity, especially from around the 1890s. Perhaps inspired by 
his correspondence with Afghani, he offered more aid and attention to the Shia shrine 
cities, promoted Shi'a education, tried to foster contacts with Arab and Persian Shia 
`ulamu and in 1894 formed a society to promote sectarian unity. 'According to the plain 
decrees of Allah, ' he wrote in some correspondence, `Muslims are brethren, the direction 
of our prayers is the same, towards the Kaaba. ' 33 
These several narratives demonstrate how Islamic `modernism' in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries has been understood as a contributory factor in the 
reconciliation of Shia and Sunni Islam. Conversely, this reading implies that sectarian 
conflict is to be associated with some form of Islamic traditionalism. The scholarship of 
past decades on the Islamic world has thus sometimes assessed Shi `a-Sunni conflict or 
Muslim sectarianism more widely as a pre-colonial or even anti-modern triumph of 
parochialism and an impediment to a tolerant and more unitary Muslim modernity. 
34 
Interestingly, it can also be seen that there is a clear correspondence between the ways in 
which Shia-Sunni relations in the era of European colonialism have been discussed for 
the very separate domains of India and the wider Middle East. This is especially true 
since it has long been known that Indian Muslims, adopting the print media and new 
facilities for travel, gained a greater knowledge of international affairs during this period 
and thereby developed an interest in and solidarity with their co-religionists abroad. 
35 
Shia-Sunni sectarianism in India has thus gone largely unquestioned in its broader 
senses. Little sustained effort has been made to chart the appearance of sectarianism, as 
Azmi Otcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain 18"-1924 (Leiden. I1)1)? 
pp. 57-8. 
For instance, Moshe iloai. Ottoman rcfvrnt in Syria uni/ Palestine, 1, ý4Q-/861: the impact nl the 
Tani. inmat on politics and . )c'1rtv 
(Oylord, 1968). 
Mushirul Hasa, 'Religion and politics in India: The 'ulama and the Khilafat \1o\cinent, 
' in \1ushirul 
Hasan cd.. Communal and frnrl-Islamic trends in colonial India (Delhi, 
1985), pp. I -26. 
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has been characteristic of studies of Hindu-Muslim communalism, in many spheres and 
at many levels of society. This thesis will attempt to present a new framework for 
understanding Islamic sectarianism in colonial India. Sectarianism was not simpl\ an 
eruption of religious passions confined to Muharram; without understating the 
importance of Muharram in Muslim sectarian conflict, this thesis takes Nluharram 
disturbances, as did the Piggott Committee appointed to enquire into Shia-Sunni riots in 
1909, as `an outward and visible sign of discord and ill-feeling already existing between 
the two communities. ' 36 Instead, sectarianism appeared in man\ spheres of societ 
simultaneously as both a practice, expressed in various modes of public religious 
confrontation, and as a discourse, delineating more closely the distinctiveness and 
exclusivity of certain Muslim communities from others. Sectarianism was, as l ssama 
Makdisi has termed it in a different context, a `culture, ' in other words, an expression of 
one `vision of modernity' which emerged as an alternative to, rather than through the 
absence of, other discourses of modernisation. 37 
This thesis argues that Shia-Sunni sectarianism was not simply a derivative of Hindu- 
Muslim communalism, which somehow cheated its way into history despite this 
alternative dominant narrative of community formation. Nor, it argues, was sectarianism 
a manifestation of conflictive primordial religious identities or of traditional or 
unreformed Islam. Instead it needs to be understood in the Indian context on its own 
terms, according to a long and multi-layered process of the construction of difference 
within religious reformist movements, and in relation to its conjuncture with wider 
colonial, national and communal discourses of modernisation and Islamic unity in 
colonial India. 
Reconstructing the Shi`as: sources and structure 
Many studies of the transformation of religious COnlnlunities in India, and perhaps 
; c' 'Resolution, ' dated 7 January 1909, General Administration Department (GAD) File No. 591 of 1Outi. 
Uttar Pradesh State Archiv«. Lucknow (UPS: \). 
17 Nlakdisi, The culture of sectciriunism, pp. 1-14,174. 
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especially those concerning Muslims, have fallen prey to the criticism that they 
unquestioningly categorise India's populations on the basis of their faith. Communities 
with little in common are thus bound together first and foremost on the loose grounds of 
religious affiliation. As such, an analysis of the Shi'as of India undoubtedly risks 
following such a trend, grouping individuals tenuously connected by religious 
commonality into an implied `community. ' 
Thus, without seeking to downplay the importance of the manifold identities and loyalties 
of the individuals or lose sight of the wider local contexts of the processes discussed, this 
thesis concentrates upon those particular moments and platforms upon which Shia 
individuals were encouraged to convene and act on the basis of religious commonality. 
Hence, the sources chiefly used in this thesis are those that compelled their readership to 
consider themselves as Shi'as first and foremost. Prominent among these are printed 
vernacular sources from the period, among them the proceedings of newly emerging 
Shia organisations and associations, religious and instructive tracts produced by Shi'a 
authors, Shia-written histories and Shia newspapers. None of these have previously 
been used substantially in western language scholarship. These have been supplemented 
by material from newspapers and government documents, particularly educational and 
political files of the U. P. Government on `Muhammadans' and police records, and 
backed up by secondary materials, especially vernacular biographies of India's Shi'a 
`ulama. 
The thesis says little on the authoritative Arabic and Persian scholarship of the great 
naujtahids (highest religious scholars) of Lucknow, nor about the fine marsiva poetry of 
the likes of Hali and Mir Anis. Rather, the intention is to look at the development of 
Shi'ism in public life, the appropriation of methods of public organisation and application 
of modern media, and the interaction of religious reform among Shi `as with wider social 
and ultimately political change. In so doing, this thesis 
does not intend to negate other 
personal orientations, but to elaborate upon the 
interactions between the varied 
experiences of individuals and groups as Shi'as, and as 
families, Sayyids (descendents of 
the Prophet or the Imams), Lucknawis, Indians and indeed as 
Muslims. Nor does the 
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thesis aim to present Shi'as as a `united' community even at points when they organised 
on the basis of faith. Under the auspices of Shi'ism lay a variety of approaches, and 
agendas, and despite being guided by a process of sectarian organisation, the thesis 
acknowledges and discusses throughout the substantial differences among Shi'as. 
This thesis discusses the fifty-year period between the close of the 1880s and the 1930s. 
Speaking generally, this period was one of great significance for its many concurrent 
efforts to modernise Islam according to the demands and faculties of the contemporary 
world, both in India and abroad, as discussed above. More immediately, the starting and 
concluding points of this period represent key moments in Indian Shi'ism. The late 1880s 
in Lucknow witnessed, as shall be seen, important attempts in Lucknow to assert the 
religious and community identity of Shi'ism by its adherents, including the foundation of 
a madrasa, the reworking of the azan (call to prayer) and the formation of a public Shia 
anjuman. The late 1930s, meanwhile, witnessed the vitriolic tabarra (the practice of 
cursing the Sunni Caliphs) agitation among Shi'as, marking perhaps the lowest point to 
date in Shia-Sunni relations in Lucknow. The somewhat abrupt stop after 1939 is 
intended in no way to suggest the closure of the forms of sectarianism founded in earlier 
decades; rather, this end-point simply reflects the rapid transformation of Muslim affairs 
in the 1940s. This said, a brief evaluation of the build-up to 1947 is offered in the 
conclusion. 
The first four chapters of this thesis all examine the approximate period reaching from the 
close of the 1880s until the mid-1920s, each taking up a different theme. Primarily 
considering Lucknow and its circle of senior mujtahids, the first chapter introduces the 
main subject of this thesis, namely the establishment of a large number of Shia anjumans 
founded on specifically sectarian lines. It discusses campaigns of Shi'a organisation, and 
demonstrates how the various involvements of Shi'as in Lucknow's emerging public 
sphere instigated change within both Indian Shi'ism and the ethos of 
Lucknow itself. 
Subsequent chapters focus more upon U. P. as a whole, and the emergence of a 
consciousness of distinctiveness among Shi'as in opposition to a 
Sunni counterpart. The 
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second chapter looks at the intertwined developments of religious proselytisation among 
Shi'as and the growth of Shia-Sunni religious polarisation in U. P.. Assessing the impact 
of print, verbal disputations and the renovation of Muharram practice, the chapter shows 
how religious change in Indian Shi'ism served to harden religious boundaries and 
accentuate sectarian conflict. 
The subsequent two chapters discuss how this enhancement of religious and cultural 
consciousness among Shi'as contributed to the creation of wider sectarian distinctions in 
society and politics. Chapter 3 assesses Shi'a responses to the `Aligarh movement' and, 
in particular, to its efforts to bring under its wing the multifarious campaigns of Islamic 
reform around India. It argues that Shi'as resisted these attempts to construct a Muslim 
`centre, ' and hence evolved a language of sectarian separateness and exclusivity. Chapter 
4 then turns to Shia responses to the issues of imperialism, jihad (holy effort or struggle) 
and pan-Islamic movements, showing how Shi'as constructed an entirely separate 
understanding of their role in respect of the wider Islamic world. 
Returning to an exclusive focus upon the muhallas of Lucknow, the last chapter examines 
the decade-long build-up to the tabarra agitation of 1939, in light of the societal 
upheavals of the decade and their impact upon Shi'ism. A conclusion expounds the 
findings of the thesis to establish a wider framework for the interpretation of Islamic 
sectarianism in colonial India. 
Shi`ism from the global to the local: Lucknow and Amroha 
Much of the most authoritative recent scholarship upon Shi'ism, working from a 
perspective influenced by new developments in globalised history, 
3h has endeavoured to 
work outside the confines of national boundaries. Cole, for instance, asserts the need to 
`look... at Shi'ite Islam outside the box of a national framework, at its 
international 
;x For a summary of such ideas, see C. A. 
Bayly and Leila Fawaz, 'Introduction: the connected world of 
empires' in Fawaz C. A. Bayly and Leila Tarazi 
Fawaz eds., Modernity and culture fron the Mediterranean 
to the Indian Ocean (New York, 2002). pp. 1-27. 
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networks and the profound interaction they entail... we need to rescue Shiite Islam from 
the nation. '39 Other studies, by emphasising the city of Najaf as the hub of international 
Shi `ism and as the centre of a trans-national web of personal and institutional connections 
labelled the `Shi`i International, ' similarly imply the existence of a global Shi'isrn 
beyond borders. 40 The most recent scholarship, drawing from the perceived significance 
of the sectarian conflict in modern world affairs, has continued such perspectives by 
depicting a global 'Shi'a crescent' linking, rather unquestioningly, communities in 
centres such as Tehran, Najaf, Beirut and Lucknow. ` 1 In the light of recent global events, 
such literature risks giving the somewhat teleological impression of the Shia-Sunni 
divide as the pivotal nexus determining the national and international histories of the 
Islamic world. 
In contrast to these studies, and aware of the self-confessed `vertigo' which an alternation 
between such diverse geographical centres can entail, 42 this thesis will look primarily at 
developments in Shi'ism within the national borders of India. Indeed, one key argument 
of this thesis is that Shi'ism in South Asia was increasingly able to turn inward to 
national rather than international sources for its own renewal and regulation. Rather than 
a `Shi`i International, ' then, this thesis adopts an approach of 'concentric circles' of 
influence which allowed local, national and international developments in Shia life and 
leadership to proceed with some degree of autonomy in each. 43 More precisely, the thesis 
for the most part examines Shi'ism on a local level, discussing changes in religious life 
and in consciousness of community as most immediately experienced. It shows how 
discourses at one level could both complement or contradict those at another, and 
conversely, how wider Indian and international dialogues among Muslims were often 
perceived through the prism of local concerns. 
Given the largely local emphasis of this thesis, it is necessary to describe at the outset 
3" Juan Cole, Sacred space and hotº" war: the politics, culture and history of Shi'ite Islam (New York, 
2002), p. 1. 
"' Chibli Mallat, The renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer us-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi'i 
International (Cambridge. 1993), passim. 
41 Vali Nasr, The Shia revival: hm%' conflicts ºt"ithin Islam will shape the future (Ne%% York, 2(In6), passim. 
42 Cole, Sacred spacce and holy war, p. I. 
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some of the local arenas of U. P. with which this thesis is most concerned, as they stood at 
the starting-point of this thesis in the late-1880s. Ascertaining the Shia population of the 
U. P. region generally is no easy matter. British census figures and district reports 
consistently cited the overall population of Shi'as as around 3% of Muslims. 44 As the 
`mapping' of India's communities by the Census became increasingly politicised, so 
enumeration became increasingly contentious and contradictory, with a sizeable 
proportion of the Muslim population sometimes asserted to be Shi'as. 4ý However, it 
seems a reasonable assumption that Shi'as constituted a very small minority of north 
Indian Muslims, although with their proportion perhaps reaching 10-15% in those towns 
and cities where they were most numerous. As such, while nominally examining the 
Shi'as of the entirety of the United Provinces, the thesis in practice focuses upon a 
specific quota of those towns and cities where Shi'as were most prominent. The cities of 
Jaunpur, Allahabad and Fyzabad had some of the largest and most self-conscious Shi'a 
populations in the province, often local landholding gentries from qasbas outlying these 
cities such as Macchlishehr and Kajgaon (outside Jaunpur)46 and Dariabad (outside 
Allahabad). The towns and districts of Moradabad and Muzaffarnagar had sizeable Shi'a 
populations, while many of the small towns in the districts of Awadh, such as 
Mahmudabad, Kintor and Nasirabad, were dominated by Shia landholding families. 47 
Having received favour and patronage under the Nawabs of Awadh, they were often 
wealthy landholders, upholding a rich education in Oriental and Islamic literature and 
proclaiming themselves as the bastions of High Islam. 
4' Litvak, Shi'i scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq, p. 45- 
44 Census of India 1881, Northwestern Provinces and Oudh, Part 1: Report (Allahabad, 1882), p. 74; 
Census of India 1911, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Part I. Report (Allahabad, 1912), pp. 142-3. 
45 For instance, by the 1940s some Shi'a politicians were making the bold claim that over two-fifths of 
Indian Muslims were Shi'as. 'Shia Muslims' position' by Hooseinbhoy A. Lalljee, Public and Judicial 
(LIPJ) File No. 81693, Oriental and India Office Collections, London (OIOC). The variations in estimates 
fell prey to various difficulties, among them perhaps the politicisation of community, the uncritical 
association of various groups considered as outside of broad Sunni Islam such as Isma'ilis and Sufis, 
together with perhaps the indications of Sayyid caste and participation in Muharram as distinctions of 
Shi'as. 
4' H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume XXVIII: Jaunpur 
(Allahabad, 1908), pp. 84-5,257. 
47 Mahmudabad (Sitapur district) was the dominion of the province's most dominant Shia, the Raja of 
Mahmudabad; Kintor (Barabanki) was the ancestral home of the 'Abagati family which emanated 
personalities such as the mujtahids Hamid Husain and Nasir Husain and the educationalist 
Karamat Husain; 
and Nasirabad (Rae Bareili) was the home of the mujtahid Dildar 'Ali and the subsequent 
Nasirabadi 
family of 'ulama. 
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In such qasbas of the North Western Provinces and Awadh alike, Shi'as were often high- 
ranking Sayyids who considered themselves directly descended from the sons of 'Ali or 
the Imams. 48 To give one example the Za'idi Sayyids, a community who dated their 
ancestral entry into India to a resident of Wasit in the fourteenth century, rose to the 
status of a landed gentry under the Mughals and were ultimately scattered across small 
qasbas in Meerut, Bijnor and Bareilly districts. The most prominent branches of this 
family matured into two especially distinguished Shia landed gentries: the Sayyids of 
Barha, a community settled primarily at Jansath in Muzaffarnagar district, and the 
Sayyids of Bilgram in Hardoi. 49 Given the renowned fierce cultural pride and 
consciousness of ancestry among such communities, it is of little surprise that the U. P. 
Census declared that `the Shia religion is the more fashionable and the more richly 
endowed... and the ex-royal family and the greater part of the higher classes among the 
Muhammadan community belong to it. '50 
However, this thesis will focus primarily upon the two most important Shia centres of 
U. P.: Lucknow and Amroha. It is the Shi'as of these two towns who feature most 
prominently in this thesis, since they became some of the most significant actors in Shia 
organisations in colonial north India. Focusing primarily upon the established and 
distinguished communities found in these centres, this thesis admittedly offers a 
predominantly elite, masculine history of Indian Shi'ism; however, it is also true that 
Shi'as in most centres of U. P. were drawn from primarily noble and landed populations, 
excepting a few particular urban centres such as Lucknow where Shia artisans existed in 
some numbers. As essential background to this thesis, then, it is necessary to offer some 
°" On the definition and significance of Sayyids, see: Zarina Bhatty, 'Status and power in a Muslim 
dominated village of Uttar Pradesh, ' in Imtiaz Ahmad ed., Caste and social stratification amaig the 
Muslims (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 89-106; Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'isin, pp. 72-84. It is significant in 
this regard that the District Gazetteers of U. P. tend to discuss Muslim society on the hasis that 'far more 
important than sect] is the division into tribes and castes. ' H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United 
Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume XVII: Shahjahanpur (Allahabad, 1910), pp. 80-1. 
49 H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume I//: Muzaffarnagar 
(Allahabad, 1903), pp. 160-6; H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers cif the United Provinces of A, c'ra and Oudh, 
volume XLI: Hardoi (Allahabad, 1904), p. 68: H. R. Nevill, District 
Gazetteers of the United Provinces of 
Agra and Oudh, volume X1V. Bijnor (Allahabad, 1908), pp. 101-3. 
s0 J. Charles William, The report on the Census of Oudh (Lucknow, 1869), Volume 1. p. 
76. 
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initial description of both these centres of Lucknow and Amroha, where the story of 
community formation within Shi'ism locates its foundations 
Lucknow was the erstwhile capital of the Shia Nawabs until 1857. Even after the 
destruction of the Nawabi state, Lucknow remained by far the most important Shia 
centre in north India, home to a large Shia population and the most senior rnujtafiids of 
post-Rebellion India. 51 As will be demonstrated by this thesis, most of the attempts at the 
renewal, reform or modernisation of Indian Shi`ism both began and found their ultimate 
expression in Lucknow. At points this thesis will move swiftly between discussion of the 
Shi'as of Lucknow and the Shi'as of north India; however, it is an implicit and explicit 
argument of the thesis that Shi'a religious and secular organisation in the early twentieth 
century increasingly centralised Indian Shi'ism around the former Nawabi capital. 
An understanding of Lucknow's centrality in Indian Shi'ism demands a brief recount of 
the history of Awadh and the expansion of Shi'ism within it. 5` Established by Sayyids 
from Nishapur in 1722, the independent state of Awadh gradually took on an ever more 
religious intimation as local Shia authorities and institutions were reinforced. While 
Shi'as themselves remained a small minority of the population, the state's patronage of 
the court, poetry and religious and welfare institutions ensured that Awadhi culture 
included strong infusions of Shi'ism. The constant immigration of Persian physicians, 
poets and 'ulama and interaction with the shrine cities of Iraq ensured that the Shia 
elements of institutional and cultural life were gradually enhanced. As time passed, the 
Nawabs increasingly centralised the governance of their state in their capital, hence 
sponsorship of religious institutions became more aggressive and Shia 'ulama were 
increasingly integrated into the administration of the state. 
Particularly significant was Dildar 'Ali (Ghufran-i-Ma'ab), an 'ulim from the yasha of 
51 Two of the most notable of these were Maulanas Muhammad Ibrahim and 
Hamid Husain. For their 
biographies, see Sayyid Murtaza Husain. Matta'-i-, A"wvür: ta; kira-i-Shia-afaZil-i a-'ufamü, 
kabür-i-bar-i- 
saghir-i-Pdk-º'a-Hind (Karachi, 1981). pp. 156-63. Fird5s-i-. 11akun 
kä to kira (Lucknow. circa 1960), 
passiin. 
2 This summary of Lucknawi Shi'ism is based almost entirely upon 
Cole. Roots of north Indian Shi'ism, 
passim, except where otherwise stated. 
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Nasirabad, outlying Rae Bareili. He travelled to the shrine cities of Iraq to become a 
mujtahid, where he made his conversion from Akhbari Shi'ism, the branch of 'Isna 
`Ashari Shi'ism which had been dominant in Safavid Iran and early Awadh, to Usuli 
Shi'ism, which made an almost global triumph over Akhbarism in the eighteenth century 
and greatly enhanced the authority of Shi'a clerics. 53 Returning to Lucknow in 1781, 
Dildar `Ali almost single-handedly transformed Shi'ism in Awadh. Akhbari Shi`ism was 
replaced by a broad Usuli consensus, and the informal tutoring networks of 'ulanza were 
succeeded by a formal hierarchy of scholars systematically coached in the Usuli sciences. 
This provided an indigenous clergy that came to supplant the Persian immigrants of old. 
Most important, however, was the creation of a 'formal religious establishment, ' 
administered by Usuli Shi'a clerics, through which Shi `ism became an instrument for the 
state in both courtly administration and social and cultural cohesion. Shia naniaz-i jum'a 
(congregational prayers) were first held in 1786 in Lucknow, while the rites of the 
festival of Muharram were greatly expanded, giving Shi'ism a public expression and 
facilitating its development as a popular faith among artisans. Shia state-formation 
reached its heights in the 1840s, when the senior Shi `a 'ulama assumed an authority that 
was increasingly charismatic as well as judicial: they acted as prayer-leaders; as 
supervisors of auqaf (religious endowments); as jurisconsults in the Awadh Court; as 
collectors of the Shi'a khums tax and distributors of these funds as public charity, and as 
founders of Lucknow's Madrasa-i-Shahi which was established in order to ensure the 
perpetuation of their expertise. Despite the religious roots of governance, Nawabi 
Lucknow was of particular note for its relatively cordial Shi'a-Sunni relations. 
Occasional sectarian disturbances could occur at Muharram, but for the most part, the 
Muslim ashraf and Nawabi government alike remained relatively free from Shia-Sunni 
quarrels. The secretaries and officials of Wajid 'Ali Shah's reign were predominantly 
ii In contrast to Akhbarism, which accepted only two sources of authority in usul and frgh, the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah, Usuli Shi'isrn added to these the roots of ijmu' (consensus) and 'aql (reasoning); both of these 
latter enterprises, of course, were the duties of the mujtahids. Hence Usuli Shi'ism expanded the ability of 
the 'u/ama to perform ijtihad (jurisprudence), and declared that the mujtahids had the ability to make 
independent legal decisions in the absence of the last Imam. On the differences between Akbari and Usuli 
Shi'ism and the Akhbari-Usuli struggle in the eighteenth century which saw the triumph of Usuli Shi'ism, 
see Moojan Momen, An introduction to Shi'i Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelºer Shi'ism (New 
York, 1985), pp. 220-5; Cole. Sacred space and holy war. pp. 58-77. 
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Sunnis as were, remarkably, those charged with the supervision of iniantharas (sites for 
the remembrance of the martyrdom of Husain, used during `luharram) and the 
management of Muharram, illustrating perfectly Lucknow's much lauded composite, 
Shia-intimated culture which was able to assimilate the cit\'s numerous religious 
communities. 54 
The peak of mujtahid power in the 1840s went into ebb and then near-destruction in 
1857, and considerable decline was evident in Lucknawi Shi `ism in the decades after 
British occupation. Oldenburg's classic study of the 'remaking' of post-Mutiny Lucknow 
according to the tenets of security and the prevention of rebellion by its inhabitants has 
been shown to have wrenched the heart out of the traditional civic structures of 
Lucknow, SS and this particularly applied to the members of the religion which had been 
carefully crafted as a suitable creed for governance. The largest lnlainhar(is were 
appropriated as military barracks, ceasing the public religious functions of these 
institutions. 56 The auqaf (endowments) of Lucknow were brought under colonial control, 
and secular law replaced the Awadh Court . 
57 The Royal family was exiled to Bengal, 
while Mirza Muhammad `Abbas, the chief mufti (jurist) of Awadh in the final years of 
the Nawab's reign, had his personal library destroyed in 1857 and was forced into self- 
imposed exile from Lucknow. 58 The closure of the Madrasa-i-Shahi after the fall of the 
Nawabs, meanwhile, left colonial Lucknow with no formal institution of Shia religious 
education. 
Consequently the 1860s and 1870s, Lucknow's `grey years' as one author has termed 
them, 59 were decades of decline there for Shi'ism. With the loss of much of the vigorous 
state patronage it had enjoyed in the early nineteenth century, its funding, isibilit} and 
popular support diminished correspondingly. The Lucknawi niujtahrd Ahmad *All in the 
54 Sharar, Lucknoºi': last phase of an oriental culture, pp. 74-5. 
S5 Oldenburg's work assesses the British administration of Lucknow as prioritising 'social control. ' and 
thereby incurring unprecedented intervention in the social and religious customs of Lucknow's indigenous 
populations. Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The making of colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877 (Princeton, 1984). 
Ihid, pp. 35-7. 
57 Ihid, pp. 191-8. 
58 Husain, , 1Iath'-i-, 4n tir, p. 
77. 
(`ýýýý s k) : \nwresh 
Misr a. Luck-Ilow fire cif ýrcrc'e, the story of its renuissnric r, revolution and the aftermath 
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1870s commented upon the `religious paucity' of the Shi'as. 60 Even the numbers of those 
registered as the Shia sect was falling. For instance, 231Ic of Lucknow's Muslims had 
been registered as `Shi`a' in the Census in 1881, equal to some 35,000 individuals. By the 
early twentieth century this had shrunk to 1490.61 Evidently many of the Sayyid families 
of Awadh, who had earlier converted to Shi'ism for patronage in the Awadh Court or 
advantageous revenue-free zamindari grants, weakened demonstrations of their religious 
affiliation after the British occupation ceased the preferential treatment they had formerly 
enjoyed. 
Lucknow's Shi `as were for the most part crowded into the city's western wards such as 
Chowk, Daulatganj and Sadatganj. Among them were included some 1,700 tivasiqudars 
(lit: `pension-holders'), the dispossessed pensioners and dependents of the Awadh court. 
This `impoverished and declining class of persons, ' crowding Luckno\v's old niu/udlas, 
had been systematised by the mujtahids' distribution of alms from Lucknow's 
endowments, and suffered greatly after annexation. 62 Devoid of work, the pensions they 
received were often very small and increasingly so with the subdivision of this revenue 
over successive generations. 63 Lucknow's wtiwasigadars were often castigated by British 
officials for their assumed backwardness, their inability to modernise and their 
attachment to a life of leisure. Lucknow's District Gazetteer evoked these pensioners and 
dependents as a people `mostly in debt, and lead[ing] a wretched hand-to-mouth 
existence, which also seems to have a demoralising effect on their fellow citizen S,, 64 
while one Commissioner of Lucknow described them with disdain as 'a feckless lot, who 
are degenerating. '65 They were stereotyped as shunning educational and commercial 
Delhi, 2004), pp. 143-79. 
60 Habib Husain ihn Ahmad Husain, Snwänih-i- `umri-i-Ghulä, n Hasnen KintOri (Lahore, 1904), p. 186. 
61 H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume XXX' II. Lucknow 
(Allahahad. 1904), p. 68-9. Remarkably, two thirds of those recorded as Shi'as were females. It is important 
to note that Lucknow's population remained largely static during this period. 
02 Lovett to Burn, 24 September 1912, and Lovett to Chief Secretary of United Provinces Go\ ernment, 31 
January 1913, Political Department File No. 42 of 1913, UPSA. 
`'` Lovett himself claimed 'What makes the matter really urgent is not only the straitened means and 
illiterate condition of many of these \v asikadars but the fact that, ww hile they become no better able as years 
go on to earn a useful living, their allowances are yearly more and more subdivided. ' Lo\ ctt to Burn, 24 
September 1912, ibid. 
Nevi II, District Gazetteer: Luckno>>, p. 65. 
`'` R. Burn to His Honour, 27 September 1912, Political File No. 42 of 1913, UPSA. 
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enterprise, and instead engaging in court cases and fratricidal feuds as they fought claims 
over inherited status and wealth. 66 Indeed, the wasiqadars received similar criticisms 
from Shia progressives themselves: 
`Today their property is alienated, education is disappearing, even 
their character is suffering a change for the worse and they have slid 
down to the level of the low castes of India excepting that they still 
know that they had worthy ancestors... does it not touch this 
community that... the descendents of the Prophet from whose house 
were sent to the world the best lessons in principles of human 
intercourse,... a standard to the rest of the followers,... should have 
made itself a target for the addage which lays down that stretching 
hands for alms blackens one's face in both the worldsT 67 
This description of such a community in the muhalla of Muftiganj further succinctly 
encapsulates their plight in colonial India: 
`This is the muhalla named after the distinctions of its people; this is 
the muhalla where you will find in abundance people of every trade 
and every rank... this muhalla had a special influence on the whole 
city, and its own affairs were very much connected with the rest... but 
alas! The people of this muhalla, which used to prosper more than all 
the other muhallas... are forgetting all those virtues and ideals which 
are considered worldly. '68 
In tandem with this Shi'a decline and one of its contributing factors was the decline of 
Lucknow itself. Much of the economic development, industry, trade and immigration that 
touched other large cities of U. P. late in the nineteenth century largely bypassed 
Lucknow, which rested under a consistent cloud of stagnation. 69 Indeed, it is quite 
possible that the colonial-era deterioration of Lucknow has further entrenched the long- 
standing perception discussed above that Lucknow's elites, and thus Shi'ism itself, were 
66 For instance, `The unfortunate man is uneducated except in Urdu and was only taught at home... He has 
two children - one of three, one of one. He is twenty two. It really is pitiable. ' Hewett to Chief Secretary, 3 
February 1912, ibid. Wasiqadars were said to operate mutually along lines of 'intrigue and favouritism. ' 
Lovett to Burn, 24 September 1912, ibid. Many cases of struggles by such individuals to stake their claim 
upon the pensions of elder relatives reached the U. P. Political Department, should the case he taken beyond 
the decision of the ºt'asiga officer. See for instance Political Department File No. 313A of 1897; Political 
Dept. File No. 365A of 1897; Political Dept. File No. 263 of 1924, UPSA. 
67 All India Shia conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address His Highness Mir Ali Nawaz 
Khan Talpur, ruler of Khairpur State (Khairpur, circa. 1930), pp. 14-5. This critique is aimed at the Sayyids 
of both Lucknow and Barha. 
`'" Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Lucknawi, Waz'idnrdn-i-Luckna'u (Lucknow, 1908), pp. 36-7. 
H David A. Thomas, 'Lucknow and Kanpur 1880-1920: stagnation and development under the Raj, ' in 
South Asia (December 1982), pp. 69-72. 
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interminably bound to Lucknow's pre-colonial structures and thus immune to modern 
processes of reform. 
The other town upon which this thesis will focus is Amroha, a large qasba in Moradabad 
district that has remained largely ignored in western scholarship. 70 In the late nineteenth 
century, Amroha was a town of some 35,000 inhabitants, a small majority of whom were 
Muslims. 71 At the heart of qasba life were Amroha's Shia Sayyids, whose ancestors had 
established the town in the fourteenth century . 
72 An influential and ancestrally 
distinguished community numbering some four or five thousand in the nineteenth 
century, Sayyids were said to be more abundant in Amroha than in any U. P. town 
excluding Lucknow. 73 Sayyid families of both sects could be found although with Shi'as 
in a large majority, having enjoyed advantage from the Nawabs. Common to all Sayyid 
families, however, was the significance attached to their Sayyid genealogy, which was 
flaunted in order to distinguish themselves from the largely Sunni Shaikh and Pathan 
families settled in the town. 74 
In many ways, Amroha was typical of the nineteenth century `ideal qasba society' 
sometimes evoked in scholarship, with its ruling Sayyids an archetypal example of rural 
70 The only sustained analysis of Amroha in English-language scholarship is S. M. Azizuddin Husain, 
Medieval towns, a case study of Arnroha and Jalali (New Delhi, 1995). Mahmud Ahmad Hashmi's Thrikh- 
i-A, nrvha (Delhi, 1930) is a detailed historical account of Amroha which has been used extensively in this 
thesis. 
71 H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volrrrne XVI. aloradabad 
(Al lahahad, 1911), pp. 176-7. 
'2 The Shi'as of Amroha were Naqvi Sayyids who traced their ancestry to Sharf-ud-din, otherwise knock n 
as Shah Wilayat, a descendent of the tenth Imam 'Ali Naqi. Originally from Wasit in Iraq, he founded and 
settled in the seat of Amroha early in the fourteenth century C. E.. After his death in 1381, the various 
rnrdrallas of Amroha were gradually established by his descendents. Some of Amroha's Sayyid families 
had changed their sectarian allegiances on some or even numerous occasions for advantages in wealth or 
status under the rulers of the day. The best study of the Sayyids of Amroha to date is Jamal Ahmad N o. j i, 
Týärikh-i-sýädnt-i-Anrrýöha (Hyderabad, 1934), which describes the genealogical heritage of the most 
prominent families, while the introductory section gives a typically rosy account of Amroha as a seat of 
classical Islamic scholarship, high culture and fashion, and communal harnmony. 
73 The Sunnis of Amroha to the Secretary of North Western Provinces and Oudh, 29 Fehruarý 1896, GAD 
File No. 106C/64 of 1896, UPSA; Anonymous on behalf of Sadat of Aniroha, 4 August 1902. GAD File 
No. 255 of 1903, UPSA. In the words of the District Gazetteer. 'the number of Seeds is greater [in 
hloradahad district] than in an` other district except Lucknow... their chief seat is Amroha, \k here they 
have been settled for many centuries. ' Nc\ ill, District Gazetteer: , lloradabad, pp. 
'-9. 
4 Nevill, District Gazetteer:. 11(, iadahad, pp. 176,180, Naqvi, TJrikh-i-sädcrt, passim. 
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U. P. 's post-Mughal `service gentries. '75 Like many Sharif elites, they had been settled on 
revenue-free grants of land upon which they maintained a tenacious hold and remained 
dependent into the nineteenth century. Similarly typical of qasba-based elites was the 
tradition of the service occupations; Amroha was a key post for recruitment into the 
administrations of both colonial government and the Nizam of Hyderabad. In addition 
religious learning was strong in Amroha, preciously guarded by its most influential 
residents and visible in the town's public structures. Despite its modest size, Amroha was 
dotted with Sunni and Shia mosques and almost fifty imambaras, and Muslim festivals 
such as `urs (death anniversaries of saints) and especially the annual Muharram 
commemorations were elaborate and well attended. 76 The numerous auqaf upon which 
some of these institutions subsisted ensured a further source of the continuity of Sayyid 
culture and stature. 77 
While there were few significant ancestral ties between the Shi `as of Lucknow and 
Amroha they largely shared a consciousness of Sayyid birth and of, albeit faded, noble 
status, 78 and engaged in religious and cultural exchange. 79 One factor shared by both 
communities, however, was the experience of decline, fostered by growing economic and 
educational poverty. The late nineteenth century, with the coming of urbanisation, 
commercial development and administrative transformation, was a challenging era 
generally for the mid-level landowners and old service communities at the heart of the 
gasba, S° but Amroha's Sayyids suffered especially. They were a `generally impoverished 
body, ' riddled with debt; their ancestral wealth had decreased over successive generations 
as a result of the constant subdivision of their estates and their failure to modernise land 
75 C. A. Bayly, Rulers, townsmen and bazaars: north Indian society in the age of British expansion, 1770- 
1870 (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 189-93. 
76 Nevill, District Gazetteer: Moradabad, pp. 184-5. 
77 Ahsan-al-Akhbar (Amroha), 29 December 188 1, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports 
(UPNNR), OIQC. 
78 Both Lucknow's wasigadars and Amroha's landholding Sayyids were constituencies of the so-called 
'noble poor' who were thought to be in particular need of government attention, and both these 
communities were included in darbars (audiences) by the British on account of their supposedly enviable 
social standing. Political Department File No. 164A of 1896, UPSA; Humble memorial of the undersigned 
Sayeds of Amroha to La Touche, 7 May 1902, GAD File No. 255 of 1903, UPSA. 
7" During the Nawabi period prominent families of Amroha would send certain chosen members to 
Lucknow for study, and their subsequent return as an `alim or wa'iz enhanced the prestige of that family. 
Cole, Roots of north Imlian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq, pp. 137-8. 
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management. Relying on inherited wealth, the community was perceived a,, educationally 
backward and slow to adapt to modern economy and society. 81 
Comparably with the established elites of Lucknow, competition over hereditary land and 
posts in municipal government and wrangles between tenants and inu `aficlars led toi 
constant quarrelling among Amroha's elites in which the individuals of particular 
families and muhallas, alone or in league with comparable local families, attempted to 
protect their own status and influence against other factions. As described by one 
observer, `party intrigue is still the chief occupation of even the leading residents, and 
when the Musulman community as a whole is not in league against the Hindus, the Shia 
and Sunni sects are engaged in quarrelling among themselves. ' 82 These tense socio- 
economic conditions likely contributed to Amroha's unique affliction of communal 
conflict, which occurred with unfailing regularity between Amroha's Shia, Sunni and 
Hindu residents, often sparked during religious festivals or by the publication of 
controversial texts. It was said that `probably no other town in the United Provinces has 
given more trouble to the administration in proportion to its size than Amroha. '83 
Tensions between Shi'as and Sunnis had existed here since the Rebellion, and were 
linked to reforms in the control of the wider Moradabad district. 84 These conflicts 
worsened dramatically from the 1890s, and the transformation of' Amroha into one of' 
north India's central arenas of Muslim sectarian conflict alongside Lucknow is discussed 
in the coming chapters. The case of Amroha presents an important antidote to the 
traditional description of the U. P. qasba as a pocket of communal harmony, bound by an 
elite, cross-communal, Urdu-based culture and a syncretic local cultural life c\emplitied 
by mutual participation in religious festivals and the veneration of local saints. immune to 
Bayly, Rulers, townsmen and bazaars, pp. 355-8. 
Neviii, District Gazetteer: Moradabad, pp. 176-8. 
S2 Ihid, p. 176. 
x; Ibid. This contrasts strongly with Mushirul Hasan's description of Aniroha as 'a quiet town... with a 
history of Hindu-Muslim amity. ' MushiruI Hasan Legacy of a divided nation: India's . Ilu. sliin. ti since 
inclehendence (London, I997). p. 146. 
S'4 Once the British had taken control of the district after the Iy57 Rebellion, it w\ as put in the care of 
\Vilavat Husain Khan, a Shi'a and a former deputy collector of NIoradabad who had been dismissed for his 
involvement in Shia-Sunni riots. He ww as one of the prime collaborators with the British 
in reoccupying the 
district and identifying former rebels in a district where large numbers of Muslims 
had supported the 
rebellion. Ne v ill, District Gaazerteer-: Morndabctc/, pp. 161-9. 
-19 
the communal conflagrations witnessed in urban arenas. 
Focusing closely upon such particular towns allows this thesis to discuss tile imniediate 
experiences of religious and political change, asking how the religious identit\ of Shia 
individuals interacted with other affiliations: one's family, gasba and, indeed, to one', 
national, `Muslim' and international Shia communities. Emphasising the crucial 
distinctions between dialogues at different levels, this thesis alternates between global, 
national, provincial and local circles of Shia-Sunni and Shia-Shi'a dialogue, 
emphasising at all points the exchanges between these arenas. Did they see themselves as 
Shi'as only in the qasba context, or as Shia Indians, or as indelibly hound to their co- 
religionists across the Islamic world? It means, moreover, that as well as a study of the 
process of community formation and organisational activity among Indian Shi'as, this 
thesis will also incidentally present a history of the individual towns at its heart. In 
particular, it offers something of a reassessment of the history of colonial Lucknoww itself, 
and the transformation of a city perpetually associated with its pre-colonial past, its 
traditionalism and its cosmopolitanism. 
NILishirul Hasan. Frone phin1lisrjr to sij arati. ýiit: gqosbas in colonial 
1ºtadh (Delhi, 2(X)-4 1, pavim: Ba), ly. 
Rule, ', to it, ilSmc'n and ba:. ciors, pp. 19ý-3. 
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CHAPTER I 
SHI`A TANZIMAT: THE BEGINNINGS OF SHI'A ORGANISATION IN 
COLONIAL LUCKNOW 
Introduction: colonial Lucknow and the modernist generation of `ulama 
In the thirty-year period commencing at the close of the 1880s, and particularly in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, a large number of organisations, associations 
and societies emerged among the Shi'as of Lucknow. While they varied in their agenda, 
leadership and longevity, all were similarly founded as strictly and exclusively Shia 
organisations, and all advocated the religious, cultural or social revitalisation of India's 
Shi'as. Moreover, all were characterised by a language of tanzirr (meaning 'organisation' 
or `regulation'). ' Tanzim became the driving force of Shi'a reformist activity in 
Lucknow, and the fresh efforts among Shi'as towards the organisation and structuring of 
social and religious life, beginning in the final ten or twelve years of the nineteenth 
century, will be the subject of this chapter. 
It has been widely argued that from the mid-nineteenth century, attempts at organisation 
and systematisation were visible in all the major religious traditions of north India. 2 
Substantial investigations, however, have not been attempted specifically concerning 
Tanzim has often been interpreted in the specific context of the 1920s following the crumbling of the 
Khilafat campaigns. For instance, Nandini Gooptu, The politics of the urban poor in early twentieth century 
north India (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 287-92: Gail Minault, The Khilafat movement: religious symbolism and 
political mobilization in India (New York. 1982), pp. 193-4. However, this underestimates the extent to 
which these notions of Muslim resurgence drew from a language which had already been developed and 
used by Muslim religious movements in the later nineteenth century. Vernacular religious texts of Islamic 
reform display a strikingly frequent application of such language of ordering and regulation. Moreover, the 
assessment of these terms with reference to specific Sunni campaigns underestimates the extent to which 
this language of renewal was evoked by numerous Muslim revitalising campaigns, including those of 
Shi'as. 
2 For instance, Kenneth Jones. Socio-religious reform movements in British India (Cambridge, 1989). 
Vasudha Dalmia, The nationalisation of Hindu traditions: Bharatendu Harisehandra and nineteenth- 
centur*v Banaras (New Delhi, 1996); Harjot Oberoff. The construction of religious 
boundaries: culture, 
identity and diversity in the Sikh tradition (Delhi. 1994): Barbara 
Metcalf, Islamic revival in Briti4h India: 
Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982). 
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Shi `as. As was suggested above, the centrality of Iraq in religious life and colonial 
Lucknow's attachment to its pre-colonial past have been perceived as barriers to the 
modern manifestations of religious reform seen among other communities. The most 
significant attempt at community formation in Lucknow after 1857, by contrast, was the 
emergence of a cross-communal talugdari (landholding) class, who with active British 
support were established as the `natural rulers' and cultural custodians of the city. ' 
Alongside this, the appearance of a number of civic social and literary associations such 
as the Jalsa-i-Tehzib and Rifah-i-'Am among a group of western-educated philanthropists 
and professionals who came to constitute an emerging middle-class, could also be 
interpreted as signifying that associational life in Lucknow was class-based rather than 
religious or communal. 4 
While further chapters of this thesis will examine wider Shia centres in the United 
Provinces, this chapter will focus predominantly upon Lucknow since, as is argued in this 
chapter, it was here that the inspirations for wider Shia organisation during this period 
originated. While this new and urgent sense of sectarian religious activity was declared 
for the Shi'as of all India, it is in fact traceable to a small and interconnected circle of 
`ulama in Lucknow. Previous scholarship on developments in Indian Shi'ism has focused 
on particular `generations' of `ulama blessed with great authority and activity. The most 
significant of these was the `first generation' of `uiama emerging in the late eighteenth 
century. With Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi as the most prominent figure, this generation 
pioneered the dominance of Usuli over Akhbari Shi`ism, instituted the practice of 
communal Friday prayers, and pioneered Usuli Shi `ism as a `formal religious 
establishment' close to the judicial administration of the State. 
5 A `second generation' of 
`ulama, emerging in the 1820s, extended the sources of their patronage and their public 
' Peter. D. Reeves, Landlords and governments in Uttar Pradesh: a study of their relations until za, nindari 
abolition (Bombay, 1991); Thomas Metcalf. Land, landlords and the 
British Raj: northern India in the 
nineteenth century (Berkeley. 1999). 
Sanjay Joshi, Fractured modernity: making of a middle class in colonial India (New% Delhi, 2(X)I ). 
Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: reli,, 'io, t and state in .4 tadh, 1722-1859 
(California, 1988), pp. 123-44. 
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influence, and came to develop their authority as charismatic as well as rational-judicial. 6 
Later, following thirty years of decline for Indian Shi `ism after 1857, there emerged what 
can be regarded here the first generation of modernist Shia 'ulama. They were modernist 
in that, whether unitedly or merely simultaneously, they established a number of new 
public religious organisations and madrasas which would come to define national 
religious life and leadership over subsequent decades. 
A brief biographical account of the four most prominent of this generation of 'ulama can 
locate the social and intellectual background of this revival. Nasir Husain ('Sadr-ul- 
Mohaqiqen'), was the son of the great Lucknawi mujtahid Hamid Husain, who received 
his ijazat (certification as a mujtahid) at the age of sixteen, and inherited the duties and 
work of his father following the latter's death in 1888. He became widely considered as 
the highest mujtahid of twentieth-century India and was sometimes pronounced the 
subcontinent's only Marja`-ul-taglid. 7 Najm ul-Hasan (`Najm-ul-Millat'), originally 
educated in Sambhal in his native district of Moradabad, received his ijazat from his 
father-in-law Mirza Muhammad `Abbas, one of the greatest jurisprudents of Lucknow, 
the city in which he settled. 8 Aqa Hasan, (`Qutva't-ul-`Ulama') was a descendant of 
Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi. He received his ijazat under a number of notable Persian 
mujtahids in Iraq around 1893-95, and returned as one of the most renowned and active 
mujtahids of Lucknow. 9 Muhammad Baqir Rizvi (`Bagir-ul-`Ulum') was educated in Iraq 
for ten years from circa 1882-3, achieving ijazat. 1° For reasons discussed in later 
chapters, these four individuals represented in certain ways the final generation of great 
Indian mujtahids, the authority of whom was not accomplished by subsequent 
generations. These `ulama, moreover, shared an ancestral and socio-cultural milieu. They 
shared commonalties in their age (all four were born in the 1860s, during a period of 
6 Ibid, pp. 173-93. Cole's is not the only study of modern Islamic society to speak of particular 'generations' 
of reformists in this way. C. f. Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939 (London. 
1962), pp. 67-103. 
7 Sayyid Murtaza Husain, Matla`-i-Anwar: tazkira-i-Shi`a afäzil-º'a-`ulamä, kabdr-i-bar-i-saghir-i-Pük- 
va-Hind (Karachi, 1981), pp. 666-7. On the institution of the Marja'-ul-taglid, see Linda S. Walbridge cd.. 
The most learned of the Shi'a: the institution of the Marja' Taqlid (New York, 2001). 
x Husain, Marla'-i-Anwdr, pp. 678-9. 
9 Ibid, p. 45. 
1° Sayyid Muhammad Naqi Rizvi, Farishtgdn jahän: tazkira-i-khänººäda-i-Sayyid Afuhamad Bägir Ri: º i 
Kashiniri Bägir-ul-'Uliim (Lucknow, 2005), pp. 10-25. 
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acute decline for Indian Shi'ism), the ties of ancestry, marriage and tuition which often 
connected clerical families, as well as their attachment to Lucknow as their ancestral or 
adopted city. All ascended to public prominence as accomplished mujtahids in Lucknow 
in the 1890s, and all became active in the formation and administration of Lucknow's 
new religious institutions and, a little later, of secular organisations. 
The adjustment of the `ulama to the colonial world has been a substance of much debate, 
but on India especially much has focused on those aspects of threat brought by these 
socio-cultural changes, and the receding influence of traditional religious authorities. 
Barbara Metcalf has described how the loss of Muslim state power precipitated an 
`inward-looking strategy, ' an introspective turn among Muslim religious reformists. 
Seeing the loss of the public space for Islam, they relinquished questions of state 
organisation and instead initiated an attempt at internal correction of faith and practice, 
the articulation of what it meant to be rightly and properly Muslim. r1 There were also the 
twin-processes of on the one hand, the growth of a conviction of the instrumentality of 
the individual as a result of the encounter with Western knowledge and liberalism, and on 
the other, the impact of print, which newly offered the public access to religious texts and 
ideas. 12 Both these processes could be understood to have empowered Muslim 
individuals to assume new responsibility for their own religious life, bypassing the 
traditional guiding roles of the `ulama. The empowerment of individuals goes part of the 
way to explaining a further challenge to the `ulama: the conquest of religious life by 
powerful lay Islamist movements in modern South Asia. 13 To paraphrase Clifford Geertz, 
traditional religious leaders were forced by modernisation to justify or even earn their 
authority, rather than suppose its inviolability. '` 
11 Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, pp. I 1-14. 
12 Francis Robinson, 'Islam and the impact of print in South Asia, ' in Francis Robinson cd., ! slain and 
Muslim history in South Asia (New Delhi, 2000), pp. 66-104; Francis Robinson, 'Religious change and the 
Self in Muslim South Asia since 1800, ' in ibid, pp. 105-21. 
13 Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia: the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of 
South Asia, ' in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby eds., Fundamentalisms observed. %'olu,, u' I (Chicago. 
991), pp. 457-530; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The 'ulama in contemporar v Islam: custodians (f change 
(Princeton, 2002). 
14 Clifford Geertz, "'Internal conversion" in contemporary Bali. ' in Clifford Geertz ed.. The interpretnlirun 
of cultures: selected essays (New York, 1973), p. 186. For a further exploration of such 
idea,. , cc Zaman, 
The 'ulanta in contemporary Islam, passim. 
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Assessing the responses of the Shia `ulama to the rapid social, religious and cultural 
transformations of colonial Lucknow, this chapter argues that, rather than experiencing a 
diminution of their authority, this circle of mujtahids in Lucknow in fact had their stature 
enhanced and extended through their embrace of the new ideas and media emerging in 
Lucknow's public sphere. Acting through a series of emerging Shia organisations and 
societies, this modernist generation of Shia `ulama were publicly active figures in a wav 
previously unseen, allowing them to regain some of the influence and stature held by, 
their ancestors in the Nawabi period. Their various activities, it was said, ushered in a 
period of `unity and agreement' (ittehad-va-ittefaq) among them, during which each 
`alim (religious scholar) contributed in his respective role to a coordinated project of 
revitalisation: 
`The unity of action among `ulama at this time was such that in every 
department of religious duty, whether in madrasas or mosques, 
imambaras or mourning rites, every `alim in whatever way showed 
complete commitment to the ideal, and set an example. ' 15 
The question of whether this apparent unanimity and cooperation was substantial or 
merely cosmetic is discussed more substantially in later chapters. Before this, however, 
this chapter will outline the various activities of Shia `ulaina from the late nineteenth 
century, and the character of this new religious and secular renewal. While various 
manifestations of tanzirr were visible in Shi'a religious life in colonial India, this section 
will focus on Lucknow and will examine some of the most prominent examples. 
The 
chapter examines the character of these manifestations of organisation and the sources 
from which they drew their inspiration, allowing an assessment of the transformation of 
Shia life and culture in Lucknow, and more widely of Indian Shi'ism 
itself. 
15 Rizvi, Farishtgän jalzäi. p. 15. 
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Institutionalising Shi`ism: the foundation of Shia madrasas 
The late nineteenth century witnessed the foundation of numerous madrasas across U. P.. 
The towns of Deoband, Saharanpur, Aligarh and Bareilly were all graced with a dar-ul- 
`ulum during this period. Less well-recognised is the fact that a striking number of Shia 
madrasas were also founded, especially in Lucknow, from 1889 onwards. The formation 
of madrasas was one aspect of a broader religious renewal discussed further in the 
following chapter, but moreover it was one of the first and most important examples of a 
process of establishment of Shi'a organisations and institutions. Later attempts at 
organisation among Indian Shi'as all drew from the language of tanzirn inaugurated by 
the proponents of these seminaries. 
As was shown in the introduction, the closure in 1856 of the Madrasa-i-Shahi robbed 
Lucknow of its only prescribed institution of formalised religious learning for Shi'as. 
With the exception of Madrasa-i-'Aliya in Rampur, there seem to have been few or no 
significant formal establishments of religious education for Shi`as in the U. P. region 
during the 1870s. While in previous generations many of Lucknow's `ulama had gained 
their ijazat from the reputed scholars of their own vatan (homeland), the generation 
emerging after 1857 were thus increasingly forced abroad. With a few notable 
exceptions, most of those who were to emerge as senior `ulama by the end of the 
nineteenth century had received their ijazat in Iraq rather than in India. 16 Those 'ulama 
fewer in number who did remain in India for their guidance commonly received 
instruction from their parents or close acquaintances, tailored towards the inheritance of 
their posts. '? In such cases, Shia religious education largely took place on a level of 
informal instruction and personal tuition. Based upon personal networks and the weight 
of the familial name, it tended therefore to perpetuate the advantages of kinship, rather 
than expanding or formalising educational activities. It seems natural, therefore, that 
attempts at religious systematisation and organisation should focus on the provision for 
16 A few prominent examples include Aqa Hasan, Muhammad Baqir Rizvi, SaN y id 
Sibte Husain and 
Sayyid Ahmad Hindi. Exceptions include Nasir Husain, Najm ul-Hasan and 'Abid Husain. 
17 As was shown above, this was certainly the case for Nasir Husain and Najm ul-Hasan. who received 
their ijazat from their father and father-in-law respectively. Each of these individuals continued to %% rite 
under the takhlus of their exalted instructors. 
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new and specifically Shi'a religious education. Emerging Shi `a seminaries were modern 
in that they attempted to reform the transmission of religious knowledge according to 
wider patterns of religious organisation and institutionalisation in the late-nineteenth 
century. 
The first attempt at the formation of a madrasa in colonial Lucknow was the short-lived 
Madrasa Imaniya, established by the mujtahid Abul Hasan, in 1872-3.18 Ghulam Hasnain 
Kintoori, a respected scholar of nineteenth-century Awadh, was charged by Abul Hasan 
with the post of fundraiser for the madrasa and was appointed as its mutawalli (trustee). 19 
He declared himself ashamed of the madrasa's failure, identifying three reasons., ' First 
of these was public ignorance of the name of Abul Hasan. Second was the difficulty of 
securing pledges and of realising promised donations. A third reason for the ultimate 
failure of the project, according to Ghulam Hasnain, was an atmosphere of self-interest 
among Indian Shi`as which precluded sectarian cooperation . 
21 In districts of U. P. such as 
Muzaffarnagar and Meerut, the madrasa's fundraiser was warned by local Shia ra `is that 
he would receive not even one paisa in donations. Moreover, in such qasbas there 
seemed little enthusiasm to finance the Shi'as of so distant a place as Lucknow. Why, 
asked one dignitary of Meerut, should the money not be better spent on religious 
education in our own town? 22 
Essentially, the madrasa project became bogged down amidst current intrigue and harsh 
disagreements among the Shia `ulama, which came to impede the fundraising effort for 
the madrasa. 
23 While on the one hand vocal attempts were launched to sully the 
18 A detailed account of the failed attempt to found this madrasa is available in a biography of Ghularn 
Hasnain Kintoori., Habib Husain ibn Ahmad Husain, Sawänih-i-'umri -i-Ghufürn Hasnin KintärT (Lahore, 
1904), pp. 176-7. 
19 One of the most esteemed Shi'a scholars of nineteenth century India, Ghulam Hasnain Kintoori wwas a 
relative of Hamid Husain. Husain, Matla'-i-Anwär, pp. 419-20. 
'" Husain, Sawärnih-i-'umri, pp. 187-8. 
'1 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, p. 178-9. 
'` A debate emerged at around this time between the 'ulama of Luckno%% and certain 'ulaºna of Niatia 
Burj, 
the seat of the exiled Nawab in Bengal, as to whether the current descendents of the 
Awadh Royal Famil\ 
maintained the rightful status of princes. While the `utama of Lucknow issued 
istifrali (legal declarations) 
questioning their royal status, a number of individuals under Muhammad 'Ali 
Qa`in-uddin, the ºnu%ri of 
Calcutta, declared as incorrect the decisions emanating from Lucknow. Ibid, p. 195. 
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reputation of the Lucknow `ulama who were heading the project, at the sane time the 
muqallids of Lucknow's Abu] Hasan in Bengal chose to demonstrate their lo\ alt` b% 
conducting the fundraising themselves, bypassing individuals such as Ghulam Hasnain 
who had been charged with the task. In such a charged atmosphere. it seems that 
cooperation around the proposed madrasa became impossible. Certainly, these open 
frictions dissuaded a number of potential donors. Raja Baqir 'Ali Khan of Pinjrawal. 
hearing these slurs against the Madrasa Imaniya's key proponents, abandoned his pledge 
of assistance with the claim that the Shi'as could not be rightly, guided in the absence of 
the Imam Mas`um ('sinless Imam, ' referring to the awaited Nlehdi), seemingly a veiled 
statement that nobody was currently capable of organising the Shi `as. 24 While a building 
was obtained for the madrasa and a round of examinations even held, within months of 
its establishment the madrasa was closed, the project abandoned, and the monies returned 
to their donors, apparently leaving its founder so aggrieved that he departed India for 
Iraq. 25 
Later attempts at the formation of a madrasa achieved greater success. It was again Abul 
Hasan who founded Madrasa Nazimiya in 1889, this time in collaboration with the other 
foremost mujtahid of the period, Mirza Muhammad 'Abbas. Najm ul-Hasan, having 
recently gained his ijazat, was appointed as its first director on account of his well-known 
'scholarly and organisational talents, ' and it was under him that the madrasu gained a 
building in the heart of old Lucknow. 26 In 1894, Abul Hasan founded a second madrasa 
in Lucknow known as Sultan ul-Madaris, funded by the great Husainabad wagf; to which 
he appointed Najm ul-Hasan, and thereafter his son Muhammad Baqir Rizvi, as principal. 
The school grew quickly, and by the early twentieth century could hold some two 
hundred students at one time. 
27 Like Madrasa Nazimiya, it produced many important 
preachers, writers, qazis (judges), hafih (those able to recite the Qur'an) and poets, its 
pupils spreading as far as Kashmir and Africa. 
`8 
24 Ibid, p. 198. 
25 Husain. ; 11ýrtlrr' i . lriiti irr. p. 
49. 
N Ibid. pp. 41), 676. 
27 All India Shia Conferen c. Rc3'kiJd-i-ijläs-i- hashtini-i-41 India Shia Kc-mfcrwi , murruclidu 
l(ti'-'U 
October 191-1 (Lucknkm, 1915), p. 98. 
Husain, p. 519. 
;\ 
These two madrasas together would have a path-breaking effect upon Shia religious life 
in Lucknow and in India more widely. The distinguishing feature of these 1nadrasas was 
their effort towards the ordering and regulation of clerical authority, as a solution to the 
long-standing problems of the dispensation of religious authority within Indian Shi'isnm. 
The first problem was the declining number of sanctioned mujtahids in India in the 
aftermath of 1857, and the implications of this shortage of teachers qualified to confer 
ijazat upon aspiring successors for the long-term prospects of the Shia clergy of north 
India. Madrasa Nazimiya's solution to the erosion of religious authority in India was, for 
the first time, the establishment of institutional bonds with the i ujtahids of Iraq. The 
managers of the madrasa acknowledged the status of southern Iraq as the centre of f qh- 
va-usul ('law and learning')' and of the contemporary Shia world more particularly, 
holding the `principle books of the original educational nisab (syllabus ). '29 Consequently, 
they initiated contact with Aqa Sayyid Kazim Tabataba'i of Najaf, the current 
representative of a dynasty considered among the Shia world's foremost in the discipline 
of fiqh (jurisprudence). An agreement was made with Tabataba'i that he would he 
established as Madrasa Nazimiya's examiner in figh. Exam papers were produced in Iraq 
under Tabataba`i's supervision, sent to Lucknow, and the answers of talihs returned to 
Najaf for examination under his authority. 30 
Additionally, the dispensation of standardised, recognised endorsements was an effort to 
resolve the further problem of the imprecision of the ijazat of many 'ula, nu in India. In 
the late nineteenth century, the former Awadh abounded with 'ulania who carried 
assumed rjn., at or similar qualifications to the status of mujtahicl; however, the authority 
of the individual 'uli, n was no longer clearly defined or regulated. In some cases, certain 
`ula»>u whose authority had been conferred by senior inujtahuls were little recognised as 
figures of conviction. 31 In others, certain individuals held great Influence among local 
"' Imamiya Mission, Khatih i ýý/ i : Ilrr/rc, ý, rucl (Lucknow, 193 3-34), p. 19. As was outlined in the 
introduction, Najal' \\ as the undisputed centre of Shia scholarship and jurisprudence during this period. 
Ibid. Kazim Tahataha'i wwould later become the highest muJiahiel of' Karbala. 
One e\amplc of such an it div idual is Sad ý id Ahmad Hindi. The district authorities of 
Luckno%%, asked 
to affirm his status as a recognised'nu tahid to ' atisf'ý the conditions of 
hi' appointment as the mutawalli o1- 
an important ºr'ugt; found him to possess 
ijazat granted from both Najaf and Karbala, but to ha\e little 
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populations despite their lack of formal qualifications. 32 Moreover, some individuals 
received their qualifications from `ulama whose own authority was doubted, and some 
were accused of forging or exaggerating the qualifications with which they had been 
assigned. 33 The qualifications offered in Madrasa Nazimiya and Sultan ul-Madaris. 
known respectively as Mumtaz-ul-Afazil and Sadr-ul-Afazil, resulted from some fifteen 
years of study encompassing a broad curriculum of hadis ('Traditions'), usul and fig/1. As 
such, the intention of the qualifications newly formulated within these nnadrasas was that 
they would be recognised and understood regardless of the distinctions of influence, 
wealth and ancestral background of its holder. 
Following a period of tangible decline for the faith, these madrasas thereby together 
furnished north India with a visible and abundant corps of 'ularna. Their achievements to 
this end were visible in the subsequent generation, by which time many visible and 
prominent `ulama, wa `izen (preachers) and zakirs (narrators of the sufferings of Husain 
during Muharram) were drawn from among the first generation of students educated in 
Madrasa Nazimiya and Sultan ul-Madaris. 34 Some of the graduates of these schools, 
among them Sibte Masan and Muhammad Haroon, gained the illustrious distinction of 
imama (lit: 'turban' ). 35 While still carrying less authority than the ijazat attainable under 
the mujtahids of contemporary Najaf and Karbala, the most esteemed pupils of these 
schools, designated as mujtahid-u1- `asp--ul-zaman, were to all intents and purposes 
36 popularly considered as mujtahids in India. 
popular recognition as a inujtahid and very few mugallids (followers). He himself blamed this on his 
frequent absenteeism from Lucknow. To Chief Secretary of United Provinces Government, 22 May 1912, 
Political Department File No. 84 of 1912, Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow (UPSA). 
3` One example is Maqbool Ahmad, who is discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. 
i; For example, see the claim of one Maulana of Lucknow: 'in Lucknow among the most famous Mujtahids 
there is a large number of those who do not possess certificate of Mujtahidship and this can be verified. ' 
Allamah Sayyid Ahmed Hindi to Burn, 19 September 1912, Political Department File No. 84 of 1912. 
UPSA. 
34 Among them are included Sibte Hasan, Firman 'Ali, Muhammad Da'ud, Muhammad Haroon Zingapuri 
and Sayyid Shabbir Husain. All India Shi'a Conference, Ro'idäd-i-ijläs-i-hashtitni, 1914, p. 98. The first 
generation of ulama created by these madrasas differed from their predecessors in important ways, and arc 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
;` Imamiya Mission, Khatib-i-, 514-Muhamad, pp. 17-20. 
16 This title of 'Mujtahid of the Age' dated from the Safavid period and was often taken to denote a 
Maija', although it entailed neither systematic doctrinal authority nor formal leadership over the 
administration of religious institutions. Meir Litvak, Shi'i scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq: the 'ulama 
of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge, 1998). p. 6. 
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While Shi'a seminaries had existed in nineteenth century India before these, Lucknow's 
freshly-founded schools were soon to exceed these in reputation and importance. Part of 
the explanation for this was the schools' ability to recruit senior mujtahids as its ustaden 
(teachers): not least Najm ul-Hasan, who had quickly ascended to his high status and 
coached a number of pupils in Madrasa Nazimiya, and Muhammad Baqir Rizvi, who 
became principal of Sultan ul-Madaris. Additionally, given the symbolic significance of 
Lucknow for Shi'as, these schools were able to attract their pupils from outside of the 
civic community, and both these schools gained a reputation for their inclusion of Shi `as 
from across the nation at large. 37 Furthermore the madrasas themselves, through the 
congregation of Shia students, the close bonds with their tutors, and apparently even the 
mehel (building) of the colleges, fostered a bond of community among their 
membership. 38 Akin to Sunni schools such as Deoband, the affiliates of these schools 
were connected through mutual participation in the institutional structures of the 
madrasas, remote from the kinship-based teaching systems predominant among 
Lucknow's maulavis in previous decades. 39 The fraternal bonds cultivated in these 
institutions were further enhanced by the fact that the schools maintained the active 
support of their former students. Certainly in the case of Madrasa Nazimiya, it was the 
rule rather than the exception that successful graduates would return periodically to teach 
40 in their former institution. 
These two madrasas in Lucknow were merely the starting point, rather than the final 
result, in a process of the construction of new Shia madrasas that continued into the 
twentieth century. Aqa Hasan later established the Madrasa-i-Din-i-Jafariya, a seminary 
which taught English alongside Arabic and Islamic studies . 
41 However, those among the 
first generation to gain faul (certificates) in Lucknow's schools had to look to 
Mesopotamia for provision for further religious education, and hence it was not long after 
37 Husain, Matla'-i-A, nt'är, p-679- 
38 Imamiya Mission, Khatib-i-äl-i-Muharad, p-20- 
3" For similar impressions of Deoband, see Metcalf, Islamic revival 
in British India, p. 106: 'such bonds, 
formed on the basis of common experience rather than on 
kin and locality. prepared the students for mutual 
cooperation and participation. ' 
40 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijlää. s-i- hashtim, 1914, p, 98. 
a1 Mustafa Husain Asif Ja'isi ed., KlOndääii-i-ijtihJd dambar, shumäira the (Lucknoýk, 
2(X)5). p. 87. 
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the establishment of these schools that appeals were made for a inaclrusa of higher 
religious education in India to serve these graduates. It was to this end that the Madrasa't 
ul-Wa`izen was established at the close of 1919, quickl\ becoming India's foremost Shia 
seminary; such is its importance that it is discussed separately in the subsequent chapter. 
It is worth briefly digressing from the confines of Lucknow to demonstrate that this spate 
of the foundation of Shia religious schools was impressed upon man\ towns and cities 
across north India. The Madrasa Hifz ul-Qur'an, a Shia-run school which accepted Shia 
and Sunni students alike, opened in Delhi in 1890.42 Madrasa Mansabia of Meerut and 
Madrasa Suleimaniya of Patna also matured in the late nineteenth century, with the 'alinz 
Sibte Husain acting as their principal. 43 The town of Shikarpur in district Bulandshehr 
was granted the Ehsan ul-Madaris in 1906, a school founded to train huff;.: its most 
famous student was Kifayat Husain, who would mature into one of the greatest 'urluniu of 
the subcontinent. `` Early in the twentieth century the famed Shi'a orator Maqbool 
Ahmed, whose activities are discussed in detail below, founded the Madrasa't L11-Qur'an, 
while after his death in 1921, the Maqbool-i-Madaris was founded in his memory in 
Agra. 45 
One town particularly illustrative of this reformation of Shia religious education was 
Amroha. As with Lucknow, the substantial Shia population of the town lacked a 
seminary in the late nineteenth century, only to be suddenly confronted with a plethora of 
such opportunities. The first came with Sayyid-ul-Madaris, which began as an Urdu 
maktab (elementary school) and matured into an Arabic maclrasa from 1894. The 
school's funds were drawn from personal contributions, government and municipal 
grants and the wealth of the Nawab of Rampur. The nnaclrasa, it was said, contained ten 
teachers and some 120 students, the final degree of the niaclrasa was known as Savvic1-trl- 
, 1fazil, and the school produced niaulavrs and 'crlama who became \w fidel} present acros« 
42 Ai-Im Haider 'Ali Beg. /mc-umia Ejikeshanal KCIngres kc ijb-i -i-au'al na rii/ jnlsu i ýýul., hüýi i tcr'1Fm i 
lm(I ? livv (Fategarh, IS92), passim. 
4; Husain. , Ilutlu' 
i. nu ýý,. p. ),,, 5. 
44 Ibid, pp. 457-'8. 
4s Husain, ,1 al1a'-i-Am , 
ir. p. 65 I. 
42 
India. 46 No less significant was Imam-ul-Madaris, founded by Najm ul-Hasan on his 
return to his native district in 1901; the school recruited a series of prominent 'ulama as 
teachers and included English into its curriculum on government request. 47 Nor-ui- 
Madaris followed in 1904. Financed through a waqf (endowment) founded by several 
Sayyids of the town, the Arabic and Persian curriculum was steered by the famed 'alim of 
Amroha, Sayyid Murtaza Husain, a specialist in Arabic mantiq (logic) and grammar. 48 
Around 1914 Maulana Sibte Nabi, a graduate of the latter, founded the Bab-ul-'ilm in the 
neighbouring Sayyid settlement of Noganwan from where he originated. 49 This latter 
instance shows how Amroha, like Lucknow, could attract aspiring `ulama from outside 
the town who would then carry their learning back to their native townships. 
There is thus little doubt that, in and beyond Lucknow, the formation of madrasas 
fundamentally transformed Shia religious life in north India. Firstly, the formalised 
teaching systems of these madrasas replaced the personal ties along which religious 
knowledge had long been transferred, substituting the significance of kinship networks 
with a greater emphasis upon participation in a fabricated network based upon a shared 
experience of formal training. 50 Furthermore, these madrasas provided new public 
presence for Shi'ism. Schools like Sultan ul-Madaris, initially convened in an imambara, 
were increasingly endowed with their own, purposely-constructed classrooms, libraries 
and hostels, reinforcing the visibility of the Shia religion in Lucknow's public spaces. ' 
In cities such as Lucknow, the madrasas began the reverse of a lengthy period of decline 
for Shi'ism, based no longer upon state-patronage of religion but upon vigorous 
voluntary patronage of modern Shi'a institutions. 
"' Mahmud Ahmad Hashmi, Tärikh-i-Amräha (Delhi, 1930), pp. 144-5; H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of 
the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume XVI: Moradabad (Allahabad, 1911), p. 185; General 
Report upon Public Instruction in the North West Provinces and Awadh, 1912 p. 99- 100, V/24/916, 
OIOC. 
47 Hashmi, Tärikh-i-Amröha (Delhi, 1930), p. 146; Jamal Ahmad Naqvi, Tärikh-i-sädät-i-Amräha 
(Hyderabad, 1934), p. 44- 
48 Hashmi, Tärikh-i-Amröha, p. 145; Husain, Matla'-i-Anwär, p. 643. 
49 Husain, Matla'-i-Anwär, pp. 287-8. 
50 This compares with the 'assoeiational ties of origin [and] educational experience' which characterised 
the organisation of emerging Deobandi schools. Metcalf, Islamic revival 
in British India, p. 98. 
51 The imposing building of Sultan ul-Madaris was built between 1911-1913, largely on a grant from 
Mehdi `Ali Khan, who is described in a plaque on the building as 'philosopher and philanthropist of 
Awadh. ' The madrasa was inaugurated by Lucknow's Commissioner James Hewett 
in March, 1913. 
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The rapid pace of the foundation of such religious seminaries raises the important 
question of why it was at this time, namely, from the end of the 1880s. that such 
madrasas suddenly emerged. When compared to the failure of the comparable . Madrasa 
Imaniya project in the 1870s, what factors had changed to make the foundation of 
madrasas so widespread and so workable during this period? Certain explanations lie in 
wider current developments in Islamic education in north India. There is little doubt that 
the formation of Deobandi madrasas across the North Western Provinces over previous 
decades set a precedent along which a similar movement could take place among Shi'as. 
The Shi'a madrasas bear comparison with their Deobandi forerunners in important ways: 
the formation of a recognised and ordered nisah, the dispensation of agreed and 
distinguished qualifications of learning, and the dissemination of education across the ties 
of kinship and locality. 52 
A further explanation for the establishment of indigenous religious education lies in 
events in the wider Shia world. The shrine cities of southern Iraq had been the source 
from which many Indian Shia religious leaders sought their direction through the late- 
nineteenth century, but a series of events during this period made Iraq less accessible to 
Indian pilgrims, students and corpse traffic alike. Plague restrictions on the movement of 
travellers to Mesopotamia were imposed from the early 1890s, with very few individuals 
succeeding in gaining entry. 53 This was compounded a decade later with the further 
difficulty of the condition of the Awadh Bequest, a branch of the Husainabad endowment 
which had since the 1850s been a prime source of funding for Indian residents, students 
and pilgrims in Iraq. Poor administration of the Bequest was compounded in 1903 with 
the abolition of the so-called `Indian fund, ' a part of the Bequest reserved for Indian 
citizens, which made settlement or study in Iraq increasingly difficult for Indians. 
54 Once 
these funds were siphoned off by »iujta/iids and trustees to alternative cause, a number 
of Indian poor, pilgrims and pensioners were effectively stranded in Najaf and Karbala, 
ensuring for many others the impossibility or at least inadvisability of disembarkation to 
S2 Metcalf, Islamic revival in British /ndia, passim. 
51 From W. S. Nlarris. 3 May 1903. Home Department (Sanitary A. ) Proceedings. JuI\ 1903. N,,.. 298-102, 
National Archivcs of India, Ncs\ Delhi (NAI). 
54 For instance, A. L. Saunders to Chief Secretary of Government cif the United Provinces, 29 Julu 1910, 
Political Department : \.. N1av 191 1. File: Nos. 10-44, UFS. \ 
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Iraq. 55 Compounded with the decline of religious education in Iraq in the pre-First World 
War period, 56 the situation in Mesopotamia thus gave pressing urgency to the need for 
workable institutions of religious learning within India itself. 
In this sense, the establishment of functional Shi'a madrasas marked the completed 
indigenisation, or `Indianisation, ' of the Shi'a religion. By providing a curriculum in usul 
and fiqh which excluded the necessity of direct travel to Iraq, these schools enabled the 
autonomous administration of religious jurisprudence, under a national Shia religious 
leadership. It is highly significant that the guardians of Lucknow's madrasas looked not 
to the 'Shi'i International' or to Najaf for inspiration or direction, but to successful 
indigenous organisations: the enviable growth of the Arya Samaj, the communal zeal and 
active public life of the Ahmadi community and the opening of colleges, hospitals, 
refuges and orphanages by Christian groups, all of which were active in contemporary 
north India. 57 In this sense, Shi'a tanzim was a movement towards the appropriation of 
the language and styles of national public organisation, assuming the organisational 
discourses of both state and other religious groups as the precursor to religious renewal. 
Yet, besides enabling religious reform in the national context, the new madrasas 
furthermore established Lucknow's precedence as the centre of national religious 
renewal. These madrasas were glorified as bringing something of the graces and 
treasures of Karbala and Najaf to Lucknow, 58 yet perhaps in light of the information 
above these madrasas are better understood as carrying the ethos of Lucknow to the rest 
of India. Lucknow saw the reinstatement of its traditional reputation as a place of 
religious learning, providing a focus to attract scholars and teachers from outside the city. 
55 The administration of the Awadh Bequest is deserving of its own analysis in greater detail. Some 
discussions of the Bequest are available in Juan Cole, Sacred space and hole ºtar: " the politics, culture and 
history of Shi'ite Islant (New York, 2002), pp. 78-98; Yitzhak Nakash. The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton, 2003), 
pp? 1 1-29. It was partly due to the heightened difficulties in travelling to and living in Iraq that the number 
of Indians visiting Iraq for pilgrimage or corpse burial fell gradually during this period. Ihid, pp. 164-71, 
184-205. 
`6 The decline of the madrasa in Iraq owed in part to the return of many students to Iran during the 
Constitutional Revolution, the deterioration of student-mujtahid relations over funding, and Ottoman 
interference. See ibid, pp. 247-62. 
57 Akbar Husain Rizvi, Madrasa't ul-Wü'izjn ki äwä: (Lucknow, circa 1928). pp. 7-8. 
5" Husain, Marla'-i-Ami'är, p. 678. 
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The foundation of madrasas was not a uniformly spread phenomenon of national 
religious revitalisation, but centred upon a restricted clique of established 'nujtaluds of 
Lucknow, whose stature was further enhanced by their charge of religious education. 
Moreover, those madrasas which emerged outside Lucknow. rather than enhancing the 
autonomous religious life of the communities of the qasbas in which they were situated. 
were largely an extension of Lucknow's revived religious consciousness into further 
localities: they emerged later, they were mostly founded by students of Lucknow's 
schools or by Lucknawi `ulama themselves, and none achieved the size or reputation of 
Lucknow's madrasas. As such, the Shia madrasas served to assert the centrality of 
Lucknow in national Shia religious life. Tanzirr within Shi'ism meant less the 
construction of ties between Shi'as of different localities, more the impartation of Shia 
Lucknow's modes and mores to wider arenas. 
The Shia mujtahids in public life: the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor 
Some of the madrasas discussed above, including the major schools founded in 
Lucknow, were enduring institutions that developed their own buildings and financial 
competence, while others were makeshift and short-lived affairs. Collectively, however, 
they furnished north India, but Lucknow and U. P. especially, with a new generation of 
religious scholars and preachers, whose activities and impact are discussed further in the 
next chapter. For our more immediate purposes, however, their effect was twofold. First, 
they inaugurated a language of tanzirr which informed the further organisational 
activities among Shi'as described in this chapter. Second, they re-established the public 
activity and visibility of the Shia mujtahicls of Lucknow in a way unprecedented since 
the Nawabi period. 
It is the second of these, the increasing participation of the mujtahids in the public arenas 
of Lucknow, with which this section is concerned. The expansive public activities of the 
Shia 'ulama have been central to important studies of nineteenth-century Indian Shi'ism; 
at the height of Shi'a 'state formation' in the 1840s, for instance, the Shi'a ºnujtalhids had 
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extensive societal responsibilities such as the provision of institutionalised education and 
the distribution of state-provided charity such as alms and 'poor tax. '59 Such perspectives 
have parallels in wider studies of Shi'ism. Litvak's study of the 'ulama of nineteenth- 
century Iraq, for instance, describes their function as 'almost exclusive custodians of 
Shi'i tradition and religious life, ' and as `bastion[s] of religious tradition and social 
continuity'; the mujtahids carried, it is further argued, a 'dual role... as both spiritual and 
social leaders. '60 As in Cole's study of Nawabi Lucknow, then, the 'ulama functioned as 
an essentially self-governing corps and as mediators between the population and 
government. 61 
Co-ordinated attempts by the senior Shia `ulama to gain a presence in Lucknow's public 
space first appeared in the late 1880s. One of these attempts was the formation of 
madrasas as described above. Actually pre-dating these, however, was the re- 
establishment of traditional Friday prayers in Lucknow. In pre-colonial Lucknow, one of 
the greatest demonstrations of communal organisation among Shi'as had been the weekly 
congregation of Shia citizens for Friday prayers. According to Usuli Shi'ism as 
instituted by Dildar 'Ali in 1786, these namaz-i jum `a could only be said in one mosque 
in each city, a custom henceforth adhered to across the Shia world. However, the 
conversion of the Asafi mosque and the expansive compound in which it stood into 
military barracks in the wake of the British occupation of Lucknow had ceased the public 
religious functions of the institution. 62 No such congregational or Friday prayers were 
permitted in the mosque during this period, a source of serious grievance that elicited 
various failed petitions for the restoration of the Friday mosque for most of thirty years. 63 
According to one source, Shia namaz-i juin'a during this time were held in a mosque in 
64 Tehsinganj, a mosque allegedly too small for its burgeoning population. This was 
`9 Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'ism, pp. 199-203. 
"" Litvak, ShVi scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq, pp. 1-5. 
61 Such perspectives, it should be noted, offer an alternative perspective to the supposed turn inwards a%% ay 
from society described in studies of the Deobandi and other Sunni 'ulama. Metcalf, Islamic revit al in 
British India, pp. 1 1-4. 
('` See Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The making of colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877 (Princeton. 1984). pp-35-7, 
49-50,210. 
`'; For instance, Porter. Commissioner of Lucknow Division, to Chief Secretary to Gmernment of the 
United Provinces, undated, Political Dept. File No. 95 of 1906, UPSA. 
" Shakil Hasan Shamsi, Shia-Suni gazia: kitnä mazhabi kitnä siäsi? (Lucknow, circa 2(X)5), p. 85. 
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possibly a factor contributing to the relegation of the Shia population to the de- 
centralised spheres of the muhalla and local mosque for prayers throughout the early 
colonial period. 65 
A landmark moment in Shi'a religious and social life in colonial Lucknow came when 
the Asafi Masjid was released by the Government to the Husainabad trustees, and was 
again re-instated as a place of public prayer. In 1884, Friday prayers were allowed to 
commence here, and Muhammad Ibrahim, descendant of Dildar 'Ali and father-in-law of 
Aqa Hasan, was appointed peshnamaz (prayer-leader). 66 The release of the mosque to this 
representative of the Nasirabadi family of mujtahids made possible for the first time the 
collective weekly congregation of the city's Shi'as in worship for the first time in thirty 
years. It represented the re-opening of the central religious spaces of old Lucknow and 
offered a highly visible public role to the Shia faith which recalled the 'organised' 
character of Shia Lucknow during the Nawabi period. 
It seems entirely plausible that the ensuing weekly congregation of the municipal Shi'a 
population on a religious basis in a way which transcended the boundaries of family and 
muhalla contributed greatly to the formation of Shia solidarity in Lucknow. As will be 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, the years after 1884 mark the approximate moment 
at which serious efforts were made towards Shia religious renewal, educational 
betterment and public representation. Following the reassertion of their efficacy after the 
reinstatement of jum `a prayers and the formation of two madrasas, the `Mama of 
Lucknow from the 1890s made efforts to create a public podium through which they 
could further project their voice into Lucknawi society. In July 1901 a circle of 'Mama, 
prominent among whom were Aqa Hasan, Najm ul-Hasan and Nasir Husain, founded the 
Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor, otherwise known as the Kanferans-i-Imamiya-i-'Isna 
65 Oldenburg, The making of colonial Lucknow, pp. 36-7. 
6" Firdös-i-Makeln kä ta: kira (Lucknow, circa 1960), pp. 48-50; Aqa Hasan to Lieutenant Governor, 25 
March 1906, Political Department File No. 95 of 1906, UPSA; 'The Shias of Luckno ' to Lieutenant 
Governor, 12 April 1906, ihid; Porter, Commissioner of Lucknow Division, to Chief Secretary to the 
Government of the United Provinces, undated, ibid. 
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`Asharia, in Husainiyya Ghufran-i-Ma'ab. 67 The anjunian mimicked, both in terms of 
organisational structure and its emphasis upon sectarian solidarity, social welfare and 
cultural development, the public voluntary organisations and societies formed during the 
same period among various caste and religion-based groupings in north India. It al'. oo 
represented an attempt by the senior `ulama of Lucknow to use the creation of a public 
anjuman to reinforce their control over civic public space and exert influence across a 
broad spectrum of municipal affairs. 
The `ulumu described the organisation as an effort to secure the betterment. both worldIN 
and spiritual, of Indian Shia Muslims. From the outset it set up a two-pronged strategy 
for leadership and guidance in both worldly and religious (dini and dunva%t'i) matters. 68 
Indeed, it was this anjuman that first established the link, influential in later Shia 
organisations, between religious awareness and worldly uplift, the latter conditional upon 
the former. Spiritual furtherance and livelihood were described as two flowers of the 
same branch: as such, 'development will be granted following the establishment of 
shard `at upon this sect, and this condition will not be obtained for as long as the followers 
are not attentive to their religion. '69 On the one hand, it established a commercial 
(tijui-ati) branch, which pledged to improve the financial conditions of Shi'as and to 
promote business enterprises. Half of accumulated membership fees, it was said, would 
be channelled to this end. 70 This said, its emphasis was unequivocally upon its second 
branch, the department of religious propagation (tabligh). It intended to establish 
ma(lrusas, offer religious instruction and appoint religious leaders across India. Aqa 
Hasan specified the organisation's aims as: 
The appointment of peshnama: and titer `ixen... that they may tour 
about different cities and villages and, after spending ten or fifteen 
days may conduct Friday and congregational prayers and may 
continuously set out preachings and counsel, and religious and 
67 Ja'isi cd., KlOntlCin-i-ijti/z zI siambar, p. 74. In successive years it was managed from the apices of' : \ya 
Hasan in Jauhari'n uhulla. 
`'s, The anjunian, its supporters claimed, engaged in 'good secular and spiritual work' alike. Surnºn-i- 
Ro;. gur 16 March 1907, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports (UPNNR). OIOC. Marco cr, 
the Organisation W\ 1S explicitly non-political. pledging to remain aloof from issues cif government. All India 
Shi'a Conference, R55'idäd-i-ijläs-i- al eil-i--rl Inrliä Shia Kc-vn civns (Lurknoww, l9(),, -)), p.. 4. 
by lhid. 
, 7" 1a'isi ed., Rhüncljja-i-ijtihjW nambur, p. 73. 
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worldly education, and set essential examples. If the hazrat and 
mominin give them their attention, then the level of funding kv ill grow, 
so that another peshnamu;, or two may be appointed and another 
madrasa established. ' '7 
The Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor counted several achievements to this end. It founded the 
Dar-ul-Zikr, a printing and proselytising organisation discussed in the next chapter. as 
well as the Madrasa-i-Imamiya in Ghufran-i-Ma`ab i, nambarn in 1904. The inaktab 
sought to provide a solid grounding in both religious learning and Western-styled 
education throughout the first twelve years of one's schooling. synthesising disciplines as 
diverse as Arabic, Persian, English, philosophy, logic, science and economics, 7 
Perhaps the anjum/an's most enduring achievement, however, was its pitch for the 
command of the regulation of Muharram in Lucknow. In line with Shia observance, it 
attempted to eliminate the festivities which had traditionally accompanied many of the 
commemorations and instate a genuine atmosphere of mourning over the proceedings at 
Lucknow's main karbala at Talkatora, the burial site of to `,, ivas (effigies of the tomb of 
Imam Husain) to the south of Lucknow. Up until 1905, the route of the jcrloos 
(procession) and the environs of this karbala had experienced a iiielu (fair), nourishing 
and entertaining the crowds that congregated during this period, awash with shops, 
entertainments and displays and even tents for prostitutes. In advance the Muharrarn of 
1905, a deputation of 'influential gentlemen' and delegates of the Anjuman-i-Sadr-i- 
Sadoor met with the Commissioner of Lucknow, asking permission for the tightening of 
public discipline during the festival. Before the `Ashura (10`h day of Muharram, when 
ta'. 1\'as are buried) of 1905, word circulated that these `leading Shias' gathered around 
the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor had issued a decree attempting to impose an atmosphere 
of solemnity around the karbala and ta'ziva route. It was said that they had asked the 
local proprietors of land around the karbala and on the main route for the ta':, iva juloos 
71 Acta Hasan. Tcnjicnui-i Imýrd of fsfým hisa-i-meal: kitäb-id-tOhTci (Luckno%v, circa I9U5), p-2- 
72 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idnd-i-ijlas-i-uºtcnl, p. 5. To this end, the organisation sought monetary 
assistance from its followers in Lucknow. It charged a small membership ice and made it incumbent upon 
its members to e: ngage in fundraising and organisational responsibilities. H. tan. Tarjtf: rýa i Inýcýcl u! /sIä n. 
p. 2. It also instigated motivated personal fundraising by its founders. As 'wulci , a\ . rya Hasan's son some 
years later, 'my Bather, the late Qutvva't ul-'Ulama, had clothes-shops opened, and himself `erscd in those 
shops... he and a ievv other dignitaries would sell cigarettes. batteries and hiýcuits' in order to fund the 
activities of the uiljrnnu/l. Ja'i. i cd., K/irnnchn-i-ijtihäc/ numhur, p. 75. 
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to close their land to the revelries, entertainments and the sale of refreshments which had 
accompanied the commemorations in previous years, commands which many dul\ 
obeyed . 
73 In 1906, a leaflet nominally produced by the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor 
attempted to further advance this purification of religious practice, designating that entry 
to the karbala ground would only be granted to those dressed in black, with bare head 
and feet and who would recite an Arabic du'a (prayer) for the Shia Imams upon 
entering, all tokens of mourning hitherto practiced by Shi`as alone. '`` 
The resulting exclusion of most non-Shi'as from the karbala was the trigger for the 
establishment in 1906 of a separate Sunni karbala in Phulkatora, to the north of the city. 
The separation of Sunni (and many Hindu) observances of Muharram fron Shia 
equivalents is commonly interpreted as the source of Lucknow's extensive sectarian 
conflict over subsequent years, as discussed in the following chapter. British observers 
understood the seeming purification of Muharram practice as indicative of a 'religious 
revival' among Shi'as. 75 However, rather than any public religious fervour, these 
renovations of Muharram rites more precisely reflected an attempt by the inujtahids to 
reassert the essential Shia character of the public spaces of Lucknow. Further to the re- 
conquest of the Asafi Masjid compound in 1884 and the construction of nladrasas 
conducted at their behest, the senior religious authorities of Lucknow staked their claim 
to a further public assertion of a central tenet of Shi `ism. 
Such aggressive activities of religious reinvigoration and purification, compounded with 
the inattention to its more secular resolutions, ensured that the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadooi 
73 'Note' by Saivid Shahinshah Husain Rizvie, 15 December 1908, General Administration Department 
(GAD) File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA. It continues: 'I think [the regulations] %ýere made a little more 
stringent in the direction of decency and decorum... I think the owners of' land on both sides of the road 
from the Aishhagh Road turning to Ghaziuddin Haidar's canal must have been consulted as %ýcll as the 
owners of the lands immediately around the Tal Katora Karbala; their consent had been obtained bv the 
leading Shl'as before thc\ approached me. ' 'Note. ' Appendix to Piggott Committee Report, ibid. 
74 Ibid. Some members of the Anjuman itself denied issuing the notice, although the I 'act that it vv as wide] 
considered genuine suggests that it was in keeping with common perceptions of' the anjwnan's activities 
and ambitions. 
, 75 The Picýeott Committee, appointed in 1908 to examine the roots of Shia-Sunni tensions, said that it %ß, ts 
not surprising that anvthing of the nature of a religious revival amongst the Shi`as should hale produced as 
one of its consequences a desire to renew and accentuate the character of these festivals as days of 
mourning, and to free their celebration from... abuses. ' Ibid. 
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failed to become the all-embracing religio-secularist organ to which it aspired. While 
communicating lofty aspirations for a unanimous Shia congregation, the stringent 
retention of the organisation's leadership in the hands of the mujtahids, its administration 
from the offices, homes and printing presses of `ulama and its focus upon the propagation 
of faith all ensured that the anjuman carried a distinctly religious aspect. The 
controversies surrounding the Muharram reforms, together with a high-profile argument 
with the Muslim Educational Conference discussed in Chapter 3, ensured that the 
organisation was interpreted by some as an antagonistic, communal or political body , set 
up to do the will of its clerical management. It created some high-profile opposition, and 
after some six years the anjuman was ultimately dissolved by its original founders. 76 
These later developments aside, the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor was a significant 
influence among Lucknow's Shi'as for several years, and upon the direction of sectarian 
activity in future organisations. For instance, it called for the establishment of organs that 
would eventually be founded by the Shia Conference, such as a madrasa to train 
wa `icen, a Shi `a College, and an institution to oversee the management of Shia augaf. 
Moreover, the anjulnan represented perhaps the most dramatic intervention into public 
life thus far by the `uluma of colonial Lucknow. It signified their first attempt to establish 
public associations among Lucknow's Shi'as which would be shared with non-'ulania on 
a basis of simple religious commonalty. It was also the first such systematised attempt to 
secure their sway over 'secular' public issues such as commerce and development. 
Moreover, while never making its intended impact outside of Lucknow, no less was the 
association a path-breaking articulation of aspirations for an all-India presence for Shia 
public organisations, and attempts to cultivate affiliations and membership outside the 
socio-cultural milieu of its mother city. 
7`, Husain, . 11atla'-i-Amt 
Jr, p. 661. 
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A Shia Conference for India 
Even before the formation of the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor. the idea appears to have 
circulated that some form of conference, a meeting of community representatives for the 
exchange of views on modern socio-economic and educational questions. was needed 
among Shi'as. A series of early efforts had been made in this direction from the 1880s 
onwards, and despite only modest success they were hailed by advocates as evidence that 
`the whole community seemed ripe for the experiment... the sectarian papers and leaders 
demanded a gathering of the sort and denounced the lethargy under which the [Shi'a] 
nation is labouring. '77 The notion of a Shia Conference bore the clear influence of 
contemporary organisations such as the Indian National Congress and Muhammadan 
Educational Conference, and demonstrates the extent to which the self-appointed 
religious and public representatives of Shi'as, rather than being bound to memories of 
their faded grandeur as has often been assumed, had adapted entirely the national currents 
of community-based activism and pressure-group petitioning which characterised public 
life in the era of elite nationalism. 
In the aftermath of the arguments besetting the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor, a number of 
individuals including Aqa Hasan, the Aligarhist Ghulam ul-Saglain, and Sayyid 
Muhammad Hadi, the current principal of Madrasa Nazimiya, convened to ascertain the 
best strategy for ensuring the future well-being of India's Shi`as. The opinion emerged 
that, in order to overcome such divisions, Shias should organisation as a `Conference' 
rather than an 'anju man, ' and should seek a balance between the 'ulcuna and English- 
speaking ha: rut. In contrast to its predecessor, moreover, the Conference should not he 
confined to Lucknow. 78 In the monsoon of 1907, Muhammad Hadi and `Ali Ghazanfar 
77 Tribune (Lahore), 18 October 1907, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge (CSASý. Some carlv. 
albeit short-li\ ed efforts in this direction included the Anjuman-i-Imamiya, founded in Lucknoý% in 1888-9. 
a conference considcring 'means for improving the conditions of the Shias' in I$99, and the Anjuman-i- 
1 ýI, / 'r l. r! . 11ýýlllinrrll Jalariva, founded hv the Sav y ids of Barha and convened at the close of 1905. 
(Lucknom ), w eck starting 2 June 1 890. Owlh . 
Ak/thin- (Luckno w ). 20 October 1899. Ul'N NR, Tribune 
(Lahore). 18 October 1907, ('SAS. 
7x ': \li Naqi Safi, Sa/ilfa'r ul-, nil/c/t i /lln'/l/t 
/7C' /uk/m tjaýir (Lucknow, undated), pp. `s-9. 
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toured U. P. and Bengal to promote support for the idea. 79 The first session of the All 
India Shi'a Conference, composed of some 450 attendants, eventually convened in 
October 1907. Organised from the home of the young Lucknawi barrister A`gha Husain. it 
was held in the prestigious Rifah-i-`Ani compound of old Lucknow. 80 It was decided at 
this session that the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor would be dissolved, and the present 
organisation, formed out of the ashes of the latter, be renamed the All India Shia 
Conference. Yet according to one source, and despite the presence of more so-called 
ghuir- `uluma (non- `ulama), the Conference's structure remained markedly similar to that 
of its predecessor. 8' Lucknow's mujtahids were consistently attendant at its sessions and 
involved in its campaigns. Aqa Hasan was hailed as its founder, and Najm ul-Hasan was 
confirmed sajjada-nashin (president of the organisation) in early sessions of the 
Conference. Over subsequent sessions, the presidential chair would be held for the most 
part by mujtahids of Lucknow. 82 
This association convened annually and became the first Shi'a organisation to, relatively 
successfully, convene support across the boundaries of locality and even of province. 
Structures were put in place by which envoys could be deputed to other towns and 
villages, members enlisted, the aims of the conference expounded, and donations for its 
projects collected. Within a year, such emissaries were received in certain districts of 
former Awadh and in Benares, Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Moradabad and Muzaffarnagar, and 
soon after in many districts in Bihar, Punjab and Hyderabad. 83 In some cases, it was said, 
local inhabitants were initially unenthused by the Conference, but were soon persuaded 
by its envoys to back it. Conference proceedings thereafter included accounts by such 
envoys, listing the number of Shi'as and Shia institutions in these towns, the Sum of 
donations elicited, and the names of newly obtained signatories. By 1910, the Conference 
boasted some 5000 members. -' 
79 Tribune (Lahore). 18 October 1907, CSAS. The latter of these two men \ as a resident cif Luckno v. ho 
would act as the permanent secretary of the Shia Conference for most of its first decade. 
80 Ibid. 
8! Safi, . Sulii/o't uf-minnt, pp. 9-10. 
82 Nash Husain, for instance, held the presidential chair in the fourth session at Amroha in 1910. 
11 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idüd-i-ijhs-i-chunrhoonr-i-. -fl India Shia Känferans, muurugida 10-12 
October 1910 (Lucknow 1) 1 11. passim. 
All India Shia Conference, 
4 
In contrast to its predecessor, the Shia Conference at its outset managed to embrace a 
diversity of eminent Shia individuals, ' Ulanza shared a public platform with 
representatives of Lucknow's wasiqadars, landed magnates such as the Nawab:, of 
Rampur and Pirpur, moderate nationalists such as the Raja of Nlahmudabad, 
educationalists like Ghulam ul-Saqlain, and spokesmen from many towns and districts. 
Its ability to do this stemmed in part from its commitment, inherited from the Anjuman-i- 
Sadr-ul-Sadoor and re-stated as the first resolution of its first session, to abstain from 
comment upon affairs of government. 85 Avoiding the minefield of political affiliation, the 
anjuman instead focused from the outset upon the supposedly consensual matters of the 
advancement of the social, moral and intellectual condition of the Shia in India. 'h" The 
Shi'a Conference thereby initially cut across the political divisions between %l'asiyadar 
and taluqdar, loyal and nationalist. At the same time, the divide between religious and 
secular constituencies was, in contrast to certain other Muslim organisations of the time, 
largely bridged by the continuation of the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor's interlocking of 
religious and worldly agendas. Restating this ethic, the second resolution of the first 
session declared that `faith and the renewal of religious principles should assist in 
worldly life, which is not antagonistic to religion. '87 Replicating and reaffirming the 
opinion that religious and material betterment were inseparable and interlinked, the Shi'a 
Conference thus rested on a platform of recuperation from perceived cultural, economic 
and educational 'backwardness' (gadda `i) from which few deemed it necessary to 
dissociate. 
This struggle for combined spiritual and material renewal among Shi'as permeated the 
Ss' 
approximately 150 resolutions passed during the Conference's first eight sessions. 
which focused on a range of broad and related principles: the renewal of Islamic law and 
guidance on religious Custom and responsibility: the formation of Shia maclrusus, 
schools and colleges: the improvement of commercial enterprise and CCO FomiC \\cll- 
"5 All India Shia Conference. Rö'idýad-i-ijlas-i- (oval. 1). 4. 
xn Ow/lr Akhbar (Luckno w ), 15 October 1907. UPNNR. 
87 All India Shia Conference. awnl, p. 4. 
All India Stil 'i Conference, Rcö'idl d-i-ijl -i- hashtim, 1914. p. 9. 
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being; the foundation of Shia printing presses and newspapers and the distribution of 
religious literature; the preservation of knowledge of Arabic, Persian and Urdu; the 
enumeration of India's Shia population; the promotion of good relations between Shi'as 
and other religious and Muslim communities in India; the reparation and correct 
management of religious foundations such as mosques, imambaras and augaf; the 
dispensation of charity in the shape of education grants and provision for orphans, 
widows and the destitute; and not least, the consolidation of the Shia Conference as the 
prime organ for the expression of Shia needs and interests and the source of guidance 
(islah) for the Shi `as of India. 
Despite the articulation of such high ideals and lofty rhetoric, the Shi'a Conference was 
ultimately most significant not as a final result of Shia organisation, but as a so-called 
`congress of anjumans. '89 The Conference became the platform for the further 
construction and propagation of numerous Shia associations and societies, a point which 
it recognised in its remark upon the `pressing need to establish new anjumans and 
reinforce current ones. '90 These anjumans, often described as `branches' (shakhen) of the 
Shi'a Conference itself, were distinct in character and purpose while reinforcing the co- 
operative ethos inherited from their parent organisation. 
Lucknow was the place most transformed by the emergence of these associations, and it 
is worth giving some examples of the most significant among them. One of the 
Conference's prime achievements was the Shia Orphanage. Its foundation came in 1912, 
following a number of supportive resolutions passed by the Shia Conference over 
several years, petitions for funds from Aqa Hasan and substantial donations from 
talugdars such as Yusuf Husain Khan. 91 The orphanage was one of the more enduring of 
the Conference's branches. Within two years it contained some 200 orphans, around a 
quarter of whom were of Lucknawi origin. 92 Described by one supporter as the centre of 
89 All India Shia Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i- awal, p. 1. 
90 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i- chhatr-i-Äl India Shi'ah KCInferans, munagidah 18-20 
October 1912 (Lucknow, 1913), p. 71. 
'' Ibid. pp. 114-123,133-34. 
92 All India Shia Conference. Rö'iddd-i-ijids-i-hashtim, 1914, pp. 104-1 18. 
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our communal activities, '93 the orphanage's significance for Lucknow's Shi`as extended 
beyond its functionary duties to its role in fostering social and religious solidarities. 
Surprisingly, some eighty percent of entrants to the orphanage were said to be of Sad yid 
descent, a fact seen as a stain upon India's supposedly mannered, hospitable and family- 
conscious Shi'a elites. 94 As such, as was elucidated by one supporter, the orphanage 
represented an intermediary institution between family and the supposed religious 
community, presenting the opportunity for the religious community to intervene in a 
situation where the affiliations of family had failed . 
95 Moreover, the orphanage was not 
simply a welfare foundation, but a theatre of religious instruction. Declaring that it was 
the will of the Prophet that orphans be taught, tutors from Madrasa Nazimiya were 
enlisted in service of the orphanage and some of its donations were received on condition 
that religious education was administered. 96 The indivisible association in the orphanage 
of the provision of food and shelter with religious education and moral instruction 
ensured that the institution was not a mere charitable foundation but a religious 
congregation (hashr), which cultivated its occupants as vigorously as the emerging Shia 
maktabs and madrasas. 97 
The orphanage was not the only scheme of charity (waza `if) established by the 
Conference. Alongside it were educational grants for poor students, hospices for widows, 
and importantly the Shia Boarding House, set up in Lucknow on the back of private 
donations in l912.9ß Like the orphanage, the funding and condition of the latter were 
perhaps not of the highest standard. However these two organisations, together with other 
charitable enterprises, prove the earlier point that many Shia associations emulated 
communal organisation among other religious communities in India. The successful 
construction of both such institutions by Hindus and Sikhs was cited as a model for Shia 
"; All India Shia conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address His 
Highness Mir Ali Nawaz 
Khan Talpur, ruler of Khairpur State (Khairpur, circa. 1930), p. 11. 
ya Ibid. 
v5 Ibid, p. 13. 
"6 All India Shia Conference. Rö'idäd-i-ijlds-i- chhatä, 1912, p-34- 
97 Ja'isi cd., Khändän-i-ijtihäd nambar, p. 86. 
98 All India Shia Conference. Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i- chhatä, 1912, pp. 1,23-68. 
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activities, 99 not to mention the zealous backing of orphanages for Europeans hý Christian 
groups and the colonial state in contemporary India. 100 
A surprising addition to these enterprises was the Conference's key commercial 
experiment: the so-called Shi `a Sugar Company of Lucknow. The Company appears to 
have been largely unsuccessful on account of internal mismanagement, unsuccessful 
record-keeping and the deflating price of sugar. 1°' The organisation is less significant for 
its actual success than for what it represented: the expansion of an organised sectarian 
agenda into professional fields. The intention was that a portion of the Sugar Company's 
revenue would be contributed to the orphanage and boarding house, and that members of 
the orphanage would receive business training within the Company. 102 The Shia 
Conference thus envisaged the full integration of the anjumans affiliated to it, by 
intention mutually supportive in a way which could provide the foundations of a 
functioning, self-reliant community. 
Other Conference-initiated anjumans were simpler, localised affairs which aimed at 
religious renewal in particular muhallas of Lucknow. The Anjuman-i-Ta'mir-i-Masajid 
was formed to construct and maintain Shia mosques in Lucknow, and the Anjuman 
Mushir ul-Iman appeared to be conducting similar work in the decaying Shi'a muhalla of 
Rustamnagar. 1 03 Imambaras were repaired alongside mosques; the famed Husainiyya 
Ghufran-i-Ma'ab and Imambara Akram-ullah Khan were both restored in the early 
twentieth century on the back of personal donations and requests, urged by the 
Conference. i°4 Even the wasiqadars of Lucknow, that most insular circle of former 
royalty and nobility who were traditionally least prone to adopting the new means and 
9" Ibid, p. 33. 
IM Orphanages for Europeans were founded across nineteenth century by church and state as a means of' 
maintaining the cultural distinctiveness and superiority of the colonisers. Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal 
knowledge and imperial power: race and the intimate in colonial rule (Berkeley. 2002). pp. 69-70. It seems 
that elite Shi'as in Lucknow may have been seeking to achieve a similar end in the municipal context. The 
idea that orphanages were, furthermore, used as guises for religious prose)}tisation is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
101 All India Shi'a Conference, Ro'idad-i-ijläs-i-chärlroni, /910, pp. 103- I4. It is also %%orth mentionintz 
that certain caste formations established a Prayag Sugar Company in Allahabad in 1910. 
102 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idüd-i-ijläs-i- chhatü, 1912, p. 121. 
IN All India Shia Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i- hashrim, 1914, pp. 71-2. 
104 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'iddd-i-ijläs-i-chärhöm, 1910, pp. 121-2. 
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methods of Lucknow's media and associational life, constructed among themselves new 
anjumans such as the Anjuman-i-Khandan-i-Shahi, the Anjuman-i-Wasigadaran-v-a- 
Pensionaran-i-Shahi, and the Anjuman ui-Ir'kan. '05 
One of the most important and influential departments of the Shia Conference was its 
Central Standing Waqf Committee, appointed to supervise the condition and 
administration of Shia augaf, or endowments. This committee aspired to establish local 
waqf committees in every city and qasba, composed of local members of the Shia 
Conference who would compile reports on such auqaf listing the mutawalli, revenue and 
expenditure. 106 The aim was that the Conference bodies could themselves supervise that 
the auqaf were being managed by correct means and according to the intentions of their 
founder, and that embezzlement by corrupt trustees would be stopped. 107 The supervision 
of auqaf was frequently the starting point for the reparation of mosques, imambaras and 
the regulation of Muharram and majlis gatherings, all of which frequently depended on 
such endowed wealth. In towns with a significant long-standing Shia presence such as 
Meerut, Moradabad and Jansath, registries of all municipal Shi'a auqaf were produced. 
108 
The Conference aspired to the classification of a full list of India's Shia augaf, and it 
was resolved that in cases of the proven poor condition of auqaf help of government 
would be requested, and information would be circulated in the press. 
1°9 Unsurprisingly, 
the large auqaf of Lucknow, especially the Husainabad wagf, were the first subject of the 
Waqf Committee's attentions. Attempts were made to streamline its management and use 
its revenue to support local educational projects and some of the Conference's own work, 
such as the orphanage and boarding house and the repair of religious buildings. 
110 
Unsurprisingly, as in other instances, this brought the Conference into conflict with the 
mutawallis of such auqaf who had long held jurisdiction over the endowed revenue, and 
10S All India Shia Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i- hashtim, 1914. p. 74. 
106 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijlis-i-aval, pp. 110-4. All India Shia Conference, Rö'idad-i- 
ijlis-i-chärhöm, pp. 111-21. 
107 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i-chärhöm, 1910, pp. I1 1-3. 
108 All India Shi'a Conference, RO'idäd-i-ijhs-i- hashtim, 1914. pp. 1 12-4. 
109 All India Shia Conference, Ro'idäd-i-ijläs-i-chhatä, 1912, pp. 138-9.142-3: All India Shia 
Conference, Rö7däd-i-ijl5s-i- hashtini, 1914, p. 185. 
110 All India Shia Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i-chärhöm, 19/0, pp. 114-117. 
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many of whom were themselves members of the Conference. "" The concern for the 
proper administration of endowed wealth echoed the efforts of earlier Muslim 
foundations to advocate a central examination of India's auqaf, especially the Central 
Muhammadan Association which had attempted such a task in 1885, and indicates that 
the failure of these efforts prompted Shi'as to seek solutions to the issue on their own 
initiative. " 2 
Of lasting impact, moreover, was the Shia Conference's creation of a vigorous press. 
Akhbar-i-Imamiya of Lucknow was the first Shi'a newspaper, running in the 1890s. 
Others opened in Lucknow early in the twentieth century, including Shi'a Gazette, 
Imamiya ka qadim tariqah, Sayarah and Al-Ma `ruf. All of these, however, were confined 
to Lucknow, appeared to have a limited circulation and some closed soon after 
opening. ' 13 Affiliated with the Shia Conference, the newspaper Ittehad-i-Islam (lit: `The 
unity of Islam') was founded in September 1910 in Amroha. In common with much of 
the emerging Urdu press but in contrast to earlier Shi `a papers, its editor Sayyid Mujahid 
Husain Jauhar, a resident of Amroha, was a young and active proponent of social and 
religious reform. 114 The newspaper quickly simplified its name to Ittehad, and switched 
to a weekly rather than monthly circulation. The newspaper was one of the great success 
stories of U. P. 's vigorous Urdu press in the 1910s, with the number of distributed copies 
growing rapidly through the 1910s and increasing by some 350% by 1915.11-5 The fact 
that the newspaper was frequently referenced in the wider U. P. press and attracted 
contributing writers from towns as diverse as Lucknow, Bijnor, Etawah and Ghazipur 
confirm the newspaper as the first successful attempt to rouse a Shi'a readership across 
particular localities. The newspaper became the mouthpiece of Shi'a Conference views 
111 Ibid, p. 95. Conflicts occurred between the representatives of the Shia Conference's Waqf Board and 
trustees of auqaf in Meerut, Hooghly, Bhagalpur and Gorakhpur. among others. 
112 All India Shia Conference, Rö'iddd-i-ijläs-i-chhatä, 1912, pp. 143-4. A full investigation of Shia 
auqaf and their reform would demand a much fuller examination than is permitted here. 
1" All India Shia Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i-hash tim, 1914, p. 72. 
114 He was born in 1882-3. Listings of the vernacular press, 2 June 1911. UPNNR. A brief hiography of 
Mujahid Husain Jauhar is available in Sayyid Aja'iz Husain Riz's i Jarchv i, . 4njuman-i-Wazifa-i-Südät-ý u- 
M©rninin silvar jiübilf nahtbar (New Delhi, 1933), p. 12. 
115 See for instance, Listings of the vernacular press, 2 June 1911 and 2 Jul N, 1915, UPNNR. 
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and propaganda and, as is proven in subsequent chapters, was an unprecedented influence 
in the formation of Shia solidarities across the limits of family and qasba. 
While Lucknow unsurprisingly experienced the greatest impact from the Shia 
Conference, no less important was the Conference's creation of anjumans outside of 
Lucknow. As was shown above, the Conference deputed envoys to various localities in 
U. P. and elsewhere to conduct assessments of local Shia communities and institutions 
and to garner support and membership for the Shi'a Conference. A connected 
responsibility of such envoys was to establish organisations affiliated to the Shia 
Conference in all districts, so that `by the influence of the Conference in all corners of 
India, all people need to promote solidarity, thus from our brotherhood we can create 
anjumans, send out teachers and make shari `at current. ' 116 Local anju, nans newly 
emerging across U. P. through the influence of the Conference include the Anjuman-i- 
Jafariya, Barha; Anjuman Nasir ul-Iman, Amroha; Anjuman-i-Imamiya, Macchlishehr, 
Jaunpur district; Anjuman Imamiya Society, Bareilly; Anjuman-i-Nasiriya, Bijnor; 
Anjuman-i-Imamiya, Gurdaspur; Anjuman-i-Rifah-ul-Islam, Dandopur, Allahabad 
district; Anjuman-i-Shi'a, Badaun; Anjuman-i-Imamiya, Shahganj, Agra; Medina't ul- 
Shi`a, Chanagarh, Mirzapur district; Anjuman-i-Haideriya, Sinthal, Bareilly; Anjuman-i- 
Imamiya, Saharanpur; Anjuman-i-Mehdiviya, Ghazipur; Anjuman-i-Sera'i Mir, 
Azamgarh; Anjuman-i-'Aliya, Sultanpur; Anjuman-i-Husainiya, Allahabad; Anjuman-i- 
`Isna `Ashariya, Hardoi; Anjuman-i-Husainiya, Noganwan, Moradabad district; 
Anjuman-i-Sajjadiya, Rae Bareili. l 7 Compounding this was a similar albeit less 
spectacular proliferation of Conference-linked anjumans outside U. P.. 
118 
By 1912, the Conference claimed the existence of a stunning 123 anew vans working 
around the country at its behest. 19 The functions of these organs were as diverse as the 
qasbas in which they emerged. Most were simply small alliances geared towards 
116 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ij1äs-i-chärhöm, 1910, p. 50. 
11' Ihid, pp. 33,36,41-2,91-2; All India Shia Conference, Ro'rdäd-i-ijhTi'-i-chhatä, 1912. pp. 71,143,157; 
All India Shi'a Conference. R5'idüd-i-ijläs-i-/iashtim, 1914, pp. 41,47,51.108,167. 
"" Outside U. P., they included Anjuman-i-Murtazwi. Amritsar; Anjuman-i-Muhammadi. Matia Burj. 
Bengal; Anjuman-i-Hifaz-i-Auqaf, Bengal; Anjuman-i-Shi'a-ul-Safa. Sonipat; Anjuman-i-Mu'id-i-Shi'a 
Kanferans, Hyderabad. Ibid. 
119 All India Shi'a Conference, R5'idäd-i-ijläs-i- chhatä, 191?, p. 71. 
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overseeing Muharram ceremonies, and administrating the rites of azadari (mourning). 
Others supervised the functioning of mosques and imambaras in their towns. or the 
distribution of religious texts. Others were wider in scope. Agra's Anjuman-i-Imami\a 
and Barha's Anjuman-i-Jafariya considered means for the betterment of Shi'as in these 
localities, while the Medina't ul-Shi'a of Chanagarh and the Anjuman Imami\ a Society 
of Bareilly, otherwise known as the Loyal Shia Society, aimed to promote Shia 1()N alts 
to government. The Anjuman-i-'Isna `Ashariya of Hardoi, meanwhile, was encouraged 
by the Shi'a Conference to expand beyond the regulation of Muharram and azaclari and 
address wider issues. ' 20 However, arguably for the first time since the British annexation 
of Awadh, the watchfulness of the Shia Conference over such anjumans gave these 
communities a concrete link with the secular and religious Shia leadership in Lucknow. 
This wide associational network distinguished the Shia Conference from its 
predecessors, including the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor. A religion-based public sphere 
among Shia communities in particular towns could thus be tied into a broader 
organisational web of Shi `a anjumans, with the Shi `a Conference at its centre. 
Indeed, despite its supposed all-India status, the Conference was largely confined to the 
Shi `as of the United Provinces. Its presence in provinces such as Punjab and Bengal 
remained minimal. It was regretted that the Conference had no connection with the Shia 
population in many major provinces of India, 121 and it was a telling fact that all of its first 
nine sessions were held in U. P. or Patna. 122 More precisely still, and contrary to its claims 
to all-India status, the Shia Conference was at heart an organisation of Lucknow. As was 
admitted by a speaker at one of its sessions, 'all the hopes of the Shi'as of Lucknow are 
attached to the Shia Conference, and it is clear that while this is the Conference of all the 
Shi'as of India, Lucknow is its presidential seat, and so necessarily it is most attentive to 
the Shi `as of Lucknow. ' 23 Lucknow was the seat of the niujtahicls who founded the 
Conference and usually acted as its sajjada nashins, the site of its offices and the location 
12U This was the rase with Shia cuijumclns in Hardoi. All India Shia Conference, 
c/ uzr/iö in 1910, p. 7:. 
121 All India Shia Conference. Röö'! [latl-i-ijlas-i-Ihas/itini. 1914, p. 1 1. 
122 The location, of its earliest s scions were as I'ollovvs: Lucknow (1907.190ti. 1901). I914), : 1mroha 
(1910). Benares (1911). Patna (1912). Jaunpur (191 H), Allahahad (1915). 
12.4 All India Shia Conference. huslitiiº1,1914. p. 9S. 
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from which its envoys were widely deputed. As the Conference expanded, subsequent 
reforms only seemed to enhance its centralised structure. The Central Committee of the 
Conference, presenting a national composition, symbolically contained quotas of 
members from each province of India. However the Conference's most influential body 
was the Intizamiya Committee, which elected the former and managed the monthly 
administration rather than annual sessions of the Conference. Half of this committee's 
forty seats were reserved for Lucknawi residents. 124 The Shia Conference, like the great 
madrasas of Lucknow, thus served largely to augment the influence of its mother city 
across the wide and disparate Shi `a communities of India. 
Shia anjuman-building: the construction and integration of sectarian organisations 
The key to understanding the apparently enhanced awareness of religious identity and its 
implications for the fostering of baradari (brotherhood) among north India's Shi'as from 
the late-nineteenth century is the process of anjuman-building outlined above. This 
chapter has identified some of the most important Shia anjumans of both religious and 
secular orientations and has indicated their functions, support, sources of funding and 
methods of recruitment. Many of the most important Shia anjumans founded in colonial 
Lucknow, such as the Madrasa't ul-Wa`izen, the Shi'a College and the Sarfaraz Qaumi 
Press, were projects initiated by the Shia Conference which would come to match or 
surpass the Conference as important influences in their own right, and are discussed 
individually in subsequent chapters. 125 This said, these and the organisations discussed 
above are only the most visible instances of a much wider trend in the formation of 
sectarian associations from the late 1880s. One Lucknow newspaper claimed in 1907 that 
`the Shias have formed several societies of their own in almost every quarter of the 
'. a Ibid, pp. 12-14. 
12` The Madrasa't ul-Wa'izen appears to have been the fruit of the frequent call in Shia 
Conference 
resolutions for a Shi'a 'Mission, ' while the Shi'a College resulted 
from frequent call', for . such an 
institution. For some early references to some of these objectives in the Shia Conference, see 
ibid. pp. 25- 
27. 
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town, ' 126 most of which have left no significant documentary record but doubtlessly 
made their contribution to Shi'a solidarity and exclusivity in the muhallas of old 
Lucknow. Similarly, the many anjumans simultaneously and hastily arranged across U. P. 
among the various Shia gentries of the qasbas of Awadh and Rohilkhand, while leaving 
little information on their activities, also identify this period and particularly the first two 
decades of the twentieth century as an era of striking reformist activity among Shi `as of 
numerous classes and localities. Few of these organisations appear to have had much 
influence outside their own qasbas or to have left any substantial written records of their 
composition, and it is difficult to speculate with any precision on the effects of these 
various anjumans upon the Shia communities in the particular arenas in which they 
operated. What can be assumed is that they fostered a consciousness of religious 
distinctiveness among certain elites in those towns where they emerged, and promoted 
Shia commonality as a basis for public organisation. 
However, it is worth examining this process of anjuman-building as a whole, in order to 
decipher why the language of tanzim and this organisational structure became so central 
in modern Shi'a reform, and to discuss the connections between the various Shi'a 
anjumans emerging at this time. This chapter has given several indications of why tanzim 
was such a prominent and ubiquitous component of Shia religious and social renewal. 
One factor is that the process of organisation instituted by Shia anjumans paralleled 
various other religious and educational movements that emerged after the expansion of 
British rule in the North Western Provinces and Awadh. 127 The formation of Shi'a 
madrasas resembled the simultaneous establishment of several Deobandi seminaries 
across the Doab, and internal reforms in the structures of teaching and funding within 
these madrasas similarly compare strongly with their Deobandi forerunners. The debt of 
the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor and the Shia Conference to elite nationalist and 
communal foundations such as the National Congress and Muhammadan Educational 
12" An-Najm (Lucknow), 10 July 1907, UPNNR. One example of this is a number of committees founded 
around this time to oversee the proper conduct of Shi'a funerals, following perception that proper customs 
were not being followed. Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an oriental culture (London. 
1975), p. 213. 
127 For a discussion of such organisations, see Gail Minault, Secluded scholars: women'. s education and 
Muslim social reform in colonial India (New Delhi, 1998), pp. 158-75. 
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Conference is self-evident. Moreover, the focus upon the correction of popular practice 
and religious ritual as a central priority of religious reform evoked assumptions common 
to the Bareilvi and Deobandi movements as well as concurrent Hindu revviv alism. 
At the same time, the above discussion could also be suggested to how the notion 
of tanzirr was in part inspired by a so-called 'culture of organisation' endemic to the 
colonial period, by which the re-structuring of societal institutions encouraged indigenous 
communities to emulate the colonial administration's organisational and regulatory 
styles. Zavos, for instance, traces wide processes of religious systematisation to a so- 
called 'colonial discourse of organisation, ' by which nineteenth-century systems of law, 
infrastructural development and bureaucracy set a modern administrative standard which 
`projected organisation as a cultural force' and came to influence the reformist dialogues 
within religious communities. 128 This connection is certainly evident in organisations 
such as the Shia Conference which included many leaders close to governmental 
machinery such as talirgdars and lawyers and which made a habit of petitioning the 
government, in the process emulating its language and style. Yet it is equally feasible that 
the will to order and regulate religious education can in part be traced to the societal and 
administrative reforms generated under colonial rule. The spokesmen of the Shia 
madrasas evoked ideas of tanzini and dastur-i-`annal (regulation), to replace the 
unordered and informal teaching systems of old. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
words of Najm ul-Hasan's son and successor Akbar Husain Rizvi, justifying the need for 
the foundation of the Madrasa't ul-Wa'izen in 1919: 
Our world, enamoured with organisation and regulation (tanzirr-va- 
tartib), is developing with great speed in the direction of active 
systematisation and administration (nizuni-va-tnrtrb-i-`uinal). So, it is our 
pressing need that a new Mission should be assembled, in conformity 
with the present age. ' 129 
It is clear from these words that the theme of tunziin articulated by t`. P. 's Shi'as was 
fashioned very much according to the bureaucratised, organisational culture of the 
colonial period, which became engrained in indigenous cultural and religious rciorm. 
l2 John Zavos. T/u emergence ()t Hinc! ºr nationalism in {ridi(i (Ncw Delhi. 2000). lip, 
20, ')4_ 
129 Rii\ i.. 1/adraLc a't ul-It ci T fl ki a tcrz. p. s. 
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A further factor contributing to this organisational language is the appropriation ul the 
emerging institutions of public activity and collective action in the urban space, such a. 
the voluntary public association and the printing press. The nemork of Shia an jwnaw, 
compares with Carey Watt's study of the wider `associational culture' of north India in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, by which both nationalist and religio- 
culturalist activity were characterised by a `proliferation of organisations dedicated to 
social service and constructive public work. ' 130 Just as organisations such as Gokhale's 
Servants of India constructed notions of citizenship through activities of social service, so 
a sense of wider solidarity among Shi `as was fostered through their co-ordinated 
contributions to this anjurnan network. Furthermore, in the context of Lucknow itself, 
these Shia anjumans reflected the various other public meetings, reform societies and 
civic associations which had arisen from Lucknow's budding middle class since the 
1880s. Joshi's study of colonial Lucknow has alerted us to how this emergent public 
sphere in Lucknow played an important role in the formation of a new middle class tied 
by professional commonalty that supplanted family ties and the advantages of elite 
heritage. '3' In a similar way, the same institutions could be appropriated for the 
cultivation of bonds of religious affiliation which crossed the constraints of kinship and 
municipality. 
A second question related to these Shia reformist associations is whether this plethora of 
organisations can be understood as an integrated, organised network of activity across 
U. P., or whether these various anjwnans functioned independently, even chaotically, 
without any sense of overarching programme. On the one hand, despite their 
predominantly local organisation, these anjumans in some ways together provided an 
integrated structure for wider reform. The above analysis has shown that this plethora of 
organisations had at its head a comparatively small network of leaders, many of whom 
were senior 'ulama or established social and political figures, often with tics to Lucknow. 
Together with such a small and intertwined headship. these Shi'a organi,, ations also 
110 Carey Watt, Serving the nation: cultures o service, associctticrrr and c'itiZoishilr in colonial India (Nc%ý 
Delhi, 2005), p. 20. 
"º Jc)shi, Fractured modernity, pp. 23-., 1. 
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sported an interlocking network of managers, donors and publicists. Moreover, assigning 
functionary roles to elements as diverse as `ulama, preachers, small-town landed families 
and urban officials, these anjumans were able to bring together co-religionists who in 
other contexts may have seemed dissimilar or incompatible. Many such individuals 
working as assistants on behalf of Shia anjumans maintained constant contact with each 
other, and were periodically invited to serve in other like-minded organisations. As such, 
these associations formed a collective network which fused together a host of activities 
that otherwise appeared to be localised and disparate. 
At the head of this network was the Shi'a Conference, which became the chief agent of 
the numerous public activities of various Shi'a associations and bore true to its stated role 
as a `Congress of anjumans. ' The relation between the Conference and the numerous 
associations founded at its behest was varied. In many cases, envoys of the Shi'a 
Conference appear to have founded the organisation themselves, while associations such 
as the Anjuman-i-Husaini of Noganwan were founded expressedly to do its will. 132 In 
other cases, the example of the Shia Conference seems to have inspired local elites to 
found such anjumans on their own initiative. Sometimes the Shi'a Conference simply re- 
invigorated pre-existent associations, while a few others, such as the Anjuman-i- 
Ja'fariya, were subsumed into it. It is a telling fact indeed that the various anjumans 
founded and integrated by the Conference were described not as independent associates 
of the Conference, but as subordinate (mataht) anjumans, working on its behalf. '33 
Beyond enabling the synchronised reform of India's Shi'as, therefore, the Shi'a 
Conference attempted to establish itself as the central manager of reform. From this 
emerged a degree of concern among smaller Shia communities that the Conference 
should not be allowed to dominate local organisations. Some newspapers described the 
attempts of smaller Shi'a associations to demonstrate their autonomy from it. Shi'as 
should unite around the work conducted by the Lucknow Conference, it was argued in 
early 1907, rather than undermining it through the foundation of separate forums. 
134 
Among the Sayyids of Bilgram there was apparent unease at the Conference's 
'; ' All India Shia Conference, R6'iddd-i-ijläs-i- hashtim, 1914. p. 108. 
133 All India Shi'a Conference, Ro'iddd-i-ijläs-i-chhatä, 1912, pp. 12-14. 
1; 4 Surma-i-Rotgar (Agra), 16 March 1907, UPNNR. 
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standardising programme, and little initial willingness to participate in lt. '' Some of' the 
Sayyids of Amroha were similarly apprehensi%e of the organisation and in some ca"e" 
worked to found an alternative. 136 
However, the anjunian -based system of organisation for the most part enabled a selection 
of alternative possible interactions between the central elite of the Shia Conference and 
the spokesmen and preachers active locally in Lucknow's muhallas or surrounding 
qasbas. Leaders in local anjumans could assume a dual role. Firstly, they could 
participate in wider currents of Shia reform, acting as intermediaries for the central 
structures of larger associations and as their legitimators in the neighbourhoods. 
Alternatively, they could act autonomously at the heads of these smaller organisations. 
working independently from or occasionally even in protest at the wider programme of 
the Shia Conference. More will be said about the periodic differences between 
individual Shia associations in later chapters. However, it is clear that the alijcrnuun- 
based system of organisation allowed individual agents to act independently and often in 
contrary directions while still, when beneficial, portraying themselves as servants of a 
wider and organised project of social and religious reform. 
Certainly this impression of cohesion among Shi'as was successfully conveyed to other 
communities within India. In colonial-era observations upon the Shia Muslims, what 
seemed most remarkable to outsiders was their frequently noted close-knit and sealed 
organisation. One British official working in Lucknow stated that Shia leaders could 
'rely with certainty on the rank and file obeying the[ir] directions... The word of the 
mujtahids is law and their lay leaders are men of assured position.... with the Sunnis it is 
a very different matter. ' 137 One Sunni petitioner equally perceived this assumed unity, 
writing that 'among the Shias there is no wide social gulf between the higher and lo\\cr 
social orders... all rendering unquestionable obedience. '' 
38 It is reasonable to assume that 
1; 5 All India Shia Conference, 19/0, p. 74- 
136 Sec Chapter 
137 Cop\ of Mi. Radice's remarks, ' Saunders to Hose. 12 February I909. GAD File No. 3fßO of IL)l 1. 
UPS" v 
1" Ncc(ilc,,: to this was particularly notable in comparison to the supposedly fractured and divisive 
Lucknami Sunnis. \\ ho \\ crc found 'vv anting in public and religious spirits' and internally 
discordant. 
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such impressions of unity were conveyed by the prevalence of sect-based anjunianls and 
the apparent cohesion among them. How substantial this organisation was is another 
matter entirely. The proliferation of Shia anjumans always had the capacit\ to promote 
diversity and difference instead of organisation and unity, and later chapters ýv ill 'a\ 
more on the diverging paths which Shia `organisation' would sometimes take. Here, it 
will suffice to say that north India's Shi`as were increasingly perceived by themselves 
and others as a distinct and integrated religious collectivity. working ww ithin and 
represented by exclusively Shi `a organisations. 
A final point of importance which derives from the above examination of the process of 
Shia anjuman-building is that it cleanly refutes any preconceptions of Indian Shi'ism as 
either substantially administered from Iraq or inseparably bound to the traditional 
structures of Nawabi Awadh. The renewal of religious education in India and the notion 
of a national conference of India's Shi'as represented the indigenisation, or Indianisation, 
of Shia concerns and activities, and reflected the diminishing dependence upon the 
education and guidance offered abroad. The process of anjunian-building among Shi'as 
also proves entirely that Indian Shi'a leaders were not restricted by loyalties to pre- 
colonial Awadh and Lucknow, but instead came to adopt the organisational language and 
styles most current in colonial India. The 'institution-building' of the Nawabi era, by 
which the Shia state implemented religious law as state policy and offered patronage to 
Shia social and religious activities, '39 gave way to a voluntary process of anjwnan- 
building more reflective of modern times. Now devoid of preferential treatment from the 
state, and established as one of many Indian religious communities rather than part of the 
ruling establishment, Shi'as through these anjumans were able to adapt to and utilise the 
public association, printing press and other elements common to various religious 
revivalisms for the purposes of constructing a consciousness of Shia commonalit\ in 
colonial India. 
'Humble memorial of the Sunni Nluhammadans of' Lucknow, ' Savvid A. Aziz to the Deputy Commi, ', ioncr 
of Luckno' ,5 
December 1910, ibid. 
119 Cole, Roots Of north IFidiait Slii 'ism, pp. 194-220. 
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Conclusion: the modern `ulawna, the Islamic city and the Shia community 
`Abdul Halim Sharar wrote of Nawabi Lucknow that it was not the custom' for Mu dim,, 
or others `to form clubs and societies. ' This was a custom associated with Europeans. 
Arabs and Persians, he argued, rather than Indians. 140 Such a statement only supplements 
a sense of the enormous social and cultural impact of such a proliferation of Nluslirn 
unjumuns in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as is discussed above. Writing more 
generally on Muslim reformist activity in late-nineteenth century north India, one 
newspaper claimed that `Indian Musulmans have... a morbid desire for establishing new 
institutions, but in making unsuccessful attempts at doing so they neglect the old 
institutions. ' 141 Muslims, the newspaper continued, were `always hankering after 
founding new separate institutions and never thinking of supporting and completing those 
already existing. ' 142 Whatever has been said about the cultural resilience and resistance to 
change among the traditional Shia elites of Lucknow, the transformative quality of the 
numerous Shi'a organisations emerging in Lucknow is not to be doubted. The 
proliferation of sectarian anjunians had an enormous impact upon Shia life in U. P. from 
the late-nineteenth century, and almost completely abandoned the organisational 
structures integral to Indian Shi'ism before that period. 
The Shia tanzini campaigns offered a province-wide organisational network of 
specifically Shia associations and societies by which families and elites could be 
integrated into a wider consciousness of religious distinctiveness and public solidarity. 
Their impact, however, was perhaps strongest in Lucknow. This chapter has shown that 
almost every Shia anjwnan of note in north India had some connection with Lucknow, a 
city that was renewed as the geographical and cultural focus of the faith in India. It is 
therefore fitting to end this assessment in Lucknow itself, with a consideration of the 
ultimate effects of this process of organisation upon the circle of n uijta/iids and the Shia 
population over which they presided. 
"" Sharar. Lucknow: the last phase (t air oriental culture, p. 1 95 
A! -Ba. shir (Etas ah). 5 June: 
1899, l? PNNR. 
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The anjumans discussed in this chapter all exhibited the ubiquitous presence of a seminal 
generation of mujtahids and `ulama in Lucknow. Whether directly or indirectly, they 
maintained some hand in the foundation, administration or merely inspiration of various 
kinds of Shia organisations, in and outside their own city. A tracing of the senior 
individuals in the foundation of the Shia madrasas, conferences and other anjwnans 
reveals a surprisingly compact central circle of eminent individuals. Senior nrujtuhids 
such as Nasir Husain, Najm ul-Hasan, Aqa Hasan and Muhammad Baqir Rizvvi were only 
the most exalted and important figures in a process which included diverse Lucknaw i 
`Mama such as Muhammad Hadi, Sayyid Ahmad and Sibte Hasan, too numerous to he 
discussed individually here. This was the new, modernist generation of Shia 'uIama 
discussed above, who emerged as authoritative public figures from the I890s. 
It was shown above that this generation were frequently perceived to have ushered in a 
new degree of unity. Indeed, while there were mutual commonalties between these 
`ula, iia in their age, cultural associations and shared municipality, possibly a more 
important factor in instilling the unity they often exhibited as a group was their mutual 
participation and cooperation within modern Shia czjumans. Contrasting with the 
'inward turn' away from colonial society or their displacement by lay religious 
movements, as has occupied some studies of the Indian 'ulamna during the colonial 
period, this clique became the most prominent and widely involved participants in the 
frenzied formation and expansion of sect-based organisations which marked the period. 
Their fresh engagement with such anjwnans and their enhanced involvement in public 
activities were largely unprecedented and demonstrate, in contrast to descriptions of the 
religious traditionalism of Lucknow, the striking adaptability of these later 'idama to the 
modern conditions of colonial India. Perhaps more than ever before in pre-colonial or 
colonial Awadh, public involvement replaced the scholarly reputation or the familial 
name as the crucial basis of clerical authority, and narrowed their distance from the lay 
Shia population of Lucknow. 
This chapter has of course investigated those pursuits, such as nradrusus and the 
\njun1I111-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor and the Shia Cont'erence, in which Luckno\\ ',, circle ol 
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mujtahids appeared to propound a largely united front. Alongside these, however, it is 
worth noting that many mujtahids engaged individually in personal projects of a similarly 
public character. Aqa Hasan, for instance, formed an anjuman known as Yadgar-i- 
`Ulama in 1912, directed at disseminating knowledge and re-publishing the writings of 
the Nasirabadi mujtahids. 143 During the same year, Nasir Husain's public activities were 
pitched at sustaining the memory of the seventeenth-century martyr Qazi Nor-Ullah 
Shastari. Starting annual majalis in 1912 at his recently reconstructed tomb in Agra. 
Nasir Husain established the Anjuman-i-Mu`in-ul-Za`irin to administer these rites. 144 
Such individual endeavours among these mujtahids are too numerous to be discussed 
here, suffice to say that a similar anjuman-led discourse of organisation drove the Shia 
`ulama individually as well as collectively. 
The willingness with which these religious authorities became involved in the 
management of public organisations contrasts with the quietude of the previous 
generation of `ulama. Instead, their new engagement with programmes of education and 
welfare better compares with the role of the mujtahids at the peak of their power in the 
1840s. Attempts by the `ulama to order religious instruction and their newly assumed 
function as the providers of charity through their participation in voluntarily-funded 
institutions such as orphanages, boarding houses and schools, it could be suggested, 
somewhat echo the earlier role of mujtahids in education and charitable dispensation at 
the peak of Nawabi power. 145 
Additionally, it could be argued that the indigenisation of religious life, or the 
reinvigoration of Indian Shi'ism in the national context unbound by connections with 
Iraq, incurred a new vigour into the activities of the Shia `ulama. The tangible loss of 
contact with Iraq perhaps offered them a certain amount of autonomy and prompted a 
14; Ja'isi ed., Khdnddn-i-ijtihdd nambar, p. 87. 
144 'Abbas Nasir Saeed Abaqati and Murtaza Nasir Saeed Abaqati, Mazar-e-shaheed-e-salis (Lucknow. 
circa 2000). I am grateful to the Nasiriya library, Lucknow, for providing this document. 
145 It is worth mentioning at this point that the charitable function of the 'ulama did not end ýý 
ith 
foundations such as the orphanage and Shi'a College. Some time after the peak of the Shi'a 
Conference in 
the 1910s a number of mujtahids, many of them from this same original circle, worked extensively 
for the 
establishment of schools for Shi'a children and refuges for orphans and widows. 
Ja'isi cd., Khändäri-i- 
ijtihÜd na, nbar, pp. 87-8. Such activities are additionally referenced in further chapters. 
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turn towards indigenous traditions. 146 Moreover, as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters, it seems that the twin processes of the distancing from Iraq together with their 
enhanced involvement in public life ultimately engendered a new propensity among Shia 
`ulama to become involved in wide-ranging national and political affairs, as will be 
discussed in following chapters. Through this unprecedented involvement in public 
activity and secular as well as religious issues, the senior Shia 'ulama were apparently 
able to enhance their own power and prestige and gradually presented themselves as the 
guardians of the Shi'a voice in modern India. 
The anjuman-centred process of organisation among Shi'as transformed not only the 
function of the Lucknawi `Mama, but the importance of their seat of Lucknow itself. 
Alongside the processes of religious renewal and associational congregation and 
cooperation discussed above, one further consequence of tanzirr upon Indian Shi'ism 
must here be acknowledged: 'Lucknawisation, ' or the unprecedented focus upon 
Lucknow as the centre of national Shia reform. Following the upheavals of 1857, 
Lucknow had lost much of its precedence as the centre of Indian Shi'ism, and religious 
life in subsequent years appears to have been very specific to the qasbas in which it was 
performed. Muharram reflected regional and local qasba affiliations, rather than `Indian 
Shi `ism' as such. The tuition of aspiring 'ulama by relatives or acquaintances of the same 
vocation, the management of mosques and inmambaras by local dignitaries and the 
organisation of Muharram rites upon local endowments were all structures which meant 
that, in the absence of a wider centre, Shia religious life had been largely particular to 
the arenas in which it was conducted rather than uniform across localities. Newly 
emergent Shia institutions and organisations, however, reinforced the centrality of 
Lucknow in Shia life. Through its new nmadrasas, Lucknow once again became the 
foremost centre for religious education, which could attract students and then depute 
them back to their own qasbas. The Shia Conference was most active in Lucknow, the 
location where its offices were held, from which Shia Conference envoys were sent and 
in which a strategy for India's Shi'as was prescribed. Printed Shi `a tracts as discussed in 
"" C. f. Cole, Sacred space and holy war, p. 9. 
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the next chapter, while in the late-nineteenth century published from various towns, 
increasingly came over time to originate from the single centre of Lucknow. 
Colonial Lucknow was, thus, established as the religious and cultural, and ultimately 
social and political, centre of Indian Shi'ism. In addition to its Nawabi history and 
resident `ulama, the city was in some senses well-placed for this new role. As Lucknow 
was moulded into an administrative hub, the urban residence of Awadh's talugdars and 
an emerging political centre, it became a cross-over point in which Shia landholders, 
gentries and local religious and social leaders could convene and communicate, returning 
to their qasbas for family occasions and religious festivals. Through their confluence in 
Lucknow, networks of Shia activity were able to embrace local and familial connections 
from across the province. As such, the evocation of religious community among Shi'as 
tended to entrench rather than erode their relationship to Lucknow. Studies of religious 
and casteist reform movements in India have often implied the substitution of local bonds 
with the creation of wider structures of community, giving the sense of the imminence of 
a Muslim solidarity which transcended local boundaries. 147 However, and in something 
of a contrast to the obsession in scholarship with the search for a Muslim `centre' 
supplanting local or geographical specificity, community-formation among Indian Shi `as 
often seemed to signify the expansion of Lucknow as the religious, cultural and social 
hub of Indian Shi'ism. Despite the numerous Shi'a populations across India and the 
presence of several important seats of earlier Shia rule, Lucknow earned a centrality in 
Shia religio-cultural life unprecedented in modern times, perhaps analogous to the 
enhanced status of Benares as the holy city and core of Hinduism during the same 
period. '48 
In some ways, early twentieth century Lucknow can be compared in the broadest sense to 
the notion of the pre-modern `Islamic city, ' evoked by Orientalists such as Hourani, 
Lapidus and Stern. The evocation of the `common character' of Near and Middle Eastern 
cities by such scholars, with common features including the centrality of the 
W E. g. David Lelyveld, Aligarh's first generation: Muslim solidarity in British India (Princeton. 1978), 
F 
la" Dalmia, The nationalisation of Hindu traditions, passim. 
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congregational mosque, the presence of numerous religious schools, the integration of 
social and religious civic leadership and the ties of religious networks binding residential 
neighbourhoods, seems to elicit strong comparison with early twentieth century Shia 
Lucknow. 149 Furthermore, the argument of such theorists that an integrated social and 
religious Islamic leadership could administer the civic community in the aftermath of the 
loss of state power150 seems to be realised by the Shia anjumans of Lucknow. These 
organisations took charge of Shi'a affairs with considerable vigour and independence, 
despite the supposedly penetrating and oppressive influence of the British government in 
the municipal affairs of Lucknow. 15' Indeed, the arising Shia madrasas, public 
organisations and charitable institutions present Lucknow instead as more evocative of 
Sandra Freitag's notion of the `alternative world' to the colonial order, an idiom which 
helps to explain the seeming invisibility of the colonial state in many of the Shia 
organisational efforts described for the period. '52 
Indeed, the renewal of the presence of Shi'ism in the public spaces of Lucknow 
reinforced the city's 'Shia' character, something of a contrast with the frequently- 
assumed continuity of Lucknow's cross-communal Nawabi culture. As budding networks 
of anjumans emerged in municipal public spaces, so the integrated cultures and 
communities of Lucknow gave way to ever more diverse equivalents. Following thirty 
years of public quietism among Shi'a and Sunni communities, the city suddenly 
witnessed the rapid emergence of inadrasas, conferences, printing presses, missionary 
organisations, libraries, literary associations, commercial enterprises and welfare 
institutions all along sectarian lines. The Shi'a Conference itself remarked upon 
lay A. H. Hourani, 'Introduction: the Islamic city in the light of recent research, ' in A. H. Hourani and S. M. 
Stern eds., Papers oil Islamic history /: the Islamic city, a colloquium (Oxford, 1970), pp. 12-8. Other 
aspects of Hourani's assessment bear an even greater affinity with Lucknow, such as the description of the 
Islamic city in terms of 'collective action' and the volume of public activity. Moreover, the described 
integration of religious and corporate life through the medieval turuq ('guilds' or Sufi orders) is mimicked 
in our example by the similarly combined activities of Shi'a anjumans. 
S. M. Stern, 'The constitution of the Islamic city, ' in ibid, pp. 25-50. 
15ý Oldenburg, The making of colonial Lucknow, passim. 
152 Sandra Freitag, Collective action and community: public arenas and the emergence of communalism in 
colonial north India (Berkeley, 1989), p. 6. The seeming absence of the state could also point to the possible 
desire on the part of these mujtahids to avoid direct association with the colonial regime, maintaining a 
'social and ritual distance. ' C. f. Avril Powell, Muslims and missionaries in pre-Mutiny India (London, 
1993), p. 74. 
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Lucknow's evolution from a cosmopolitan, integrated municipality into a stage 
comprised of separate schools, orphanages, hotels and commercial enterprises for 
alternative religious communities. 153 This parting of the ways on matters of communal 
advancement mimics the process of Hindu-Muslim differentiation in other U. P. cities 
from the 1880s. On the other hand, the sectarian nexus along which this sectionalism 
occurred was very specific to Lucknow itself, and the transformation of old Lucknow into 
a theatre with parallel and often conflicting Shi'a and Sunni institutions left Lucknow as 
an independent microcosm of Shia-Sunni segregation with few parallels in India. 
Alongside the spate of Shi'a organisation came the re-working of descriptions of 
community among Indian Shi'as. Increasingly during this period, Shi'as were evoked as a 
qaum, a term indicating an autonomous collective grouping usually translated into 
English as `community' or `nation. ' 154 The term qaum was that frequently espoused by 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan to describe Indian Muslims, 155 and the use of the term by the early 
twentieth century to demarcate Shia Muslims mimicked the language adopted by 
Muslim reformists to describe the distinct Muslim `nation, ' and no less the evocation of a 
Hindu `nation' by groups such as the Arya Samaj. 156 Qaum was adopted in the vernacular 
religious writings and proceedings of emerging Shi `a madrasas and organisations, and its 
usage was accelerated by its constant presence in the rhetoric of the Shia Conference and 
its associate anjumans, especially the newspaper Ittehad, as will be further discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
1 5.1 India Shi'a Conference, Ro'iddd-i-ijläs-i-hash tim, 1914, p. 73. 
154 For Sir Sayyid's definition of the term qaum, see Lelyveld, Aligarh's first generation, passim, pp. 26-7, 
300-348; Safia Amir, 'Semantics of the word Qawm: a study of Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan' in Journal of the 
Pakistan Historical Society Vol XLIX, (4,2001), pp. 53-61; Farzana Shaikh, '; tlillat and iahzab: 
rethinking Igbal's political vision, ' in Mushirul Hasan and Asim Roy eds., Living together separatelN.: 
cultural India in history and politics (New Delhi, 2005), pp. 387-8: Ayesha Jalal, 'Negotiating colonial 
modernity and cultural difference: Indian Muslim conceptions of community and nation, 1878-1914, ' in 
Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly ed. s, Modernity and culture from the 11editerranea, n to the Indian 
Ocean (New York, 2002), pp. 230-60. 
Ii, S For a discussion of Sir Sayyid's use of the so-called 'semantic flexibility' of the term of qaum, see 
Amir, 'Semantics of the word Qawm, ' pp. 53,59-60. 
1sß For an enlightening study of the evocation of 'religion' as a qaum, panth or dharm, and the conferring 
of a so-called 'unified and organised qaumik form' upon Hinduism by such reformist groups, see ; stark 
Juergensmeyer, Religion as social vision: the movement against untouchability in twentieth-cen unv Punjab 
(Berkeley, 1982), pp? -6. 
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Formerly, qaum had rarely been used to evoke the Shi'as as a group. Aý far aý can be 
discerned from nineteenth-century texts, more usual were the terms jama'at or Hufhut, 
each of which was carried into the Urdu writings of Shia 'ulanna and writers from its 
presence in Persian texts. 157 These terms denoted communities on a primarily religious 
basis, suggesting the status of Shi'as, respectively, as a Muslim `party, ' or as part of the 
wider Islamic people. The new application of qaum to denote the Shi'as carried 
connotations of national and ethnic distinctiveness, and implied their autonomy as a 
distinct and independent community. As of the turn of the twentieth century, the Shi'as 
were no longer part of the Islamic millat, or one jania `at within a Muslim gaum. They 
were an entirely separate qaum of their own, well-defined, close-knit and exclusive, 
looking to their own heritage and aspiring to cultural, social and political autonomy as a 
distinct community in India. 
157 For instance, Ja'far ihn Said ul-Hilli, Jämi' ul-Ja Pari. shari'at-ul-IsiLzm (Lucknow. circa 1 ", T'Os 
passim; Ghulam Haider Khan. Tehyiy-i-Ja fari, (Lurknow, 1888), passim. These texts are partiall\ 
translations, or make extensiv c use, of earlier Persian \w ritings; it is thus quite plausible that the usaa, c cat the 
term Flaum coincided \\ith the usage of Urdu as a key a, -, cncv Of 




TABLIGH AND IKHTILAFAT: SHI`A RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISATION 
. AN! 
) 
CONFLICT IN COLONIAL INDIA 
Introduction: the zakir, wa `iz and the immediate face of Shi`ism 
In 1910, the Sunni propagandist 'Abdul Shakoor drew attention to the emergence of a 
`fresh religious life' (na `i mazliabi zindagi) among India's Shia Muslims. 1 One aspect of 
this religious renewal was the wide array of tan: i, n campaigns as discussed in the 
previous chapter. From the close of the 1880s inadrasas were founded, mosques and 
imambaras were repaired or freshly built, and the senior 'irlanra of Lucknow 
substantially expanded their public significance through their role in numerous Shi'a 
anjunrans. A second aspect, however, was the theme of tabligh, religious proselytisation, 
the presence of which was ubiquitous in discourses of religious renewal. Like the notion 
of tairzinr of the previous chapter, the term tabligh is associated with particular Sunni 
revivalist campaigns of the 1920s, but was actually a theme common to much of the 
discourse of religious revitalisation on both Shia and Sunni sides from the nineteenth 
century onwards. 2 This chapter will focus upon the ideas and manner of religious 
proselytisation among Shi`as during the period, discussing the emergence of bodies 
which aspired to publicly promote faith in the central tenets and enforce the correct 
practices of Shi'ism. 
A few of points of difference in analysis from the previous chapter need to be noted. 
Firstly, this chapter does not only examine Lucknow but, given the concerns of this 
language of tabligh for the expansion of the faith into other centres. discusses nuilmemus 
'Luc'knu'u /c masibat-zcida Suniöh ki f'an'Ci! ör vüga i asbäb-I-nmu. abat' (Luc know , circa 19 10), a 
pamphlet contained in General Administration Department (GAD) File No. 366 of 1911, Uttar Pradesh 
State Archives. I. urkno%s (UPSA). p. 2; Shamraluddin Ahmad, Shikast-i-'a, im 
((. ucknoww. 1920), p. 3. 
For a Ions, history of understandings of tabligh in Indian Islam, sec: Yoginder Sikand, The oriýins and 
(It' cIOpitie'nt of the Ttibliglri-Junia'(lt: n cross-compccrative sols' (Ncýý Delhi. 2002 ). pp. 10-0-+ 
78 
municipalities in U. P.. Furthermore, this chapter will focus less upon the established 
mujtahids, but instead will mostly discuss that lower level of orators and preachers, 
known as wa'iz or zakir. These were the individuals who more usually took to the public 
mimbar addressing audiences after prayers, or who led private and public inajlis 
gatherings during the weeks of Muharram. Many of those trained in the burgeoning 
madrasa network of north India came to fulfil exactly these functions. The ha `izen were 
often funded by influential individuals who would invite them to speak in their localities, 
and they often drew support from more senior `ulama in their respective towns; this said. 
their roles were largely separate. In contrast to the Lucknawi abodes of the 17111jtalli(Is, tile 
presence of wa'izen in the mosques and muhallas of towns with Shia populations, 
together with the relative independence from institutional structures in which they 
operated, meant that they often encapsulated the more immediate public presence of 
Shi'ism. As Fischer claims, it was `in this role that the passion of Shi'ism [was] most 
clearly focused. '3 It was they who most often acted as the connecting point between the 
reformist trends within the circle of mujtahids and social dignitaries and the wider 
population, and between the reformist agendas of Lucknow and other centres of U. P.. 
While the previous chapter examined wide currents of both religious and secular 
organisation among Shi'as, this chapter is concerned primarily with modern 
developments within the Shia religion itself. As such, it relates to wider studies of 
religious reform within Indian Islam. What, for instance, was the impact upon Shi`ism of 
what Barbara Metcalf termed an `inward-looking strategy, ' an introspective turn among 
Muslim religious reformists, who eschewed questions of state organisation and instead 
initiated an attempt at internal correction of faith and practice? 
4 Alternatively, \\ hat 
change was incurred in Shi'ism as a result of what Francis Robinson has described as a 
shift towards more `this-worldly' manifestations of Islam, by which new systems of 
knowledge and modern media inaugurated a fresh emphasis upon individual 
instrumentality in the world, and the responsibility of the individual to act'? What '\ as 
I I\lirhael NI. J. Fischer. Ircºn: fironi religious dispute to revolution (NIassachusctts, 1980), p. 100. 
4 Barbara NIetcalf, Islamic revival in British India: 1)c bnºtd, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982), pp. 11-4. 
Francis Robinson, 'Reli, -, 
iuus change and the Self in Nluslirn South Asia since 18(X). ' in Francis Robinson 
CLI., Islc1nn1 uuncf . 
tluslim history in South Asia (Nc\\ Delhi, 20(X)), pp. 105-21 
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the impact of the onset of print? More generally, did Shi'ism conform to the wider trend 
among Muslim, Hindu and Sikh reformists of the construction of more organised and 
standardised manifestations of religion, with ever more carefully delineated boundaries? " 
An analysis of the transformations of religious faith, practice and leadership within 
Indian Shiism offers an excellent example of the styles and effects of religious renewal 
in colonial India. 
Finally, this chapter will also introduce the subject of Shia-Sunni sectarianism, which 
was in the ascendant in colonial north India during this period. As was argued in the 
introduction, analysis of Islamic sectarianism in India has remained largely unexplored, 
hitherto lacking the same scrutiny as has been applied to studies of Hindu-Muslim 
communalism. Drawing from analysis of long-term processes of religious change, this 
chapter aims to present a framework for understanding the dynamics and causes of Shi'a- 
Sunni religious conflict, considering why religious proselytisation and polemic were so 
heavily intertwined, and why the renewal of religious consciousness should have taken 
place along such oppositional and conflictive lines. 
Maulavis, majalis and `Mission' in Shia Islam 
Our holy and humble teachers and their pure education, they lifted 
the curse of our stutter through their oratory. After such a light had 
'7 shone, the candle could not be extinguished. 
One of the intentions and outcomes of campaigns of religious revitalisation from the 
nineteenth century onwards was to establish a role for the Shia religion in the developing 
public spheres of cities such as Lucknow. The previous chapter described a largely visual 
and spatial conquest of Lucknow's cityscape by the representatives of Indian Shi'ism, 
with the foundation of madrasas and the re-appropriation of the city's central religious 
buildings als sites of public worship. There was, however, a simultaneous intervention 
6 Harlot Ohcroi, The construction (If religious boundarics: culture, ide, ºtits' and cliº'crsitV 
in the Sikh 
tradition (Delhi, 1994). 
Akhar Husain Rim, . 1ladrusct't u! -W, 
i'i;. jh ki ciiv (Luc know-, circa 1928), p. 10. 
So 
into the verbal and printed public spheres of colonial Lucknow, and it i,, these attempts to 
communicate religious knowledge and make it accessible to the population which 
concern us here. 
The cornerstone of Shia tabligh was the heightened emphasis placed by Shia reformiktý 
upon oratory or eloquence (sometimes called khutbah, referring to the sermons 
traditionally given after namaz-i jum `a) in both written and spoken forms. The 
prioritisation of public communication, a characteristic which distinguished religious 
renewal during this period, prompted a fundamental change in the role of even the senior 
Shia `ulam a. The key mujtahids of the late nineteenth century had their authority 
established primarily upon the strength of their ijazat and the reputation of the 'aline 
under whom they studied. By the twentieth century, a change in the designation of 
religious authority had become evident. The increasingly numerous graduates of 
Lucknow's ina(h-asas, whose qualifications lacked the same connotation of expertise as 
the ijazat of some of the inujuhids of the previous generation, instead increasingly strove 
for distinction based on their reputation for fine oratory, be it written or spoken, and their 
ability to communicate their learning to the Shia public. 
One such example is Sibte Masan, trained in Madrasa Nazimiya and Sultan ul-Madaris, 
who quickly became one of twentieth-century India's most prominent 'crlama. His 
reputation derived from his gift for eloquent speech and writing, and he was frequently 
acknowledged as the greatest orator in Urdu that India has produced. 
' Encapsulating the 
orientation of many 'ti/ama towards the task of communication evident in his time, 
he 
earned the title Khutib-ul-Azinn, or Great Orator. As is written in his tuzkira (biographical 
treatise): 
'Maulana Sibte Hasan was in all reality perfected in oratory, and 
oratory was perfected in him. The »unibar (speaking stand) was `given 
graaee by him, and he was its grace. If the gift of praise (firn-i-zukri) 
had come from the heavens, then he gave it the greatest throne, and 
if 
it was a star, then he nurtured it into the sun illuminating the world. 
'9 
.' 
Fatch 'Ali Khan co 
'List of those persons who have done women service to the 
Shia Colleg cauýC 
Nieston. 24-7 July 1917, Education 'A' File No. 152 of 1914. UPS: \. 
9 Imamia Mission, lýhntitý r cif i . 
1itEhWflU l ýLucknkm, 193,, -, s4), p. 61, Sonic of the great uC C CV, C, cif 
Indian Shia public organisation at this, time, such a-, the mustering of the re,, oource and encr`gic 
to found 
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In many ways, Sibte Hasan embodies the transformation of the Shi'a clergv hv the early 
twentieth century. He received the entirety of his training in India. imparted formall\ in 
recognised institutions. While never achieving the same jurisprudential authority as those 
most senior mujtahids trained in southern Iraq, he quickly ascended to national 
prominence through his involvements in public religious life: his famed oratory, his 
participation in the teaching of Lucknow's madrasas, and his establishment of new 
schools. His example demonstrates how many `ulama of the colonial period assumed 
public involvements, rather than reclusive excellence, as the means of legitimising, their 
role. 
Yet it was not only the niadrasa-educated `ulanna who gained such a following as exalted 
public speakers. A new standard in khutbah was reached in the twentieth century by a 
populist Shi'a speaker, Haji Maqbool Ahmed, the appearance of whom was widely 
interpreted as having been a turning point in the revitalisation of Shia religious life. 10 ,A 
Sunni orphan of Delhi by background, he converted to Shi'ism by choice in his 'teens. 
Having gained great fame as a preacher initially in the mosques and seminaries of Delhi, 
in the early years of the twentieth century he toured the fertile ground of U. P. where he 
became a renowned preacher achieving, it is said, particular fame and influence among 
the Shi'as of Lucknow and Jaunpur. l' His khutbah and in particular his majalis sermons 
gained unprecedented popularity, and appeared to have a profound and long-term effect 
upon Shia public religious activity: 
`A revolution in the preference and intellectual condition of faith 
among the population came upon the appearance of Maulana Maqbool 
Ahmed. The general public were so compelled at hearing this 'alum 
that the people could not get their fill. Wherever news spread that the 
aforementioned was preaching people would come, running alongside 
or behind his convoy, and congregate there in their hundreds and 
12 thousands. ' 12 
the Shia CoIIciie of 1917, were attributed directly to the persuasive skills of' Sihte Hº,, an. The Leader 
(Allahahad). 9 October 1911. Centre of South Asian Studie:. Camhrid c (CSAS). 
: \hniad, Shikast-i-'uuZim, p. ý. 
11 S\ed Murtaza Husain, . 
1IutIa'-i-. mvJr: tct,. kiru i Shi'u u%ýtýil tct 'ulumýt, kcýhýir i bar i-. sa., ' ºir i-Pd/., ýu 
Hine! (Karachi. 19S I ), pp. 650- I. 
12 Imarilla Mission, K/iutth i-ail i t/; ri"tcritºcýd, p. 1 1-2. 
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Contrary to Sibte Hasan, Maqbool Ahmed was not a product of anything we could Call a 
religious establishment. He did not have a family background of religious learning. 
receive a formal religious education, originate from Lucknow or maintain associations 
with the established Lucknow `Mama. He was in fact criticised by some among the latter, 
since he delivered sermons in common Hindustani which incorporated English rather 
than Persian or Arabic vocabulary. 13 His example demonstrates the capacit\ of the 
twentieth century's developing public sphere in urban centres to elevate fresh, subversive 
voices, as well as pre-established authorities, to popular prominence. 
The Shia tabligh was not confined to a few personalities, but became the driving purpose 
of new Shi'a anjumans, among them certain inadrasas. The Madrasa't ul-\Va'izen, 
founded in Lucknow in 1919, quickly became the foremost Shia inwlrasa of South Asia. 
Pioneered like earlier Lucknawi schools by the niujtahid Najm ul-Hasan, and built and 
administered upon the funds provided by a specially founded «wagf and an annual 
donation drawn from the estates of the Raja of Mahmudabad, the school was the fruit of 
the resolutions in the Shi'a Conference since 1907 calling for a so-called Shia 
Mission. ''4 The mudrasa, termed by its founders a 'house of propagation (dar-ul- 
asha'at)', '5 was the destination of many of those 'clam a who had claimed faul in 
Nazimiya, Sultan ul-Madaris and other schools in U. P. discussed above, who then came 
here to attain the higher qualification of wa `1:, qualifying them to offer public sermons on 
the 'nudrusa's behalf. It included a seminary for the training of preachers, a hostel, an 
extensive library for both scholarly and public use and an in-house printing press, the 
latter an addition which had become increasingly common in north Indian mudrusus in 
recent years. Within two years, the nnadrasa had gained considerable prominence, 
recruiting scholars from across India, who would then carry its 'mission' back to their 
nati\'c qasbas and districts. 16 
11 All India Shia Conf-erýnýý, Rýýidüd i ijlýrs i rhhcirý i 9l India S/ii'a Kanfercrn. s, munagida 18- 20 
October /9/' (Lueknow, 1913). p. 1 _' . " The rnw rasa was founded in commemoration of the deaths of Najm ul-Hasan's son and the Raja of 
\lahmudahacl's brother. 
15 Rizv i, 
. 
tlailrcrsu't ul-lt ci'i. -. jn ki 5 , -i;, p. 13. 
16 Ihid, pp. 11-3 
l, 
If the Madrasa Nazimiya and Sultan ul-Madaris had been institutions of ran: im, or 
attempts to regulate religious education and jurisprudence, then \Iadrasa't uI-\Va'izen 
ushered in an era of tabligh. The madrasa presented itself not as an instrument merely of 
religious revitalisation, but as an active missionary organisation. Trained titu'ize, i were 
quickly dispatched to Punjab, Peshawar, Bihar, Bengal and Gujarat, by which the Shia 
tabligh was presented `across approximately half of the area of British India, and 2-1 
crores of population, ' as well as in Africa. '7 Proselytising literature was produced, 
including a number of serialised publications, among them the regular Al-Wa'iz and the 
monthly English-language magazine Muslim Review, in order to address a new and wider 
audience. ' 8 
One aspect of the madrasa's tablighi efforts was its appropriation of fresh linguistic 
means as well as its innovative media of communication. The way for Shi'as to avoid 
their own extinction in the face of this communicative process, claimed the `Irlanna of the 
madrasa, was a focus upon new eloquence and communication, both written and spoken, 
by a new generation of orators. Moving away from the authority of the traditional 
languages of Islamic scholarship, Arabic and Persian, 19 the chief demand of these fresh 
orators was to be `knowledgeable and clear in indigenous and foreign languages, ' and 
primarily those of the Indian subcontinent . 
2') The adoption of Urdu compares with and 
served as a counterpoint to the 'Hindi sphere' through which Hinduism was 
simultaneously reinvigorated in other urban centres of U. P.. 2' Moreover, alongside the 
disaffiliation from Iraq discussed in the previous chapter, this 'vernacularisation' was one 
further manifestation of 'Indianisation' among Shia maulavis, who met the declining 
knowledge of Arabic and Persian with a turn inward to indigenous traditions. 
Importantly, tabligh as embodied by the Madrasa't ul-Wa`izen came to notify explicit 
missionary activity under the »luclrusa's centralised administration and guidance: 
17 Ihici, 1 2. 
is Husain, 
. 
11 ýtla'-i : 1ii 'är, pp. 676-7. 
19 The iuthoritN denoted by the use of Arabic and Persian by the Indian 'Mama i,, discussed in Muhammad 
Qasiin /.. aman. The 'ulama in contemporan, Islam: custodians of change (Princeton, 2002). pp. 43-9. 
20 Riiv i, 11ac1ra. co't ul-It ci'T.. Jri ki äit t, pp. 8.14. 
21 Francesca Orsini, The Hindi public splte/cc 1920-1940: language and literature' irr the age u/ nutiortuli. cm 
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`Within the constitution of all of us is the form of a missionary. Inside 
every member is present the armoury to be made into a missionary. The only necessity now is that these missionaries are given their direction with the apparatus of those modern formations and 
enterprises of the current times. ' 22 
The constant evocation of the madrasa both before and after its foundation a' a 
`Mission, ' transliterated from the English word into Urdu, demonstrates hm\ the Shia 
tabligh was framed clearly in the language of overt missionary activity, borrowing from 
Christian `Mission' as well as wider evocations of tabligh among Muslims and shurddhi 
(a religious purification movement) among Hindus. Resembling these latter movements 
especially was the adopted ideal that this 'Mission' should break the divisions between 
different castes and social groups. The Madrasa't ul-Wa`izen, in striking contrast to the 
continued citations of nobility and ancestral distinction by north Indian Shi'as, criticised 
the fact that Shi'as were invariably of Sharif ancestry and contained few from among the 
ajlaf (indigenous) castes. 23 The emphasis on actively conferring religious knowledge 
upon India's common populations was one relatively new to Shi'ism, and more in line 
with the tabligh campaigns in Mewat or the cow-protection movements in late-nineteenth 
century Hinduism, which comparably aspired to traverse caste boundaries. 2` 
The idea of 'Mission, ' moreover, reflects the pressure felt by some of the Shia `Mama in 
the face of the rise of a number of aggressive campaigns of proselytisation by other 
religious communities. The founders of Madrasa`t ul-Wa`izen evoked the description of 
India as essentially a battleground upon which all faiths were possessed of new 
missionary organisations, arguing that Shi'as had been by comparison slow to accept this 
trend: 
'Every religion is free. All faiths are level and open upon the great 
stage (medan-i-'a»ml). Every faith and every community in its 
freedom must be ready, with great seriousness and without surprike, 
for the questioning of faith. and the exchange of beliefs. '' 
(Newww Delhi, 2002), passim. 
22 Rizvi, A1aclrcrsu't ul It'ýr't.. ýýýr ki ätit :, p. 10. 
2 All /ndici S/, icr conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address of His fli, Lhnr. tis , 1/ir, -1li . 
\a taz 
Khan 7ulpur, ruler of Khair/mr State (Khairpur, circa. 1930), p. 16. 
Sikand, The origins and development of the Tablighi-Jama'at; John Zav-os. The emercenc(' of Hindu 
nationalism irr India (New Delhi, 200)). 
25 Riiv i, 
. 11adrasct't ul- 
ti i `IZi"i kl a it ci:, p. ti. 
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Such words show clearly the perception by religious leaders of the transition within 
Indian Shi'ism away from the advantages of state patronage in the early nineteenth 
century into simply one of many faiths, forced into battling for its survival against the 
unprecedented scrutiny projected by other religious communities. 
This raises the interesting question of whether the development during this period of 
Shia oratory and the rhetoric of tabligh owed in part to the simultaneous competitive 
revivalisms amongst other faiths. It has been convincingly demonstrated in scholarship 
that the communicative styles of Muslim resurgence, whether spoken or written, were 
spurred in part by the activities of Christian missionaries in nineteenth century north 
India. 26 This hypothesis has strong support in the case of Shi'as. Tracts were produced 
which attempted to contradict Sunni and Christian doctrines simultaneously, offering 
different proofs in each case, 27 and a comparison of the sufferings of Imam Husain and 
Christ was also established as a subject of contention. 28 Lucknow certainly had a 
powerful presence of Christian proselytising organisations and evidently caused some 
worry among Lucknawi Shi'as; for instance it was alleged that the Shi'a orphanage was 
founded on account of Christian successes in proselytising among Shi `a orphans. 
29 
However, despite awareness of the parallel campaigns amongst such communities, it was 
doubtless the emergence of the Tablighi-Jama`at which gave the Shia tabligh its greatest 
source of orientation. While the Tablighi-Jama`at's ability to cross the boundaries of 
locality, nation, language, caste and the differences between Sunni schools have been 
widely acknowledged, and while the organisation even gained involvement from the 
Ahmadi community, it made little outreach to Shi `as. 
3° At the same time, Shi `as 
2( Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, p. 198. For comparable influences upon Hindu revivalism, see 
Zavos, The emergence of Hindu nationalism, pp. 38-9. 
27 Ghulam Haider Khan, Tehgiq-i-Ja fari, (Lucknow 1888), passim. 
2" Mukhbir-i-Alam (Moradabad), 23 December 1912, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports 
(UPNNR), Oriental and India Office Collections, London (OIOC). 
29All India Shia Conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address of His Highness Mir . Ali Nawa: 
Khan Talpur, p. 12. The induction of native orphans into Christianity by European missionaries 
is also 
discussed in Avril Ann Powell, Muslims and missionaries in pre-Mutiny India (London, 1993), pp. 158-63. 
`What they frequently dwell upon and take pride in is their important role in bridging the 
doctrinal divide 
between various schools of theology and jurisprudence. What they will not react to 
is why they keep the 
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seemingly voiced no approval of the Tabligh-i-Jama'at's campaigns initiated in the 
1920s. As such, the aggressive campaigns of religious dissemination of both sides aided 
to give the impression that there was no co-ordinated 'Muslim' tabligh, but rather a series 
of separate and possibly adversarial projects. Despite the constant circulation of the 
language of tabligh and attempted proselytisation among Muslim groups in early- 
twentieth century north India, such a flurry of activity represented competitive rather than 
co-operative currents between separate Muslim reformist movements. Separate religious 
communities, even in such a supposedly composite and well-integrated city such as 
Lucknow, were engaged in a constant process of differentiation from and competition 
with others. 
Ultimately, the constant circulation of the theme of tabligh effected considerable 
amendments not simply within public religious organisations and schools, but perhaps 
alluded to an equally significant transformation of personal faith and conception of the 
Self. An enhanced duty was conferred upon the wa'izen, muballighin (missionaries) and 
others emerging from Madrasa't ul-Wa'izen and other madrasas, who were addressed not 
as mere teachers or followers of a particular religious tradition, but were conceived as 
active defenders of their faith. Such language is highly reminiscent of Robinson's 
description of the development of `this-worldly' forms of Islam in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, which incurred a 'new sense of responsibility' and entailed 'the 
empowerment of individuals, indeed the requirement placed on individuals to act. '31 All 
such maulavis were freshly assigned the obligation to act appropriately, passionately and 
publicly as representatives and emissaries of their religion. Fittingly, the reference to a 
`great stage' (niedan-i- `areal) in the literature of the Madrasa't ul-Wa`izen32 is somewhat 
ambiguous; it perhaps refers to modern India as a battleground upon which India's 
various religious traditions were battling to stamp their marks, or to the life of the 
Shias outside their fold. Is their silence an avowal that for them the Shias, who despite reciting the 
ku/ima 
day in day out, are beyond the pale of Islam... Although Ilyas forbade his follower,, to enter into religious 
controversy and disputes over detail, the Tablighi Jamaat frequently finds itself emhr&nled... they hate 
themselves taken positions against the Shias (though not officially). and refrain from observing Niuharrann. 
Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a divided nation: India's Muslims since independence (London. 1997). pp.? tX)- 
I. 
't Robinson, 'Religious change and the Self, ' pp. 1 12.116. 
32 Rizvi, Madrasa't ul-Wci'izeh ki Jw5 , p. 
8. 
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individual as the platform upon which they must perform appropriately, but probabl\ to 
both. This powerful vision of personal empowerment and responsibilit\. as Robinson 
points out, perhaps helps to explain much of the zealousness of Muslim religious activit\ 
during the colonial period. 33 It also indicates something of the combativeness \\ ith which 
many came to defend their religious convictions against those of alternative sectarian and 
intellectual positions, as will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Printing and proselytisation in Shia Islam 
Khutbah was projected among the Shi`as through two media, both of which gained in 
importance in north India during this period: preaching and publishing. The training of 
wa `izen by a new madrasa-network as discussed above and the crowds they attracted 
testify to the importance of the former. Easier for the historian to analyse, however, are 
the religious writings published during this period. It is without question that a key aid to 
the distribution of religious oratory came with the impact of print in north India. 
Publishing houses serving local communities became increasingly common in north 
Indian cities and towns onwards from the 1870s. Many of the first cities in north India 
affected by the printing press were those with significant Muslim populations, while even 
more importantly, in cases such as Lucknow, Moradabad (serving Amroha), Meerut and 
Jaunpur, the emergence of print coincided with important Shia centres. 
Much study has been conducted on the implications of the emergence of print upon 
Islamic resurgence in South Asia. Many authors have stressed the role of the press in 
offering the 'u/ama and their intellectual orientations a new readership and broadening 
public access to Islamic ideas. 4 Yet the printing press was also employed in the service 
of particular Islamic doctrinal groupings. Specifically Shia publishing houses %ýcre in 
operation in Lucknow by the end of the 1880s. Among these %%crc the \latba'-i-Ja'fri, 
which served many of the Arabic and Persian writing of the 'idama, while a prolific 
Shia 
Robinson. 'Religious change and the S,: 11. ' p. 1 10. 
Lspcciall\ Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, p. 233; Francis Robinson, 'ýlam and the 
impact ()t 
print in South in Fr. rncis Robinson cd.. Islam and . ti! uslim Iii. vtürv, pp. 
66-I04. 
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publishing house for Urdu tracts arose in the private property of one 'Abid 'Ali Rizvi, a 
Shia Sayyid from the bustling central muhalla of Wazirganj. 3S The aim of such 
establishments was to dispense Shia tracts into and amongst the city's population. 
Studies of Lucknow have demonstrated how the city's press contributed to the emergence 
of a new and public leadership in the city, in social, political and cultural terms. It was the 
ability to cultivate the press, it has been argued, that contributed more to the emergence 
of communities and classes in cities such as Lucknow than traditional status or ancestral 
heritage. 36 In the same way, print played its role in the propagation of a religious 
consciousness among the city's Shi'as unbound by loyalties of family or locality. 
When the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor emerged among the `u/am a of Luck-now at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, one of its most visible endeavours was the 
appropriation of new print media for the purposes of proselytisation in Lucknow. It put 
anjumans in place to propagate religious awareness. The Dar-id-Tarjemra was established 
to translate into Urdu and disseminate the exalted texts of earlier scholars, in particular 
the writings of Dildar 'Ali. 37 Meanwhile the Dar-u i-Zikr, operating separately but 
simultaneously, produced and published newly authored religious literature. 38 Both 
organs were administered by Muhammad Hadi, a descendant of the Nasirabadi family 
and an `alien associated with Madrasa Nazimiya. Both organs appear to have been active 
in Lucknow for over a decade and were taken under the wing of the Shia Conference 
after 1907. Nominally, Dar-id-Zikr was served by both Shi'as and Sunnis, although the 
organ was also accused of fostering sectarian ill-feeling during the 1900S. 39 
Who authored these tracts, and what subjects were discussed in the burgeoning Shia 
presses of Lucknow, Jaunpur and western U. P.? Their writers were sometimes 'ulama-, at 
15 E. o. , Ala Hasan, K/razän a't u/-Fnasär'i/ ! [I fighiva (Lucknow, 1894). p. 218, Nur ul-Haan, Tauärikh 
shahün-i-lmla';. iva-i-mazhab-i-'Isllä 'Asharia (Lucknow, 1896), p. l; Said Ismail hin Sadr uI-Din, Sirc-it-ul- 
. 1lustagiln (Luckno\w, 1898-9), passim. ; c' Sanjay- Joshi, Fractured modernity: making of a middle class il! colonial India (\cw Delhi, 2001), rh. 
'14,34-41. 
17 For example, : \ya Hasan, Taijºolla i lllliccl ul-Islam! liJs[l-i-algal: kitc-ih-ul-n hid (Lucknow. circa I905). 
;K Mustafa Husain Asif' Ja'isi cd., KhümulJn-i-ijtihüct ainbclr, s/i nnc-ira c11[' (Luckno\\. 2005), p. 76; All 
India Shia C'onfcrence, R(3'idäd-i-I*-i-c/lcinc(ýnl-i-. -1l lluliää S/ii'a Kciltfc'! "U11.1, numaclWa 10-12 October 
/910 (Luckno\\ 19I I), pp. 4, Q5. The organisation contained two full-time paid statt. 
39 AI-Nol'm (Lucknov, ), 10 JuIN 1907, UPNNR. 
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other points they were free-working maulavis, many of whom were not religious 
authorities but merely figures of local prominence with some level of religious 
education. 40 Such authors gained their stature less from formal religious training. but 
from their creative and powerful use of the vernacular in such tracts. With some 
exceptions, such authors largely neglected the specialist disciplines of Kadis and frgh, 
these being left to the qualified, madrasa-educated `ulama who wrote primarily in Arabic 
and Persian as testament to their exclusive education. Few senior `Mania made incursions 
into this `popular, ' vernacular press. Instead, most texts were independent tracts and 
treatises (rasa `il), eschewing the traditional authority of the classical languages, and 
emphasising the communicative abilities of the vernacular. Such genres also gave their 
authors the freedom to work outside the disciplines of the most senior religious 
authorities. 
While an exhaustive study of the development of vernacular Shia treatises would 
deserve its own study, it is worth identifying a few of its key genres. Many tracts 
concerned the practice of Muharram, and the exact regulation and purification of the 
practice of mourning (azadari) for the Shi `a martyrs. 41 A large proportion of others focus 
upon popular histories of the Shia Imams, and eulogies for Husain (niarsivas). This 
partially biographical genre of writing reflected one aspect of the wider so-called 
`interiorisation' of Islam by reform movements after 1857; a new focus upon the 
personages of Islam as moral exemplars and suitable guides for the Muslim individual. `- 
Similarly aimed towards the individual, a further emerging genre was that of corrective 
literature, or works of public instruction. Their authors and contributors were occupied in 
large part by concern for the proper behaviour (akhlaq) of Muslims. For instance one 
such text, published in Fyzabad and Jaunpur, specified the correct structure, charitable 
40 To assess this, we need only to look to Amroha, where two established writers of controversial Shia 
critiques of Sunni Islam were Amjad 'Ali Khan, an honorary magistrate and long the Deput\ Collector of 
the district, and the town's niunsif (judge). From J. S. Lock, undated, and From H. W. Hammond, 21 
September 1859, in Hamid All Khan ed., The certificates etc of'Haki, n Mohamed A, njcu/ . 4/i 
Khan, Hakim 
, Ilca/rn, irc'c/ Nia;.. 1/ Khan, 
Khan Bahac/ur Sheikh 4/taf Hasan Khan, and! Munshi Shaukat Hasan (Lucknow, 
1899), pp. 1,6.27, Vizam-rrl-. tlulk (Moradahad), 10 Februarv 1893, and Jcn-i-Ja»rshec! (Nloradahad ), 29 
January 1893, UPNNR. 
41 Prominent among these are Hakim Ahmad 'Ali Khan, . 1ýU[IUl! ! nlQ/r t-, 
1/«/ºcircuºº (Lucknow, I O5ý. 
)assim: Sa'id ', Aid '. \1i, Fýiýi/cct nJ, na i týº'ýiýa (Bahraich, 1908), hasim. 
2 Poww ell, Muslims and mi. ssionarie. s, pp. 2 6-7: Robinson, Islam and the impact of print, ' pp. 95-0. 
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deeds and actions (taqvim; waza'if, `amal) of the life of the individual. Through this 
structure the text could outline, firstly, the appropriate observation of the religious 
calendar and festivals; proper ethics of commerce, finances, interest and management of 
endowments; and finally, particular responsibilities encompassing issues as broad as 
prayers, rituals, Haj, slaughter, marriage, and the making of wills. 43 Freshly published 
Shi `a texts of both biographical and instructive slants therefore had at their heart a 
preoccupation with public behaviour, reflecting the argument of several scholars that 
religious leaders of this period came to focus less on matters of state, more on the 
correction of practice and the purification of the conduct of Muslim individuals. " 
Another series of Shia printed works of some importance was newspapers. The 
emergence of an active newspaper press from the 1870s has long been understood as an 
active agent in promoting a consciousness of community in north India, and Shia 
newspapers began to emerge decisively from the 1890s. The Akhbar-i-Imanziya was 
published monthly from Lucknow from the beginning of the decade, and while focused 
largely upon civic affairs in Lucknow, the paper was often used as a vehicle to carry as 
supplements religious tracts and treatises by Lucknawi and Amrohawi authors. Among 
these were a biography of the twelve Shia Imams, and Sa `if-i-Qata (The sword of the 
Prophet), a controversial tract accusing the first three Caliphs (Khalifas) of infidelity to 
the Prophet. 45 
However, a large number of newly emergent tracts were controversial sectarian writings, 
In popular Urdu literature at least, religious most of which attacked the Sunni Caliphs. `ý6 
histories were merged with polemical literature to the extent that the genres were 
little 
distinguishable. In this way, religious knowledge was fused inextricably with sectarian 
polemic, and such provocative works were something of an emerging 
literary genre in the 
4-1 Haji Sayyid 'Ali Ansar, Masd'it-i-Ja"firiva (Fyzabad and . launpur, 
1915). As with Muslims more 
generally, a large proportion of such instructive texts were concerned with the correct conduct 
of women. 
See especially Sayyid Mujahid Husain Jauhar, Masnaººvi 
Mewd-i-Shirin (Amroha, 1915) and Havät-i- 
niswsn (Amroha, circa 1929), passim. More will be said on such texts 
in a later chapter. 
' Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, passim; Robinson, 'Religious change and the 
Self. ' passim. 
,` Nur ul-Hasan, Tawärikh shalOn-i-ma'ziva, passim; 
Akhbar-i-Imarnia (Lucknow). April 1893, UPNNR. 
46 To take just a few of the numerous examples of this genre: 
Sayyid Muhammad Husain, Budra _i- 
Hedariva li-rrayc-i Isla-i-. 4bi Bakriva (Muzaffarnagar, 1910); Sa'dat 'Ali 
Sufi, TaJira-i-Imär»in 
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early twentieth century. In the 1910s in U. P., one government report affirmed that 
`polemical publications supplied their usual quota. The differences between various 
Muhammadan sects, as for example, between Shi'as and Sunnis, accounted as always for 
a certain number. '47 It can be seen how the emergence of the printing press in the cities of 
U. P. created new possibilities for the emergence of sectarianism in colonial India. 
Polemical tracts emerged not only among Shi'as but among various Muslim groups, such 
as Deobandis and Bareilvis, Ahl-i-Hadis and Wahhabis. 
Furthermore, it is significant that Shi'a and Sunni polemical tracts frequently emerged 
from the same cities, particular those with strong printing presses, such as Lucknow, 
Meerut, Moradabad and Jaunpur. 48 Such municipalities clearly became the chief akharas 
(arenas) in which conflicting religious identities were formed and enacted, with each city 
sufficiently served by its own publishing industry to witness its own development of 
sectarian formations. The number of emerging polemical tracts in particular towns 
initiated a long-term literary conversation among emerging writers; one tract of polemical 
literature was followed by a counter-tract in specific refutation, passing from one sect to 
another respectively. 49 As such, despite their evocation of universal debates and 
questions, sectarian diatribes sometimes hinted at their distinctly local instigation. In 
Amroha, for instance, sectarian writing sometimes offered an apparent outlet for local 
rivalries. One Shia author wrote a response to a tract attacking the doctrine of tagiva (the 
Shi `a doctrine of the concealment of faith in times of danger), penned by a resident of the 
(Moradabad, 1898). 
47 Report on the Administration of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1914-15 (Allahabad, 1916), 
V/10/1916, OIOC, p. 72. 
°" Of these, the first three had numerous lithographic presses that produced many publications on various 
topics; Jaunpur, however, was noted solely for producing 'polemical works on Musulman theology. ' H. R. 
Nevill, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume XXViii. Jaunpur (Allahabad, 
1908), p. 90. Other centres of publication for Shi'a and Sunni tracts were those of central significance for 
particular Sunni schools, such as Saharanpur or Bareilly, the presence of whom seemed to impel local Shia 
writers in turn. These are general observations from the extensive Urdu catalogues of the Oriental and India 
Office Collections, London. 
4' Two texts published in Bijnor demonstrate this point clearly. Muhammad Rahim-ullah Bijnori, I tä1-i- 
usitl-ul-Shi'a (Bijnor, 1903) and Sayyid Amir Kazim, Ehgääq-ul-hdy-ul-ibtäl-ul-bail (Bijnor, 1906), 
passim. The first of these was a systematic Sunni confutation of Shi'a personages and doctrines: the second 
a defence explicitly written against the former. From the titles as well as their contents, it can he seen that 
the publication of one tract would initiate a retort from a rival party. 
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muhalla neighbouring hi S. 50 The printing press, therefore, often elevated local rivalries 
onto a higher level of universalistic religious difference. Moreover, the citation of the 
Shia doctrine of taqiya as a point of attack by Sunni polemicists raises another 
interesting issue: that sectarian polemics often focused upon aspects of Shi'ism drawn 
from textual accounts rather than as lived in north India. Given the growing visibility of 
Shi'a religious practice in public spaces, and its role in instigating religious conflict with 
Sunnis - the increasingly demonstrative practice of Muharram, the evocation of the 
Imams, the distribution of provocatively sectarian writings and so forth - the focus by 
Sunnis on the issue of concealment of the Shia faith seems to be remote and de- 
contextualised. Sectarian disputation thus reflected a focus upon textual, idealised, 
prototypical standards of religion, rather than the everyday forms lived and practiced. `' 
This discussion reveals how the sectarian writings so frequently produced during the 
period were less individual pieces and more part of an ongoing literary dialogue taking 
place through the lithographic presses of individual towns. It was a dialogue with two 
effects. For one, it widened the reach of religious knowledge, acquainted new sections of 
the public with religious doctrine, and democratised its interpretation. 
52 At the same time, 
it systematised and sharpened the differences between traditions. Indeed, the 
conversations conducted through these writings were marked by hostility and insularity, 
rather than communication or any attempted exchange of ideas. Shia writings were often 
marked with warnings that they should not be read by Sunnis. 
53 Alternatively, other texts 
projected tabligh as an outward as well as inward process, attempting to correct the 
beliefs of non-Shi'as and pull them into the fold. For instances, one assault upon the 
Sunni Caliphs published from Amroha stated ultimately that it would be handed out 
free 
of charge, so that Sunni Muslims may see from their cold hearts and may 
distinguish 
truth from falsehood. '54 Such polemical writings were aimed not only at 
internal 
50 Sayyid Hamza `Ali, Tashih ul-agä`id (Amroha, 1919), p. 1. A Lahore newspaper serialised these 
dehateý 
in 1904. 
C. f. this is the perspective on Muslim sectarian conflict given 
by Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 
'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni identities, 
' federn Asian Studies (36,3. 
2000) 
Robinson, Islam and the impact of print. ' passim. 
Kazim, Ehgäq-ut-h5q, p. i. 
Sayyid Hanmza 'Ali, Häq ki kasöti (Delhi, 1916), p. 80. 
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regeneration but were projected outwardly at their opponents. This surely contributed to 
and helps to explain the intensity of the print-wars between alternative authors. Writers 
thus became defenders of their religion, not simply against internal forgetfulness but 
against deliberate outside assault. 
Despite the seeming outward, aggressive projection of sectarian discourse, it was in fact 
often a tool used to exercise internal religious reform. It seems that these confrontational 
writings were generally pitched at the author's own sect, and that in such cases the 
framing of an alternative religious group as an opponent was a tactic adopted by authors 
attempting to instruct or direct Shi'as themselves. In other words, the fabrication of an 
outside opponent offered the sense of urgency and competition which could elicit 
attention from within the author's own religious community. One striking example of this 
is a text published from Jaunpur, which outlined the tenets of Usuli Shi'ism through an 
assault upon Akhbarism, the other branch of 'Isna `Ashari Shi'ism with a separate 
conception of figh. 55 Akhbari Shi'ism was virtually extinct in north India at the time that 
this tract was written, and clearly presented little contemporary challenge to the 
dominance of Usuli Shi `ism. 56 However, the medium of the polemical sectarian tract 
simply acted as a convenient means of describing the tenets of Usuli Shi'ism, by 
comparison and competition with the opponent. The evocation of Akhbarism as an urgent 
threat to Usuli Shi'ism allowed the author of this tract to outline Usuli tenets with more 
purpose and passion, and perhaps to assume the status of a defender of the faith among 
his readership. This example demonstrates something of the interdependent relationship 
of internal religious renewal and sectarian disputation, and furthermore, shows how the 
Shi'a tabligh, the propagation of religious knowledge among members of the religion, 
was entirely enmeshed with the consolidation of sectarian polemic. As such, a full 
understanding of tabligh demands a more detailed examination of Shi'a-Sunni religious 
conflict in colonial India. 
ii Shaikh Muhammad Kazim, Tangid-u1-taglid (Jaunpur, 1915), passim. 




Shia-Sunni ikhtilafat: religious discord in nineteenth century north India 
Having discussed certain aspects of Shi `a religious renewal above, our analysis now turns 
to the subject of the various manifestations of religious polemic or conflict between 
Shi'as and Sunnis. As was discussed above, the presumption of Lucknow's quietude and 
cosmopolitanism, the focus on wider Muslim unitary organisation and the constant 
shadow of Hindu-Muslim communalism have all served to sometimes conceal the 
veracity of inter-Muslim religious conflict. Some expressions of sectarianism appeared 
most dramatically in the early decades of the twentieth century, and will occupy later 
sections of this chapter. However, before this it is worth offering a brief account of a 
more general religious evolution within Indian Islam towards increased sectarian 
specificity. It was in the nineteenth century that we begin to see the erosion of many of 
those factors and institutions which could harmonise Shia and Sunni belief and practice 
into mutually sympathetic systems and likewise into benevolent religious communities. 
in favour of conceptions more broadly hostile to communication or reconciliation 
between Shia and Sunni traditions. 
Much scholarship has implied that Islam as lived on a local level in the nineteenth 
century qasbas of U. P. proved itself a more syncretic, integrationist force than later 
instances of Shi'a-Sunni conflict would have us believe. Several examples can be 
identified of a gradual transmutation of custom and practice in nineteenth century north 
India away from religious mutuality between Shi'as and Sunnis and towards sectarian 
particularity. One of these is Muharram, which is discussed on its own terms below. Two 
others, however, are deserving of examination here. One such instance is the practice of 
Sufism, the 'mystical' strand of Islam associated with the veneration of saints and 
popular rather than scriptural practice. Attendance at and pilgrimage to the shrines of pirs 
(saints) and the observation of `urs (death anniversaries of saints) 
had been a source of 
common faith and practice between Shi'as and Sunnis 
from the eighteenth century 
onwards. According to one scholar, 'the gentry's patronage and the common man's 
veneration of Muslim shrines and holy men enhanced, undoubtedly, the qu. tiha's 
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solidarity as a unique entity. '57 While mostly associated with Sunni practice. Sufi orders 
with few exceptions tended to trace their lineage to the descent of 'Ali and so maintained 
some form of Shi'a consciousness. In Amroha, Shi'a Sayyids had long attended the 
dargahs (shrines) of saints who were credited as their ancestors and the founders of the 
town, and still offered great respect to their shrines into the twentieth century. 58 
A further instance of collaboration between Shi'a and Sunni traditions through the early 
decades of the nineteenth century was the consistent intellectual cooperation between 
Hanafi Sunnis and Shi'as in many of the province's nineteenth century mrmadrasas, and 
more particularly, through the consensual nature of their curricula. No better instance of 
this exists than Firangi Mahal, Lucknow's foremost madrasa and the dominant seminary 
of U. P. until and even into the nineteenth century. While administered by a Hanafi 
family, its syllabus was constructed upon the famed days-i-Nizalniva curriculum, which 
had a rationalist emphasis. It excelled in the fields of kalam (theology) and mantiq 
(logic), Oriental literature and languages, grammar, scientific knowledge (inclusive of 
philosophy, natural sciences and metaphysics) and mathematical knowledge (including 
geometry and astronomy) '59 all disciplines with which Lucknow as a whole would long 
be associated. 60 This focus upon rationalist subjects enabled the school to offer some 
tuition to Shi'as alongside Sunnis. Furthermore, the emphasis upon rationalist thought 
and applied learning facilitated the instruction of judges and secular administrators as 
well as `ulama, and the madrasa emerged as essentially an institution of state 
administration for Shia Awadh, fashioning much of the state's juristic and administrative 
bureaucracy 
. 
61 Firangi Mahal was therefore able through its curriculum to serve both 
Islamic sects and integrate them into the apparatus of governance, contributing to the oft- 
lauded composite character of nineteenth century Lucknow. Comparably the Madrasa-i- 
'Aliya in Rampur, a Shi'a seminary functioning for much of the nineteenth century with 
57 Mushirul Hasan, From pluralism to separatism: qasbas in colonial. 4wadh (New Delhi, 2004), pp. 124- 
132. 
s" Jamal Ahmad Naqvi, Tarikh-i-sacht-i-Amroha (Hyderabad. 1934), pp. 28-30. 
" For details on the dars-i-Nizamiv a, see Francis Robinson, The 'ulama of Farangi Mahull and Islamic 
culture in South Asia (Delhi, 2001), pp. 46-55,249-251. 
60 Abdul Halim Sharar, Luck,: ow: the last phase of an oriental culture (London, 1975), p. 95, Powell, 
Muslims and missionaries, pp. 174-5. 
6' Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: religion and state in Aººadh, 1722-1859 
96 
Najm ul-Hasan of Lucknow as its principal, emphasised Oriental learning and literature, a 
curriculum which was harmonised from 1889 with the syllabi of the Oriental Colleges of 
Calcutta and Punjab. Its inclusion of both Shi'as and Sunnis and its consensual 
curriculum appeared to harmonise rather than strain sectarian relations, and contributed to 
good sectarian integration in Rampur State. 62 
However, modern attempts at religious reform initiated a gradual erosion of such 
integrationist influences between Shi'as and Sunnis, and the corresponding appearance of 
an elevated consciousness of difference. From the nineteenth century, movements of both 
Shia and Sunni reform targeted Sufi practice. The assaults commenced by Dildar 'Ali 
upon Sufism on the grounds of its supposed ecstatic innovations and its inclusion of 
Sunni influence in the Nawabi period was continued by modern `ulama into the twentieth 
century. In Lucknow, the dargahs of Muslim saints such as the Shahmina Sufi shrine 
attracted the attentions, and vituperations, of those seeking to purify Islam according to 
the tenets of orthodox practice. 63 Lucknow's Shi'as referred in the early 1900s to 'urs, the 
observation of saints' days, as `an institution unwarranted by Muhammadan religion and 
offensive to the Shi'a creed and sentiments. '64 The esteemed dargahs of Amroha and in 
particular that of Wilayat `Ali, long a source of cultural affinity and cordiality between 
Shia, Sunni and Hindu communities in the town, were also targeted by Shia and Sunni 
reformists alike. 65 At approximately the same time, a Shia newspaper launched an attack 
upon the descendants of Fakhir ud-din, the founding member of a prominent Sufi family 
of Delhi. 66 Tellingly, one Shia author writes in the 1915 to defend the virtues of 
tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism) as an important part of the philosophical origins of 
Shi'ism, dismissing its detractors as misguided and narrow-minded67; the implication of 
this statement, of course, is that Sufism was being criticised by many Shia 'ulaina at this 
(California, 1988), pp. 43-5. 
62 Gazetteer of the Rampur State (Allahabad, 1911). pp. 72-3. Evidence suggests that Rampur remained 
immune to many of the sectarian quarrels that characterised the United Provinces, at least until the 1930s 
when the leading Nawab was accused of preferential treatment towards Shi'as. 
`'; Tafrih (Lucknow), 7 June 1913, UPNNR. 
64 'The humble memorial of the Shias of Lucknow' to T. C. Piggott, President, Shia-Sunni Committee. 
Lucknow, 24 November 1908, GAD File No. 591 of 1908. UPSA. 
6s S. M. Azizuddin Husain, Medieval towns: a case stud of . Antroha and Jalali (New Delhi, 1995), p. 28. 
66 Tauhid (Meerut), 24 April 1913, UPNNR. 
67 Kazim, Tangid-ul-taglid, p. 12. 
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time. During this period, it was the mosque and madrasa, institutions o1 sectarian 
specificity, which overshadowed the Sufi dargah and khanaqah (Sufi ordert as the 
foremost structures of civic life in towns such as Lucknoýk and Amroha. 
The same period witnessed the increasing exclusivity and differentiation within north 
India's madrasas. The process began with Lucknow's Madrasa-i-Shahi, founded in the 
1840s, which promulgated a curriculum fusing works from the dars-i-Nizam va with 
works of Shi'a jurisprudence borne of the Usuli revival from Iraq, Persia and India. 
While the madrasu failed to survive its second decade, its more lasting contribution was 
the dissociation of Shi'as from Firangi Mahal, which set a precedent for the 
sectionalisation of Islamic education even after its closure. 68 From this point, those 
madrusas established during the period of proliferation of such institutions after 1857 
tended to display a far greater level of differentiation between Shi'as and Sunnis within 
the context of formalised religious education. The Deobandi schools emerging after 1865 
were exclusively Sunni and virulent in anti-Shi'a polemic, adopting a syllabus that was 
strikingly different from the Nizarni curriculum hitherto dominant. Downplaying the 
importance of philosophy and scientific subjects, they placed new emphasis upon the 
disciplines of tafsir (exegesis of the Qur'an) and hadis. Such subjects brought to the fore 
Shi'a and Sunni divergences over issues such as thesource of the meaning of the Qur'an 
and the conceptions of hadis, b9 contracting the space for common education for Shi'as 
and Sunnis. Thus, while an emphasis upon hadis lent itself well to the more instructive, 
ethical constructs of Islam emerging in British India, it also led to the consolidation of an 
emphasis upon religious differentiation. 
When Shia madrasas began to appear once again after 1889, they tended to echo 
Deohand both in their sectarian exclusivity, being open only to Shia tulips, and in their 
emphasis upon disciplines which had long been associated more with Delhi and the North 
bs ; \mir Hasan, Palace culture of Lucknoºt (Delhi, I983). p. 22. While 
Shi'a dissociation from Iýirangi 
Mahal at this point is tangible, it is not clear whether it was total. tiayyid . Anieer '. \li ""rote of hrangi 
Mahal as a Contemporar\ Shia institution in his article 'Islamic culture under the Mughak of 1927. S'cd 
Razi \Vasti cd1.. Src'c/ : nleerr . iIi on 
Islamic Instarv and culture (Lahore. I IWS'), r. 221 
69 Shi'a hacks is largeI\ drawn from the \\urds and deeds cif the Inmams. hue most', unni hadi. S i. based 
upon oral traditions passed down by the Companions of the Prophet, 'ý 
ho in tihi'a understandings area 
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Western Provinces than with Lucknow itself. 70 Despite its continuation of many of those 
hallmarks of the dars-i-Nizamivu, the curricula of schools such as Madrasa Nazimivva and 
Sultan ul-Madaris mostly took the lead of their 1840s predecessor and contained more 
works of the Usuli Shia masters. They oversaw a diminution of the attention conferred 
upon subjects such as logic and philosophy in favour of a distinctly greater emphasis 
upon subjects such as hadis, tafsir and jurisprudence. 7' As was seen above, Madrasa 
Nazimiya established as one of its distinguishing features the study of fiqh, a discipline 
with entirely separate roots according to Shia and Sunni traditions, and thereby a 
speciality which precluded intellectual cooperation with Sunni counterparts. 
For these reasons, educational reform among Shi'as and Sunnis took separate paths. If 
Firangi Mahal had epitomised the intermittent educational cooperation between Hanafi 
Sunnis and Shi'as at the turn of the nineteenth century, then it was Madrasa Nazimiya, 
Sultan ul-Madaris and the new Sunni schools in Deoband, Saharanpur and Bareilly which 
represented their relations by the turn of the twentieth. In both Lucknow and Amroha, the 
decisive growth in the number of both Shia and Sunni nzadrasas represented a form of 
undeclared competition between the two communities, as each patronised religious 
institutions which represented their side. 
The general evolution in the direction of sectarian precision and differentiation, in Sunni 
as well as Shia inadrasas, intellectual life and ritual practice, laid the foundation for the 
origination of more overt Shia-Sunni religious antagonism in Indian in later decades. A 
decisive moment in this regard came at the end of the 1880s when the phrase "Alin' an- 
ºtwali-Allah, wasi-i-Rasul-i-Allah-va-Khalifa-bila fasil ('Ali, the beloved of God, heir of 
the Prophet and Caliph without interruption)', implying the first three Caliphs to have 
been usurpers rather than legitimate forerunners of `Ali, was freshly introduced into the 
considered to have erred. 
70 For instance, 'Lucknow was not strong in the fields of theological science, rafsir (the interpretation of 
the Quran), hadis and rijal (investigation of hadis). Tafsir wwas understood to a certain degree, but no more 
than in many other places. ' Sharar, Lucknmi': the last phase of an oriental culture, p. 95. 
'1 A full account of the curricula of these maclrasas is not given here for want of space. However, a useful 
description of their syllabus is given in Syed Najmul Raza Riz\ t, 'Shi'a Madaris of Awadh: historical 
development and present situation, ' in Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut Reifeld eds., Islamic eclu union, 
diversity auf national identity: dini madäris in India post 9/I 1 (New Delhi, 2(X)6). pp. 108- 114,12 1-130. 
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Shi'a azan in several U. P. towns. Its first application appears to have been in 1887 in 
Allahabad when Sayyid Aqa, a Lucknow-educated zakir, built a mosque into which he 
inscribed the phrase and incorporated it into the azan. He was taken to the municipal 
court of Allahabad by a Sunni hakim, who demanded that the phrase should be removed 
from the azan, although the case decided in favour of Sayyid Aqa in 1890.72 However, 
controversies surrounding the introduction of the phrase appeared almost simultaneously 
in Allahabad, Lucknow and Jaunpur. In Lucknow, the phrase appeared in the a,. (Inr of one 
Shi'a mosque in Daliganj, an event which initially stoked violence in several districts of 
Lucknow. 73 Comparably, some Sunnis challenged the right of Shi'as to use the phrase in 
local courts in 1887-8, and the government initially ordered the controversial addition be 
removed. However, the Commissioner of Lucknow consulted the nnujtahid Muhammad 
Ibrahim, who claimed that the `bila fasil' claim had always been present in the azan, and 
that its recitation was a compulsory act of faith. After the mujtahid wrote to the British 
monarch declaring the Shia faith to be founded upon belief in Hazrat 'Ali and hence the 
phrase in the azan to be compulsory, government declared the use of the phrase to be an 
ancient practice and permission for its inclusion was granted. ' 4 Seeing perceived victories 
in each of these towns, the phrase then appeared in the azan of several Shia mosques in 
Amroha. Here, the case in 1894 reached the District Magistrate and ultimately the 
Commissioner of Rohilkhand, Sunnis accusing Shi'as of exploiting the fact that the 
munsif (judge) and tehsildar (collector) of the town were counted among them to turn the 
municipal machinery in favour of the Shia side. 75 The implicit acceptance in all of these 
cases by the British of the unassailable right to include a reference to the eminence of 
The curricula established in Lucknow were replicated in other Shi'a madrasas across north India. 
- Husain, Marla'-i-Anw r, pp. 41-2. This individual was a writer of Shia tracts, one of which was a 
somewhat typical biography of the Imams, Tagrir-u1-'ali'aten (Lucknow, 1895-6). Some of his writings 
were, again typical of the period, held to have corrected the faith of Sunnis as well as reinti)rced that of 
Shi'as. 
7 Fitdös-i-Makän ki tazkira (Lucknow, circa 1960), pp. 18-20: Shakil Hasan Shamsi, Shia-Sani yaziva: 
kitnCj mazhabi kitna siväsi? (Lucknow, circa 2005), pp. 86-7. Different sources cite the insertion of the 
contentious phrase in 1882,1887 and 1889 respectively, although 1887 appears to he the best substantiated. 
7' Firdös-i-Makän kä ta; kira, pp. 21-3; 'Note' by Sayyid Shahinshah Husain Riivie, 15 Dec 1908, GAD 
File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA. Following the persuasions of Muhammad Ibrahim and others, the Cit\ 
Magistrate of Lucknow resolved that "'not the words themselves, but the exception taken to them by the 
Sunnis, is a novelty. - 'The humble memorial of the Shia residents of Lucknow, ' to A. L. Saunders. 22 
March 1908, GAD File 591/1908, UPSA. 
75 To Chief Secretary, 27 January 1896, GAD File No. 106C/64 of 1896. UPSA: 'The Shia,, of Amroha' to 
Mac Donnell, Lieutenant Governor of the North West Province and Oudh, 19 December 1895, ibid. 'The 
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'Ali in the azan seems to have contributed greatly to the often favourable Shia response 
to British rule, which is further elaborated upon in later chapters. 76 
The introduction into the azan of this reference to the pre-eminence of `Ali represents the 
increasingly coordinated and public role of Muslim religious conflict in north India as 
would develop over subsequent decades. Ensuing sections will discuss two key 
manifestations of ever more direct and `public' expressions of religious difference: the 
practice of munazara, or public religious debate, and the consolidation of difference 
around the rites of Muharram, both of which became key theatres in which sectarian 
differences could be negotiated, crystallised and demonstrated. Both were most evident in 
Lucknow, but were common to various qasbas of the United Provinces. 
Disputation and munazara in colonial India 
Munazara, religious disputation indicating in this context debates between Shi'as and 
Sunnis, grew steadily as a written genre from the late eighteenth century onwards, in 
north India generally but in Lucknow particularly. Its starting point is commonly 
considered to be the anti-Shi'a polemic of Shah `Abdul 'Aziz of Delhi (d. 1824), the 
Tuhfa-i- `Isnä `Ashariya, written in a combination of Arabic and Persian. 77 The work's 
introductory passages, while hinting at the synthesised society of Shia and Sunni Islam 
in the early nineteenth century as discussed above, professes its intention to erode such 
composite influences from Sunni life and practice through a systematic confutation of 
Shi'a doctrines: 
'The need for writing this book arose due to the problem of the 
popularity of `Isna 'Ashari faith among Muslims. Sunnis are being 
influenced by the faith of 'Isna 'Asharis and not a single house was 
left where one or two Sunnis would not have accepted the `Isna 
'Ashari faith or taken influence from it. '78 
Sunnis of Amroha' to Secretary of North West Province and Oudh. 29 February 1896, ibid. 
76 Shamsi, Shi'a-Sari gazziva, p. 86. 
77 Space does not permit an examination of this work here, but a thorough examination is provided in 
Sayyid Athar 'Abbas Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz: Puritanism, sectarian polemics and jihad (Canberra, 1982) 
pp. 245-355. 
This translation is taken from Husain, Medieval towns, p. 24. 
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The work was not an isolated instance, but ushered in a literary genre of polemic which 
came to prevail in the nineteenth century. While the genre had its roots particularly in the 
custom of hadis scholarship associated mostly with Delhi. Lucknow quickly became the 
centre of such literary activity. 79 It was initially the Nasirabadi family of `urlatna who 
responded in writing to the claims of `Abdul 'Aziz's Tuhfa, but a further cornerstone in 
Shia polemical scholarship came with the production of `Abagät u1-Amt, ý-ir fi Imank-it id- 
a immat ul-athar, an extremely thorough response to the former written over the two 
lifetimes of two of Lucknow's most revered mujtahids, Hamid Husain and his son and 
successor Nasir Husain. 80 
It has been argued that nuwazara, which existed as both literary genre and a form of 
verbal discussion between scholars of alternative religious traditions, was greatly 
expanded in the early part of the nineteenth century through the initiation of such debates 
by Christian missionaries. 81 The prevalence of these written Shia-Sunni controversies 
through the century, then, suggests how such conflictive traditions became indigenised 
and internalised, evolving from Christian-Muslim disputations and ultimately 
contributing to debates among Muslims themselves. However, in the later stages of the 
nineteenth century, there was a development towards the carrying of niufnazara out of the 
sole guardianship of religious scholars and into the public akhara. Mwuia: ara evolved 
from, as one scholar has expressed, 'a harmonious, elegantly conducted discussion' into a 
'hitter disputation, of a kind to be repeated many times in the bazaars of northern India in 
79 Sunni polemics against Shi'ism, following the precedent of 'Abdul 'Aziz's Tuhfa, include the Muntalºi 
ul-Kulum by Nlaulana Haider 'Ali, a resident of Fyzabad who became famous in Lucknow in the nineteenth 
century. Other renowned polemicists of the age include Mauvli Lutuf Ullah and, in confutation of' the 
treatises of the latter, Mian Mushir. Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an oriental culture, p. 95; for other 
examples, see Rizvi, Shah '. Abd al-, 4: i;., pp. 356-470. 
"O 'Abagat ul-, , near'. s authors answered Arabic portions of 'Abdul 'Aziz's work in Arabic. and Persian 
portions in Persian. Haulid Husain, in a lengthy reply of some seven volumes to the Tuhfü, defended certain 
hadi. s which 'Abdul 'Aiiz had considered weak or invalid, drawing from both Shi'a and Sunni sources in 
his support. Eight further volumes of the work were produced after his death by Nasir Husain, %ý riting 
under the name of his father. Sinlilarl\, he defended Shia avat, and showed that the Shi'as accepted a 
number of the paths which according to 'Abdul 'Aiiz were rejected by Shi'as. Sa\yid Athar 'Abbas Rizvi, 
I Nr>c'io-inte'llcctººul history 0J [lit, '/sna Ashari Shi'is in India, Volume II, (Delhi, 1986), pp. 17I-3, Husain, 
11cztlcý' i 
. 
1ºrºtý, r, 1ß. 071. 
Pk)\\ CII, 4l1rsliºººs uºul missi0ººa'riex, passiTU. 
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the last years of the nineteenth century. ' 82 
The invigoration of inunazara in the early 1900s had a profound effect in the localities of 
Lucknow and numerous other cities for at least two decades. The appearance in the first 
decade of the twentieth century of the Sunni polemicist `Abdul Shakoor \ý as a turning 
point in the practice of munazara. 83 Initially from the outlying qasba of Kakori. his fame 
in the muhallas of Lucknow was borne of his volatile preaching and his editorship of 
Lucknow's foremost Sunni newspaper Al-Najm, crafting him as a public representative of 
Lucknow's Sunnis. The early twentieth century equally witnessed the emergence upon 
the public scene of Haji Maqbool Ahmed, the above-described young and rebellious 
Shi'a orator, who was of particular note for his inflammatory sermons and his 
unprecedented development of the munazara genre. Upon his arrival in Lucknow in 
1904, it is said that he called nlunazara on an almost daily basis in numerous nnuhallas, 
sometimes even failing to attend the confrontations that he had organised. 84 
Consequently, he was held personally accountable for the early twentieth century 
integration of nnunazara into mainstream religious discourse: by the mark of this man, 
the infusion of munazara into religious worship was completed, a distinction passed 
down to one or other figurehead until today. '85 
A particularly prominent numazara, classic and representative of the practice in many 
respects, is described for the year 1910 in Lucknow. In one Shia mosque a pamphlet, 
lacking the name of the author or publisher, was circulated, praising the Caliphs Umar 
and Mu`awiya. As a result of the argument provoked, a munazaru was held between 
'Abdul Shakoor, still operating in Lucknow, and on the Shia side Mirza 'Abdul Husain 
and Sayyid 'Ali Jaunpuri, respectively an Arabic teacher from Hyderabad and a member 
of Madrasa Nazimiya. 86 The ensuing debate, unravelling through a number of sessions, 
concerns the virtue of these supposed Caliphs, each side evoking Arabic literary sources 
in their defence. The Shia side for their part blamed the three first Caliphs for certain 
S2 Ibid, pp. 0. -4. 83 Sharar, Luckno t: the Just phase of an oriental culture, p. 95. 
2-3. 84 'Luc"kna'u ki rnasibat-: aa'a Surii(J)ri, ' GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA, PP. -- 
Imamia Mission. Khutih i ýrl i . 1/ýr/ýcrmncl, p. 11-2. 
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military defeats and for fleeing from the Prophet's side in battle, '' while defending 
against the claim that the Shi'as were kafirs (unbelievers). However, while the primar\ 
focus is the familiar disputation of the authenticity of the Caliphs, the debate also 
encompasses a much wider breadth of subjects, such as disagreement upon the 
authenticity of the Qur'an. The Shi'as are accused of believing in a Qur'an which was 
`created' and open to inaccuracies, while the Sunni Caliphs under whom the Qur'an ww as 
compiled are blamed for their partiality and innovation in conducting the task. 88 Of 
course, this Shia-written text proclaims a decisive victory for 'Abdul Husain who, it is 
said, maintained perfect composure while 'Abdul Shakoor became increasingly 
aggressive in his self-defence, and inarticulate and agitated in his responses. 89 
As with many of the printed treatises discussed above, the linguistic tone and structure of 
the debate clearly demonstrate that the medium of 'nunaz, ara was intended not for the 
orderly exchange and synthesis of views, or the identification of common ground, rather, 
the primary function of the inuliazara was the demonstration by both parties of 
unqualified victory over the rival sect. This perhaps explains one common feature in the 
written records of this and other muna: arcs: a non-Muslim Arabic speaker, in this case a 
Hindu `Pandit, ' as a neutral spectator interested in advancing his knowledge of the Shia 
religion. Whether a factual truth or stylistic flourish, he is so persuaded by 'Abdul Husain 
that he comes round to the Shia side. 90 
While drawing from a largely Lucknawi tradition and particularly prominent within this 
municipality, such 'nunazaras were not confined to Lucknow. Similar controversies, 
described as an 'echo of the pamphlet controversy in Lucknow' and imitative of the 
"' Shi'a-v i-S, wi k mumr zart surr 1328 hijri par teligi yi', azar- (Lurknový , 
1910), pp. 1-3. 
H7 Ibid, pp. 7-12. 
xx Ihid, p1p. 68-77. This debate re' cads the adherence of some Indian Shi'as at this time to the particularly 
c\clusi\ ist doctrine that kcý portions of the Qur'an had been e\rised h\ the enemies of the Prophet. These 
ideas arc h\ no means consensual among Indian Shi`as and perhaps evidence ideas gained fron Persian 
scholars, such as Muhammad Baqir l\lajlisi, whose works were frequently re-printed in India during this 
period. C. t. Po\\ell, . 1luslims and missionaries, p. 148 
Shi 'a-va-Surn kti rnim/u ori. pp. ')-10. 
`"' A similar figure is present in the account of a'nuna: ara in Amroha, in which the debate is in fact 
dclav d unti0 it ii-'Muslim Arahist is found. Alimad. Shikust-i-'azifll. pp. 3-5 
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munazara culture and style that the city had fostered, 91 quickly spread to other cities in 
the province, notably Amroha, Fyzabad and Saharanpur. ", These municipalities in effect 
became the theatres in which wider Shia-Sunni controversies of U. P. pla\ ed out. 
Amroha, for instance, clearly demonstrates the way in which 'nuna: ura became a civic 
spectacle, dominating municipal life and drawing celebrity to the town. Debates between 
various religious communities here became regular calendar features from around 1916, 
invariably attracting a large audience. 93 On the calling of a muna: ara, Shia `u/ama and 
rnaulavis of national prestige, not least Sibte Hasan and Maqbool Ahmad together with 
Deobandi `Mama of Saharanpur and Moradabad, travelled for miles to grace the small 
outpost of Amroha with their presence, whether due to their desire for public exposure, or 
perhaps for their worry at public irrelevance stemming from their absence at such 
important occasions. 94 As inunazara developed in Amroha, it increasingly took on the 
character of overt theatre and tamnasha (spectacle). More than simple discussion, it would 
consider only questions of the utmost and dramatic importance (glamat haisa a%val' ). 95 
Debates had a carefully selected audience which balanced religious communities; scribes 
were present to record the proceedings; and partly for the benefit of the latter, the 
disputants were requested to speak in a clear and stylised manner. 96 The obvious 
popularity of such occasions entirely contradicts the view of some modern observers that 
munazaras were matters solely for theologians, carrying minimal public significance. 
97 
Moreover, the frequent production of written accounts of the munazara theatricals 
allowed the preservation of the debate for later personal reflection, as well as shaping 
memory of the event itself. In effect, these texts marked the privatisation of numazara, 
back from public spectacle to private meditation. 
"' To Chief Secretary, 4 August 1914, GAD File No. 480 of 1914, UPSA; From Commissioner of' 
I. ucknow Division, 20 Jul), 1914, ibid. 
Ibid. The emergence of Saharanpur as a site of n uia aro is probably explained by the presence of the 
two most important Deohandi ! nadrasas in the district, which were fundamental institutions in the 
cultivation of the mu! lazara tradition in north India. 
93 See Muhammad Ashfay Husain Saddiyi, Mujddala hasna (1loradahad. 1918), passim; Ahmad, Shikast- 
passirn. 
' Alimad, Shiku. st-i-'a;, F! n, pp. 2-4. Amroha also at \ arious points enlisted the presence of 'Abdul Sh koor. 
some prominent 'uln na o1' Nloradahad, and other Deohandi and Bareilvi leaders. 
Ibid, pp 2.10-11. 
4h Ibid, pp. 4-i. 
Y7 Hasgyn. From /pluralism ro crlh lratism, pp. 36-7. 
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While munazaras were confined to a few key towns where they occurred prolificall\. 
they often absorbed much wider provincial themes and controversies. In Fyzabad. 
described as a 'place... where the feeling between the two communities is alwa\ s more 
or less strained, '98 Shia-Sunni hostility increased as a result of the debate between 
Hindus and Muslims in neighbouring Ayodhya, concerning Muslim obligations to cow 
sacrifice. Certain Sunnis were apparently hostile to the assumption by Shia politicians of 
spokesmanship for `Muslims' on this question, and displayed notices across the city 
which attempted to draw the Shi'a editor of Al-Islah, a Shia newspaper, into a niurnazara 
with the same `Abdul Shakoor of Lucknow: 
it is an old practice with the Shias to run away from debate, to put the 
public in delusion and to publish pamphlets and notices for the 
mitigation of their shame... As it is not our aim to deceive the public 
like the Shia ulamas, we accept the challenge of the Shias for debate... 
the editor of the Islah and other Shia ulamas may come to Faizabad 
and may hold debate with the said Editor [`Abdul Shakoor]. '99 
Exposing the overlap between 'n ia: ara and the notions of tabligh discussed above, the 
declared aim of such mcnna 'anus, whether in Lucknow, Amroha or Fyzabad, was 
frequently the conversion of the unfaithful to the religion of the victors. In the latter case, 
for instance, the proposals instructed that the loser of the debate should publicly 
acknowledge his defeat and should espouse the religion of the victorious party. '°° 
However, it does appear that in spite of such stated goals, the proceedings of the orators 
in inunazaras were principally directed at the consolidation of their supporters. Just as 
sectarian publications clearly often professed their aims as the correction of the opposite 
community, so the inunazara enabled the invigoration of sectarian awareness among the 
populace, while expressing this process as the victorious and confident recruitment of the 
rival group. 
That nruFiazuru was a pursuit centred upon internal religious renewal rather than an active 
attempt at outwardly focused proselytisation is further strengthened by the presence of 
munu,. aru in particular towns where the religious allegiances of individuals proved fluid 
Notice, ' A. W. McNair to Fcrard, 2(1 July 1914. GAD File No. 480 of 1914. UPSA. 
99 'Proclanmation of the: Shias for dehatc aeccpted, ' ibid. 
'M Ibid. 
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and negotiable, depending upon the groups targeted in the debates. Looking again to 
Amroha, a qasba with sizeable Shia, Sunni and Hindu communities. it can be seen that 
munazara was not limited to Shia-Sunni controversies, nor even to solid communal 
categories. In 1917, some activity by the local Arya Samaj prompted certain 'Muslims' of 
the town to convene the Anjuman-i-Asha'at-i-Islam, formed to invite prominent local 
`ulama to the town and hold staged confrontations with the Hindu babas, of course 
gaining perceived victory. 101 When the organisation convened to defend against Hindus, 
quarrels between Shias and Sunnis apparently fell silent; Shi'as and Sunnis alike appear 
to have been among the named participants. Yet, Amroha simultaneously gained 
something of a reputation in Shia-Sunni debates, in the same way attracting preachers to 
the town to defend their respective sects in front of audiences. The case of Amroha 
therefore demonstrates the existence of a three-way communal triangle, in which 
Muslims rallied to Islam or to sect depending on the circumstance. In such a context, 
munazara was less a confrontation between fixed parties and more a means of 
negotiating momentary and fluid religious identities through the constant communication 
of difference from other religious communities. 
The conduct of niunazara from the late-nineteenth century therefore differed in several 
important ways from its antecedent manifestations. For one, rriu, tac, ara was included in 
the process of vernacularisation discussed above. For its proponents, scholarly learning or 
acquaintance with the classical languages were perhaps less significant than their fluent 
and dramatic Hindustani oratory and their foothold in the Urdu sphere of popular writing 
and speech. Secondly, rnunazara in effect metamorphosed from an intellectual pursuit 
among the literate ashy-af into a populist altercation on the public street. Third. munazar-a 
widened not only public knowledge of the Shia-Sunni divide but the scope of these 
differences themselves. The medium of debate by its nature endlessly referenced, 
reproduced and systematised the gulfs existing between Shi'as and Sunnis in scholarly 
background and orthodox interpretation. The specific histories of the Prophet's 
Companions and the acts of the Caliphs, the meanings attributed to each particular act of 
Niuharram, disagreement over the authenticities of this or that hadis. all left the gates of 
Saddigi, . 11 uujýuclala 
hasna, pp. I- )). 
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the madrasas and emerged into the realm of public knowledge. Aluna: ara, like the 
printed sphere discussed above, tended to enhance the significance of those subject. of 
sectarian specificity such as taqiva and mut`a (a form of Shia temporary marriage) 
which drew much more from textual traditions than from the normative realities of Islam 
as lived in modern north India. Islam as evoked in muna,, ara overtook Islam as lived in 
its sectarian specificity, while also gradually influencing the latter. 
From civic cohesion to sectarian division: the reformation of Muharram 
One of the definitive manifestations of Shi `a-Sunni religious differentiation from the end 
of the nineteenth century was Muharram, the annual commemoration of the martyrdom 
of the Imam Husain. Aside from all the instances of Shia organisation discussed in the 
previous chapter, proponents of Shia organisation often identified the 'organising factor' 
of Muharram as the prime source from which sectarian solidarity could be kindled. 102 The 
inherent uniformity of the great to `z va processions and gatherings for their burial at 
karbalas enlisted great congregations from Nawabi times onwards in Lucknow and other 
cities and qasbas. They have been described subsequently by scholars as indicators of 
Lucknow's `high level of organisation and corporate cooperation for a pre-modern South 
Asian city. ' 103 However, during the colonial period the application of this organisational 
character increasingly shifted away from the encouragement of broad cross-communal 
participation and towards the propagation of uniform, standardised demonstrations of 
sectarian homogeneity. Muharram was appropriated as a means of distinguishing and 
delineating alternative conceptions of Islam. 
This perspective somewhat contrasts which much scholarship upon the observance of 
Muharram in India, which has more usually focused upon the abilities of this festival to 
W2 
., 
/l Inclicr Shin Conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address His Highness , 11ir. 11i . \ctuaz 
Khan Talpur, p. 15. 
r"i Cole, Roots of north India,, Slri'isrn, pp. 110-2. Writing can Mtuharram in Lurknmw in the 18. ß(h, the 
Indian city in \N hick Muharram \% as most exuberant, the oh. cr\ er 11r,. Meer Hasan 'Ali remarked upon the 
sin`-ularity in the habit,,. manners and customs' OI Shi'as during Muharram. Mrs. Meer Haan All, 
Ohwrºationts on the , Ilir. csal, m, uns (It 
India IK: u: rchi. 1")78), p. 5-1. 
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assimilate with the cultural norms of the diverse centres in which it was practised. 1°-' 
While nominally a Shia commemoration of the slaying of Husain at karbala, the 
diversity of Muharram as practiced around the subcontinent has long been taken as 
evidence of the ability of lived Islam to adjust entirely to the popular customs of the 
Indian milieu in which it found itself. 105 This has especially been the case for U. P.; one 
analyst writes of Muharram that `the "little" and "local" traditions could seep in... and 
make possible the collective participation of the masses, "06 while another assessment 
takes Muharram as a component of so-called `popular as opposed to scriptural Islam, ' 
contributing wholeness and harmony to Lucknow and its outlying gasbas. 107 Going yet 
further, the analysis of the practice of Muharram in the Indian diaspora has revealed how 
the commemoration could be appropriated as a public demonstration of `Indianness' 
rather than religious persuasion, uniting Hindu, Shia and Sunni artisans alike. 108 It could 
indeed be argued that this concentration on the observation of Muharram in India from 
the perspective of cultural assimilation and cross-communal participation is one reason, 
in addition to those already covered, for the overlooking of the significance of Shi `a- 
Sunni conflicts in India. 
104 E. g. David Pinault, Horse of Karbala: Muslim devotional life in India (New York, 2001), passim. 
1115 Such perspectives reflect the framework championed by Imtiaz Ahmad that Islam in India adapted so 
completely to its environment that it became inseparable from the local cultural traditions in which it was 
expressed. For instance, `the religious tradition of the Muslims in India... comprise[s] two distinct 
elements; one ultimate and formal, derived from the Islamic texts; the other proximate and local, validated 
by custom. The integration of the two elements to a point that they should come to co-exist as 
complementary and integral parts of a common religious system was presumably conditioned by the 
constraints of Islam's own struggle for survival in an alien environment... the resistance and resilience 
shown by the indigenous traditions encouraged Islam in India to accept and retain the local cultural 
traditions but adapt them to its own requirements and needs by putting an Islamic content into them. ' 
Imtiaz Ahmad, `Introduction, ' in Imtiaz Ahmad ed., Ritual and religion among Muslims in India (Delhi, 
1981), p. 15. 
""' For instance, `Moharram,... not being a rigorously defined religious event, could be more easily torn 
out of its real- as essentially political/historical - context, and transformed into a mass festival. Its ten-day 
duration was another facilitating factor; it is not surprising, therefore, that in the context of Indian rural life, 
Moharram eventually came to be what it is... [it has] succeeded, to an extent, in binding Hindus and 
Muslims together. ' A. R. Saiyid, `Ideal and reality in the observance of Moharram: a behavioural 
interpretation, ' in Imtiaz Ahmad ed., Ritual and religion among Muslims in India, p. 140. 
107 Hasan, From pluralism to separatism, p. 21. 
L"x For instance, one study of Muharram among Indian artisan laborers in Trinidad, as also in Guyana, 
Surinam and Jamaica, has shown how Muharram was celebrated by Hindus, Shi'as and Sunnis alike. 
Muharram is thus interpreted as an expression of a common subaltern culture and an agent of social 
integration among such communities. Prabhu Mohapatra, 'Unmaking the coolie: resistance and 
accommodation among Indian labour in the Caribbean, ' in Arvind N. Das and Marcel van der Linden cris., 
109 
Such a perspective has informed our knowledge of tiawwabi Lucknow. tluharram matured 
from the Nawabi period as the ceremonial centre of the religious calendar, and its 
commemorations were an important source of municipal communal integration. Rather 
than being an exclusively Shia obligation, Muharram was perceived for sears as 
contributory to communal harmonies. The great to `: iva processions enlisted the 
participation of Shi`as, Sunnis and Hindus alike and carried a flamboyant carnival 
atmosphere, 109 while the large assembly at the karbala engendered a similarly cross- 
communal participation. 110 A number of Lucknawis even described between Lucknow's 
communities `good feelings, which were more prominent during the Muharram than on 
other ordinary days. '' 11 Further ensuring its role in the often-lauded communal 
integration of Lucknow, Muharram was a key moment in the interaction of the city's 
economic classes. The Shia nobility dispensed public charity on Muharram days, while 
the displays of Muharram provided labour that would seasonally engage many of the 
urban poor of Lucknow. 112 Muharram in fact generated such revenue from the donations 
of all communities that it was an important economic occasion for the city. ''3 Scholarship 
has been quick to pinpoint that these 'syncretic tendencies' allowed Lucknow's 
Muharram to assume a distinctly inclusive, composite quality, the product less of 
orthodox traditions and more of Lucknow's distinctive municipal culture. ' 14 
This quality of Muharram in Lucknow was shared by the qasbas of Awadh. As practised 
in individual towns, the collective participation in Muharram bound together a Shi'a- 
tinged civic culture by which the rites of mourning in effect contributed to social 
cohesion between the religious communities and classes of these small towns, and hence 
tu the integration of society within the gasba. il In Amroha, for example, the lavish 
U'mrk and social change in , Asia: essays in 
honour of Jan Breman (Nevk Delhi, 2003), especially p. 156. 
10° Nlrs. Meer Hasan 'Ali wrote in the 1830s that 'the pompous display is gr(-mn into a habit, by a lone 
residence among people. who make a merit of showy parades at all their lesti% ails... the ceremony is not 
complete ww ithout a mixture of pageantry. ' Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the . 
11iissulmauris of 
India, 1). 30. 
110 'On these occasions. the vast population of Luc: know, may he imagined by the almost countless 
multitude, of e\ er\ rank, who visit this Durgah. ' Ibid, p. 36. 
11 t Note' hv S iy vid Shahinshah Husain Riivie, 15 Dec 1908, GAD File No. 591 of 19W N. UPS,, 
112 Mrs. Haan All. O/'venvnrions on the ,i lrrssalrrturcns of Indio, lip-53-54. 
1" Ibid, p. 30, Cole, Roars of north Indian Shi'ism, pp. 93-S. 
11' Cole, Roots 0 north Indian Shi 'ism, p. 115. 
115 These idea, are expounded in Hasan, From pluralism to separatism, especially pp. 3; -40. 
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displays of Muharram apparently held the centre of municipal life and contributed to the 
social cohesion. 16 In certain towns, Sunnis even led the nominall\- Shia ta'ziva 
processions. In Barabanki, for instance, it was the local Sunni zain ndar Mir Nlehboob 
'Ali Khan who took the lead, and the processions were marked by the use of specifically 
Shi'a practices, such as the carrying of the standards of tit- and mashk (a representation of 
the water-holding vessel of Sakina), with little apparent sign of sectarian controversy. ' 17 
Such customs demonstrate how Muharram, permeating the public life of individual towns 
and cities, was able to act as a cementing force between the nobles and populations as 
well as between the religious communities of particular localities. At the heart of 
Muharram was a consensual sympathy for Husain who, while regarded differently by 
Shi'as and Sunnis, was applauded by both for his heroism and sacrifice. Consequently, 
Muharram literature and practice remained comparable among Shi'as and Sunnis for 
much of the nineteenth century. Sunni-authored tracts circulated in which the whole 
pathetic story of Husain's expedition and of his death is set forth in terms which any 
Shia enthusiast might be glad to endorse, and [his] character and conduct are praised in 
the most enthusiastic terms. ' 118 
Fischer's notion of the so-called 'Karbala paradigm' reveals how the tale of Husain's 
martyrdom was able at different historical moments to absorb and project a diversity of 
meanings. 119 This was proven widely true of Muharram in India, as it was able in terms 
of both its significance and ritual practices to act as an agent of communal discord as 
fluently as a source of integration. From the 1890s Muharram was increasingly organised 
as a more particularistic Shia occasion in several towns, diverting the organisation of 
Muharram from cementing civic and social ties towards the re-assertion of distinctively 
1 "' Naclvi. Türikh i sacht i . lnýrohu. p. 
44-5. 
117 'Luckna'u kC mas bat-zndu Suniöit, ' GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA, p. 6; The humble petition 
Miria Mohammad Jelaluddin Bakht Bahadur, alias Munna Sahab, a zamindar in the district of Ga)a on 
behalf ' of the Shia community to Victor Alexander Bruce, ' 30 September 1894, Home Department (Public) 
Proceedings, January 1895, Nos. 12 3-146, National Archives of India. Delhi (NAI ). 
118 Piggott Committee Report. GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA. 
119 ''I'I1e story can he elaborated or abbreviated. It provides models for living and a mnemonic for thinking 
about how to Ike: there is a set of parables and moral lessons all connected with or part of the storv of 
Karbala... to which all of life's problems can he referred. ' Fischer. Iran: from religioi s 
dispute to 
r'c')'OII tiOir. P., 1. 
Shia religious practice. Attempts by any community to amend customary practice 
concerning Muharram frequently spilled over into communal disturbances. In Amroha 
the duldul, a representation of the steed of Husain reminiscent of Lucknawi rather than 
Amrohawi custom, was introduced anew by Shi'as in 1894, provoking the segregation of 
the commemorations and even animosity between Shi'a and Sunni residents which 
eventually culminated in a series of three-way riots between Shi'as, Sunnis and Hindus in 
1902-3.120 Just across U. P. 's borders in Gaya, Shi'as freshly attempted to take out 
Muharram processions with the Shi `a particularities of tir and mashk upon the standard of 
`Ali, an innovation possibly resulting from the formation of an Anjuman-i-Imamia in that 
town bent on reforming local Muharram practices. The interpolation was vigorously 
challenged by Sunnis and led to public disturbances from around 1885.121 In other towns, 
the erosion of the composite character of Muharram revealed itself in sectarian violence. 
Allahabad witnessed Shi'a-Sunni skirmishes during Muharram as early as the late 1880s, 
despite the fact that Sunnis had taken out a majority of ta'zivas in the city just a few years 
earlier. 122 Jaunpur and Barabanki were among the towns to witness Shi'a-Sunni 
disturbances in the very early years of the twentieth century. ' 23 
The central theatre for the re-negotiation of the character of Muharram, predictably, was 
Lucknow. Turning its back upon the historical predominance of cross-communal 
participation and civic organisation, the Muharram of Lucknow demonstrated increased 
segregation according to sectarian particularity. The practice of inatam (flagellation) 
seemed to be on the rise during these years, sponsored by certain wealthy members of the 
community. 124 A defining moment was the intervention of Maqbool Ahmed, the above- 
discussed maulvi, who became a visible figure in Lucknow's Muharram in 1904. He held 
120 'Official translation of a petition from Sayyid Gulsham Ali and others, residents of Mohalla Qazizada 
and others, Amroha, District Moradabad to the Government of India, ' 20 January 1896, GAD File No. 
106C/64 of 1896, UPSA; 'Humble memorial of the undersigned Sayeds of Amroha' to La Touche, 
Lieutenant Governor, 7 May 1902, GAD File No. 255 of 1903. UPSA. 
'21 Babu Baij Nath Ojha to District Superintendent of Police, Gaya, 19 April 1892, Home Department 
(Public) Proceedings, January 1895, Nos. 123-46, NAI; 'Appendix VIII: Resolutions passed by the Shia 
community of Bihar, ' L. M. T. to Secretary, 27 November 1894, ibid. 
12' C. A. Bayly, The local roots of Indian politics: Allahabad 1880-1920 (Oxford, 1975). p. 81- 
123 On Jaunpur see Ar-Riva: (Lucknow), 18 June 1901. UPNNR: in Barabanki. Shi'a-Sunni % iolence 
resulted from the innovative Shi'a practice of mourning for the figure of Haider during Nluharram 
alongside Hasan and Husain. Tohfah-i-Hind (Bijnor), 20 June 1900, ibid. 
124 Hidavat-ul-, -lkhbar (Moradabad), 8 May 1900, ibid. 
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a number of incendiary majalis in various quarters of the city, in which scorn was thrown 
upon the Companions of the Prophet. 125 In response to Maqbool Ahmad's interpolations, 
the government expelled him from Lucknow. Following his banishment. he carried his 
majulis to Jaunpur and Fyzabad, and it was after his utterance of the tabarrali in a famed 
rnajlis offered before a large crowd in the latter city that he was arrested. The treatment of 
Maqbool Ahmad apparently caused great bitterness among Lucknow's Shi*as, 126 and may 
have added fuel to the concurrent attempts by the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, to purify religious practice at the karbala. As 
demonstrated above, in 1905 leading Shia `ulaina and dignitaries affiliated with this 
anjuman introduced a number of provisions for admission to the karbala ground, such as 
entry bare-headed and bare-footed. It was in response to these reforms that the Sunnis 
decided to establish a separate karbala, at Phulkatora on the city's northern outskirts, 
separating the communities at an annual event which had previously encouraged their 
mutual participation. 
This separation of the Shia and Sunni karbalas signified a fundamental change in the 
composite character of Muharram. Shi'as and Sunnis were segregated and their to `ziva 
processions led in opposite directions, often along the same streets. Most importantly, 
this separation led to the incorporation of identifying particularities on both sides. As was 
written by the Piggott Committee, appointed to investigate Shia-Sunni disturbances in 
Lucknow, the separation of the karbalas and purges of the more frivolous 
accompaniments to the Talkatora karbala was followed by 'movement... in favour of 
impressing upon the Sunni celebrations a character which should, in one way or another, 
bring prominently forward the peculiar tenets of their religion as opposed to those of the 
Shias. ' 127 On the Sunni side, the char-vari (four comrades, ' denoting the names of the 
Sunni Caliphs) were freshly inscribed upon the corners of to `. ivas and their 
accompanying standards and jhandas, and paraded through the streets of Lucknoww . 
Thc\ 
were supplemented also by the recitation of maclh-i-sa/iaba, verses in praise of the three 
Caliphs and a marker of distance from Shi`ism. Contrasting with earlier Sunni rniarsivas 
125 'Luekna'u k1 musibat-zada Suniar, ' GAD File No. 591 oI 1908, LP-S: \. pp. 2-3. 
Ibid. 
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and writings in Lucknow which illustrated the glories of Husain. a new and innovative 
genre of Sunni elegiac poetry in praise of the Caliphs emerged and was 'published. sold. 
distributed, read and recited publicly everywhere. ' 128 A series of new meetings. including 
bazrn-i-Saddigi, bazm-i-Faruqi and bazm-i-Usmani, in honour of the Caliphs and 
Companions of the Prophet and seemingly self-conscious opposites to the more 
traditional Shia majalis, were established and convened during Muharram, and publicly 
advertised. 129 At the heart of many of these practices was `Abdul Shakoor. the above- 
described Sunni maulvi who, like Maqbool Ahmad, became known for his twin-role in 
the consolidation of spoken munazara and Muharram controversy. 
Following the initial transformation of the Muharram rites at the older karbala, Shia 
religious practice during Muharram showed the same broad fluidity and adaptability as 
that of Sunnis, and comparable innovations took place. Shi `as leaflets condemning the 
Caliphs were published during Muharram. Reflecting the novel 'nehfils (congregations) 
of Sunnis in honour of their personages, self-consciously comparable Shia alternatives 
were freshly construed in their place: mock-janazas (funerals) of Sunni leaders were 
commenced, while bazm-i-Firo: i meetings were held in celebration of the death of Umar, 
taking the name of his murderer, and advertised publicly. ' 30 'Abdul Halim Sharar 
described such experimental innovations as theatrical performances, novel decorations 
attached to tu `z, ivas and the burning of effigies of Umar, and indicated something of the 
ability of Shia rnajalis to absorb and project any number of new innovations. 131 The 'bile 
f isil' phrase, while in earlier years recited mostly in seclusion and only in three or four 
Shia mosques, 132 appeared as a frequent feature of religious life across Lucknow. 
Around 1905, these words were habitually introduced into majalis, mosques, funeral 
12s, 'The humble memorial of the Shia residents of Lucknow, ' to the Lieutenant Go%ernor of U. P., 8 April 
1908, ihid, 'The humble memorial of the Shia residents of Lucknow' to A. L. Saunders, 22 March 1908, 
ibid. 
129 'Notes of the proceedings of the committee, dated 18 April 1907, at the kothi of Nlirza Muhammad 
Abbas All Khan Sahib' and 'The humble memorial of the Shias of Lucknow' to T. C. Piggott. President, 
Shia-Sunni Committee Lrrrknm» , 
24 Novernher- 1908, ibid. 
1.10 Such customs \\ crc. according to their detractors, 'taken out by Shia fanatics \ý ith no concei\ able 
purpose but that of insulting the religion of their opponents. ' 'The humble petition of the Sunni community 
of Lucknow, ' ibid, 'Translation of the report of Mauls i Muhammad Ahdush Shakur, Sunni member, dated 
15 December 1908, ' ihid, Advocate (Lucknovv ), 2I Ma" 1908, UPNNR. 
131 Sharar, Lueknow: the lad I)ha c' cat an oriental culture, p. 217. 
112 -i'hc humble petition of the Sunni community of Lucknoww ' GAD File No. 591 of 1) )ý, UPS: 
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sermons and, perhaps most importantly, into the public street. 133 A similar proccss 
applied to the tabarra. Its recitation had been documented during Nluharram since the 
Nawabi period, '34 but in the early twentieth century the usage of these verses became 
increasingly conspicuous and public. ' 35 Their inclusion in majalis and their repetition b\ 
the assembled crowds resulted in the cessation of Sunni attendances at Shia 
congregations, and the establishment of separate assemblies for Sunnis. 
The reform of Muharram not only effected a change in the systematisation of difference 
between Shi'a and Sunni traditions, but somewhat altered the internal character of these 
traditions themselves. The antagonistic correspondence which arose between the two 
communities through the consolidation on both sides of the specific sectarian qualities of 
to `ziva processions and mehfils, the recitations and counter-recitations of coil trovers1al 
phrases, all reduced Muharram into a standardised set of motifs, phrases and practices. 
The myriad customs of Muharram were reduced into a series of uniform recitations and 
sloganeering, while the multifarious meanings attached to Husain's martyrdom were 
contracted into more overt and clear-cut exaltations of, respectively, Husain or the 
Caliphs, and denunciation of their opposites. The diverse traditions of Shia and Sunni 
Islam were thereby increasingly reduced to a finite inventory of idioms, acts and 
personages, which increasingly became signifiers of their religions in their entirety. It 
was for this reason that customs like the recitation of tabarrah and char-vuri even 
became divorced from their original context, recited outside the period of Muhariarn. 
'36 
Given the consolidation of difference and the construction of sectarian boundaries around 
the rites of Muharram in Lucknow by certain maulavis and anjwnans on both Shia and 
Sunni sides, it is unsurprising that the `Aslu-a (first ten days of Muharrarn) became a hc\ 
period of Muslim sectarian conflict in early twentieth century Lucknow. A series of 
1 13 Ibid. 
114 r\lrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the Ilia Nal, nauns cf /ndia, p. 2 3. 
115 Observers pointed out tabarrah as generally said not to he a 'neWW' or 'introduced' practice, hut 'we 
do certainly dislike that in our city tabarrn should he uttered on the public road. ' 'Notes of' the proceedings 
of the committee, dated 18 April 1907, at the kotbi of Ntirza Nluhamniaci Ahhas All Khan, ' GAD File No. 
X1)1/1908, UPS. A. 
The humble petition of the Sunni community of Lurknow, ' ihid: 1dvocate (Lucknow), 21 Nia\ 1908. 
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Shia-Sunni riots followed the institution of such religious practice in 1906-8. cited by 
police reports as some of the worst instances of civil violence of the decade. " They left 
an enduring legacy of sectarian tension over the enactment of NIuharram which was only 
inhibited in subsequent years by the firm hand of the police. There had long been a 
routine of Shia-Sunni disturbances at the time of Muharram, extendinL, back to the 
Nawabi period. '38 However, the new clashes were distinct not only in their sheer severit\, 
but in their lasting legacy, poisoning inter-sect relations long after the close of Muharram 
and into the next decade, with implications in wider society and politics. 
Without attempting to rationalise the violence with which these processes of the ritual 
differentiation of the two sects unravelled, it is worth assessing some of those factors 
which contributed, on each side, to this process of religious differentiation. There is no 
doubt that Muharram could act, as in the past, as a theatre for the playing out of 
innumerable personal and local quarrels; as had written one observer some seventy years 
previously: 
`The enthusiastic Sheahs and Soonies - having reserved their long 
hatred for a favourable opportunity of giving it vent - have found an 
early grave on the very ground to which their Tazia has been 
consigned. Private quarrels are often reserved for decision on the field 
of Kraabaallah. ' 139 
Among such 'private quarrels' are likely to have been innumerable social and class 
conflicts. It is likely that those `lower orders' of Sunnis who were deemed to be engaging 
in the to `ziva processions used such antagonistic theatricals to express their resentments 
against the illustrious mujtahids who were perceived to be at the heart of the karbala 
reforms, and the respectable Shia zamindars who permitted such reforms upon their 
land. 140 Similar instances of class animosity between erstwhile Shia landed nobilities and 
protesting Sunni artisans were evident factors in Shia-Sunni Muhar am clashes in other 
137 Report on the cu/ ninistratio, 1 of the police of the United Provinces, year eliding _, 
'/ December 1908, 
V/24/3 174 (()IOC), p. 6. 
Cole, Root,, of north Indian S/li'ism, pp. 322-32. This ww as also true in the cjasbahs of ; \wadh; see 
Gvanandra Pande\, 'Encounters and calamities". the history of a north Indian qasba in the nineteenth 
ccnturv, ' in Ranajit Guha cd., Subaltrrn studies HIl: writings on South Asian 
hi-s0 1\ and society (ti''\ý 
Delhi, l984), I'P. 243-4. 
I Mrs. Meer Haan Ali, Obsrrºulioons run the I! i v, rlmaun. s o India, pp. 2-3. 
t'r, L' Fort c oni nittc'c Report, ibid. 
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north Indian towns. 141 
This said, the origination of comparable conflicts across the province, simultaneously and 
spanning very different local social and economic factors, suggests the need for a wider 
explanation crossing the particulars of individual towns. Imtiaz Ahmad has argued that 
efforts towards sectarian differentiation stemmed from a wider new context of 
heightened self-consciousness' among Muslims at this time, instilled by the language of 
community emanating from Aligarh College, the formation of the Muslim League and 
resurgent Hindu nationalism. Such assertions of Muslim distinctiveness, he convincingly 
argues, encouraged more overt displays of Islamic ritual in public which in turn tended to 
intensify equivalent sectarian demonstrations. 142 Further helping to explain these Shi'a- 
Sunni conflicts within the colonial context is the role of colonial government in giving 
legal definition to the sectarian division. Taking an active self-appointed role in banning 
or approving religious observances and processions, the state increasingly converted 
religious differences into public, political and legal issues. 143 Furthermore, given the 
state's desired role as arbitrator between the two communities, there was a converse 
process underway by which numerous grievances with the state could be expressed 
through the stirring of public unrest based around religious conflicts, which themselves 
became an effective means of undermining government authority. This is certainly true in 
the 1900s and even more so in the later period when, as will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5, sectarian conflict came to intertwine with nationalist protest. 
141 In Jaunpur, disturbances occurred when Sunni masses gathered outside the houses of elite Shi'as during 
Muharram. Ar-Rivaz (Lucknow), 18 June 1901, UPNNR. The disturbances in Gaya also reveal a pre- 
existing grievance in local relations. The leading Shi'as of the district, who were primarily zwnindars 
holding a number of villages on the qasba's outskirts, were directly challenged by 'lower orders' and 
'illiterate antagonists' from inside the town, evidently confronting the hegemony of traditional authorities. 
As in Jaunpur, the site of the disturbance was the ancestral residence of the former, with a crowd 
preventing the juloos from leaving the gates. 'Heading of decision in original suit, ' from Brihmohun 
Prasad, 27 August 1894, Taffazul H. Khan and others to Commissioner of Patna Division, 28 May 1893. 
Home Department (Public) Proceedings, January 1895, No. s 123-46, NAI; D. J. Mac Pherson to 
Commissioner of Patna Division, 14 November 1893, ibid: Sayyid Khairat Ahmed to Commissioner of 
Patna Division, ibid; 'Humble petition of Mirza Muhammad Jellaluddin Bakht Bahaudur alias Moona 
Sahib, ' to Commissioner of Patna Division, 24 August 1892, ibid. 
142 Imtiaz Ahmad, 'The Shia-Sunni dispute in Lucknow, 1905-1980, ' in Milton Israel and Narendra K. 
Wagle eds., Islamic society and culture: essays in honour of Professor. 4ziz . 4hmad (Delhi. 
1983), p. 338. 
143 Keith Hjortshoj, 'Shi'i identity and the significance of Muharram in Lucknoww, India, ' in Martin Kramer 
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Connected with the above, there is little doubting the importance of the evolution of 
urban public arenas during this period into what Freitag calls 'a world of ritual, theatre 
and symbol, ' in which ritualised public activities in north Indian urban arenas became the 
chief means by which social and political re-configurations between communities were 
communicated, negotiated or resisted. 144 Such symbolic religious activity, she argues, 
produced a set of motifs which encouraged the `otherisation' of alternative communities, 
and evolved from expressing civic identity to systematising the differences between 
religious groups. 145 Such a framework for understanding community formation echoes 
very strongly the parallel development of Shia and Sunni idioms in the streets of 
Lucknow. As was shown above in the case of practices such as the recitation of tabarrah 
or madh-i-sahaba, it was the projection of overtly identifiable Shi'a or Sunni acts into the 
public space, rather than the novelty of the customs themselves, which was most at issue. 
Recitations of such verses in earlier years had been `occasional and infrequent and not 
calculated to attract general notice'; the innovation was instead the `organised and 
systematised recitation' of the verses in public arenas and in newly-convened sectarian 
majalis and meetings. 146 
As an extension of this assessment of sectarian differentiation in municipal public arenas, 
we could understand such riots as the product of the colonial transformation of the Indian 
city, and the consequent attempts of separate religious communities to impose their stamp 
upon such re-worked arenas. It is notable that those main towns in which the 'bila fasil' 
verse was introduced into the azan- Lucknow, Allahabad, Jaunpur and Amroha - were 
also the key centres of sectarian conflict during Muharram, suggesting that the 
consolidation of one Shia idiom in the public space ensured further attempts to impose 
ed., Shi'ism, resistance and revolution (London, 1987), p. 291. 
144 Sandra Freitag, Collective action and community: public arenas and the emergence of communalism in 
colonial north India (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 19,280. Freitag's understanding of communal activity in public 
spaces draws heavily from Geertz's notion of the 'theatre state. ' 
Ibid, p. 53. 
146 Piggott Committee Report, GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA. In a similar way, while sectarian 
literature had long been circulated during the days of Muharram. it had been circulated on a personal basis; 
it was only in the 1900s that sectarian organisations began 'circulating these leaflets publicly. ' And, while 
meetings denouncing the Caliphs had previously held with some discretion, were now 'convened... 
publicly, and they are advertised by posters. ' 'The humble petition of the Sunni community of Lucknow, ' 
ibid. 
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Shia particularities into municipal religious observances. The Muharram reforms in 
Lucknow in particular hint at a struggle between Shi `as and Sunnis to control the city's 
public space. The exercising of reforms at the karbala and ensuing battles in the courts 
could be understood as an attempt by Shi `a mujtahids, landowners and lawyers to 
maintain their long-held grasp over the city's institutions, by ensuring the visibility of 
distinctly Shi'a elements in public municipal events. '47 Conversely, the formation of a 
separate Sunni karbala could be construed as an attempt by aspiring Sunni leaders to 
resist the influence of this Shia elite, furthering their own aspirations for influence in 
municipal public life. 148 
However, the transmutation of the ritual and significance of Muharram cannot be 
understood solely in terms of local factors or contemporary municipal power struggles; it 
must also be assessed in terms of a broader and multi-layered religious and cultural 
assertion in Indian Shi'ism during this period. Muharram was frequently the canvas upon 
which a province-wide religious rejuvenation and enhanced consciousness of religious 
distinctiveness among Shi'as was first impressed, with its exclusive Shia character 
renewed in many towns. The invigorated network of madrasas created an abundance of 
wa `izen and zakirs, those preachers of sermons and marsivas active primarily during 
Muharram, who could either work in Lucknow or return to administer Muharram in their 
own towns. New printing presses were able to circulate poetic and prosaic eulogies for 
Husain. The general and pervasive religious consciousness of the period doubtlessly had 
its effect upon the communities of Sayyids and landed gentries around U. P.; newly 
compelled by the activities of the madrasas, anjuinans and printing presses around them 
to make their own efforts towards invigorating the public presence of Shi'ism in their 
towns, Muharram was often the first subject of their efforts. This explains why in the 
towns discussed local Shia social elites actuated the purification of ceremonial practice 
and, it seems, were perhaps more inclined to invite to their towns energetic or even 
"' Earlier Shi'a-Hindu conflicts in Fyzabad have been similarly interpreted as stemming from the attempts 
by ruling elites to maintain their grasp over the public spaces of the city. Cole, Sacred space and hol war: 
the politics, culture and history of Shi'ite /slain (New York, 2002). pp. 173-189. 
148 It is perhaps no accident that the new karbala was encouraged by and founded upon the lands of 
Ehtisham 'Ali, an aspiring Sunni politician. It was he who approached government seeking permission to 
found a separate karbala and procession route. Note by Sayyid Shahinshah Husain Rizvie. 15 December 
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antagonistic speakers, who were most likely to make a public impact. 
As such, the Shi `a particularities of Muharram in Lucknow ww ere onww ards from the 1890s 
increasingly emulated in other qasbas. Many of the Shia anjumans founded in cities and 
qasbas from the 1890s, as was shown above, identified the organisation or correction of 
Muharram as their first point of contact with the local populations which the\ sought to 
influence. This was especially true of the anjumans founded in the wake of the Shia 
Conference, which were often directed to oversee the management of the Shia 
imambaras in which Husain was remembered and the augaf through which Muharram 
was funded. There is little indication that Muharram subsequently lost any significant 
participation from the Hindu or Sunni public in most of U. P. 's towns and cities during the 
subsequent period. However, in many cities and gasbas Muharram came to be renovated 
for the Shia section of the population as an increasingly ordered and regulated 
phenomenon, emphasising the ritual and didactic particularities of Shi'ism. 
Conclusion: the internal and external dynamics of Muslim sectarianism 
The overriding impression to be gained from the above analysis is the interconnected and 
co-extensive nature of the exercise of tabligh and ikhtrlufut. Religious renewal among 
Shi`as was executed not as a stand-alone process, but through conflict with other 
communities. Sectarian disputation, whether through published tracts or spoken 
'nunuzura, was not somehow secondary to processes of religious revitalisation but 
engrained within them. This was not simply due to the essentially competitive nature of 
religious renewal and community formation in colonial India, which relied upon the 
otherisation' of alternative groups and the construction of separate inventories of motifs 
and symbols. 149 Instead the above discussion reveals a more nuanced process. in %% hick 
authors or public speakers communicated religious, doctrinal or historical knowledge to 
their co-religionists through the Vituperation of other conmmunities. This explains why 
1908, GAD File No. 51) 1 of' l QOS. L'I'SA. 
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sectarian disputation was not simply a tangential product, but a central part, of the 
processes of religious renewal discussed. 
Religious argumentation in Indian Islam was fundamentally transformed, or even 
modernised, during the colonial period. Its increased expression through ritual separatism 
converted doctrinal differentiations into an inclusive, participatory public sphere activit\ 
Connected with this, knowledge of Shia-Sunni controversy was no longer solely in the 
grasp of an exclusive clerical elite, but ventured out of the inadrasa and onto the streets, 
and was communicated in the vernacular. It demonstrated a process of experimentation 
mirrored simultaneously in other religious traditions, an ongoing series of innovations 
encompassing the use of print, the democratisation of religious knowledge, new literary 
genres, poster and publication campaigns, and the transformation of religious ritual and 
ceremony. Indeed, it is striking how examples of Shia religious renewal discussed in this 
and the previous chapter drew from the languages and methods of other Muslim reformist 
movements, while being conducted entirely separately from them. The frequently used 
dialogues of tanzim and tabligh to describe the Shia campaigns for the formation of 
madrasas, the appropriation of printing, the correction of ritual and custom and the 
practice of public debates, all echoed the aims and methods of Sunni reformist 
movements such as Deoband, and were set up as a counterpart discourse. Such a 
perspective on Muslim religious conflict in colonial India is an important response to 
those implicit understandings, tangible in colonial readings of Indian Islam, of 
sectarianism as the result of a re-assertion of Islamic traditionalism, or the opening of 
controversies unchanged for 1300 years. In India, sectarianism was entirely bound up 
with the language, media and emerging public life of the modern world. 
The discussion of sectarianism inevitably suggests the existence of clearly defined and 
fixed Shi'a and Sunni communities, in perpetual struggle against each other, establishing 
their respective distinctiveness through public debate and periodic conflict. Indeed, the 
vitality of the Shi'a tahli, ýJ/i presented a largely united front, and suggested the existence 
of singular and co-ordinated efforts amon`z Shi'a 'u/ama, it a'i--cn and : akin". This section 
takes a different approach, arguing that those processes of' religious innovation and 
1-1 
experimentation which instigated transitions in relations between Shi'as and other 
religious communities also impacted upon the internal dynamics of Indian Shi'ism itself. 
The perception among the key pioneers of the Shi'a tabl gl1 of contemporary India as 
something of a battleground in which all faiths were locked in perpetual competition with 
each other was discussed above. Yet the study has so far said little about the internal 
religious dialogues, among and between Shi'as. For this reason, our study shifts back to 
the internal dynamics of Shia religious reform for its further explanation. 
Both religious renewal and the reconfiguration of religious disparities can only be 
properly understood against a background of diversity and differentiation within the Shia 
fold. Despite the cosmetic appearance of a homogenous religious awakening, the 'fresh 
religious life' was by contrast a subject of little consensus. masking disputes over the 
direction and leadership of religious renewal. The proliferation of new Inadlresas, the 
development of a public sphere, the impact of print and its implications for 
vernacularisation and the democratisation of religious knowledge, all led to the 
diversification of religious authority and the appearance of a new generation of religious 
leaders in various conurbations. 
Despite their new public exposure gained through the headship of an invigorated 
associational network in Lucknow and some other towns, the inujtahids emphasised in 
the previous chapter largely remained on the sidelines of the activities discussed above. 
Most authors of populist Urdu publications were aspiring local leaders and emerging 
orators, with few senior or established niujtahids choosing to involve themselves openly 
with such media or genres. Both munazara and the Muharram reforms also reflected to a 
great extent the immediate command of local maulavis and %t'a`izenn rather than a distant, 
restricted circle of established authorities. In individuals such as Maqbool Ahmed and the 
graduates of new maClras'as, we see fresh, young public orators trumping the traditional 
Nbulanas in their imminent authority and public visibility. 
Several factors during the period in question contributed to a pluralization of religious 
1cadcr hip. The partial replacement of person-to-person and family-ba,, ed religious tuition 
ý 
by systematic education within formal establishments; the decreasing number of Iraq- 
educated `ulama; the proliferation of new religious anjumans, and the emergence of nerv 
public spokesmen holding fazil from newly formed madrasas were all important factors. 
It is also likely that a further contributing factor to the diversification of religious 
leadership was the development in north Indian cities of an open `public sphere' \ý ith a 
multitude of voices, which perhaps favoured more demonstrative, populist, even 
aggressive performers. In an age of ascendant printing media and public association, 
secluded scholasticism perhaps counted for less than public visibility. 
These rapid and un-coordinated adjustments of religious leadership in Indian Shi'lsm 
ensured the production of competition not simply between Shia and gliair-Shi'a 
communities, but between the various actors engaged in Shia religious renewal. Some 
scholars have identified competition between alternative religious leaders as an inherent 
tendency within Usuli Shi'ism, since to some extent a mujtahid's financial and social 
standing are predicated upon his public recognition and the number of individuals 
observing taqlid under him. ' 50 Whether or not a fair assessment of the essential doctrines 
of Shi`ism, it seems clear that the Shia religious renewal in north India produced as one 
of its effects the intensification of competition between rival candidates for leadership. 
Evidencing this is the clear expansion of those terming themselves 'mujtahids' in early 
twentieth century India. While in the nineteenth century the retention of religious 
authority within particular families and the small number of individuals holding certified 
iju: at had ensured the existence of a relatively small and authoritative circle of 
undisputed inujtah0s, the early twentieth century saw increasing the title of inujtahid 
used with increasing regularity. It was essential in order to compete for a popular 
following in the ever more crowded religious battlefield, and consequently was 
increasingly used in public life to denote merely a »naulvi, preacher or recipient of some 
1`0 The author continues- 'competition... is of the essence in the legal and social structure of Shi'ism. It 
determines the barometer of learnedness and the subsequent number of followers in the Shi'i civil , Ocict\. ' 
Chihli Mallat, The renewal o, / Islamic L. aºº': . 
11uha, nmad Buyer as-Sadr, . 
Vujaf aºul the Shi'i International 
(Cambridge. 1993), p. 35. 
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form of fazil or equivalent qualification rather than to indicate formal clerical training. ' 
This meant that the title was laicised, used with less selectivity and in turn with less 
significance for its recipient. While this thesis guards against the overstatement of Indian 
Shi `a connections with co-religionists abroad during this period, this makes an interesting 
comparison with the description of religious authority among Iraqi Shi `as by the British 
Resident in Baghdad in the 1900s, which could equally well have been written about the 
Shi'a `mujtahids' of Lucknow and U. P.: 
`The word [`mujtahid'] is loosely used... it seems to be that a man... 
with a sufficiently large following and... in most cases worldly wealth 
also or the command of it, may style himself and soon become a 
mujtahid... if we follow the vox populi, the mujtahids may go up and 
down like puppets in a marionette show. "52 
While new Shi'a anjumans and campaigns of religious dissemination appeared to exhibit 
a co-ordinated front of united action, they in fact developed as arenas for negotiation 
between alternative Shi'a religious leaders. An examination of the Shia tabligh 
demonstrates how the propagation of religious ideas could also fuse with struggles for 
recognition among alternative voices all craving the opportunity for public exposure. The 
media of print demonstrates this. While the impact of print has often been interpreted as 
enhancing the stature and widening the audience of the `ulama, print also carried with it 
connotations of differentiation and democratisation. It threw new scrutiny upon the 
pretensions of established authorities to be the sole guardians of religious knowledge, 
cutting out the traditional requirement that tracts be read with a qualified `alien. Print 
weakened traditional scholars by breaking their monopoly over the transmission of 
religious knowledge, and allowed instead the development of alternative voices and 
151 As, for instance, in the constant evocation of `mujtahids' in Shia-ova-Suni ke rnundznre-, passim. This is 
also a general observation taken from the biographical accounts of numerous 'ulatna in Husain, Marla'-i- 
Aitºt'är, passim, and from discussions with certain present-day 'ulama in Lucknow. 
15' He continues: 'It seems to be essential that a mujtahid should have an "ijaza" or diploma from some 
older or greater mujtahid [hut]... these ijazas seem to have been given rather freely. They are often very 
vaguely worded and sometimes amount to little more than an announcement by the writer that... the 
applicant is qualified to become a mujtahid, and the implication seems to be if he can only get people to 
accept him... There would be a general consensus of opinion probably about [the status of] a few 
[tttujtahids] but there would be so many more nearly, if not quite equal, to the lowest of these that it would 
he almost impossible to know where to draw the line. ' Major L. S. Newmarch, Officiating Political Resident 
in Turkish Arabia. to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 20 September 1902. 
Political Department A., May 1911. File Nos. 10-44, UPSA. 
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unfettered religious change. ' 53 Much the same could be said of munazara, which 
sometimes functioned as a series of competitive endeavours for recognition among 
aspiring orators. 
Yet nothing better embodies the internal struggles for influence among the Shia 
population than the conduct of Muharram, which became one of the key theatres in which 
struggles between alternative orators were played out. Admittedly the inujtahids initially 
sanctioned the 1905 imposition of the atmosphere of mourning, one mujtahid had years 
earlier issued a fatwa supporting the right of Shi`as to use the words bila fasil, 154 while 
Aqa Hasan represented the Shi'a case in the committee appointed to find a solution to the 
quarrels. 155 However, the display of matam, shouting of tabarra, performance of funerals 
and other such innovations seem to have thrived in a sphere of activity distant from their 
influence. As `Abdul Halim Sharar claimed, `mujtahids and Shia prelates do not approve 
of such innovations, but popular interest in them is increasing day by day. ' 156 Instead, the 
Muharram conflicts in Lucknow demonstrated the local authority of new and 
inflammatory preachers who were of recent fame in the city and carried little ancestral or 
clerical distinction, as well as the seemingly decisive influence of the editors of and 
contributors to the local Shi'a and Sunni press. ' 57 Propelled from a lower level, higher 
authorities were marginalised from such activities. 
Other quarrels relating to the conduct of Muharram took place between the supporters of 
new reforms and those tied to more traditional practice. In Lucknow, the decision to 
purify the Muharram commemorations was presented as a consensual one. However, a 
drop in Shi'a as well as Sunni and Hindu attendance at the karbala suggests the existence 
of limited public sympathy for this programme of reform. 158 In Barabanki, a qasba 
comparable with Lucknow insofar as Muharram had long contributed to civic integrity 
153 Some of these ideas are explored in Robinson, 'Islam and the impact of print, ' passim. 
I" Sayyid Muhammad Naqi Rizvi, Farishtgdn jahjh: tazkira-i-khänwtwäda-i-Sayyid , %! uhamad Bdgir Rizt i 
Kashmiri Bdgir-ul-'Ulüm (Lucknow. 2005), p. 19. 
ý" 'Luckna'u ke masibat-zada Suniön, ' GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA, p. 4. 
15" Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an oriental culture, p. 217. 
157 See especially Asr-i-Jadid (Lucknow), May 1907, UPNNR. 
158 'Luckna'u ki masibat-zada Suniön. ' GAD File No. 591 of 1908, UPSA, pp? -3. According to this 
assessment there was an 80% drop in attendance at the karbala, which included a reduced Shi'a presence. 
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and communal cohesion, clashes occurred not between Muslims and Hindus or Shi'as 
and Sunnis, but between different groups of Shi'as. 159 Such cases prove that broad 
attempts at the adjustment of Muharram rites were met with fierce resistance from within 
particular localities, including Lucknow. 
In this light, the Muharram reforms are best understood in terms not of cohesive Shia 
action, but of the considerable debates and controversies emerging within each sect. The 
reformed Muharram commemorations displayed not sectarian unanimity but uncertainty: 
not Shi'a unity in cities such as Lucknow, but what could be better described as 'inter- 
muhalla competition' between different sections and preachers. 160 
The modern manifestations of Shia-Sunni religious conflict discussed in this chapter 
emerged at a historical moment when Shi`as were increasingly beset by argument and 
internal debate. With this in mind, how is the growth of sectarianism in Indian Islam to be 
interpreted? It seems that the manufacturing by Shia orators of a Sunni opponent 
allowed discussions and disputes among and between Shi `as to be expressed as an inter- 
community debate, rather than an internal one. Printed tracts and public munazara, while 
outwardly depicting the vituperation or conversion of a rival party as an end in itself, 
provided a podium from which an aspiring voice could address his own religious 
community and craft his own space in local life and leadership. Claimed aspirations to 
convert or claim victory over other communities were largely cosmetic and certainly 
secondary to the opportunity provided by such media for the reform of one's own sect. 
Confident and combative dialogues against a supposed `other' allowed these debates to 
be presented as a mark of sectarian strength rather than of weakness or uncertainty. A 
number of alternative prescriptions for religious reform, and the jostling for influence 
between various mau/ai'is and preachers, thereby took place under the outward cloak of 
Shia-Sunni sectarian controversy. Individual writers and orators, by expressing their 
attempts to shape the religious life of their own community as sectarian conflict, were 
able to influence inward religious rejuvenation while sustaining the sense of confidence 
`9 Mehr-i-Nimro (Bijnor), 14 May 1900, UPNNR. 
160 I have drawn this phrase from Nita Kumar, Artisans of Banaras: popular culture and identitN., /880- 
1986 (New Delhi, 1995), pp 21 1-12. 
i- 
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and purpose of an outward struggle. 
This argument that Shia-Sunni hostility often materialised out of salient debates and 
disagreements among variant groups of Shi'as themselves informs subsequent chapters. 
More immediately, the argument contradicts the frequent understanding of sectarianism 
in terms of interactions between pre-supposed and clearly categorised Shia and Sunni 
communities, newly revitalised and radicalised by modern styles of religious reform. 
Sectarianism is to be understood not as the result of religious renewal, but as the chosen 
means by which religious evolution and transformation were debated, negotiated and 
communicated. Shia-Sunni sectarianism was, therefore, entirely interlinked with internal 
processes of change and debate among the Shi'as (and, indeed, within various Sunni 
schools) of colonial north India. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CRAFTING `SEPARATENESS': SHI`AS AND THE Aligarh MOVEMENT 
Introduction: Shia `separateness' and Muslim `separatism' in colonial India 
Writing on colonial Lucknow, the essayist and journalist `Abdul Halim Sharar remarked 
that `the Shias... maintain a separateness (judagana) in their habits and customs. ' Instead 
of attempting to `unite into one fraternity' with other Muslims, he claimed, Shi'as `prefer 
to remain separate and exclusive (juda-va-murntaz). ' 1 While in Nawabi Lucknow `no one 
even noticed who was a Sunni and who a Shia, '2 early-colonial Lucknow witnessed the 
consolidation of elements of Shia distinctiveness from Sunnis. This was largely a 
cultural phenomenon, reflected in moments of distinctive dress, linguistic differences, 
and as of 1871, separate Shi'a and Sunni graveyards. 3 Moreover, as has been 
demonstrated by the previous two chapters, this distinctiveness also meant the 
consolidation of religious distinctiveness, asserted in the institutionalisation of more 
exclusive Muharram rites, the parting of the ways over religious education, and a 
vigorous production of polemical religious tracts. As claimed Sharar, `in recent times 
even the religious leaders of both factions encourage[d]' this separateness. 4 The next two 
chapters of this thesis both consider how this judagana of Shias in Lucknow gave rise to 
the emergence of a language of Shia separatism in wider public life, in both province 
and nation. It was primarily in the twentieth century that the need to express Shia 
distinctiveness transgressed from disparities in customary practice and religious belief in 
towns such as Lucknow into a more widespread and active social and political demand to 
1 Abdul Halim Sharar, Guzashta Luckna'u 1'ä mashrig ke tamaddun kä akhirT numäna (Delhi. 1985). 
? p. 310,327. 
Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an oriental culture (London. 1975), p. 74. 
It was said that Shi'as began to use the address Salam-un 'Alaikum rather than the more traditional As- 
Salain 'Alaiku, n, in order to distinguish themselves from Sunnis. Ibid. p. 198. On the establishment of 
separate graveyards, see Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The making of colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877 
(Princeton, 1984), pp. 112-3. It is likely that this development preempted the consolidation of specifically 
Shi'a ritual customs, including the recitation of the rabarrah at funerals and the carrying of the coffin by 
relatives of the deceased, both of which have been referenced in earlier chapters. 
Sharar, Lucknow: the last phase of an oriental culture, p. 198. 
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keep `separate' ('alehda). 5 
As was discussed in the introduction, this consolidation of Shia exclusiveness in colonial 
U. P. has been largely neglected in scholarship on account of an alternative historical 
focus, upon the development of Muslim solidarity as a basis for wider public and political 
organisation. According to this narrative, Muslims came to conceive of themselves as a 
distinct qaum, a clearly delineated community, in north India. At the forefront of this 
process was the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh (henceforth, Aligarh 
College), founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1875 in order to promote the learning of 
western knowledge and sciences among Muslims. According to a frequently applied 
historical narrative, the language of the Muslim qauni within Aligarh encouraged 
Muslims to mobilise across the distinctions of kinship, class and religious persuasion on 
the basis of religious commonality. 6 
The interaction between the simultaneous development of Muslim sectarian identities and 
Muslim `separatism' is an untold story which is considered in this chapter. It dispels a 
seemingly frequent assumption in much of the historiography of Muslim separatism: that 
however intensive and protracted Shia-Sunni disputes may be in religious dialogue or on 
local levels, Muslims were willing to bury their religious differences in the higher 
echelons of public and political life and work together as Muslims. Sectarian and unitary 
discourses, such historiography has implied, could exist in separate spheres with minimal 
impact on each other. For instance, while Sayyid Ahmad himself may have indulged in 
anti-Shi`a religious polemic as a young `alim, this was of little significance in his later 
evocation of collective Muslim nationhood. 
This chapter seeks a redress of this slightly uncritical perspective on the relationship 
between Muslim sectarianism and `separatism. ' It is true that recent revisions of the 
notion of Muslim `separatism' have considered the vacuity of the notion of a Muslim 
s This term for 'separateness' pervades Sayyid Mumtaz Husain, Risdla-i-kifan-posh lidarwi-i-gorn 
(Amroha, 1915), passim. 
h Especially important works in this regard include David Lelyveld, . 4ligurh'. s 
first generation: Muslim 
solidarity in British India (Princeton, 1978). especially pp. 00-48: Francis Robinson, Separatism among 
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qaum at the hands of the normative particularities among Indian Muslim individuals and 
groups. The work of Ayesha Jalal in particular has shed light on the often ambivalent 
relationship between the Muslim self (khudi), the product of various individual, sectarian, 
regional and class distinctions, and the externally-imparted notion of the Muslim `nation' 
which grouped all Muslims together as a supposedly cohesive social and political 
community.? Yet this framework opens up new directions for further elaboration upon the 
relationship between the varying orientations of individuals and the religious brotherhood 
in which they were supposedly encompassed. Was it simply that the Muslim gaum was 
an elusive ideal with which personal realities were often unable to engage? Alternatively, 
did other personal loyalties, among them Shi'a-Sunni distinctions, come to actively 
conflict with the overarching and somewhat homogenising Muslim gaum? 
Previous chapters have demonstrated how Shi'a organisation in the public spaces and 
publishing networks of Lucknow and other centres crystallised the evocation of Shi'as as 
a qaum, an independent and self-governing community in India. It was also shown how 
this notion of a qaum derived inspiration from the language appropriated by other 
movements of religious reform in colonial India and, in particular, from the expressions 
of Islamic nationhood emanating from the offices and publications of Aligarh. This 
chapter examines the interactions between the languages of the qaum of, respectively, 
Muslims and Shi'as. Rather than interpreting these as two complementary constructions 
of community to which the Shia individual could relate in different contexts, it argues 
that they were increasingly construed as alternative and even adversarial forms of 
affiliation. 8 In other words, one's sectarian and `Muslim' identities, rather than simply 
existing in separate spheres, often became increasingly oppositional focuses of solidarity. 
The perception increasingly arose among U. P. Shi`as that they would have to organise 
Indian Muslims. the politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge. 1974). 
7 Ayesha Jalal, Self and sovereignty: individual and community in South Asian /slam since 1850 (London, 
2000), passirr. Such were the differences between the normative identities and moral systems cal' individual 
Muslims that there were diverse reactions to social and political change: 'the recognition of a religiously 
informed difference from an assertive Hindu "other, "' she argues, 'did not cement the multiple internal 
cleavages among Indian Muslims... this haemorrhaging of a religiously bounded community was not a 
fleeting but a recurrent phenomenon. ' p. 100. 
" On the increasingly 'well-defined, closely knit, exclusive and even aggressive' implication of the term of 
gauni as applied by Sayyid Ahmad Khan from the 1880s, see Safia Amir, 'Semantics of the word Qawm: a 
study of Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan' in Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society (49,4.2001), p. 59. 
130 
and function separately from, and even in competition with, other Muslim communities 
in India. 
Just as a language of Muslim solidarity was developed in colonial U. P. primarily through 
attempts to initiate the educational and cultural betterment of Indian Muslims, so this 
chapter will discuss educational reform as a means of assessing the wider transformation 
of understandings of community among Shi'as. The chapter examines simultaneously 
two interconnected themes. Firstly, it considers issues of educational modernisation and 
regeneration as discussed by Shia reformists, and the anjumans founded in order to 
actualise these goals. Secondly, it discusses Shia responses to wider efforts towards the 
improvement of the condition of Indian Muslims. The `Aligarh movement' is a highly 
loose term which is used to indicate not only Aligarh College but a broad array of 
Muslim anjumans and societies which aspired to modernise Muslim education, 
ameliorate Muslim backwardness and as such foster a communitarian Muslim solidarity. 9 
Among these are included organisations as diverse as the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, 
Anjuman-i-Islam and, from 1894, the Nadva't ul-'Ulama. All such organisations are 
commonly perceived to have formed components of a coordinated network of Muslim 
anjumans, with Aligarh College and the Muslim Educational Conference at its head, 
which adopted an inclusive ethos as a means of cultivating Muslim communal solidarity 
as widely as possible. '0 
The principle sources used for much of this chapter are extracts from newspapers, 
primarily those from the newspaper Ittehad, north India's foremost Shia newspaper from 
1910 until 1925.1 1 As such, in addition to its assessment of Shi'a educational reform and 
9 For an excellent description of many such anjurnans, see Abdul Rashid Khan, The , -ell-India Muslim 
Educational Conference: its contribution to the cultural development of Indian Muslims (Karachi, 2001), 
13 25,42-53. 
For instance, Aligarh was 'the arena in which Muslim opinion was created and U. P. Muslim leadership 
assembled' and the Educational Conference 'extended the scope of Aligarh's influence to Muslims 
throughout India. ' Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims, pp. 124-5. Another author writes that the 
Educational Conference 'achieve[d] a general consensus to break the deadlock between the 'Young' and 
'Old' parties' and 'fashioned a community of views and a shared outlook among the educated classes of 
Muslims in all provinces. The bonds of Islamic brotherhood were strengthened. ' Khan, The All-India 
Muslim Educational Conference, pp. 106,252. 
11 A compilation of extracts from Ittehad until 1915 has been preserved as the text Husain, Ri. snla-i-kifcuº- 
p6sh lidaran. This has been supplemented by the plentiful extracts from Ittehad surviving in the Native 
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perspectives on Aligarh, the chapter has implications for the study of the newspaper-press 
in colonial north India, including its contributions to public-sphere debate and the novel 
construction of communities. 12 
Imamiya Congresses and madrasas: Shia alternatives to the Muslim `centre' 
Aligarh College, and its affiliated organisation the All India Muhammadan Educational 
Conference founded in 1886, sought to offer a `centre' to Muslim education in India. 
Through these two establishments, Aligarh was designed as the 'great centre for a unified 
network of Muslim institutions, ' serving to coordinate numerous efforts for religious and 
cultural regeneration among India's Muslims. 13 Indeed, until the Aligarh-Conference 
combine became dominated by the campaign for a Muslim University from around 1908, 
the need for a Muslim `centre' was the dominant theme of their discourse and sessions. 
Both these organisations have been examined primarily from the perspective of their 
unitary achievements, and less discussed is the fact that the attempt to establish a 
monolithic Muslim `centre' was apparently resented by certain minority Muslim 
communities. This section examines early attitudes among some Shi'as to the Aligarh 
movement and argues that, at a time when Shi'as in many cities and towns had been 
newly engaged with the foundation and administration of specifically Shia organisations, 
there was often little willingness to be submerged into the Aligarh programme. Of course, 
many Shia individuals of provincial and national significance, prime among them the 
Raja of Mahmudabad, Mehdi 'Ali Khan (`Mohsin-ul-Mulk')'4 and Sayyid Husain 
Bilgrami were ardent supporters of Aligarh College and its prescriptions for communal 
betterment. However, an examination of Shi'a communities on a more local level before 
around 1908 reveals a much greater degree of suspicion and ambivalence towards this 
overarching programme. 
Newspaper Reports compiled by the U. P. Government (UPNNR). 
1' C. f. Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London, 1991); Anindita Ghosh, Power in print: popular publishing and the politics of language and 
culture in a colonial society (New Delhi, 2006). 
1' Lelyveld, 
. 4ligarh's first generation, p. 
303. 
14 Mehdi 'Ali Khan (Mohsin-ul-Mulk) is also frequently known as Mehdi 'Ali Hasan; I has e used the 
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Interestingly, and perhaps on account of the proximity to Aligarh, it was in the North 
Western Provinces rather than Awadh that the first organised Shia responses to the 
Aligarh movement appeared. An anjuman entitled the Imamiya Educational Congress 
emerged at the beginning of the 1890s, primarily on the initiative of a large number of 
Sayyids of Saharanpur. Originating within years of both the All India National Congress 
and Muhammadan Educational Conference, the Imamiya Educational Congress openly 
acknowledged its resemblance to both. 15 It shared an array of features with these 
organisations, not least its convening of annual and bi-annual sessions, its carefully 
ordered lists of members and attendants and a conscious effort to enlist geographically 
and culturally wide support. Like these forerunners, the Imamiya Congress manifested an 
elite basis of mobilisation, led by eminent public figures of local position and 
dominance. 16 Moreover the Imamiya Educational Congress' evocation in prose and verse 
of a Shi'a qaum, one of the first instances of its kind, echoed the attempts of these parent 
associations to subordinate the interests of self, kinship and caste to, respectively, the 
Muslim `community' or Indian `nation. ' 
In common with Deoband, and in a rare moment of acknowledged sympathy for the 
institution, 17 the aim of the Imamiya Congress was to administer religious education, and 
to oppose the westernised strand of learning propounded in Aligarh. Aligarh College and 
the newspapers affiliated with it were accused of having `quaffed the cup of nechri'at 
(atheism or materialism), ' of setting obstacles in the path of Islamic works, and of failing 
to distinguish lawful and unlawful knowledge. ' 18 To this end, the Imamiya Educational 
Congress founded the Madrasa-i-Imamiya of Delhi, a seminary of substantial size and 
annual intake founded in 1890. The madrasa was established in order to offer a broad 
curriculum of basic subjects and, in particular, to train haft: (those able to recite the 
former simply because it is the name usually adopted in the sources used. 
15 Agha Haider 'Ali Beg, lmämr`va Ejükeshanal Küngres kä ijläs-i-awal ma'r: 7f jalsa-i-, ýulshän-i-ta'lirn-i- 
lmämiti'a (Fategarh. 1892). pp. 30-2. 
16 See the lists of donors and 'well-wishers' of the Congress, ibid. pp. 19-27. 
r Ibid, p. 29. 
IN Ibid, pp. 28-9. 
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Qur'an), with the aim of raising preachers to be dispersed across India. 19 The seminary 
was intended to serve Shia and Sunni students alike, and was forced to change its name 
to Madrasa Hifz-ul Qur'an to this end. 2° 
The Imamiya Congress' presence in Saharanpur most likely reflects the contemporary 
visibility of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in the North Western Provinces 
rather than Awadh, as well as the desire for a visible rejuvenation of Shia religious 
learning to mirror the same region's Sunni renewal at Deoband. However, as Shia 
organisational efforts became apparent in Lucknow from the 1890s, it was this city where 
Shia responses to Aligarh increasingly became focused. One community conspicuously 
absent from the sessions of the Muhammadan Educational Conference were the 
wasiqadars, the Shia pensioners of the former Awadh Court. Contrasting with the rapid 
transformation of Aligarh, and better reflecting the current economic stagnation of 
Lucknow itself, this clique was slow to modernise, and unenthusiastic to seek education 
or employment. Wasiqadars were noted for their failure to enrol their children in 
government schools. 21 Looking on Lucknow's Shi'as as `a community backward beyond 
all normal degrees of backwardness, ' Government treated the wasiqadar class as a 
constituency in need of special consideration. 22 Attempts were made by government to 
uplift this class, but early attempts to ease certain children of wasiqadars into commercial 
or industrial education came to nothing. 23 Some years later in 1912, a Wasiqadars' 
Scholarship Fund was established by Government for the same purpose, and the All India 
Muslim Educational Conference proposed the construction of a special school to educate 
wasiqadari children appropriately, again to no avail. They were instead castigated by the 
"' Agha Haider 'Ali Beg, lmdmTva Ejükeshanal Kängres kä jalsa-i-sälcna imtehdn sä1-i-d5m 1310, ma'ruf 
jalsa-i-gulshän-i-ta'lim-i-lmdmivva (Fategarh, 1892), p. 7. 
2° Beg, Imämiva Ejükeshanal Kanferans kä ijläs-i-aval, pp. 9,30-1. 
2 Hewett to Chief Secretary, 3 February 1912, Political Department File No. 42 of 1913, Uttar Pradesh 
State Archives, Lucknow (UPSA). 
22 Meston claimed, for instance, that the Shi'as 'embrace that multitude of impoverished ashraf in 
Lucknow whom it is so absolutely essential to bring into the ranks of the ordinary population and to 
provide with respectable employment. This result is certainly not going to be achieved without some 
special measure of Government help in the way of education for the younger men of this class. ' From 
Meston to Secretary, 7 February 1918, Educational Department File No. 7 of 1918, UPSA. He also claimed 
that 'the pressing need of doing something is strongly felt by those who know something of the private life 
of this impoverished and declining class of persons. ' Lovett to Chief Secretary to U. P. Government, 31 
January 1913, Political Department File No. 42 of 1913, UPSA. 
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latter for their `life of laziness and beggary' and 'moral decadence' (akhlagi kam oi-i)., 4 
The wasiqadar networks in the muhallas of old Lucknow were clearlv little affected bv 
the distant revolutionary murmurs of Muslims in Aligarh, and the : Muhammadan 
Educational Conference proved unable to entrench itself among this particular local elite. 
This was due in part to the resilient self-awareness of the Lucknow nobility, who clung to 
their family heritage and distinctive civic culture rather than being absorbed into a 
monolithic communitarian reform campaign from which little tangible benefit had been 
forthcoming. On the other hand, and in the municipal context of Lucknow, it reflected a 
social and class rivalry between this Shia elite and the representatives of the 
Muhammadan Educational Conference in this city. The talugdars newly established in 
Lucknow often adopted the Aligarh College and Educational Conference as the vehicles 
for their sustained social mobility and furtherance under colonial administration . 
25 The 
dispossessed former aristocracy were not natural allies of the taluqdari class, and the 
latter's re-definition of respectability in Lucknow took as its victims the courtly nobility, 
who were dismissed for their self-indulgence and backwardness. 26 It was an edge which 
separated social groups of the `old' city of Chowk and `new' residents of Qaiserbagh, and 
on occasion, overlapped with the emerging rivalries of Shia and Sunni. 
Another dimension of wasigadar- opposition to the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference was more overtly political. Having endured an era of dissipating wealth and 
social decline since the British annexation of Awadh, the ivasigadars had suffered 
Substantially under colonial rule and were surprising but consistent participants in the 
Indian National Congress. The Anjuman-i-Muhammadi, the foremost public organisation 
1 Lovett to Bur7n, 24 September 1912, Political Department File No. 42 of 1913, UPSA. 
4 All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, Rapbrt i ijläs i scýlänn i . 1l 
/ndiýý Muhaniadcaiº . 1iºglö- 
öri'iººtal Ejiºkeshanal Kjnferans, bemaqCm Luckna'a 28-30 December 1912 (Aligarh, 1913), pp. 9,103, Sir 
Nas v id Room, Azad Lihrarý, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). 
'` John L. Hill, Muslims and the Congress organisation in Lucknow, 1885-1905, ' in John L. Hill cd., The 
C'oni, 'rrs. ' and India/, nationalism: historical perspectives (London, 1991), p. 138. 
2" It is worth mentioning that the talugdnº sere not the only opponents of the wasigadar's in Lucknow in 
social or class terms. Burgeoning 'middle class' activity in Luckno\ý was largely formulated against both 
talugdari and ºta. cigadari notion-, oI respectability, g iving middle-class political activity in Luckno%s 'an 
anti-aristocratic ed`ge... less visible at other urban centres. ' Sanjay Joshi, Fractured modernity: nºakiººi' of n 
nri(lrllc cluº. '. s in colonial India kNcv% I)e"lhi, 2001 ). p. 15, c. f, pp. 44-s. 
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of Lucknow's wasiqadars, was close to Congress through the late nineteenth century., - 
As political competition was systematised between the Congress and Educational 
Conference, it was thus raw political competition, as well as substantial class and 
educational differences, which separated many Lucknawi Shi'as from the Aligarh 
movement. 28 
The other Shi'a clique whose response to the Aligarh movement was less than 
enthusiastic was the `ulama. Contrary to some perspectives that the Shia `ulama were 
more sympathetic to the assumed benefits of Western learning than their Sunni 
counterparts, 29 there was little evidence of this in the nineteenth century. A descendent of 
Dildar `Ali, Sayyid Banda Husain, had produced in 1866-7 an edict asserting the 
important of a sound education, which had been included in a compilation of fatawa 
(legal decisions) published primarily by `ulama of Deobandi and other schools and 
entitled Imddd-ul fdq-ul-rahim-i-ahl-ul-nufdq, published from Kanpur in 1873-4, which 
accused Sir Sayyid of atheism and of denying the mi `raj (ascension of the Prophet). 30 In 
1891 certain mujtahids of Lucknow, unnamed but evidently scholars of particular 
eminence, urged and forced the Raja of Mahmudabad to withdraw his financial support 
of Aligarh College, a move which incurred significant financial damage upon the 
institution. 31 It seems that, at a time when formalised Shia education was being 
established in new madrasas in Lucknow and elsewhere with considerable success, many 
senior Shia `ulama were loathe to admit the Aligarh movement as the solution to 
questions of Shi `a cultural and social regeneration. 
27 The head of this alliance was Sheikh Raza Husain Khan, who was also involved in the literary Rifah-i- 
'Am Assocation. Akhbar-ul-momineen (Lucknow), 2 June 1890, UPNNR. It was only around 1900 that the 
wtwasigadars severed their formal connection with Congress. Al-Bashir (Etawah), 8 May 1900, ibid: c. f. Hill, 
'Muslims and the Congress organisation, ' pp. 137-8. 
`x It is worth mentioning that the rift between Aligarh and Congress supporters was particularly acute in 
Lucknow, since the city was both was a prominent fixture in the early organisation of Congress and 
conversely a particular target of anti-Congress activity by supporters of the Aligarh movement. Speeches 
by Sir Sayyid in Lucknow condemned Congress, while a Lucknow Anti-Congress Committee was 
established through his machinations. 
29 This is the perspective of Saiyid Athar `Abbas Rizvi, A socio-intellectual histoq of the Isna '. -tshari 
Shi'is in India, (Delhi, 1986), Volume II, pp. 163-444. 
Firdds-i-Makän kä tazkira (Lucknow, circa 1960), p. 12. 
All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, Rö'r'ddd-i-säldna, chhatä ijlds, 1891 (Aligarh, 1892), 
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Later in the same decade, the opposition of mujtahids seemed to tangibly diminish. 
Sayyid Ahmad and Mehdi `Ali Khan both corresponded with Lucknow's peshnamaz 
Muhammad Ibrahim, and convinced him to issue an edict allowing Western education on 
condition that religious learning was not neglected. 32 The move was hailed by Shia 
educationalists as a victory and paved the way for wider Shia attendance in Aligarh. but 
the continuing quarrels between `ulama and Aligarhists meant that little common ground 
was agreed. 
As the expanded public role of Lucknow's `ulama crystallised, so their prescription for 
Shia education became increasingly separate from the Aligarh project. A crucial moment 
came with the foundation of the Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor. As was described above, the 
organisation was primarily concerned with religious propagation, despite its claims of 
concern for secular uplift, and described worldly development as contingent upon 
religious nourishment. Its overbearing attention to religious learning and establishment of 
the Madrasa-i-Imamiya in Lucknow implied a rejection of the Aligarh programme. This 
generated powerful opposition to the anjuman from Shi'as closest to the Muhammadan 
Educational Conference, including the Secretary of Aligarh College Mehdi `Ali Khan, 
the educationalist Sayyid Husain Bilgrami (Imad-ul-Mulk) and the founder of the 
Anjuman-i-Islam Badraluddin Tyabji of Bombay. 33 
The Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor's unequivocal refutation of the Aligarh movement came 
in December 1904, upon the convening of the Muhammadan Educational Conference's 
annual meeting in Lucknow. 34 At this meeting, a protest assembly of around 5000 
. 147-53, AMU. Firdös-i-Makän kä tazkira, pp. 13-5. 
'Ali Naqi Safi, Sahifa't ul-ºnillat-i-ma'riüf be-lakhatjagir (Lucknow, undated), pp. 7-8; All India Shi'a 
Conference, R5'1ddd-i-ijl5s-i-awal-i-Ä1 Indiä Shia Känferans (Lucknow, 1908), p. 4. On the Tyabji clan as 
`pioneers of both westernisation and modernisation' among Muslims, see Theodore P. Wright, 'Muslim 
kinship and modernisation: the Tyabji clan of Bombay' in Imtiaz Ahmad ed., Family, kinship and marriage 
among Muslims in India (New Delhi, 1976), p. 218; Husain B. Tyabji. Badruddin Tvabji: a biography 
(Bombay, c. 1952), passim. For a biography of the educational modernists Sayyid 'Ali Khan and Sayyid 
Husain Bilgrami, see Robinson. Separatism among Indian Muslims, pp. 395-8; Khan, The. 411 India Muslim 
Educational Conference, pp 258-60. Further information on Husain Bilgrami can be obtained from his 
? rivate papers in the Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi (NML). 
J This was only the second session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference to be held in Lucknow, 
the first of which was in 1887. 
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individuals gathered opposing the Educational Conference, composed of `all classes of 
Mahomedans, mostly Shias, ' wasiqadars and ra `is. 35 A number of Shia mujtahids of 
Lucknow, most prominently Aqa Hasan, declared in writings and through fatawa that 
religious instruction was only nominally given in Aligarh College and that Shi'as should 
give no financial help to Aligarh College until arrangements for religious education were 
introduced. 36 There was concern among government and religious voices alike that such 
an influential figure as Aqa Hasan should so unequivocally oppose the principles set by 
Aligarh, and in response to this incident some argued that he should be somehow 
demoted from his influential post of peshnamaz in Lucknow's Asafi mosque. 37 The stand 
of these certain mujtahids was not universal among the Shia `ulama, and such influential 
men as Nasir Husain were notably less hostile to western education. 38 These moves were 
furthermore criticised by such men as Aligarh's secretary Mehdi `Ali Khan, the young 
lawyer Hamid `Ali Khan, and Sheikh Reza Husain, a former participant in Lucknow's 
Rifah-i-'Am organisation. 39 
As shown above, this row was one of the major factors which led to the dissolution of the 
Anjuman-i-Sadr-ul-Sadoor, and its replacement by the All India Shia Conference. The 
Shi'a Conference claimed upon its foundation that it would pay full attention to modern 
Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 23 December 1904, UPNNR. 
Aligarh Institute Gazette (Aligarh), 9 January 1905, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge (CSAS); 
Akhbar-i-Imamiya (Lucknow), 20 December 1904 and Shahna-i-Hind (Meerut), 1 January 1905, UPNNR. 
Initially, the Shia mujtahids found a rare source of common cause with the Sunni 'ulama of Firangi Mahal, 
both putting forward a single front of opposition. However, many prominent supporters of the Educational 
Conference in Lucknow were senior Firangi Mahallis, and maulavis 'Abdul Hamid, 'Abdul Wali and 
'Abdul 'Aziz all apparently held public meetings to promote the benefits of the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference. The opposition of some Shi'a mujtahids was seemingly more persistent. Aligarh Institute 
Gazette, 9 January 1905, CSAS. 
;' 'Sayyid Aka Hasan is the person who opposed the British Government when Muhammadan Educational 
Conference was held at Lucknow, a fact well known to the public and published in newspapers. He 
prohibits men and women to learn English arts and language and his speech has produced some effect in 
some places. He will become more powerful if he is allowed to lead prayers in the mosque Asafuddaulah. 
He is therefore not a fit person to lead prayers in the said mosque. ' Sayyid Sibte Husain to Lieutenant 
Governor, 9 May 1906, Political Department File 95 of 1906, UPSA. 
. IN Aligarh Institute Gazette, 9 January 1905, CSAS. The family of Nasir Husain were significantly 
accommodating towards western education, and the mujtahid's cousin, Maulei Sayyid Karamat Husain, 
made great advances in the education of women, spearheading the Educational Conference's focus upon 
women's education and funding Karamat Husain Girls' College in 1912. Gail Minault, 'Sayyid Karamat 
Husain and education for women' in Violette Graff ed., Lucknow: memories of a city (Delhi, 1997), 
. 
ýp. 155-64. 
Aligarh Institute Gazette, 9 January 1905, CSAS. 
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education. However, the powerful influence of the `ulama and the predominance ut 
wasiqadars and landed elites within it meant that, despite the presence of reformists, 
authoritative acknowledgement of a desire for modern education was conspicuousl\ 
absent. Like its predecessor, the Conference perceived the reformation of religious 
education as the primary means of maintaining the cultural distinction and promoting the 
uplift of the newly fabricated Shi'a qaum, a fact which caused some unease among 
modernists within the Conference, such as the young Lucknawi barrister Agha Haider: 
`One thing which I note with regret is... [that] secular education is 
neglected and apparently made subordinate to sacred education. If not 
cured in future I doubt whether this scheme can prosper. The special 
object of this Conference appears to be to found a College of Divinity 
and send out a Shia Mission. '40 
The Shi'a Conference often and consistently declared itself `a helper and supporter of the 
Educational Conference in the realisation of its aims and objects. ' , However, it was 
admitted that `at the birth of the [Shi `a] Conference some of the leaders of public opinion 
were afraid, and their fear in the circumstances was not groundless, that it may find itself 
in conflict with a Conference representing a joint body of Muslims like the Muhammadan 
Educational Conference and may split the Muslims in two opposite camps. '42 Particularly 
in its early years, the Shia Conference focused upon religious education. In later years, 
as will be shown in later sections, policy centred around the foundation of exclusive Shia 
inaktabs, schools, colleges and boarding houses, all of which reflected the Shia 
Conference's view that educational advance could only come alongside the propagation 
of a consciousness of Shia distinctiveness. Proponents of modern education were 
increasingly estranged from the Shia Conference, and there was an 'open breach' 
between educationalists and `ulama; Ghulam ul-Saqlain, a key modernist and figurehead 
of educational advancement, resigned from the Conference in protest at the dominance of 
4" Tribune (Lahore), 18 October 1907, CSAS. 
41 'The Muhammadan Educational Conference does offer a common platform for all the Muslims and aims 
at the common good. ' The Shi'a Conference, meanww hile, does not 'aim... at a separatist policy, but stood 
for co-operation or unit), of action. ' . -1ll 
India Shia conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential 
address of His Highness . Ilir . l/i ,\ awaz-. 
Khan Talpur, rider (t Khairpmr" Stare (Khairpur, circa. 1930), pp 2- 
3, 
42 Ibid., p. -. 
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the `ulama and the pervasive focus upon religious instruction. 43 Over subsequent sears 
secularist, progressive individuals such as the Raja of Mahmudabad and Wazii- Hasan 
were absent from its sessions. Those who remained within the Conference were primarily 
of the `ulama and the so-called 'Old Party, ' and consequently the Conference largely 
scrapped the reformist agenda. 
The example of such opposition by Shia organisations indicates not only the failure of 
the Aligarh movement to ingratiate itself with established Muslim nobilities and religious 
authorities, but suggests how attempts at the standardisation of a Muslim programme for 
communal betterment accentuated attempts by minorities within this suggested category 
to assert their autonomy. The call for a Muslim `centre' was a key factor in prompting the 
differentiation and sectionalism which increasingly came to define relations and 
interactions among and between Muslim groups in colonial north India. 
Shia suspicions of the Aligarh movement before the 1910s were far from unified or 
codified, but nevertheless there was a tangible resistance to the principle of uniformity in 
Muslim education and the coronation of Aligarh's College-Conference combine as the 
educational 'centre' for Indian Muslims. However, the emphasis of Shia critiques of 
Aligarh tangibly shifted through the colonial period. From the time of Aligarh's 
formation and during its 'first generation' until 1897, criticism largely focused upon 
perceptions of Aligarh's deleterious effect upon religious education. At this time, Shia 
Iiilama were able to pinpoint common ground with Deobandi or other Sunni counterparts, 
and even cooperate in criticism. However, from the 1890s onwards many prominent 
Shia 'ulmna appear- to have acceded to the necessity of such education. Some like Nasir 
Husain or Sibte Hasan voiced acceptance of western learning, and it was widely 
introduced into the curricula of Shia madrasas, among them even those administered by 
Aula Hasan such as Madrasa-i-Imamiya and Madrasa-i-Jafariya. By this point, the 
dominant line of criticism against Aligarh appears to have been less the denigration of 
western education, more the belief that Shi'as needed to be educated in exclusively Shia 
41 Savyid Rci. t All. The Khilafat and the Shia mujtahids, ' in The Leader (Allahahad), 26 March 1920. 
('S. \S. Ghulam ul-Saylain's distinguished record in supporting secular education is recorded in Khan, The 
. oll-India Muslim 
Educational CO /iference, pp. 63,120-1.125-6,1 )2-4. '03. 
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rather than wider Muslim institutions. It can be assumed that the appearance of abundant 
Shi `a unjumans in Lucknow and other towns from the 1890s. and their frequent focus on 
provision for public education and charity, encouraged their membership to focus on 
exclusively sectarian institutions as the best means for securing Shia educational and 
social betterment. As is discussed in subsequent sections, the debate over 'Nluslim' 
education thus shifted from a discussion of the virtues of Western and religious education 
towards a debate over the viability of legitimate Shia instruction in wider Nluslim 
institutions. 
Exclusion and compartmentalisation: Aligarh College and Nadva't ul-`Ulama 
`People used to say that Aligarh is a place of unity 
Everyone fights in his own place for unity 
Every atom composes a picture of unity 
From all sides you hear the cry of unity 
In the faith of Islam everyone is blended together 
And without fear or pressure fulfils his duty... 
In our situation, you should again come out and cry for unity, 
You will be made to repent if you try to bring unity, 
The management of the College themselves demolished the foundation of unity, 
Such great holes appeared in [unity] that walls turned into doors, 
Such hatred was unveiled and spread outside. ' 
Mushir Kazim Lucknawi, Shör-i-Mäshehr- (The crv of Judgement). 44 
Il' we are to believe its own hype, no institution better encapsulated the ability of Shi'as 
and Sunnis to work together within an individual, cross-sectarian 'Muslim' educational 
institution than the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. Symbolically. just 
before its foundation, Aligarh's college was allocated the collected revenues of the failed 
Shia Mladrasa Imaniya project of 1872-3. suggesting that it carried the support of Shia 
reformists of religious as well as secular persuasion 45 In its lauded 'first generation, ' 
44 Husain, Ri. 1cthi.. i-kifan-1)Osh lidarw i, pp. 118,127. 
JS Habib Husain ihn Ahmad Husain. Sa't'. Tih-i-'umri -i-Ghu! ini Hasnen Kint(-Jri (Lahore, 
1904), p. 199. In 
the end. ho\\ ever, the funds \. ere returned to their donors. Ihid, p. 203. 
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Aligarh College set a precedent as a transitional foundation in which sectarian factors 
were conspicuous by their absence. Following the College's foundation, its development 
of common allegiance to a Muslim qaum above sectarian loyalties ensured that 'Aligarh 
was able to transcend sectarian narrowness, including both Sunnis and Shi'ahs among its 
students, ' while Shi'as were also generously represented among its trustees and staff. 40 
The College mosque, Aligarh's trustees boasted, was the only mosque in India shared by 
both Shi'as and Sunnis, with both concordantly holding their namaz at different times. In 
1899, it was said that `Sunni and Shia students live on terms of perfect cordiality and 
friendship' in Aligarh. 47 Even in 1902, certain newspapers claimed that the 
Muhammadans of all sects, Shias and Sunnis... stand on an equal footing the Aligarh 
College... it will be a great day indeed when all the Muhammadan sects cooperate with 
each other in reforming the present system of education. '48 
However, in the 1910s many Shi'as increasingly declared Aligarh College to be a 'Sunni' 
institution. Contradicting the esteemed, inclusive ideology of Aligarh, they regarded it 
with increasing degrees of mistrust and, ultimately, launched open challenges upon it for 
its assumedly narrow and Sunni-informed character. Described pervasively in the Shia 
newspaper Ittehad as an expulsion (ikhraj) from Aligarh, Shia students and trustees 
deserted the College body and boards en masse. This story of the descent of Aligarh from 
a space of unitary pragmatism into one of sectarian controversy has been sidelined in 
scholarship, which has long been preoccupied with Aligarh's unitary qualities. Yet, as the 
chief aspiration of the Aligarh movement shifted from the establishment of a Muslim 
`centre' towards the promotion of Aligarh College into a Muslim University after 1908, 
so Shi'a opposition was transferred away from criticism of the singular Muslim agenda 
and towards the supposedly Sunni character and composition of Aligarh College itself. 
The reasons for the Shi'a desertion of Aligarh College, and its parallels with the Shi'a 
abandonment of the Nadva't ul-'Ulama association some two decades earlier, are 
discussed here. 
"" Lelyveld, Aligarli's first generation, pp. 123-4.186,200. 
17 A1-Bashir (Etawah). 5 June 1899, UPNNR. 
" Edward Gazette (Lucknow), 9 December 1902, UPNNR. 
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The Shia-Sunni troubles in Aligarh were initiated by a pamphlet issued by the , ccretary 
of the Shi'a Conference, which outlined a number of Shia grievances caused h\ the 
Aligarh College in 1913.49 There were complaints that the secretary-ship and other senior 
posts had always been held by Sunnis, and that disproportionately low numbers of Shi'as 
held professorships or posts in senior and student bodies. 50 The number of Shi `as on 
Aligarh's Board of Trustees was said to be insufficient, given the size of Shia financial 
contributions. 51 Salaries were reported to be lower for Shia teachers, and Shia students 
were underprovided for with pecuniary help. 52 Shi `as, it was also argued, were further 
disadvantaged in the College's religious life. No peslznaniaz had been provided for Shia 
students, and no money was provided to fund their preachers. While Sunnis gained 
priority of access to the college mosque, Shi`as were forced to practice their religious 
rites in private houses and out-buildings. 53 Some Shi'as described restrictions upon 
majalis and certain other overt practices of Muharram, while concurrently no ban on 
rowdy behaviour during Muharram was imposed by the College. 54 Shia festivals were 
not properly acknowledged as holidays, and Shia literature was not widely available. 5i 
The College's main teacher of Sunni dinivat (theology) was said to have recited the 
biography of Caliph Abu Bakr in front of all students including Shi'as. 56 All of these 
complaints compounded the perception among Shi`as, both inside and outside the Aligarh 
campus, of a gradual drift in Aligarh's character from a Muslim into a Sunni College. 
A little after the Shi'a Conference's announcement of these grievances and its 
prescription for their correction came the pinnacle of Aligarh's Shia-Sunni controversy 
in early 1914. Sibte Hasan visited Aligarh, and in a speech before Shia students he 
quoted a huclis offensive to the Sunni conception of the Caliphs. After his departure. 
, \ligarh's Sunni peshnaina Suleiman Ashraf responded to it with a 'scandalous attack' 
J'; Extracts of this pamphlet are published in Husain, Risäla-i-kiftin-pösh lidaran, and The Leader 
(Allahahad), 1-5 Scptemher 1913, CSAS. 
so Husain, Risäla-i-kifan-pösh lidaran, pp. 72-4. 
51 lttrlrud (Amroha), 16 Januarv 1914, UPNNR. 
Husain, Ri. «ila-i-kifa, i-pöslr lidaran, p. 75. 
Ibid, p. 77-80. 
Ihid, pp. 80-81. 
Ihid, pp. 7`). 82-85. 
On these numerous gnc\anccs. see Ittehad, 16 Januar, -'3 March and 1 April 1914, Daily Prince 
(Meerut), 20 Fchruarv 1914, VPNNR. 
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upon the Shi'as, calling them infidels and urging Sunnis to dissociate from them. '' This 
convinced many Shi'as of the College's Sunni partialities. Some denounced the College 
as an institution of the kafirs (atheists), 58 and striking rumours circulated that the college 
would be renamed Umaran College (after the second Caliph), teaching only Sunni 
principles and educating all pupils as in missionary institutions. 59 In late 1913 an internal 
committee, composed of Shi `a staff and trustees, had been appointed within the college to 
examine Shia grievances, 60 but its lack of achievement in the wake even of this incident 
was interpreted only as another indication of the college's Sunni composition. The 
Nawab of Rampur and others resigned their seats on this committee in protest at the 
failure of the college authorities to act upon its recommendations. Particular blame fell 
upon the current College Secretary Ishaq Khan, who was accused of Sunni partiality, 
collaborating with Ashraf and ignoring the findings of the committee appointed to study 
Shi `a grievances. 61 
The press remarked upon the transformation of Aligarh College from symbol of Indian 
Muslim unity into a campus of sectarian vitriol and the convening of rival majalis and 
milads (celebrations of the birth of the Prophet) by opposing communities. 62 Yet, many 
of the issues newly cited by Shi'as as grievances were in no way new practice in Aligarh, 
and had persisted in the long-term without complaint. 63 What happened in the early 
twentieth century, therefore, to bring sectarian issues into the foreground? 
No doubt, part of the explanation for the opening of closed issues reflects a fresh 
consciousness of Shi'a distinctiveness and a wider appetite for sectarian assertion, 
S7 Ittehad, 24 February, 16 and 24 April 1914, ibid. 
s" Ittehad, 1 March 1914, ibid. 
Ittehad, 16 April 1914, ibid. 
Nai}'er-i-Azam (Moradabad), 28 August 1913, ibid. 
Ittehad, 24 February, 23 March, 16 April and I May 1914; Oudh Akhbar, 2 April 1914. Al-Bashir, 24 
April and I May 1914, UPNNR. Ishaq Khan forcefully repudiated accusations of such partisanship, 
defending the attention he had given to the issue. See his long self-defence in Aligarh Institute Gazette, 10 
June 1914, CSAS. 
6' Al-Bashir, 23 March 1914, UPNNR. 
63 A Shia mosque, while planned on the original blueprints for the college, had never been constructed, 
yet for years both sects shared just one mosque, performing their namaz at different times, seemingly 
without difficulty. Indeed, Shi'as and Sunnis had only organised separate namaz as late as the 1890s. 
Lelyveld, Aligarh's first generation, pp. 157,276. Equally, restrictions on religious ceremonies within the 
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spurred by the formation of the Shia Conference and other Shia anjuniuns in Lucknoww 
and elsewhere. Yet furthermore, Aligarh College itself had experienced a shift in 
character since the turn of the twentieth century. Despite their sudden impact in 1914. 
Shi'a complaints against Aligarh had been growing steadily during the secretary-ships of 
Mehdi `Ali Khan (1898-1907) and Mushtaq Husain (1907-13). Both secretaries were 
mistrusted by some Shi'as in a personal capacity. 64 But more importantly, as put 
succinctly by one source, `the Shia grievances... began with the introduction of religious 
education in the college, '65 and it was during these two secretary-ships that attempts were 
made to increase the religious credibility of Aligarh. 66 In the year after Nlehdi 'Ali 
Khan's promotion, the College authorities called upon both Shi'as and Sunnis within 
Aligarh to give more attention to their religious education, `which they have neglected so 
far. '67 It was during his tenure that an Arabic department was established, and it was 
mainly on account of his efforts for a balance of religious and modern education that the 
opposition of the `ulama to Aligarh considerably decreased. 68 Mushtaq Husain ('Vigar 
ul-Mulk') introduced for the first time a compulsory paper on `Islamic Religion' for all 
students, which appeared to some as an attempt to standardise religious instruction. 69 
Such moves were perceived by Shi'as as a relinquishment of Aligarh's secularist 
commitments. By some assessments, in a diversion from the cherished understandings of 
Sayyid Ahmad, the College had come to perceive itself as a religious rather than 
educational institution. 70 Moreover, provision for Shia religious education was widely 
perceived to be weak. It was claimed that, in comparison with the theological teaching 
provided for Sunnis, the Shia equivalent was under-staffed and under-funded, with 
college precincts had long been enforced. Ittehad, 1 May 1914, UPNNR. 
64 Mchdi 'Ali Khan, a Shia Barha Savvid of Etawah, converted to Sunni Islam by personal decision, 
probably during his holding of the college secretary-ship. Some have suggested that this was in account of 
his view that the notion of taglid, which continued to be held in particular esteem by Shi'as as shall he 
described in Chapter 4, was an impediment to modernisation. Mushtaq Husain, meanwhile, wwas the leading 
representative of the Sunnis of Amroha and so was resented by many of the town's Shi'as, as is discussed 
belom. 
65 
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organisation deficient and exams badly administered. 71 
The combination of the erosion of Aligarh's secular status, managerial intervention into 
questions of religious education, and under-provision for its Shi'a minority, gradually 
convinced increasing numbers of Shi'as within and outside the campus of Aligarh's 
Sunni majoritarian propensity. Yet an addition to this Sunni character was given to 
Aligarh in the 1910s, with the rise of student activism on campus. The pan-Islamic 
agitation found a particular theatre among young, disaffected students at Aligarh, and the 
heightened visibility of `ulama and wa'izen in college life which followed further implied 
the penetration of the college by a radical and Sunni-tinted discourse. 72 Moreover, the 
sectarian quarrels were an expression of the dissatisfaction of many young student 
activists with their college at a time of considerable political fervour. Shi `a-Sunni 
questions were deliberately stoked by young activists to confront and challenge the 
college's boards and trustees, who were perceived as outdated and pro-government 
sympathisers. 
For all these reasons, it became widely declared that `at this time, Shi'as cannot recognise 
this college as their own college. '73 There was the perception or the reality of a shift in 
Aligarh's ability, or willingness, to maintain a secular ethos in which all sects could 
subside, or to allow separate space for its Muslim minorities. Perhaps the contraction of 
Aligarh's inclusiveness was, ultimately and ironically, the result of its attempt to occupy 
a middle-ground between secular and religious reformists. Aligarh's claim to be a 
Muslim `centre' had sharpened disagreements between reformists of variant persuasions, 
and attacks upon Aligarh from `ulama and others for its secularism and supposed atheism 
were intense. Attempting to annul these complaints of its critics and instil fresh unity into 
the Aligarh project in the early twentieth century, college secretaries and authorities 
other communities. For instance, Surma-i-Rozgar (Agra), 16 October 1910, UPNNR. 
71 Akhbar-i-lmarnia (Lucknow), 5 June 1906, UPPNR. 
72 The presence of pan-Islamism in Aligarh had actually been of persistent concern for Shias, even as 
early as 1897, the date of an early agitation in support of the Ottoman Sultan which had some effect on 
Aligarh. Some Shias were skeptical of the College on account of support within the College for the Sultan. 
Despite issuing a series of articles declaring that the Sultan could not be a Caliph, Sayyid Ahmad seemed 
powerless to remove the perception of Aligarh as a centre of solidarity with the Sunni Khilafat, and Aligarh 
was characterised as a centre of Turkish imitation. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 7 October 1910, UPNNR. 
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increasingly acceded to requests to adopt a more visibly religious ethos and include 
provision for religious education. As the College's religious character was emphasised, it 
implied the acceptance of a Hanafi Sunni consensus which was less able to encompass 
Muslim minorities. 
The events in Aligarh and pervasive evocation of an ikhraj bear an uncanny parallel to 
the experiences of Shi'as some twenty years earlier in Nadva`t ul-`Ulama, the association 
of `ulama established by Shibli Numani in Lucknow. The comparison was made by some 
observers, and Mujahid Husain Jauhar, the editor of the newspaper Itte{had which 
spearheaded the Shia rebellion against Aligarh, had first made his journalistic name in a 
systematic denunciation of Nadva't ul-'Ulama in Awtwadh Akhbar. 74 As such, the story of 
Nadva't ul-'Ulama and the Shi'as is worthy of examination. 
Comparably with Aligarh College and the Muslim Educational Conference, Nadva't ul- 
'Ulama desired the integration of the leaders of various Muslim associations and schools 
into a coherent singular programme. It aspired to be a podium for the internal 
strengthening of Islam through the initiation of dialogue, articulation of issues of 
common concern and resolution of long-standing disagreements. The disunities which it 
aimed to settle included those of sect: it aimed to `produce union and friendship among 
the opposing sects of Islam' and 'persuade them to drown their petty sectarian differences 
and thereby bring about good will and amity. '75 As such, its initial committee of twelve 
members, founded in 1894 to construct the organisation's objectives and provisions, was 
self-consciously inclusive, incorporating representatives of the Bareilvis, Deobandis, the 
Ahl-i-Hadis, Aligarh and others. A representative of the Shi'as was included in Ghulam 
Hasnain Kintoori, the renowned scholar and founder of the Lucknow's Madrasa Imaniya 
in 1872-3.70 Teachers from the Shia Madrasa-i-'Aliya of Rampur graced the Nadva't ul- 
'Ulama early sessions with their presence, and the convenors of these meetings evoked 
common Shi'a and Sunni adherence to the hadis and principles upon which Nadva`t ul- 
71 Husain, Riscäla-i-kijun-pcösh lidarun, p. 85. 
14 Ihid, pp. 17-18. 
Is lnstituac' Ga: rtte, 12 %1arrh P, 81)5 and 10 October 1901, CSAS. 
76 Nadva`t uI-`Iilama. (Lucknoww, I894). 
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`Ulama's ethic was based. 77 Until its third session, its speakers referred to the question of 
diversity within Islam with the claim that all are involved and all are invited. '", 
Despite the organisation's lofty aims, Ghulam Hasnain encountered opposition in its third 
session and was forced to withdraw from Nadva't ul-`Ulama, signalling the end of the 
organisation's inclusion of Shi`as. During the annual meeting of 1895, three Bareilvi 
maulavis attacked the Nadva't ul-'Ulama as over-inclusive of minority groups, dubbing it 
a mixture of Shi'as, Nechris (referring to the supposed 'atheists' of Aligarh) and 
Wahhabis. 79 In self-defence, the Nadva't ul-'Ulama committee in a weak moment... 
decided to sever its connection with the Shias altogether. '80 Weakness was indeed the key 
factor, its leaders forced by accusations from religious spokesmen to prove its legitimacy, 
leading to a broader self-identification with a Hanafi Sunni consensus and excluding 
Shi'as. At the annual meeting of the organisation the following year, one member 
defended Nadva't ul-'Ulama against these earlier accusations by depicting the school as 
broadly Sunni: `those who are Sunnis like myself and my friends act on the basis of the 
Qur'an and hadis... There are no Shiah among us. '8' The withdrawal of Ghulam 
Hasnain left the organisation as another narrowly Sunni establishment and ended its 
pretensions to cross-sectarian unity. By the time of the official foundation of the 
organisation's rnadrasa in Lucknow in 1898, the Nadva't ul-'Ulama was understood by 
Shi `as as a broadly Sunni seminary, indistinguishable from schools such as Deoband in 
its adherence to a rigidly sectarian creed and disposition for inunazara. 
The experiences of Shi`as within Aligarh College and Nadva't ul-`Ulama remain 
strikingly analogous. Both demonstrate a process by which an embrace of diversity 
within 'Muslim' organisations gave way to sectarian quarrels, scepticism of their ability 
to accommodate Muslim minorities, and a consequent narrowing of membership. Both 
display a comparable contradiction between their aspirations for inclusiveness and 
P7.9. 
Nadva't uI-'Ulama, Röö'IclCid-i jalsa-i-döln-i-Nadvvn't ul-'ulaniää (Lucknow. 1895), pp. 1 1-2.87. 
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realities that pushed them in a direction of enhanced sectarian particularity. Their parallel 
furthermore extends to other institutions long-hailed for their propagation of 'Muslim' 
communal unity. The Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, an organisation founded in Lahore in 
1884 to promote Muslim unity and education, was similarly declared to be neglectful of 
Shi `as. 82 Rather than interpreting all of these examples as isolated cases, it is possible to 
envisage a general narrowing of the constituencies represented within supposedly 
'Muslim' institutions. Even the Lieutenant-Governor of U. P. James Meston hinted in the 
1910s at the `turbulent atmosphere which has recently been characteristic of some of the 
mixed Muhammadan institutions. ' 83 
Rather than being symptomatic of a simple desire among Shi `as to conduct efforts for 
their betterment within exclusively Shia organisations, this process could be taken more 
widely as a metaphor for certain developments within Indian Islam itself after 1850. 
Previous chapters have discussed the prolific establishment of anjumans and societies by 
aspiring Muslim leaders, and demonstrated that these numerous organisations often acted 
autonomously and under independent guidance, rather than as components of a collective 
effort. With this plurality of organisational efforts came differentiation, and the 
systematisation of division. Separate Muslim groups became increasingly 
compartmentalised into different anjumans, crystallising and enhancing the differences 
between them. In particular, as Shia and Sunni anjumans emerged across U. P. in 
growing numbers, so `Muslim' institutions found it increasingly unworkable to maintain 
their broad basis and avoid categorisation as `Sunni' or 'Shi'a' institutions. As a result of 
the 'expulsion' of Shi'as from Aligarh College, Shia educationalists were increasingly 
powerless to heed the further sectionalisation of Shi'as from Aligarh-inspired institutions 
far beyond Aligarh itself. 84 The perceived mistreatment of Shi'as here led to the wider 
81 Barbara I)alv Metcalf. Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982), p. 344. 
"` Husain, Rist-i-kifa, i-pe)sh lidaran, p. 71. On the Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam see Khan, The . -Ill-Irrdia 
, 1/itslim Educational Cwi. lcrence, p. 16. "i Nieston to Hamid All Khan, 16 September 1915, Educational Department 'A'. File 152 of 1914, UPSA. 
"4 A case in point is the Islamia High School of Etawah, long an exclusive Muslim intermediate college and 
a stepping-stone to Aligarh. Its manager was the Shi'a editor of, 4l-Bashir, a newspaper which remained 
supportive of Aligarh's cross-sectarian modernisation project. When he invited local Shi'as to contribute 
funds to and participate in the Islamia High School, the Shia press whipped up vociferous opposition, 
arguing that Shi'as should recall their experience in Aligarh and \ý ark only for the education of their ow n 
community, not rcl\ ing upon educational institutions vv ith a heaviiv Sunni contingent. Ittchad, 15 and 19 
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compartmentalisation of the Muslim modernisation agenda along Shia-Sunni lines, and 
would project new support into the foundation of specifically Shia alternatives to 
Aligarh. 
Sectarian divide or municipal enmity: Aligarh and Amroha 
At many points in this thesis, it is suggested that apparent Shia-Sunni conflicts were 
often manifestations of distinctly localised disputes and rivalries, with social and political 
conflicts in particular towns played out along sectarian lines. In other cases, however, 
sectarian rivalries could express hostilities between the elites of different towns. The 
Shia-Sunni controversy in matters of education and communal modernisation largely 
intersects with the rivalry between leading Muslim representatives of two of western 
U. P. 's Muslim centres: Aligarh and Amroha. 85 Barely 130km apart across the plains of 
the North Western Provinces, these two towns could hardly have been more different in 
their response to colonial presence and western styles of education. While Shia 
organisation in north India had formerly been directed mostly from Lucknow, during the 
1910s the lead on the Aligarh issue was taken by the Sayyids of Amroha, a qasba which 
came to both absorb and broadcast wide-ranging Shia grievances. The enormous and 
consequential debates over the 'Sunni' leanings of Aligarh and the consequent Shi'a 
separation from wide-ranging Muslim educational institutions in north India were largely 
orchestrated in Amroha. Amroha's Shi'as were strongly criticised by Muslim reformists 
for their apparent refusal to participate in Aligarh College and the Muhammadan 
Educational Conference. In 1911, the Shi'as of Amroha explicitly dissociated themselves 
from the current campaign for a Muslim University at Aligarh, and refused to offer 
contributions to the fundraising efforts in its direction. 86 Moreover, the chief organ for 
E) cemher 1914. UPNNR. Conversely, the editor of Al-Bashir opposed the Shia College on the grounds of 
it heint, 'so decided a secession from Aligarh. ' `Extract from a fortnightly letter dated 24 March 1916. from 
the Commissioner of Allahahad Di\ ision, ' Educational Department 'A', File 152 of 1914. UPSA. 
Aligarh in this section is taken to mean the College and Civil Lines district around it, as opposed to the 
largely separate old town of Aligarh some kilometres away. 
86 Husain, Risala-i-ki: ur/I-posh IFdaran, p. 18. The campaign and fundraising for a Muslim University 
reached their height at this time, around 1910-12. See Khan, The All India Wuslini Educational Conference, 
pp. 9 1 -8. 
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Shia criticism of Aligarh was the newspaper Ittehad, published from Amroha b\ its 
dynamic young editor Mujahid Husain Jauhar. It employed the inventive medium of a 
mock-dialogue, one drawing from the discursive styles of Sayyid Ahmad's Tehzib-ul- 
Akhlaq and even Gandhi's Hind Swaraj. S7 This depicted Sir Sayyid in conversation with 
a number of past and present Aligarhist trustees and politicians; it portrayed his supposed 
frustration at their desertion of his legacy, and at the descent of Aligarh from a centre of 
Muslim progress into an arena of sectarian controversy. 88 What explains such hostilit\ to 
the Aligarh College and its branches among the Sayyids of Amroha`? Moreover, why 
should their opposition have become expressed as an instance of wider Shia resistance, 
rather than mere local defiance? 
As was discussed in the introduction, the Shia Sayyids of Amroha were a cultured, 
devout and fiercely independent local landed gentry, who found their legitimacy through 
ancestral ties and the distinctions of heritage. As such, they could scarcely have differed 
more from the modern Muslim professional aspirants centred upon Aligarh College, a 
newly fabricated `Muslim' (and predominantly Sunni) space largely unconscious of the 
ties of family and clan from which its inhabitants had been recruited. Those Muslims 
clustered around Aligarh substituted the loyalty to one's own family, clan and qasba for a 
Muslim gaui, disregarded the historical and local origins of its shat-if members in favour 
of common youth and professional status. In contrast to the manufactured and novel 
communal identities of Aligarh, encroaching modernisation prompted in Amroha an 
increased insularity around the pillars of kin and qasba, by which the Sayyids clung more 
tightly to the glories of their familial lineage and memories of past prosperities. Sayyid 
authors frequently outlined their genealogy in self-justification, 89 while the continued 
attendance by the Sayyids at the dargah of the founding Sayyid of the town, in spite of 
the wider efforts by Shia religious reformists here and elsewhere to eliminate , such 
practices, was a powerful statement of cultural resilience. 90 
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The opposition to Aligarh among the Shi'as of Amroha had long roots in fundamentally 
different approaches to educational reform in the North Western Provinces. As has been 
demonstrated in previous chapters, Amroha witnessed the entrenchment of maktab and 
madrasa education, and the sustained propagation of traditional education and religious 
publications. It was shown in the first chapters that a large number of Shi'a and Sunni 
madrasas appeared in Amroha from the 1880s. 91 In fact, the persistent tendency to 
religious learning among the Sayyids was often begotten of their poverty. Unable to 
afford an English education in the town, many sons of Amroha were sent to the 
burgeoning selection of Urdu maktabs and Arabic schools, whose endowments provided 
free education. 92 By contrast with government schools, these establishments were 
`apparently flourishing. ' 93 Consequently, religious education took precedence and distrust 
of Western-style educational institutions grew among Amrohawi Sayyids of both sects. 
Like the wasiqadars of Lucknow, the Sayyids of Amroha were treated by government as 
a group in need of special consideration. Government were forced to institute unique 
legislation in Amroha, making Islamic religious education compulsory in some 
government schools, in an attempt to persuade Amrohawi Muslims to join them. 94 A 
special arrangement was made between the government and the Sayyid-ul-Madaris that a 
set annual quota of five of the maktab's pupils would be admitted freely to the town's 
Government High School, a scheme explicitly to `encourage Western education among 
the old Muhammadan families of the neighbourhood. '95 The arrangement was in place 
for some years, although its success was limited. 96 Attempts to uplift Amroha's Sayyids 
according to a British example thus failed, due to their immersion in religious education 
91 Mahmud Ahmad Hashmi, Tärikh-i-Amröha (Delhi, 1930), pp. 138-46. 
92 From E. F. L. Winter, 19 November 1905, Educational Department File No. 21 of 1911, UPSA. 
93 From E. M. Cook, 4 February 1911, ibid. Amroha's young, madrasa-trained Muslims were perceived as 
'discontented and fanatical and disloyal' by the government. From E. F. L. Winter, 19 November 1905, ibid. 
94 It is no accident that Amroha was the single town chosen for this scheme, and it was said that it was this 
aberration from government policy alone which persuaded the Muslim residents of Amroha to enrol their 
sons within such establishments. General report on public instruction for the North Western Provinces and 
Oudh (1894-1895), p. 82; General report on public instruction for the North Western Provinces and Oudh 
(1895-1896), p. 54, V/24/916, OIOC. 
`" Yakub Ali, headmaster of Government High School, Amroha, to Inspector of Schools, Rohilkhand 
Division, 12 November 1910, Educational Department File No. 21 of 1911, UPSA. 
%A large proportion of its few beneficiaries withdrew or were expelled from the High School for 
unsatisfactory work. De La Fosse to Secretary of U. P. Government, 21 January 1911, ibid. 
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and their mistrust of its Western-inspired counterpart. 
Hostility to Aligarh among Amroha's Shi'as, however, was not simply a question of 
religious versus secular education. At the heart of the debate was the persisting crisis of 
Muslim identity from the post-Rebellion period and the search for a response to colonial 
jadid. While the Aligarh generation sought accommodation with the colonial 
administration and reaped the benefits of economic betterment and political visibility, in 
Amroha a sense persisted that colonial rule had brought with it ruin rather than 
betterment. While the Shia Sayyids had remained in stagnation or decline economically 
and educationally, modernisation had been kinder to Amroha's Sunnis. Headed by 
Mushtaq Husain (who would become the Secretary of Aligarh College much mistrusted 
by Shi `as in the next decade), a number of Sunnis acquired considerable wealth as 
administrators and pleaders, after which as new `masters of wealth and property' they 
aspired to gain influence and civic honours. The conflict between the established Shia 
aristocracy and aspiring Sunni professionals in Amroha intensified greatly after the 
devolution of power to municipal councils in the early 1880s, which led to the 
appointment of some local Sunnis as municipal commissioners and established 
institutions of local governance as an arena in which Shia-Sunni conflict would be 
enacted. 97 Indeed, the above-discussed introduction by Shias of new Muharram rites and 
the hihi f isil phrase into the azan during the 1890s, it could be argued, represented a form 
of public resistance to this new civic prominence sought by Sunnis. 
For the Shi'as of Amroha, therefore, colonial presence had brought with it a hostile local 
administration, challenges to former Shia dominance and enhanced Shia-Sunni conflict. 
, Since the connotation of jadid (modernity) for Amroha's 
Shi'as was one of instability 
and decline, attempts by Shi'as to alleviate their `backwardness' were often marked by 
insularity, shunning perceived modern or Western ideals in favour of municipal heritage 
and traditionalism. A striking example is the Anjuman-i-Sadat-i-Amroha, a society 
formed with apparent considerable local support after the Amroha session of the Shia 
97 In other ritic,, in the North \V estern Pro inces, the 1883 Municipalities Act has been shown to have 
enhanced local Hinclu-Muslim conflicts in a similar way. Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims, 
pp. 79-80. 
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Conference in 1910. The organ's proclaimed function was to promote the Islamic shari'a 
and uphold Islamic traditions, expunging non-Islamic innovations. Even the Shia 
Conference perceived this organ to be misguided and over-conservative, and urged the 
Sayyids to close it and open an alternative that could work for educational and financial 
betterment. 98 Nevertheless, the organisation seems to have been successful in at least 
temporarily siphoning off the latter's support; in contrast with the former enthusiasm 
within Amroha for the Shi'a Conference, in 1912 no deputation from Amroha attended its 
session. 
Resistance to the Aligarh project in Amroha was manifested not only in resistance to 
modern education and colonial municipal administration more widely, but in wider social 
reform. The uplift of women's education became one of the most visible and distinctive 
aspects of the Aligarh movement in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The 
sense grew that women were guardians of the domestic space, the hearth of Islam, and 
hence the transmitters of Islamic values responsible for the correct religious and ethical 
upbringing of future generations; women were thus established as the battleground on 
which various reformists and traditionalists would play out their agendas. 99 As such, 
many Muslim reformists during this period came to focus upon the proper role of women. 
In particular, a number of Aligarh-inspired reformists developed ideas that women should 
be educated in practical as well as religious matters, should attend schools with a 
formally organised curriculum rather than receiving home instruction, and should be 
relieved of purda (veiling or seclusion). '00 By contrast, those opposing the Aligarh 
project more widely came to offer an opposite prognosis for the role of women, and this 
was especially true in Amroha. Alongside his opposition to Aligarh in the columns of 
99 All India Shi'a Conference, Rö'idäd-i-ijläs-i-chhatä-i-. 9l Indiä Shia Känferans, munagida /8-20 
October / 912 (Lucknmw. 1913), pp. 183-4. 
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Ittehad, Mujahid Husain wrote and published instructive tracts for women, a common 
literary genre in colonial India. One of his writings, described as `a book suitable for 
young girls, ' laid down the regulation of the appropriate lifestyle, morals and habits of 
women, discussing issues such as home-making, manners, cooking and the raising of 
children. 101 As with many wider reformists discussed above, he emphasised the domestic 
sphere as the building-block of Muslim society. However, his omission of a prescription 
for women's education implied that women needed to be further reminded of traditional 
manners and custom, rather than becoming newly versed in modern knowledge or 
participating in the institutionalised education advocated by many modernists. Mloreover, 
Mujahid Husain frequently restated of the need for purda. Ittehad press distributed 
numerous tracts aimed at the `honourable woman' who, it was said, would never be seen 
out of purda. 102 Poetry glorifying the `sweet fruit' of pmrda was published, 103 while 
Ittehad newspaper declared opponents of the custom to be morally vacuous. 104 Mujahid 
Husain's reinforcement of purda, then, was a symbolic form of written resistance to some 
of the wider campaigns of educational modernists associated with Aligarh. 
Equally important is the question of why the Sayyids' suspicion of Aligarh should have 
become expressed as a Shia-Sunni controversy, rather than an issue of municipal 
competition or dispute between the `old' nobility and `new' middle class? Simply, the 
framing of the quarrel as a Shi'a-Sunni question coincided with its entry into national 
debate through the conversations of the vernacular press. Ittehad, a newspaper which was 
often dominated by news on local issues such as land tax and municipal personalities, 
aspired nonetheless to a wider readership, causing it to frame its assault upon Aligarh as a 
wider Shi'a-Sunni question, rather than as one specific to Amroha's Sayyids. Partly in 
consequence, sections of the pro-Aligarh reformist press in the towns of western U. P. 
were prompted to frame their responses in equally stark Shia-Sunni lines. In 191 1-12 a 
series of attacks were made upon Amroha's Shi`as in vernacular Muslim newspapers, 
accusing them of backwardness and an undermining of Muslim modernism. `ioradabad's 
101 Nlujahid Husain Jauhar, fl, ivJi-i-niswCm (Amroha, circa 1928), passim. 
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Naiver-i-`Azam contained a contributed article by an Amrohawi Sunni on the Muslim 
University movement, claiming that `the absence of education and the extent of the 
ignorance among the Shia Sayyids of Amroha results in them having absolutely no sense 
of the pace of the times, ' the words and spirit of which were recycled in several other 
U. P. newspapers. ' 05 These articles were decisive in inciting Amroha's Shi'as to finally 
break their links with Aligarh College and the campaign for a Muslim University. It was 
this dialogue between Shia and Sunni columnists in the budding Muslim press which led 
to the identification of `Shi`as' rather than the clique of landed ra`is as the impediment to 
Aligarh's uplift agenda. More widely, this dialogue came increasingly to frame the 
traditional-modernist debate in Muslim education in ever more stark Shia-Sunni lines. 
As Ittehad matured, it increasingly criticised Aligarh primarily for its Sunni-tinted 
administration rather than its irreligious syllabus. 
This transition of the debate from a traditionalist-modernist one into a sectarian one owed 
further to the fact that by the 191 Os many Shi `a organisations of Amroha no long differed 
substantially from the Aligarh movement in their language and aims, after which their 
sectarian distinction became their characteristic feature. An example is the Anjuman-i- 
Wasifa-i-Sadat-va-Mominin, founded in 1912 by Mohsin Mirza, a participant in many 
Shia orphanages and refuges in Delhi, and Jalal-ud-din Haider, an Azamgarh resident 
settled in Lahore. 106 The organisation essentially requested donations and provided 
financial grants for the religious and secular education of Shia students, as a strategy for 
lifting their families and by extension the Shia community out of backwardness. 107 It 
acquired some 300 members and affiliation to the All India Shia Conference within two 
years of its foundation, 108 and claimed the proud status of an all-India organisation, 
maintaining members and presence across Punjab, U. P. and Bihar, and even as far as 
Najaf, London and Oxbridge. However, its membership lists, the origins of contributors 
to its journals, the location of its administrative and publishing activities and close 
105 Husain, Rist-ila-i-kifarr-pösh Martin, p. 18. 
106 Jal; il uci-din Haider was descended from a line of Za'idi Shi'as of Jaunpuri origins. Say v id Aja'it 
11usain Ri/Vi Jarchvi.. "lirjrcnrarr-i-ltaýifcr/r-i Sädcaý iu ; 11ýýrniýriir silvar jiribili Haarbar (Ne'. 
Delhi, 1937), 
Ibid, pp. 1-2. 
Irrdis ShT'cr kc-m/t'rans, muirnqTda 18-20 Oct / 'i 191-1 (Lucknovv. 1915). 
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alliance with Mujahid Husain Jauhar109 all reveal it to have been largely an anjwnan of 
Amroha. Similarly suggesting its local origins was its reinforcement, in spite of its 
supposedly wide religious constituency, of the distinctions of the sadat so revered in 
Amroha. In some ways, the Anjuman-i-Wasifa-i-Sadat-va-Mominin could have been a 
branch of the Aligarh movement. It spoke in terms of progress and the overcoming of 
backwardness, in a way which did not negate religious identity. °° The appeal to 
membership on grounds of religious rather than familial or local affiliation, the attempt to 
craft it as a national organisation, and the support of secular subjects such as commerce 
and technology, also placed it more closely to the Aligarh project than previous 
Amrohawi efforts. With a great deal of equivalence between the aspirations of this 
anjuman and Aligarh, the greatest distinction was no longer one of substance, but the 
Shia exclusivity of the latter. The organisation reflected and propounded the assumption, 
influential in many circles, that Shi'as could no longer be educated mutually with Sunnis. 
On account of these new seminaries and anjumans in Amroha, by the 1910s the town 
offered its Shi'as numerous alternatives to the monolithic Aligarh project. As Aligarh 
became the centre of an aspiring all-India educational project for Muslims, Amroha 
became the equivalent centre of the alternative vision for Shia distinctiveness in 
education. Unsurprisingly, in subsequent years Amroha would become a dominant 
platform for the Shia College movement. Once the campaign for the Shi'a College 
began, the Shi'as of Amroha were its most enthusiastic supporters, giving `great 
reception' to its envoys and pledging donations 'far in excess of their whole 
possessions. ''" Shia College committees were held in Amroha, and there was even talk 
of the College being founded there. Ittehad, meanwhile, evolved into the chief organ of 
I,. 18. 
't)9 In its commemorative edition of 1937, perhaps approaching a half of listed members and donors are 
cited as residents of Amroha. Jarchvi, Aiijuman-i-Waz fah-i-Sjdjt-tv(i-Minºirniri, passim. Nlujahid Husain 
Jauhar \\ as so closely affiliated to the anjuman that he temporarily closed his newspaper to help with the 
anjuman, and took on some of the anju»run's members as his staff. 
tº" 'Progress should al\ýavs he apparent in education, but our customary education i, divorced from the 
education of faith and integrity, and the influence of this particular kind of education i,, that výe are moved 
further a\\ a' from the standard of Islam. ' Ibid, p. 5. 
III 'Extract from a fortnightly report, dated 12 March 1916, from the Comnmissioner of' Rohilkhand 
Ui\ ision, ' Educational Department'A', File 152 of 1914. UPSA, Nieston to Fateh All Khan Qir. ilhash, 29 
May 11)16, ibid. Stories also circulate in Lucknow of how the Shi'a women of : \mt ha oIfcred their 
je eIlerv as donation to the college fund. 
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the Shia College movement. As is discussed below, the reasons cited for supporting the 
Shia College ranged from the support for progressive Muslim education to sectarian 
vitriol against the `Sunni' character of Aligarh, but in Ittellad certainly the latter 
predominated. The leaders of the Shi'a College movement voiced concern that Ittehad 
was exploiting the issue to `make a living, ' and undermining the respectability of the 
movement by giving vent to `imaginative, scurrilous and malicious outpourings. ' 112 
Having reaped few of the benefits of Aligarh during the early-colonial period, the 
Sayyids of Amroha took instead the route of heightened insularity and refuge in the tested 
cultures of kin and qasba. While the estrangement of Amrohawi Shi'as from the Aligarh 
movement appeared initially as a rift between the traditionalist gentries and the modernist 
Muslim middle-class, such an interpretation is partly misleading. The process by which 
opposition to the Aligarh movement was fostered, including among its features reformed 
inadrasa education, fresh journalistic campaigns, new public anju nanzs and the active 
participation of budding Amrohawi writers, district administrators and magistrates, do not 
identify Amrohawi resistance to Aligarh as a resurgence of traditionalism. Rather, the 
Sayyid retreat from the Aligarh movement represented an alternative programme of 
modernisation, focused upon resistance to Aligarh's centralised reformist programme. 
However, like the Aligarhists, they increasingly appealed to religious commonalty rather 
than ashraf status in the articulation of their reform agenda. It was a choice that, besides 
distancing Amroha's Sayyids from the Aligarh movement, came increasingly to define 
the nexus of the wider debate over Muslim education as a Shia-Sunni one. 
The campaign for a Shia College 
As Shia-Sunni tensions swelled in Aligarh, and as Ittehad of Amroha inflamed sentiment 
around the issue, so grew the calls for a separate College, run by Shia staff and trustees 
and for Shia Students. The foundation of such a college wa" policy of the Shia 
Conference onwards from a narrowly passed resolution in its 1913 sC' 5ion, but the 
112 Fatch All Khan to Nlcston, 17 July 1916. ibid. 
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concept was given its main legitimacy by the sectarian quarrels the following year in 
Aligarh. Indeed, there were signs that certain of Aligarh's Shi'a students and trustees 
were accentuating the conflicts and impeding their resolution in order to further vindicate 
the concept of a separate sectarian institution. 113 Subsequent years saw a high-profile 
campaign for the foundation of this college, which was eventually founded at the close of 
1917. The campaign for the Shi'a College is remarkable for the unprecedented level of 
unanimity and organisation seen among Indian Shi'as, as well as for its impact in 
distancing them from the Aligarh movement in the early twentieth century. 
The campaign was initiated by Fateh `Ali Khan Qizilbash, a resident of Lahore and `Old 
Party' Aligarh trustee with landed property in Punjab, U. P. and Karbala. After talks with 
Shi'a `ulama and trustees at Aligarh soon after the sectarian controversies, he proposed 
the foundation of a Shi'a College in the province. ' 14 In 1914 a deputation of `ulama 
toured U. P. in order to enlist donations from Shia talugdars. 115 At the close of the same 
year, a deputation of U. P. Shi `as led by the ra `is of Jansath toured the country to promote 
the College idea. "6 The Shi'a Conference became an active vehicle for the project, its 
sessions repeatedly passing resolutions in its favour. The Nawab of Rampur stepped 
forward with financial pledges to the college, and many local Shia gentries followed 
suite. The Shi'a College Foundation Committee, sending out further deputations and 
requests for contributions and establishing district committees for the college in various 
towns of U. P. and Punjab, was active in 1915-16.1 17 As had been the case with the Shi'a 
Conference in its early years, the prospect of a Shia college initially received support 
from diverse political persuasions of Shi'as, and many were surprised by the 
uncharacteristic `absolute unity' of the Shi'as of all parts of India to establish the 
Naiyer-i-Azam, 12 March 1914, UPNNR; Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 17 March 1914, ibid; Oudh Akbar, 23 
May 1914, ibid. 
114 Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 19 May 1914, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/6, OIOC. 
11s Ibid. 
116 /ttehad, 15 December 1914, UPNNR. The following year, Fateh Ali Khan made a further suggestion 
that all Shi'a landlords and raluqdars should release a fixed contribution to the College. Ittehad, 24 
December 1915, ibid. 
117 'A number of devoted workers have travelled far and near interesting the Shiahs of India in the college, 
collecting money for it and creating an atmosphere of pride and enthusiasm. ' The Pioneer (Lucknow), 26 
April 1916, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/15, OIOC. 
159 
College. ''; 
This `unity' had several facets, and the level of cooperation was unprecedented. On the 
one hand, the College movement seemed to temporarily bury the disquietude between 
those of religious and secular inclinations. Significantly, most senior `Mama of Lucknoww 
actively engaged with the college campaign's deputations and committees, among them 
Nasir Husain, Najm ul-Hasan and even Aqa Hasan, who in previous years had taken a 
stand against the supposedly irreligious education of Aligarh. Sibte Hasan issued strong 
and sometimes crucial oratorical support. 119 In essence, the character of the college was 
left ambiguous from the outset, and suited the aspirations of its various supporters. For 
the `ulama, the college presented a further arena for religious teaching, and would 
combine secular learning with powerful and ubiquitous moral instruction. Meanwhile, the 
most ardent of secularists applauded the rhetoric of welfare and secular uplift which 
initially surrounded the college project and envisaged the construction of another college 
broadly within the Aligarh tradition, and possibly even as an antidote to the sectarian 
theatre into which Aligarh College itself had descended. 
However, as the will for the existence of the college progressed into a debate on its 
character, the emergence of disagreement was predictable. The nluiIahlds began 
campaigning for a high contingent of theological teaching in the curriculum of the 
college, asking that `religious teaching will have the first place among all the teachings of 
the College' and that other subjects should contain an admixture of theology. ' 
1 2" In a 
series of petitions over the coming years, they proposed measures such as compulsory 
religious education for Shi`as and the presence of `Mama on the Board of Trustees. 
12' 
Simultaneous disagreement arose on the location of the college. Suggestions among 
patrons were as varied as the individuals, although Lucknow was the most obvious 
11" 
, 
4I-Bashir, 25 April 1916, UPNNR. 
119 It \vas in fact Sibte Hasan's speech in 1913 that wwas widely perceived to clinch the passing of a 
resolution in favour of the Shia College's foundation by the Shia Conference. The Lender, 9 October 
191 ?, C, s: \ S. 
IN 'Memorandum of nmujtahids: \Vhv did \ýe need the college? ' Educational Department 'A'. 
File 152 ol 
1914, UPSA. 
121 'Draft Constitution of College Governing Body, ' ibid. In addition, the Constitution expres. cd unease at 
the 'nc, _leet of the nest \wrld' 
M modern svstcnis of learning. 
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possibility. 122 This prospect frightened many, for Lucknow was both a hive of nationalist 
political activity and a seat of learning, both of which were feared as possibl\ detrimental 
influences upon the institution. 123 The Shia mujtahids remained decided upon Lucknow, 
and a series of meetings between the Nawab of Rampur and the'nuitahids on the location 
of the college descended into in-fighting. '24 
Amidst such fundamental disagreements, much of Qizilbash's success in realising this 
project in its early years owed to the proactive support of Government, especially from 
the Lieutenant-Governor James Meston. Meston showed great willingness to be openly 
associated with the scheme and corresponded at length with Qizilbash, assuring college 
committees of the `sympathy and assistance' of government. l'`s Meston promoted the 
college vision as an effort towards educational uplift, pronouncing himself 'genuinely 
anxious to advance Muhammadan education, and... the enthusiasm of the Shia 
community provides a splendid opportunity for promoting that cause. ' 12c' He contended 
that the college would further secular education and thus foster 'the healthy competition 
of learning and not of theological disputes. ''27 Crucially, it was Meston's continuous 
communication with the leading figures of the college committees that seemed to hold 
together college supporters of diverging opinions, and Meston was largely responsible for 
keeping donors on side. He mediated the schism concerning the location of the college, 
and forced an agreement. 128 On the issue of the constitution of the college, crucially 
Meston served to maintain the support of the `u/ama even as it became clearer that the 
college would be primarily an establishment of secular education, saying that on top of 
the school's curriculum 'would rest as a crown the special instruction in religion, which 
122 For instance, the Nawab of Rampur and some ra'is of Jansath favoured Meerut, while others suggested 
Amroha, Fyzabad or Dehra Dun. Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 22 October 1916; Nlcston to Fatch All 
Khan, 29 October 1916, ibid. 
123 Lucknow ýý as 'the central home of Ulamas [hence]... the students may come out 'erg orthodo . 
higoted. c\ en fanatics. ' Petition to Niesion, 22 December 1916, ibid. Heston described that 'the I*c; ar that, 
in 
a great centre of Shia religion, theological teaching and practice may leave insufficient time 
for adequate 
secular education' was commonplace. Nieston to Education Department. 7 January 
1917, ibid. 
L4 Heston to Fatch All Khan, ?4 December 1916, and Fateh All Khan to Nleston 25 December IQ 16, ibid. 
125 The Piomcc'r, 20 April 1916, Nieston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/15. 
Nieston to Fateh All Khan, 24 October 1915, ibid. 
Speech by Nieston in The Pioneer, 26 April 1016, ibid. 
Heston, for instance, forced an agreement on the location of the College. Nieston to Fateh Ah 
Khan. (6 
Januar\ I() 17, N lesion Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/4. 
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would be the distinguishing feature of your College. ' 129 That Meston ultimately laid the 
foundation stone of the College was a telling piece of symbolism not missed by sections 
of the press, which lamented that Shi `as themselves were not sufficiently co-ordinated to 
conduct such a campaign without outside support. 130 
The question of the Shia College's relation to Aligarh College can only be answered in 
connection with the ubiquitous hand of government in the College. Was the Shia College 
a broadly complementary project to Aligarh, sharing its institutional structure and 
educational programme? Or, was the Shi'a College an attempt to undermine Aligarh'? 
Meston unequivocally stated the former, proposing the Shia College as part of the wider 
framework of the development of Muslim education. He declared that the college was 
founded `not as a fruit of racial bitterness, but as a genuine endeavour to increase the 
facilities... for Muhammadan education. ' 131 Meston compared its future system of 
learning to that of Aligarh. He stressed the need for technical and commercial learning, 132 
insisted that the College would contain non-Shi'as and would not mix religious education 
with the wider curriculum, and he outlined certain safeguards in order to prevent 
`excessive devotion to theology. ' 133 
However, the British administration at this time had a further vested interest which 
contradicted declared government policy that its support for the Shia College was not 
inspired by a desire to impair the usefulness of Aligarh College. ' 134 Aligarh College in 
'' Address by Meston to Shi'a deputation, Lucknow, 12 January 1916, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. 
F. 136/15. 
130 Nai Roshni, 15 December 1917, UPNNR. According to Meston, 'I have worked very hard to get a start 
made with the Shia College and to stir up and maintain the necessary enthusiasm among the community. It 
had no previous experience in organisation or in the search for knowledge, and the whole of this business 
has been a very laborious enterprise. ' Meston to Education Department. 7 February 1918, Education 
Department File No. 7 of 1918, UPSA. 
131 Meston to Her Highness Nawab Sultan Jahan Begam of Bhopal, 15 September 1916, Meston Collection, 
Mss. Eur. F. 136/ 15. Also note his comment that 'I am influenced by no desire to attack any person or sect, 
but solely by the wish to improve the facilities for Muhammadan education in these parts. ' Meston to 
Maulvi Sayyid Fasih-Ullah Manzur Ali, 5 December 1915, ibid. 
;' 'Reply given by His Honour Sir James Meston to an address presented by a Shiah deputation at 
Government House, Lucknow, ' 12 Jan 1916, ibid. 
1" These included the careful selection of a Governing Body, a watertight constitution, the situating of the 
college on the outskirts of Lucknow, and affiliation to Allahabad University. The Pioneer, 
26 April 1916, 
ibid; Melton to Fatch All Khan. 6 January 1916, ibid; Meston to Rampur, 4 February 1917, ibid. 
114 Burn to Meston, 28-9 March 1914, ibid. 
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the 1910s had become a focus and centre of `Young Party' politics and pan-Islamist 
fervour, and the campaign for Aligarh's elevation to University status became a 
significant challenge to the government. Harcourt Butler in 1912 described the 'pan- 
Islam flavour about the idea of a central university, ' 135 and subsequent British policy 
came to orient around attempts to, in the words of the Viceroy, `isolate Aligarh. ' 136 
Subsequently, Government sought to diffuse Aligarh's activism by encouraging a 
provincialisation and sectionalisation of Muslim education through the devolution of 
educational institutions away from Aligarh's `centre. ' 137 The Government seized upon 
the opportunity provided by the Shia College as a means of undermining Aligarh's 
emergent student radicalism and diffusing the funding, participation and attention 
conferred upon Aligarh. Fateh `Ali Khan Qizilbash, the leader of the college movement, 
alluded to this at one point, when he deemed Aligarh's Shia-Sunni quarrels 'a lesser evil 
and a convenient opportunity to divert them from politics by keeping them for some time 
engaged in their own miserable... sectarian controversies. ' 138 Perceived Shia nationalists 
and seditious newspaper editors were likewise deliberately diverted from such activities 
through their promotion onto Shia College committees. 139 
As a result, the figureheads of the Shia College campaign were men of government 
loyalty, prime among them Qizilbash himself, who had been a strong proponent of 
discipline within Aligarh and headed the Moderate Muslim Senate, an association which 
attempted to further Muslim loyalty to government. '40 The College movement thus began 
the process of shaping a coalition sympathetic to Government, with Aligarh-inspired 
1" Butler to Hardinge, 3 November 1912, Butler Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 116/71, OIOC. 
136 Hardinge to Butler, 13 April 1913, quoted in S. Y. Shah, Higher education and politics in colonial 
India: a studs of Aligarh Muslim Uniiversity, 1875-1920 (Delhi, 1996), p. 241. 1" The Shia College was not the sole fruit of British attempts to devolve Muslim education from Aligarh; 
added to it were new Islamiya schools at Lahore, Peshawar and the Sultaniya College at Dehra Dun. Fateh 
All Khan to Meston, 30 July 1916, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/15, OIOC; Meston to Her Highness 
Nawab Sultan Jahan Begam of Bhopal, 15 September 1916, ibid; Nawab of Bhopal to Meston, 23 October 
1917, ibid. This raises questions about the extent to which British policy in education contributed to 
sectarianism during this period, since it facilitated the ascendancy of those who wished to set up 
educational systems on sectarian lines. 
" 18 Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 19 May 1914, Meston Collection, Mss Eur F. 136/6, OIOC. 
1.19 Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 17 July 1916, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/15, OIOC. 
140 Fatch Ali Khan to Meston, 26 December 1913, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/6, OIOC. 
Qizilbash 
established himself as the main spokesman of government interests on the Board of 
Trustees, and organised 
meetings for discipline to be discussed on behalf of Government. Fateh Ali Khan to 
Meston. 19 May 1914. 
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progressives conspicuous by their absence. 141 The Shia College was left in the hands of 
sympathetic operators, with Qizilbash as the spearhead of the movement and Shia 
taluqdars as its patrons. After its foundation, Government funding exceeded that of any 
other college in U. P., and its grant was consciously used by Government as 'a lever of 
their loyalty, ' to ensure the college maintained a suitable governing body and political 
opinion. ' 42 
In many ways, the exploitation of sectarian inclinations in education was successful in 
weakening Aligarh College itself. Tellingly, significant Shia participation in the 
Muhammadan Educational Conference virtually froze until 1917.143 Furthermore, the 
Shia College campaign diverted funds and donations away from Aligarh. Many of the 
key donors recruited to the Shi'a College cause were traditional patrons of Aligarh, and 
from 1917 their gifts to the latter were severely diminished. '44 Some of Aligarh's 
wealthiest patrons, such as the Nawab of Rampur, resigned their trusteeships in Aligarh 
and became crucial contributors to the Shia College. 
Perhaps more significant, however, was the ideological rather than financial 
destabilisation of Aligarh College. The Shia College undermined Aligarh's claim to 
represent the entirety of India's Muslim population. The language with which the 
necessity of the Shi'a College was justified became increasingly inflammatory and 
frequently intoned themes of overt hostility and sectionalism to accentuate the gravity of 
the sectarian difference. Ittehad depicted Aligarh as a purely Sunni conspiratorial 
institution and frequently evoked the historical persecution of Shi'as as the reason for the 
expediency of the new College. In this way, a whole new polemical dialogue matured in 
the debates surrounding the College. The active leaders of the campaign were motivated 
largely by sectarian passions, and persuaded prospective donors through recourse to the 
Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/ 15, OIOC. 
1 °1 Al-Bashir, 25 January and 25 April 1916, UPNNR. 
142 De La Fosse to Secretary, 28 January 1918, Educational Dept File No. 7 of 1918, UPSA, From James 
Meston, 27 December 1917, ibid. 
14' Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 22 August 1917, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/15, OIOC. 
144 Some newspapers were concerned that the foundation of a Shi'a College was 
diverting funds 
contributed to Aligarh. Al-Bashir. 5 April 1916, UPNNR. 
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College's exclusive nature rather than to educational furtherance. 145 
The claims of Shi'a College News after the establishment of the College that it was a 
branch of the same tree as Aligarh thus carried little weight. 146 Despite such lofty 
rhetoric, the College was founded to compete with rather than compliment Aligarh 
College, and undermined rather than enhanced the Muslim solidarity which its founders 
had long evoked. The exclusivist motives of certain activists, together with the overtly 
sectarian rhetoric used to justify its necessity, ensured that the Shi'a College would be 
widely perceived as the rival rather than companion of Aligarh. The same opinion was 
further reinforced by the College's critics, notably Wazir Hasan, who described it as a 
government-manipulated attempt to break Muslim solidarity and deflect attention from 
the Aligarh movement. 147 However, opponents of the College were widely dismissed as 
unrepresentative in the Shia press 148; instead it was proponents such as Yusuf Husain 
Khan, who argued that Shi `as must be educated in separate institutions and not subsidise 
the education of Sunnis, who were hailed as the new representatives of Shia public 
opinion. 149 It is an interesting fact that the sectarian struggles within Aligarh College 
themselves evaporated quickly in 1914,150 and no significant sectarian outburst appears to 
have taken place there subsequently. After 1914, the momentum against Aligarh appears 
to have been engineered entirely outside Aligarh itself. 
One newspaper commented on the widespread consensus upon the need for the Shia 
College, despite the fact that `even responsible persons do not know what sort of an 
institution the college will be or what will be its aims or objects. ' 15 1 The only consensus 
holding the campaign together was the belief that Shi'a education could only be properly 
'J` The proposals floated by its planners which won the College a great deal of support. none of which 
were eventually borne true, included proposals that the college should be named a 'Shi'a' college; that non- 
Shi'as should be forbidden from attending the college, contributing funds or participating in its 
management; that the 'ulama should control its most senior managerial positions; and that all education 
should be supplemented with a heavy dose of religious learning. Ittehad, 24 November 1915 and 16 
February 1916; Al-Bashir, 9 November 1915,14 March, 11 April and 16 May 1916, ibid. 
146 Shia College News (Lucknow), 10 May 1918, ibid. 
147 Sitara-i-Hind (Meerut), 16 May 1918, ibid. 
14" As in the case, for instance, of the Raja of Mahmudabad. Ittehad, 23 March 1914. ibid. 
149 Dabdadi-i-Sikandari (Rampur), 16 February 1914, UPNNR. 
"S" Meston to Rampur, 16 August 1914, Meston Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 136/6, OIOC. 
151 Al-Bashir, 25 April 1916, UPNNR. 
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administered in separate institutions. That the cooperation between Shi'as of variant 
partialities in education was a pragmatic temporary arrangement for the foundation of the 
College is shown by the fact that these disputes soon re-appeared after its establishment. 
A series of debates on the exact role assigned to religious education led to protracted 
argument among trustees and within the College bodies, a `struggle between the old and 
the new' which led to the disputation of Board elections, College strikes, withdrawal of 
financial grants, and other such `unfortunate upheavals' which revealed the fragility of 
the ground upon which temporary unanimity had been built. 152 The College in the 1920s 
was afflicted by declining funds and managerial struggles, after which it was said to have 
`fallen from its high place, illiteracy is common among it, poverty has got hold of it and it 
is no longer in an organised state. ' 153 This was scarcely a suitable tribute to an institution 
whose foundation had set such exacting standards and ideological clarity for Shi'a 
solidarity. Further, as is consistently evidenced by the persistent references to Shia 
beggary and poverty in the sessions of the Shi `a Conference in subsequent years, neither 
did the College make great inroads into its stated purpose of uplifting the persistent 
backwardness of many Shia communities, in Lucknow and elsewhere. Instead, the more 
enduring effect of the Shia College movement came with the collapse of the notions of a 
Muslim `centre' and a distinct Muslim nationality that spanned sectarian affiliations. The 
newspaper Al-Balagh of Calcutta summarised most succinctly the impact of the Shia 
College campaign on the Aligarh movement: 
`Is not the establishment of a separate College a message of death for the 
principle of a `centre'?... Is it not true that the real founding of the Shia 
College was based on opposition to Aligarh College, and that in this manner 
injury is being inflicted on the scope and effect of the Aligarh College?... 
Does not every member... know that this is the most harmful movement of 
the present time and that it will greatly injure the Muhammadans?... where 
has your attitude towards a centre been destroyed? In what corner has your 
appeal for a nationality been buried?... The fundamental foundation of 
Aligarh College is being demolished and Sir Sayyid's shari'at of 
centralisation is being torn entirely. ' 154 
1 52 Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 24 June 1924, Education Department File No. 93 of 1921, UPSA. 
More specifically, supported by the Shia Conference, a majority of College trustees resolved that the 
'ulama carried the right to veto the appointment of future trustees, to the dismay of certain barristers among 
the trustees. To Secretary, 5 July 1924, ibid. 
1 . 5.1 All India Shia conference: Calcutta sessions 1928, Presidential address His Highrrrs. s Mir Ali . Va ta: 
Khan Talpur, pp. 7-8. 
154 Al-Balagh (Calcutta), 25 February 1916, Education 'A' File No. 152 of 1914. UPSA. 
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Conclusion: the sectionalisation of Islamic reform 
As the Shia College campaign expanded, the realisation of its deteriorative influence 
upon the Aligarh movement's aspiration for Muslim unity da\\ ned on much of the 
vernacular press. One newspaper predicted that the foundation of an exclusively Shia 
College will not only leave the Aligarh College entirely to the Sunnis, but will also create 
a gulf between the two sections of the Muhammadan community, which will 
considerably weaken the Muhammadans. '155 Another assumed that the establishment of 
an exclusive educational institution for Shi`as will separate the two communities even in 
social and political matters. ' 156 The College demonstrates howw the discourse of Muslim 
education, so proactive in the creation and articulation of a Muslim qa uni after 187-5, was 
eroded in the early decades of the twentieth century. Muslim education became 
increasingly particularised along Shia-Sunni lines, and the unitary ideals of Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan were weakened by the establishment of separate educational institutions. 
There was an increasing sense during this period that Shia uplift could only be actualised 
through disengagement from Sunni-dominated Muslim institutions. 
'Past events, ' Ittehacl claimed, 'have proved the falsity of the saying that education tones 
down religious prejudices. ''57 The gradual emergence of alternative colleges and 
anjwiniaiis along sectarian lines demonstrates the vacuity of that assumption held in some 
degree by colonial government, the Aligarh movement and the National Congress alike, 
and no less by certain subsequent commentators on Indian nationalism, that secular 
education would come to erase sectarian and communal differences. One early ne%t spaper 
suggested that the eventual Shia College with its proposed secular syllabus would be 
instrumental in removing the inter-communal religious prejudices \\hich have created 
the existing gulf between Sunnis and Shias. '15s In reality, the Shia College campaign 
1" k ii. 'c, --i-Hi, u1(Fyzahad), 23 January I916. UI NR. 
1,56 Zulgarnain (Barfaun), 14 Nla' 1916, ibid. 
17 Ittehad, IS and 19 December 1914. ibid. 
I SH 'tlt'Jina (Bijnor), UPNNR. 
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demonstrates how even such a theoretically consensual agenda as the improvement of 
Muslim education became conceived along purely sectarian lines in the earl} twentieth 
century. Education came to be implemented less as a project of cross-communal 
betterment or of bridging communal differences, more as a resource used competitiv el\ 
to strengthen the distinctiveness of individual communities. 
In the late nineteenth century, reactions of Shias to the Aligarh movement were informed 
by wider debates over the value of Western or religious education. The invigorated 
standing of the `uluma and the renewal of formalised Shia religious education directed 
Shi`as in towns such as Lucknow and Amroha in an entirely different direction from 
Aligarh's secular and vocational learning. Debates on education at this time took on a 
primarily religious-secular focus of debate that intersected only passingly with Shi'a- 
Sunni questions. Into the twentieth century, however, the tone of debate changed 
. substantially. 
Organs such as the Shia Conference, Anjuman-i-Wasifa-i-Sadat-va- 
Mominin and the Shi'a College committees all implied a tacit acceptance that some form 
of western knowledge was essential to provide income and employment. At this stage, 
none of these organisations differed qualitatively in their agenda from the diverse 
coalition of associations within the Aligarh movement. From this point, then, the 
dil't'erence was primarily construed as a sectarian one. Shia-Sunni animosity, rather than 
any disparity of educational policy, became the nexus around which the aims of these 
organisations were articulated and justified. The more Shia educational projects 
progressed, the louder the rhetoric about the impossibility of Shia participation within 
Muslim educational institutions. At the same time, sectarian particularity increasingly 
proved a useful mechanism for overcoming the secular-religious debate which had 
dominated educational development over previous years. Demonstrated most succinctly 
by the campaign for the Shi'a College, little was needed to unite its variant supporters 
except their faith in the necessity of exclusivity. 
This chapter has only discussed the most prominent Shia responses to affairs of 
educational betterment. However, it hints at numerous, disparate efforts b\ local Shia 
elites of U. P. to separate themselves from the centralising Aligarh movement. One 
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particularly demonstrative example is found in the Shi'as of Shahganj, a long-established 
Sayyid community dwelling on the outskirts of Agra. After the foundation of the 
Muhammadan Educational Conference, they were consistent attendants at its sessions. 
However, in 1906 they convened their own meeting to find a common plan for the 
advancement of their education. Henceforth, they were incorporated into the Shia 
Conference, and their names disappeared from the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference members' lists. The Shi'a Conference gave formal affiliation to their 
association, Anjuman-i-Imamiya-i-Shahganj, and they went on to become visible actors 
in the Shia College campaigns. 159 The example of this one local Shia community 
encapsulates a much wider and multi-layered desertion by Shi'a communities of the 
Muslim betterment agenda in U. P., which extended far beyond its founding College and 
Conference at Aligarh. The often told story of the emergence and development of 
organisations for Muslim educational uplift from the 1880s onwards is therefore matched 
by a concurrent and consistent story of sectionalisation within these organisations, and 
the consequent foundation of more exclusive sectarian alternatives. 
This examination of Shia separateness, as opposed to Muslim separatism, suggests the 
need for a wide re-appraisal of the narrative of Muslim communal organisation in 
colonial U. P.. The story narrated above contradicts the expectations of both Indian 
Muslim reformists and the subsequent literature which has emphasised the unitary 
capabilities of the Aligarh College and its branches. The evocation of Shi'a 
distinctiveness in the heart of public life and the Muslim betterment agenda contradict the 
argument implicit in some literature that the individual could be mobilised as a Shi'a or 
as a Muslim in different contexts with no contradiction. By contrast, a driving concern 
among many Shi'as was to maintain their independence from an overwhelming `Muslim' 
counterpart. Some of this apparent confrontation between Shi'a and `Muslim' 
programmes, it could be argued, owed to the language in which Shi `as were evoked; the 
159 This story of the Shi'as of Shahganj is deduced from the following: H. R. Nevill, District Gazetteers of 
the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, volume VIII: Agra (Allahabad, 1905), p. 194; All India 
Muhammadan Educational Conference, Rö'iddd-i-säläna chhatä ijlds, 1891 (Aligarh, 1892), passim; 
Surma-i-Rozgar (Agra), I August 1906, UPNNR; Ro'idäd-i-ijläs-i-chhatä-i-Äl India Shia Kdnferans, 
rnunagida 18-20 October 1912 (Lucknow, 1913), p. 71: 'List of those persons who have done yeomen 
service to the Shia College cause, ' Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 24-7 July 1917, Education 'A' File No. 152 
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articulation of a Shia gawn afresh in the early twentieth century placed this idiom on a 
competitive equality with the Muslim qaum, and posited a direct challenge to the cause of 
Muslim unity. 
Certainly it is this emerging sense of difference, and sometimes rivalry, between the 
Muslim gauni of the Aligarhists and the separate Shia gaum that seems to have 
characterised the evolution of supposedly unitary associations into narrower, more 
conflictive sectarian counterparts. It seems that the increasingly frequent interventions by 
aspiring Muslim spokesmen of various persuasions into the anjunian-based public sphere 
of urban north India led to a compartmentalisation of Muslim communities. The various 
cleavages between individuals and groups, it could be argued, were newly systematised 
and crystallised by their fresh institutional expression. This chapter has solely discussed 
the separate educational initiatives of Shi'as, but the process in fact embraced far broader 
conceptions of charitable action. Lucknawi organisations such as the Shia Conference, 
Shi'a Waqf Board, Shia Boarding House and Shia orphanage all expressed and 
propagated the sense of Shi `as as an independent and self-governing community, 
independent from wider communities in India. 
Finally, this chapter has important implications for an understanding of sectarianism in 
colonial India. As was discussed in the introduction, the implied assumption of some 
scholarship has been that Shia-Sunni sectarian differences in India were limited to the 
private sphere and to distinctions in religious belief and ceremonial practice, having little 
impact upon attempts by Muslims to form social and political unanimities in order to 
sustain their importance in colonial India. By contrast, the debates over the public 
character of Shi'ism embodied by the Aligarh controversies did a great deal to widen the 
scope of Shia-Sunni sectarianism in colonial India. The distinctive feature of Muslim 
sectarianism from the 1890s, contrasting with its manifestations in earlier decades, is its 
appearance in social and political questions of national significance. No longer simply a 
Conflagration of religious passions, sectarianism by the twentieth century bore an impact 
upon the definition and direction of the Muslim qawn itself, and upon the place of that 
of 1914, l''1'S; A 
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qaum within the nation-state. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPERIALISM AND ISLAM: 
UNITY 
SHI`ISM, PALS-ISLA\IIS\I AND NIUSIANI 
Introduction: Colonial encounters and Muslim unity 
As was demonstrated at the beginning of the last chapter, much of the historiography 
concerning the impact of colonial rule upon Indian Islam has emphasised the expansion 
of discourses concerning Muslim unity. Shia Muslims, it has long been implied and 
argued, for the most part positioned themselves alongside Sunnis in the cause of a greater 
Muslim unity. The story of the articulation of Muslim solidarity has been well-narrated, 
beginning with the Aligarh movement and its definition of Muslims as a distinct and self- 
governing community, and then following on through the enumeration of Muslims as a 
separate political electorate, and the emphasis upon a symbolic language of 
distinctiveness and exclusivity. 
However, a further important aspect of the development of unitary discourses was the 
growth of awareness and concern among Indian Muslims for their co-religionists abroad. 
Pan-Islamism, it is argued, enhanced a sense of Muslim solidarity by cultivating 
sympathy for Muslims across international borders. The notion of a day--cri-Islam (abode 
of Islam), an Islamic nation or millat with the Caliph at its head, had long existed as an 
ideal but during the colonial period the notion became infused with a greater level of 
tenilporal resonance among some north Indian Muslims from the 1870s onwards. Its 
effects, however, became most manifest in the 1910s, with a series of intense agitations. 
In 1913, the destruction of a portion of the Machhli Bazaar mosque in Kanpur triggered a 
widespread and coordinated protest, with many declaring it an assault by government 
upon Islamic sentiment and sensitivities. This tied up with the current international 
context of the loss of power and autonomy in the Islamic world. with stories of the 191 3 
crisis in the Balkans, Italy's invasion of Tripoli, Russian interventions in Persia, together 
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with Imperial attacks upon the Ottomans and occupation of their former lands, all 
reaching Indian Muslims through a growing Urdu press. These latter grievances fostered 
the pan-Islamic agitations through the 1910s, eventually culminating in the Khilafat 
movement from 1919, an agitation in support of the Ottoman Sultan. Such campaigns, so 
it is commonly argued, fostered a communitarian identity which surmounted the various 
individual, class, regional and sectarian loyalties of Muslims. 
Like the Aligarh movement, these campaigns for unity between the various sects and 
sections of Muslims have been assumed to have induced forms of cooperation between 
Shi'as and Sunnis. In his study of pan-Islamism, for instance, Azmi Ozcan has claimed 
that during the pan-Islamic campaigns of the 1910s, `the participation of the Muslims was 
almost total... for the first time in their history, the ulema appeared to have found an 
issue on which they could patch up their differences. Thus the Deobandis, the Barelvis, 
the Farang-i Mahalis and the Nadvatu'l-Ulema, as well as the Shiis, came together. ' 
Hence, most of the key scholars of `Muslim' politics have pointed out the significance of 
these agitations in combining Shi'as and Sunnis and enhancing their mutual cooperation. 
The consensual scholarly view of Shi'a participation in such campaigns is epitomised by 
these words of a leading specialist: 
`certain developments in India and abroad created a favourable 
climate for... Shia-Sunni rapprochement. Whatever the depth of 
doctrinal cleavage, they shared the concern over the future of the 
M. A. O. College at Aligarh and combined in protesting at the 
`sacrilege' of the Macchli Bazaar mosque in Kanpur. Above all, they 
shed quietism for political activism in trying to defend the Turkish 
Empire and the Holy Places. '2 
In tune with this argument the Shia barrister Sayyid Ameer `Ali, a figure discussed in 
more detail below, claimed in 1923 that all followers of Islam `are animated by one 
common sentiment of unity and faith and doctrine. Even the longstanding feud between 
Sunni and Shi'a has now disappeared as a factor in practical politics. ' 
3 
Azmi Ozcan. Pan-Islamisin: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain 1877-1924 (Leiden, 1997). p. ' 47. 
Mushirul Hasan, 'Sectarianism in Indian Islam: the Shia-Sunni divide in the United Provinces, ' in The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review (27,2 1990), p. 212. He continues: 'Even after the Khilafat and 
non-cooperation movements petered out, there was no indication of Shia-Sunni friction in UP or 
elsewhere. ' 
'The Khilafat and the Islamic Renaissance. ' first published in Edinburgh Review 1923, reprinted 
in 
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While the Aligarh movement was foremost an effort of Indian Muslims, the examination 
in this chapter of pan-Islamism and the forging of connections by Indian Muslims with 
their international co-religionists leads us to consider global developments in Shia-Sunni 
relations. The introduction of this thesis demonstrated how, by some assessments, the co- 
joined factors of jurisprudential reform, rising currents of pan-Islamism and the search 
for a united Islamic response to European colonialism meant that the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries represented a moment of `modernist' Islam which prevailed 
over Shi'a-Sunni differences. As was shown above, both Jamal ud-din Afghani and the 
Ottoman Sultan `Abdul Hamid II attempted, to some extent, to bring about a 
reconciliation between the two traditions, making space for Shi'ism within a particular 
brand of Islamic universalism. 4 However, perhaps the most illustrative instance of the 
inducement of Shi'a-Sunni collaboration internationally was the combined participation 
of Shia and Sunni `ulama in protest at the British Mandate in Mesopotamia. Iraqi 
nationalist organisations, oratory and political rallies through the 1910s were inclusive of 
Shia and Sunni alike, and to some extent offered active rapprochement5; however, the 
climax of this was the call by the Shia mujtahids in 1920 to revolt together with Sunnis 
under the banner of the Ottoman Sultan. 6 The decision bore the hallmarks of all these 
processes; jurisprudential reform, combined embrace of pan-Islamic action, and the 
construction of cross-sectarian support for the Caliph in the face of colonial intrusion and 
desire for self-determination in the Islamic world. The Shi'a participation in the Sunni 
jihad in this case was orchestrated `in order to prevent the rule of non-Moslems over 
Moslems. This is a general Islamic religious principle and not a sectarian one. '7 
Sayyid Razi Wasti ed., Sved Ameer Ali on Islamic histori' and culture (Lahore 1968), p. 150. 
Hala Fattah, `Islamic universalism and the construction of regional identity in turn of the century Basra: 
Sheikh Ibrahim Haidari's book revisited, ' in Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly eds., Modernit)v and 
culture: frone the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (New York, 2002), p. 125. 
S Amal Vinogradow, `The 1920 revolt in Iraq reconsidered: the role of tribes in national politics. ' in 
leiternational Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (3,1972), pp. 133-5. 
6 On Shia agitation in Iraq in support of the Ottoman Sultan, see Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq 
(Princeton, 2003), pp. 66-72; Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq 1918-1932 (London. 1976), pp. 38-41; Charles 
Tripp, A history of Iraq (Cambridge, 2002) pp. 41-5; Vinogradow, 'The 1920 revolt in Iraq reconsidered, ' 
pp. 123-39. 
Vinogradow, The 1920 revolt in Iraq reconsidered, ' p. 136. 
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Keeping in mind these themes of the supposed impacts of this broad Islamic 
`modernism, ' this chapter re-visits these matters of Islamic religio-political unity in the 
colonial period. As the previous chapter questioned the frequent presumption that the 
Aligarh movement induced a form of concord between Shi'as and Sunnis, this chapter 
seeks to address the similarly frequent assumption that the growth of pan-Islamism 
among South Asian Muslims and their response to colonialism led somewhat inevitably 
to Shi'a-Sunni cooperation. The chapter argues instead that the conjecture of sectarian 
renewal did not necessarily coalesce with the experiences of Shi'as in the wider world, 
and pursues an alternative framework for understanding a national consolidation of 
sectarian difference. 
A suitable starting point for this chapter is the story told by a frustrated contributor to a 
vernacular newspaper in 1913. Elaborating upon the pressing urgencies which should 
concern Muslims in the current age, namely, the defence of Islam against the challenges 
of imperialism and the loss of Muslim power in the world, he writes: 
`Whenever their Sunni brothers want to make any efforts, then the 
Shi'as build up alliances among themselves in opposition to them, and 
bind themselves up in distractions... our rights will be pulled away 
from us by the Shi'as themselves and handed to others out of our very 
hands... if today the Shi'as could be re-united with the Sunnis, then 
just look at what would result, and what power would develop in both 
the hands of Islam. Yet due to the Shi'as, this outcome is impossible, 
because until now whenever the Sunnis have wanted to raise their 
voice for any communal or national tasks, the Shi'as have 
immediately reacted against it. '8 
This perspective rather departs from the scholarly narrative of colonial-era Muslim unity 
outlined above. Moreover, the eruption of such dialogues at this moment locates the heart 
of the analysis of this chapter squarely in the 1910s. While this chapter will consider the 
several decades leading up to the 1920s, it was the conversational relationship during this 
decade between the jihadist and pan-Islamic rhetoric of some Muslim apologists on the 
one hand and Shia dialogues on the other which will form the mainstay of the analysis. 
The second decade of the twentieth century has generally been seen as both the zenith of 
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Muslim communal and separatist politics, and simultaneously a crucial moment of 
communal accord between Hindus and Muslims. On account of the engagement of 
Muslim modernists and `ulama alike with anti-British initiatives in concert with the 
National Congress, and ultimately the combined coalescence around the non-cooperation 
movement, this decade is generally represented as the peak of communal harmonies 
before the sudden polarisation of religious communities in the 1920s. 9 Simultaneously, 
however, the same period witnessed the first explicitly political interventions by Shia 
organisations. As was explained in the first chapter, Shia organisations had largely 
shunned overtly political statements in the earlier period, not least the All India Shia 
Conference. In its early years, this organisation's initial agenda was the advancement of 
the social, moral and intellectual condition of the Shia in India' 10 and it committed itself 
to avoid `meddling in politics. "' These pledges were short-lived, however, and 
community leaders starting around 1910 to petition for a new Shi'a political voice. '` At 
the Conference's 1911 session, one speaker said that all questions on social and 
educational uplift were in fact `political questions, the solution of which is necessary for 
the well-being of the community. ' 13 Accompanied by the newspaper Ittehad, the process 
of community formation took on the more overt tones of politicisation. As such, this 
chapter discusses the somewhat enmeshed and conversational relationship between these 
various political dialogues, and the impact upon them of the inflamed religious conflicts 
current in the lanes and streets of towns such as Lucknow. 
A final point is that this chapter does not seek to underplay the importance of certain 
Shi'a individuals in the traditional narrative of Muslim politics. The Raja of 
Mahmudabad was a prominent leader of the All India Muslim League and a pioneer of 
Aligarh; Wazir Hasan accompanied Muhammad `Ali to London on the 'Muslim' 
deputation in 1913 and was prominent in the Muslim League; and Sayyid Reza 'Ali, the 
' Sayyid Mumtaz Husain, rRisdla-i-kifan-pösh lidaran-i-qöm (Amroha, 1915), pp. 17-8. 
9 Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: the politics of the United Protvinces' Muslims, 
1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974); Judith Brown, Gandhi's rise to power: Indian politics 1915-1922 
(Cambridge, 1972). 
1" Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 15 October 1907, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports (UPNNR). 
Oriental and India Office Collections, London (OIOC). 
11 Tribune (Lahore), 18 October 1907, Centre of South Asian Studies. Cambridge (CSAS ). 
12 Hindustani (Lucknow), 28 October 1910, UPNNR. 
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lawyer from a qasba in Moradabad district later based in Allahabad. was a prolific 
spokesman of Muslim unity and an active figure in the provincial Khilafat campaigns. All 
of these and many others took part in Muslim politics without specific reference to the 
Shia character of their own faith. Rather than questioning the moti s es of Such 
personalities, this chapter looks at those separate individuals who were primaril\ moved 
to action as Shi'as rather than Muslims, in the process asking why it was such individuals 
who were apparently so able to surpass the former in their right to speak for the supposed 
'Shi'a community' of India. 
Jihad and taqlid: modern activism and traditional religion 
A key instance of Shia resistance to wider Muslim political activism in the 1910s was 
the reaction to the Kanpur mosque agitation. When a section of the Machhli Bazaar 
mosque in Kanpur was destroyed by the British Government in order to build a new road 
in 1913, the issue was appropriated by a number of Muslim activists in U. P. as a source 
of mass protest and a demonstration of Muslim unanimity. To some extent, there were 
hopes among Muslims that the subject could garner support across sectarian boundaries. 
Remarkably, the intended cross-sectarian significance of the campaign is revealed in the 
fact that the demonstrations themselves often appropriated the evocative language and 
symbolism of the so-called 'Karbala paradigm. ' 14 The destruction of the mosque was 
often discussed in the distinct terminology of shahadat (martyrdom), and the 
protestations in Kanpur, in which antagonists walked bare-headed and bare-footed and 
paraded black 
. 
jhandas (flags), were densely reminiscent of the annual Muharram juloo. s 
for Husain in Lucknow and other towns. '' Freitag has identified more generally in 
Muslim collective action a similar symbolic language evoking idioms of 'mourning, 
martyrdom and defeat. ' 16 Such themes, it could be argued, were not exclusive to the 
Kanpur mosque question, but ran through religious mobilisations as broad as the Khilafat 
VI The Leader (Allahahad), 8 October 1911, CSAS. 
14 This notion of the 'Karbala paradigm' as discussed in Chapter 2. 
1` 
16W 
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and tan--im movements, while similar themes of the victimisation and oppression of 
Muslims drawing from the language of Muharram also accompanied the Mu-slim 
League's `Islam in danger' campaigns in the 1940s. 17 
While some newspapers commented that `we are very glad to find that the majority of the 
Shi'as are aggrieved at the demolition of the mosque, '18 it was clear that this sentiment 
among Shi'as was by no means unanimous. In Kanpur, Sunnis were drawn into 
exasperation with the Shi'as, not helped by the fact that two local Shi'as, an honorary 
magistrate and tehsildar (Collector) of Kanpur, led a campaign for the acceptance by 
Muslims of a separate portion of land for the re-building of the mosque. 19 Muzaffar 'Ali 
Khan, the ra'is of Jansath and the key figurehead of the several thousand-strong Shi'a 
Sayyids of Barha in Muzaffarnagar district, issued a declaration that only the ablutions 
area of the mosque had been destroyed, and urged fellow Shias to keep their distance 
from the campaign. That this served to forge disagreement between Shi'as and Sunnis is 
clearly indicated in the words of one columnist, who urged that the ra `is `should not have 
been compelled to give the Shi'as the impression that they were separate from the Sunni 
Muslims on the Kanpur issue. '20 Contrary to the religious passions which have been 
assumed in much scholarship, then, Shi'a perspectives on the Kanpur mosque action were 
often apathetical and sometimes overtly hostile. 
An implication of the Shia reaction to the Kanpur mosque affair, one undermining some 
presumptions of scholarship on Shi'ism, is its demand for a questioning of the metaphor 
of martyrdom as a symbolic language common to both Shia and Sunnis. Much of the 
theatrical expression of anger at the Kanpur mosque question did seem to decorate itself 
in Katherine Ewing ed., Shari at and ambiguity in South Asian Islam (New Delhi, 1988), p. 151. 
17 It is an interesting point that Muslim League activists in the later period, mirroring the mobilisations of 
the Kanpur mosque and Khilafat agitations some thirty years earlier, employed the Karbala paradigm as a 
\ý av of conmmunicating their cross-sectarian significance. Numerous examples can be found in the speeches 
of pro-League campaigners touring U. P. late in 1945. The Muslim struggle for freedom was compared with 
the battle at Karbala on which rested the strength of the Muslim 'nation. ' Muharram was evoked as part oI 
the common heritage of Muslims and Husain as a suitable model for emulation. Dawn (Delhi), 16,19 and 
21 December 1945, CSAS. 
tluslin: Gazette (Lucknoww ), 23 July 1913, UPNNR. 
Ibid. 
Husain, Ristilu-i-kifan-pösh 11-daran, pp. 16,23 
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in symbols of persecution drawn from the Shi'a mourning for Husain. Was this symbolic 
language, however, really common to Shi'as and Sunnis? In the Kanpur case, Shi'as 
clearly regarded the appropriation of the symbols of martyrdom with some suspicion. It 
may well be that some Shi'as were displeased with the possible trivialisation of Husain's 
sufferings by their evocation in unrelated contexts, or the use of such a didactic symbolic 
language in singular political causes. Alternatively, it may have been that the use of such 
imagery in the Kanpur mosque case as a precursor to urgent, proud action in the name of 
religion was more befitting of Sunni rather than the more anguished, aggrieved 
interpretations of the Karbala paradigm among Shias. In any case, this event 
demonstrates that the use of the martyrdom motif, one recurrent in South Asian Islam, 
should not be taken as indicative of cross-sectarian participation. 
However, of more immediate importance is the question of why Shi'as remained 
apparently hostile to the Kanpur mosque agitation, and there appear to be two essential 
reasons. The first was the essentially conservative nature of many Shia communities, and 
the consequent resilience to activism and revolutionary campaigns. The interventions of 
Muzaffar 'Ali Khan and Ittehad identify the Sayyids of Barha and Amroha respectively 
at the forefront Shia anti-agitationalist politics. Both communities, who were shown in 
earlier chapters to have been ardent opponents of challenges to their ancestral authority, 
seem to have been somewhat troubled by these antagonistic campaigns among a 
reactionary clique of nationalist Muslims. Support for the government was construed as 
synonymous with the perpetuation of the authority of local elites, and of the current 
systems of land revenue and local control on which their prosperity entirely depended. 
The Kanpur mosque issue is bound up with the wider question of the Shia response to 
colonial rule, and this thesis has shown consistently that in comparison to certain Sunni 
movements and in particular certain schools of Sunni `ulama, Shi'as had long been close 
to the British Government. The starting point for this trend was perhaps, as discussed 
above, the general British tolerance for the reconstruction of the Shi'a azan in the late 
1880x. and some \cars later, the Piggott Committee's focus on the innovative aspects and 
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subsequent curtailing of Sunni rather than Shi'a religious customs. -" The close 
association also owed in part to, as seen in the previous chapter, the close alliance 
between particular Lucknawi Shi'as and British officials, including several 
commissioners of Lucknow and, in particular, U. P. Lieutenant Governor James Nieston. 
It is quite possible that the romantic typecasts of Lucknow and Nawabi rule, together 
with the close association of the government with the taluqdars and ra'is of whom many 
were Shi'as, extended to a particular sympathy for this religious community more widely. 
However, the Kanpur mosque incident in 1913 was a defining moment in the 
configuration of Shi'a-British relations over subsequent years, inaugurating a sustained 
programme of Shia loyalty towards the British. In contrast to an increasingly vigorous, 
nationalist and anti-establishment Urdu press, the newspaper Ittellad became 
government's fervent defender. Despite early indications that the publication would 
follow many contemporaneous publications and bring Shi'as into line with wider Muslim 
causes and activism, the newspaper was offering by 1913 a determined appraisal of the 
benefits of colonial rule for Shi'as. The newspaper blamed the leaders of the Kanpur 
mosque agitation for prejudicing the government against Muslims, and even indirectly for 
the destruction of the mosque itself. 22 In consequence, it dictated that it was the 'duty of 
the Shias to publicly dissociate themselves from such an... agitation. '23 Urging 
submission to the colonial administration on the grounds that it had never suppressed 
religious practice or conspired against the descendants of the Imams, the newspaper 
boldly stated that `among Muhammadans, the Shias alone are truly loyal subjects of the 
British Government. '`` Such statements demonstrate the determination of many Shi'as to 
craft a space in colonial politics independently from wider Muslim communities, entirely 
against the rhetoric of wider Muslim unity by politicians and pan-Islamists which has 
'ý As can he deduced from Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, the inujtahids after 1857 maintained a strong 
social and ritual distance from the British. The first sign of sustained communication between the mujtahids 
and the colonial administration came only in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1884, Muhammad Ibrahim negotiated 
the release of the compound of the Asaf-ud-daula Imambara and Asafi mosque. of ýýhich he became 
/)eshnumaZ. A few wears later, he similarly earned British recognition of the legitimacy of the reference to 
'Ali in the (IZan. By the time of the sitting, of the Piggott Committee in 1908-9. the Shia religious 
authorities in Lucknow were widely accepted to haue access to the ear of government. 
lttc'had (Amroha). 8 July and 8 September 1913, UPNNR. 
Ittehad, 24 April NI 3. ibid. 
24 Ittehad, 24 October 1913, ibid. In a similar vein, a later issue argued that Shi'as should not assert claims 
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hitherto so concerned scholarship. 
However, equally significant in Shia opposition to the agitation, and seemingly more 
proactive in causing the abstention of those Shi'as from outside the Sayyid elites of the 
western United Provinces, was a religious rejection of the Sunni understanding of jihad 
(holy war or struggle), the notion of religious struggle commonly indicating action 
against the government. The rhetoric of jihad was widely circulated in the Sunni- 
dominated Urdu press from the time of the Kanpur struggles onwards and by activists and 
by 'ulamu from Deoband, Firangi Mahal and, in particular, Nadva't ul-'Ulama. However, 
the declaration of jihad was widely resisted by Shi'as. Certain Shia traditions affirm 
jihad to have been forbidden since the occultation of the Mehdi, the absent Twelfth 
Imam, since he alone is qualified to make such a declaration, and these were widely 
endorsed by contemporary Shi'a representatives. In one allegorical passage, Ittehad 
narrated a castigation by a government figure of Muslim newspapers for their violent 
language, and claimed that the Shi'as were alone among Muslim sects in deprecating 
jihad and disloyalty to the ruler. 25 At the same time, newspaper editors reported the claim 
that Shi'as `will never make Jehad with the Government. '26 
Shia rejection of jihad in the 191Os can largely be understood in relation to the process 
of religious renewal among Shi`as in this period, described in previous chapters. One 
aspect of the attempt to reverse the decline of Shi'ism in India was the reaffirmation of 
the notion of taglid, the doctrine of individual submission to a chosen senior mujtahid. It 
was part of a wider elaboration on the specifics of Usuli Shi `ism, which propounded the 
absolute jurisprudential authority of the senior mujtahids. A number of tracts by Shia 
writers and 'ulamna in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concerned tag1id, 
and it was often the first principle discussed in Shia compendiums of fiyh. 
27 However, 
for our purposes here, taglid impacted upon the assumptions underlying the declaration 
of jihad. The declaration of jihad was contingent upon a sanction of the right to 
'` Ittehad, 23 January 1914, ibid. 
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autonomous decision and self-determination, which implied a rejection of taglid: as such, 
the Shia reassertion of taqlid forbade the kind of individual activism implicit in a 
declaration of jihad. 
One important Shia treatise on taglid, compiled from the , ritings of Safav id-erd 
scholars such as Muhammad Baqir Majlisi28 and printed from Jaunpur in 1915 in Arabic, 
Persian and Urdu editions, opened its discussion of taqlid with an expressed prohibition 
of jihad: 
`The subject of this tract concerns the following: that the jihad of the 
Imamiya (Shi'as), in the age of the absence of the manifestation of the 
[Twelfth] Imam... without his inimitable declaration from any source, 
is therefore not lawful in any way, upon the defence of any instance of 
the law, without he who declares it, the Imans-i-Mas `u m ('sinless 
Imam'). This faith in themselves and in the Imamn-i-Mas`utill, is in all 
aspects binding upon the Imamiya. '29 
The re-statement of taqlid was primarily a religious matter, reasserting the relevance of 
learned Usuli authority and the invalidity of unqualified personal judgements and 
declaring taglid to a chosen marja' as wtwajib (obligatory). The text contrasted the Shia 
faith with other strands of Islam that consider taqlid as harani (forbidden), meaning by 
implication Sunni Islam and Akhbari Shi'ism. 30 However, set in its historical context of 
widespread activism and the pronouncement of individualistic assertions by religious 
activists and writers, the accompanying prohibition of jihad was widely perceived, in 
spite of the directly religious focus of the text, as a political statement by Shi'as. By its 
own admission in a re-print, the text itself caused something of a stir upon its release, and 
advocates of jihad criticised its interpretation of taqlid as invalid. 31 This same tract was 
submitted to Government by some unidentified loyal Shia individual or group as proof 
that the Shia religion could not admit any hostility to British control of India. 32 
ul-inasýJ'TI uI figltIVO (LucknovW, 1894). p. 3. 
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While seemingly enunciating a tenet essential to Usuli Shi'ism, the prohibition of jihad 
by Shi'as in the 1910s is furthermore significant for several reasons. For one, the current 
opposition to jihad appeared to contradict decisions on comparable issues by U. P. Shi *as 
in earlier decades. In 1857, Shia mujtahids in Lucknow had not recoiled from sharing a 
declaration of jihad with Sunni `ulama, and several members of the Nasirabadi family 
had taken up arms against the colonisers. 33 After this point, Shi'a opposition to jihad 
against the British government gradually crystallised with subsequent declarations on the 
issue. In 1871, a number of mujtahids produced a pamphlet condemning the jihad of the 
Wahhabis and proclaiming it to be impermissible in the absence of the twelfth Imam: 
`When that innocent Apostle shall appear, is known only to the all- 
knowing God, and to no-one else. To commit bloodshed, except under 
the leadership of that Imam in person, is strictly forbidden by the Shia 
law. Those are the rebels and sinful ones who would revolt without 
the Divine Sanction the Apostle. '34 
This fatwa was a turning point in the relation of Shi `as with the British, overturning the 
upheavals of 1857 for a compromised acquiescence. In his famous assessment of post- 
Rebellion `Muslim' opinion, Hunter concluded that: 
`At least one small sect of our Muhammadan fellow-subjects are not 
bound by the first principles of their religion to rebel against the 
Queen... they are naturally loyal, for they know that if either the 
Hindus or the Sunni Muhammadans ever get the upper hand in India, 
the days of tribulation for the Shias will begin. '35 
No doubt British concerns were further assuaged by the fatwwv's explicit prediction of 
good relations between Shi'as and Christians, on the basis of a shared belief in the final 
judgement. 36 This episode of 1871 established the traditions of Shia political quietude 
I' Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of north Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859 
(California, 1988), pp. 272-82. 
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and congenial relations with government which would persist over subsequent decades. 
Furthermore, while the Shia decision to prohibit jihad differed from the verdicts of 
earlier generations of co-religionists in India, it differed no less from the contemporary 
pronouncements coming from contemporary international co-religionists. During the very 
same period, mujtahids in Iraq were urging a qualified form of jihad, known as idfah, 
which could be declared by the community of Vama in the absence of the Imam. 37 Such 
developments among Shi'as in Mesopotamia seem to have been much less evident in 
India, where submission to established lines of authority was apparently asserted. This 
perhaps reflects the separate orientation of the Vama in U. P. towns. Drawn from, 
serving and patronised by elite Sayyid circles, they were perhaps enticed to more 
conservative or even restrictive interpretations of fiqh than those Vama of Iraq. It also 
reflects a further impact of the process of `Indianisation' discussed in previous chapters. 
In addition to the formation of indigenous religious educational institutions and the turn 
towards the vernacular, `Indianisation' came to include among its outcomes the political 
determination of Indian Shi'as separately and autonomously from their international co- 
religionists. There was an enhanced distance between the political vocalism of the Shia 
Vama in Mesopotamia and Iran, and the resilience to political activism among their 
equivalents in some of the more traditionalist, conservative qasbas of north India. 
As such, the anti jihad campaign of the Shi'as, tracing its roots as far back as the 1870s 
but crystallised and invigorated by reactions to the Kanpur mosque question, owed to a 
coincidence of factors. Among the distinguished Sayyids of Lucknow and Rohilkhand it 
drew from their association with government and their guarded political and socio- 
economic interests, while in cities of Shia scholarship such as Lucknow and Jaunpur, it 
was religious sensibilities and an adherence to political quietude in the absence of the last 
Imam that prevented involvement. Indeed, the Shia opposition to jihad in the 1910s 
the Fourth Heaven, and friendship, not enmity, shall exist between these two Great 
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demands a corrective of one manner in which Shi'ism has often been interpreted: that of 
subversion and social protest. Due to its expectation of the temporal governance of the 
twelfth Imam and the historical mistrust of temporal rulers, together with the emotive and 
transferable quality of the Karbala metaphor, some research has identified a certain innate 
tendency towards anti-govern mental hostility on the part of Shi`ism. 38 In India, however, 
Shi'ism lent itself to the alternative role of government legitimisation. This had been the 
case with the `formal religious establishment' Shi'ism which had proven a suitable and 
controlled ideology of governance under the Nawabs. 39 It later, as is shown above, 
became the case under British rule, where the continuous evocation of the historical 
tribulations suffered by Shi'as under Sunni domination were appropriated alongside 
conservative interpretations of Shia jurisprudence to develop Shi `ism as a doctrine 
justifying deference to government. 
Moreover, the Kanpur events cast doubt upon the assumption of some scholarship as 
discussed in the introduction that this was a period marked by reform within global Islam, 
whereby efforts to break jurisprudential traditionalism, and the pursuit of a united 
response to colonial power, both opened new space for cooperation between Shi'as and 
Sunnis. Neither such process appears to have occurred in India. Also, the events hint at an 
expansion of Shia-Sunni difference far beyond the limits of localised quarrels. Indeed, 
the divergent reactions accompanying the Kanpur mosque event were perceived by some 
Muslim nationalist politicians as a considerable threat to Muslim unity. So severe became 
the political disunities between Shi'as and Sunnis that Sayyid Reza `Ali, a leading 
agitationalist Muslim League politician, was forced just a few months later to assemble a 
meeting of Shi'as and Sunnis in Amroha, exhorting them to sink their differences and 
work for the common good of Muslims. 40 It would soon become apparent that such 
petitions did little good. Opposition to the Sunni political jihad, beginning with the 
Kanpur mosque agitation but perpetuated over subsequent years, came to colour 
Shia 
reactions to a dominant issue among Muslims in the remainder of the decade: the pan- 
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Islamic campaign. 
The Sultanate and the `Shi`i International': Shia responses to pan-Islamism 
From the late nineteenth century, and especially in the second decade of the twentieth, the 
single question of the Prophet's successors at the root of centuries of Shia-Sunni 
difference rose to prominence as an acute issue in Muslim politics. The collapse of 
Islamic rule and subjugation to the British monarch spurred sections of ashraf Muslims in 
north India to look to the Ottoman Sultan, nominally the successor to the Islamic 
Khilafat, as a point of reference for the continuation of Islamic statehood and as a 
necessary safeguard for their own political future. The idea of an international Islamic 
state (dar-ul-Khilufut), presiding over the international unlinah (Islamic brotherhood), 
had long persisted as an ideal, yet the concept gained greater temporal relevance with the 
political activism among the `Mama and Muslim middle-classes of the United Provinces 
from the late nineteenth century. The city of Lucknow was consistently at the very centre 
of the pan-Islamic campaigns. The first Khilafatist organisation was perhaps the Majlis-i- 
Mu'id-ul-Islam, established in Lucknow by a group of Firangi Mahalli 'urlama after the 
start of the Russio-Turkish war in 1877, which supported the Ottoman Amir-id-Alo, ninin 
and aimed to raise money for Turkey in its war with Russia. 4' The first pan-Islamic 
agitation proper took place on the occasion of the Russio-Turkish war of 1897, but the 
agitation really came into its own after 1912 when the themes of Islamic universalism 
rooted in the perpetuation of the Ottoman Sultanate were developed by numerous Muslim 
nationalist individuals and groups. Prime among these were the 'Ali brothers, some 
u/unru of the Firangi Mahal led by 'Abdul Bari, Deobandis such as Nlahmud ul-Hasan, 
4- and an active and reactionary Urdu press. 
What was the response of Shi'as to this pan-Islamic movement" Nluch scholarship has 
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assumed that they widely participated in the campaigns. and thus calculated that pan- 
Islamism was a key force in cementing cross-sectarian unities. There are several reasons 
for this understanding. For one, pan-Islamism did not focus solely upon the status of the 
Ottoman Sultan as legitimate successor to the Caliphs, but upon the wider concern of the 
fate of the Muslim world, and particularly the Holy Places, under western machinations 
across the Middle East. That the Shia-Sunni distinction was largely negated in these 
concerns is evidenced by the fact that the fate of Persia under Russian influence. 
including alleged massacres at Tabriz and the bombardment of the shrine of Imam Reza 
at Mashhad, was consistently cited by Indian pan-Islamists alongside the Balkan wars 
and occupation of Egypt as an indication of western hostility to Muslim freedoms and 
sensitivities. 43 Encapsulating the wide thematic scope of pan-Islamic concerns, both 
Shi'as and Sunnis were initially enlisted in committees proposed in India to discuss the 
rehabilitation of the Khilafat. 44 
Equally suggestive of pan-Islamism's capacity to induce Shia-Sunni cooperation was the 
prominence of certain Indian Shia leaders among the key advocates of the Khilafat ideal. 
In the later nineteenth century, Indian Shia thinkers had largely offered it their support, 
, seeing it as a means of renewing the Muslim niillat around the world, and 
in India itself. 45 
In particular, the Agha Khan of the Ismaili sect, and Sayyid Ameer 'Ali, an 'Isna 'Ashari 
Shia barrister of Calcutta based in London, established themselves as the spokespersons 
of Indian Muslims to the British on the Khilafat question throughout the 1910s, and 
carried their concerns to Mustafa Kamal in 1922. 
Allleer 'Ali, aspiring to the role of `bridge-builder' between Indian Muslims and the 
Government, likewise aimed through his writings to lessen the gulf between Shi`as and 
Sunnis. For Ameer 'Ali, the survival of the Khilafat was a question for both communities. 
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and their collaboration around the issue was indicative of their unanimous verdict upon 
modern affairs. In an influential article written in 1915, `The Khilafat: a historical and 
juridical sketch, ' he argued that the 'prestige and influence' of the Khilafat were essential 
for the `renaissance of Islam, ' and attempted to rework a notion of the Khilafat ideal 
which could be acceptable to both Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. Indeed, his characterisation 
of the Khilafat seems to belie his own Shia faith, and to be written with Shi'a concerns 
in mind. In his discussions, the `spiritual leadership' of the temporal Caliph is termed 
'Imamate'; the application of the titles `Caliph' and `Imam' is interchanged; a distinction 
is made between the Ottoman Sultanate and a Muslim Khilafat of concern to all Muslims: 
all such features seem to carry a curious Shia intimation. Furthermore, the description of 
the `spiritual tie' bonding Imam and »ia `ilium (congregation) depicts the Imam as 
possessing a charismatic authority closer to Shia than Sunni understandings of religious 
sovereigns, while implying the practice of compulsory singular congregational prayer 
especially characteristic of Usuli Shi `ism. 46 Future works of Ameer 'Ali, evoking a 'spirit 
of Islam' above regional and sectarian distinctions, continued this trend, appealing to a 
brand of `Islamic modernism' which would exclude Shia-Sunni difference. 47 As pan- 
Islamic loyalties spread among Indian Muslims, he wrote in 1919 that `the Sunnis and the 
Shias have combined in this agitation. '48 
In India, therefore, pan-Islamism presented and to some extent instilled accord between 
Shi'as and Sunnis. However, a very different story unravelled in the qasbas and districts 
of north India. An examination of particular Shia communities in the localities of U. P., 
and especially those towns such as Lucknow and Amroha where Shi'as were most self- 
consciously distinct from other Muslims, demonstrates that pan-Islamism acted as a 
divisive rather than unitary force between Shi'as and Sunnis during this period. While 
certain Shi'as established themselves on the all-India level as spokesmen of the Khilafat 
cause, their reach as representatives of their community was limited. Local Shi'a 
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dialogues increasingly evoked traditional Shia antipathy to the Caliph and, by extension, 
to the pan-Islamic and Khilafat agitations. 
Speaking generally, it appears that many Shi'as in Lucknow were hostile to ans' moves to 
promote allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, and crystallised their opposition to the 
institution as a further mark of defining their `separateness' from wider Muslim 
communities. When the Turkish cap, popularised by Sayyid Ahmad Khan among 
modernist Muslims, appeared in Lucknow, some Shi'as adopted the kulalr cap of the 
Persian court. ``' Sharar remarked that `just as the Sunnis are culturally close to the 
Ottoman Empire, the Shias are faithful to the culture of Persia. '50 Shia opposition to the 
institution of the Khilafat was no doubt fostered by many of the combative Shia printed 
tracts and published debates which, as discussed in previous chapters, were in the 
ascendant in many north Indian cities from the late nineteenth century. While these were 
mostly directed at the illegitimacy and immorality of Caliphs such as Mu`awiya and 
Yazid, they also threw criticism upon the venerated early Caliphs and Companions of the 
Prophet. While saying little on current debates over the Ottoman Khilafat, the new 
consciousness of Islamic history introduced by such texts would certainly have had the 
effect of reminding the Shia faithful that the institution of the Khilafat was an 
unsanctioned usurping of the Imamate. 
The perspective on pan-Islamism among certain Shi'as could be compared in some 
senses to the reactions to Aligarh discussed in the previous chapter: an impression of 
Shia-Sunni convergence of opinion in the 1870s, which gradually transmuted into 
suspicion of its distinctly Sunni character over subsequent decades. The available 
information for the period of the Russio-Turkish war of 1877-8 suggests that Shi'as lined 
up visibly alongside the Sunnis in support for Turkey. The Aligarh Institute Gazette 
stated that 'happily the enlightened Shias burst the shackles of prejudice and warmly 
joined the other sect in their proceedings. The Mussulmans must congratulate themselves 
that the feeling of unit, of nation and religion now animates the two great divisions of 
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Islam in matters which concern their common interest. ''' One religious leader of Mecca 
evidenced the same point in his writings upon Indian Muslims in 1877: `O 
Mussulmans... the Sunnis and the Shiis, you have done very well indeed... You should 
continue to act in this manner as far as you can. Both God and the Prophet are pleased 
with this action of yours, and you will be doubly rewarded by the Creator. '52 
It was only in later years that such common ground evaporated. Indian Shia opposition 
to the Ottoman `Caliph' was solidified concurrently with the first campaigns in support of 
Turkey, which broke out over the Russio-Turk war in 1897. A text published from 
Lucknow by Shaikh Ahmad Husain, an Awadhi taliigdar, piloted the Shia response. It 
appears that this pamphlet was widely circulated, and extracts were distributed in 
newspapers. 53 It was essentially an indictment of the concept of the Caliph as circulated 
in the mainstream Urdu press, and the titles of Caliph -ul-Mominin and Aniir-ul-, Wonunin 
attributed to him. It claimed that the title of Caliph could be bestowed only upon a leader 
of Qureishi descent in the thirty years after the Prophet's death, and hence the title had 
recently been 'falsified in order to gratify a certain class of people who are anxious to call 
someone their Caliph. ' In effect, adherence to the modern Khilafat was a 'blunder' with 
'its origin in no other cause than the ignorance of the tradition of their own faith. ' 54 The 
title of Amir-ul-Moniinin, the text continues, referred in the Shia tradition only to 'Ali, 
precluding the Shi'as from attributing the title to any worldly sovereign and thereby 
excluding them from the Khilafat agitation. As the author claimed, the Shi'as 'do not 
consider themselves religiously bound to any Muslim sovereign, however pious or 
benevolent, and would never rise in jihad against men of other creeds at his instigation, 
and cannot address him by any such title. '55 Rejecting the Caliph in this way, he then 
pledges loyalty to British rule: 
To be a peaceful and loyal citizen is the first duty of every 
Muhammadan... our worship is protected, and we are particularly 
taken care of; facilities are offered for working out our regeneration, if 
we are inclined to utilise them; these are the blessings for which it is 
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our duty, as true Muslims, to be extremely grateful... It is 
emphatically in your own interest to be loyal.. 56 
The tract had significant influence in later years. A contributor to one newspaper in 1900 
wrote that the Shi`as were alone among Muslims in not regarding the Ottoman Sultan as 
Caliph. 57 In 1906, the newspaper Akhbar-i-Imamiva of Lucknow stated that 'British rule 
in Mecca and Medina will be more welcome than that of the Sultan. '58 While in 1909 the 
All India Shi'a Conference applauded the British Government for action on the side of 
Turkey, come 1911 the `Shias of Lucknow' issued a notice deprecating support for 
Turkey in the war with Italy. 59 The Shi'a newspaper Ittehad was quick to take up 
opposition to the pan-Islamic agitation. At the beginning of 1913 it appeared to support 
the wider international Muslim cause, publishing accounts of alleged Allied atrocities in 
the Balkans, expressing support for the Turkish Relief Fund, and instructing the Shi'as to 
take an interest in Turkish affairs. 60 The overt framing of pan-Islamism in the language of 
jihad at this time, however, and the visible involvement of the Sunni school Nadva't ul- 
'Ulama, convinced the editor to change direction. From this point, the newspaper 
recommended that Muslims should renew their loyalty to the British Government, 61 a 
standpoint reinforced by its subsequent convergence with the Kanpur controversy. 
Such early developments in the construction of Shi'a `separateness' from pan-Islamism, 
primarily in Lucknow, assumed new momentum after the foundation of the Anjuman-i- 
Khuddam-i-Ka'ba in 1913, the new organisation of `ulama in defence of the Caliph and 
Ottoman control of the Holy Places. The Shia press termed this organisation the 
`Anjurnan-i-Jihad, ' claiming that it would preach religious war, exclusively admit Sunni 
members and corrupt Muslim youth and women. No Shia, it was said, should join the 
society. 62 The same newspapers also gave a strong defence of loyalty to government, not 
just on the basis of the prohibition of jihad, but on the claim that Sunni atrocities 
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committed by the early Caliphs were worse than the desecration of Muslim shrines b\ the 
modern Christian powers. 63 
Outside of the printed sphere, Shia expressions of an alternative agenda to pan-Islamism 
took on distinctly local manifestations. While in Lucknow Sunni mosques collected 
contributions for Turkish widows and orphans through the Relief Fund, Shia mosque,, 
launched a clearly reminiscent although oppositional campaign, raising funds for the 
Shia orphanage recently established in the city. 64 In 1915 Muzaffar 'Ali Khan of Jansath, 
who had two years earlier led Shi'a opposition to the Kanpur mosque agitation, 
republished the 1897 tract of Shaikh Ahmad Husain, to which he added a declaration of 
loyalty to the King and the claim that `to be a peaceful and loyal citizen is the first 
religious duty of every Muhammadan. '65 The re-emergence of this tract from his district 
of Muzaffarnagar appears to have carried the Shia anti-Khilafatist agitation out of 
Lucknow where it had previously been focused, into the western United Provinces; the 
following year, the `Shia community' of Bulandshehr issued up prayers for the success of 
66 British arms against Turkey. 
Shia opposition to jihad among Muslims earned them many friends in government. 
Following the Shi'as' response to Sharif of Mecca's declaration of independence in 1917, 
Meston claimed that the Shi'as were `conspicuously friendly and loyal, ' noting that 'they 
have been perfectly staunch to the British Government, and have never listened to any 
temptation to embarrass us. '67 The Shi'as, he noted, have withstood all suggestions for a 
Jihad and have justified their opposition on strict theological grounds. They have no 
feeling against the Khilafat passing away from the Sultan of Turkey. 
68 Meston at one 
point even warned the Viceroy that such pledges of loyalty from Shi'as could backfire, as 
they would be seen as deprecations of the sacred Sunni institution of the Khilafat itself 
61 Ittehud, I June 1913, ibid. 
64 Home Department (Political) Proceedings. August 1916, No. 34. NAI. 
Shaikh Ahmad Husain, Ba' Musulmin5 h ki afsösnäk ghalat fehmi (2nd edition: Nluzatfarnagar. 1915), 
p. 4. 
hh Home Department (Political) Proceedings, Part B, August 1916, Nos. 36i-8. NAI. 
67 'Note on the future system of Government at Baghdad, ' 21 May 191 7, N1cton Collection, 
l 136/4, OIOC. 
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and thus encourage Sunni Khilafatists to intensify their agitation in response. 69 
Shia resistance to pan-Islamism did indeed spur denunciations from Sunni reformist". 
Furthermore, the divergent Shia and Sunni understandings of the Khilafat were 
interestingly intertwined with current debates over supposed Muslim modernism and 
backwardness which, as was shown in the previous chapter, often overlapped with Shi'a- 
Sunni controversies. In other words, Shi'a Sayyid communities of qasbas such as 
Amroha were dismissed as stagnant and out of touch with the modern world on account 
not of their economic or educational predicament, but the regressive nature of their 
religious belief. The Sunni notion of the Khilafat was interpreted as evidence that Sunni 
Islam was able to maintain its modernity and relevance with the changing times: it was 
the institution through which the Prophet `remains modern and fresh tomorrow, and in 
eternity. ' In comparison, implicitly on account of the absence of guidance from the 
Imam, Shia `religious life is struck by dearth and insularity. '70 The issue of the Khilafat 
became one more area in which Shi'as were attacked for the supposedly inherent 
conservatism of their religion, meaning that arguments between conservatives and 
modernists often became manifested along Shia-Sunni lines. 
It is thus clear that, in contrast to the assumptions in much scholarship, pan-Islamism did 
little to promote agreement between Shi `as and Sunnis upon modern religio-political 
questions. Despite their own claims and those in some scholarship, the various pan- 
Islamic associations appearing in the 1910s were in many senses no more broad or less 
sectarian than many other Muslim anjumans, and never managed to develop an 
inclusiveness of the Shia minority. 
How are we to explain the failure of pan-Islamism to interrupt the development of 
political 'separateness' among Shi'as during this decade? Part of the explanation lies in 
the wider promulgation of Shia distinctiveness at the heart of this thesis. by which the 
establishment of anjunian-based organisational structures resulted in the 
69 Viceroy to Nleston. 5 Sept 1914, and Meston to Viceroy, Home Department (Political) Proceeding' 
April 1916. No. 22. NAl. '" Husain, Riscila-i-kij'an-pösh lydaran, p. 2 1. 
19 
institutionalisation of broader social and political differences bet«een Muslim 
communities. In further part, however, Shia-Sunni differences over pan-Islamism can he 
traced to very dissimilar contemporary configurations of relations ww ith the wider Islamic 
world. In fact, in contrast to the usual interpretation of the effects of pan-Islamism. it 
could be argued that concern among Shi `as for wider events in Persia and Iraq in fact 
steadily declined during this period. It seems that even Sunnis paid more attention than 
Shi'as to the Russian incursions in Persia, and destruction of the holy tombs in Mashhad. 
While the Shia Conference issued an obligatory notice against Russian activities in its 
session of 1912,71 action by Indian Shi'as upon their supposed loyalty to Persia Wds 
largely negligible. Even one Shi'a newspaper stated that the Shia Muhammadans made 
no effort to collect funds for the help of their suffering brethren in Persia, ' and that the 
Shia mujtahids neglected to request pecuniary help for the cause. 72 Another 
commentator accused Indian Shi'as of shedding only `crocodile tears' for their brethren 
overseas. 73 No celebrations were held in Lucknow when the Shah of Persia was 
inaugurated, and no `better instance of indifference' could be cited than the All India 
Shi `a Conference.? 4A few years later, Shi `as were accused of `apathy' to the question of 
Persia. 75 
The Shi'a reaction to pan-Islamism thus demands a reappraisal of the prevalent view that 
pan-Islamism nurtured increasing concern among Indian Muslims for the fate of their co- 
religionists abroad. Previous chapters have emphasised some manifestations of a broad 
'Indianisation' of Shi'ism which marked the colonial period, a turn away from a vague 
adherence to a 'Shi'i International' and inwards towards national traditions and structures 
of collective governance. This 'Indianisation' encouraged some Shia 'u/ama to engage 
more directly with national political affairs but, conversely, it also perhaps explains the 
growing Shia disinterest in the wider Shi'a world in the 1910s. While Sunni `cý/ama were 
becoming ever more conscious of and concerned with the wider Muslim world, Indian 
Shi'as were becoming more exclusively focused upon their national future. 
71 Home Department (Political) Proceedings, November 1911 File No. 9. NAI. 
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73 Husain. Rrsnla-i-kifaiº-pösh lidaran, pp. 19-20. 
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Lastly, the Shia reaction to pan-Islamism demonstrates that developments in national 
and provincial politics had little influence upon the emotive anti-Khilafatist dialogues in 
many localities of north India. These two discourses existed in different spheres, each 
rarely influencing or commenting upon the other. When an interaction between the two 
was apparent it was often a hostile contestation of the legitimacy of the national 
figureheads of pan-Islamism to speak for 'Muslims. ' One such example is the serialised 
assault launched by a Shi `a author of Ghazipur district, published in Ittehad, upon Ameer 
'Ali's famed tract on the Khilafat. The author refutes Ameer 'Ali's biographies of the 
Caliphs and Imams, his description of the spiritual presence of the Imam, his depiction of 
Sunni perspectives upon the integrity of the Caliph and his view that jcun `a prayers could 
be said outside of congregation. 76 The serialised assault was not so much a refutation of 
Ameer 'Ali's goal of Shia-Sunni unity; rather, it was an attempt to establish U. P. 's Shia 
petitioners as the public spokesmen of their supposed community, and to impede the 
attempts of a small minority of English-speaking Muslims to establish themselves as 
representatives of India's Shi`as. 
In essence, there were two debates among Shi`as concerning the Khilafat. The former 
was largely conducted in English, pitched at the national level and influenced by modern 
concepts of statehood, and conducted in the constitutional language of government 
petitioners. The latter was conducted in Urdu, pitched very much at the local level, 
conducted in the confrontational language of the inima: ar-as and printing presses of early 
twentieth century north India, and intermeshed with local-level sectarian conflicts. 
National pan-Islamic dialogues, therefore, did not consistently penetrate the resurgent 
consciousness of distinctiveness and doctrinal disparity which marked some Shia 
communities in U. P. 's cities and qasbas. 
'` ('khmi'or (Luckno\\ ), 2 March 1919, UPNNR. 
76 Itteli ad, 24 October, I and I1 November 1915, UPNNR. 
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Ambivalent responses: Shi`as and the Khilafat movement 
The apex of the pan-Islamic campaigns was the Khilafat movement, a nationwide 
agitation in support of the Ottoman Sultan. As with pan-Islamism generally, it has mostly 
been assessed as a moment of successful religious mobilisation with a remarkable 
accumulation of support among Muslims above and beyond differences of region, class 
and sect. 77 Moreover, the sudden involvement of certain Shi'as in 1921 has been 
interpreted as part of the successful Khilafatist strategy of cross-sectarian mobilisation. 78 
A wider concern over the threat to the holy places rather than the specific future of the 
Khilafat itself, allowed the movement to, by common scholarly agreement, `transcend... 
regional or sectarian differences. ' 79 Such scholarly impressions are further reinforced by 
the fact that the leaders of the Khilafat movement in the United Provinces were figures of 
sectarian compromise by their very backgrounds. The Shia barrister Sayyid Reza `Ali 
was the leader of the Khilafat movement in Allahabad, along with another Shia of that 
city, Sayyid Hyder Mehdi. Muhammad `Ali Jauhar, the Indian figurehead of the pan- 
Islamic and Khilafat movements, was himself the product of a truly cross-sectarian 
family. His Sunni father had converted to Shi'ism at the behest of his Shia wife, while 
Muhammad `Ali himself made no attempt to convert his Sunni wife to the Shia faith. 8° 
Himself encapsulating the cause of Muslim unity, he spurned the sectarian polemics of 
his era. 
It is against this background that Shi'a reactions to the Khilafat movement need to be 
reviewed. It is indeed true that in a number of cities in U. P., the activity surrounding the 
Khilafat movement appeared to recruit significant support from Shi'as. For the first 
Khilafat day in October 1919, Shia maulavis attended assemblies alongside their Sunni 
counterparts in Allahabad, Jaunpur and Meerut, all cities where the Khilafat movement 
77 Especially Gail Minault, The Khilafat movement: religious swnbolism and political mobilisation in India 
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seemed to gain some ground among Shi'as. On the second Khilafat da\ six months 
later, Sayyid Hyder Mehdi issued a rousing speech admitting that Shi'as did not belie\ c 
in the Khilafat but albeit shared anger at the occupation of Muslim lands. and urged 
Shi`as to co-operate with other Muslims. 82 In such towns, Shia-Sunni differences were 
overlooked and disagreements postponed in the cause of a pragmatic unanimit\. 
However, in those towns where the ethic of Shia distinctiveness was most entrenched, 
there were few signs of a Khilafat-manufactured reconciliation. The nationalist Deobandi 
`aline Muhammad Mian, arriving in Amroha at the point when the Khilafat movement 
was at its peak and the need of the time was to maintain unity... among Muslims in 
particular, ' was horrified to find Shi `a-Sunni inunazaras being conducted by the town's 
mnaulavis. Given the needs of the time, he argued, any action that increased the gulf, 
instead of bridging it, was not proper. '83 Such instances demonstrate that the actions of 
Khilafatists to inspire sectarian harmony were frequently unsuccessful, and that in those 
towns where Shia communities were most self-conscious, Shia involvement in the 
Khilafat movement was by no means as extensive as has sometimes been supposed. 
The most powerful Shia opposition to the Khilafat movement was orchestrated by the 
nrujtahicls of Lucknow, within that same period of 1920 in which 'Abdul Bari declared 
India a clar-id-harb ('abode of the unfaithful') and vindicated hiji-at (exodus to the lands 
of Islam). Perceiving it as a purely Sunni endeavour which contradicted Shia doctrine, 
three of Lucknow's most esteemed inujtahids, Nasir Husain, Aqa Hasan and Muhammad 
Baqir Rizvi, issued a hokum (order) demanding that the Shias should strictly keep aloof 
from the proposals published by the Khilafat committees. ' Participation, they declared, 
ww-: is not lawful under Shia religious laws and... not advisable. ' While expressing moral 
support l'or the Sultan and sympathy with all Islamic countries, their edict stated that: 
'The Shias have no concern with the present Khilafat question, 
because according to the Shia religion there is no Calipha... except 
the Ali... A Shia who believed anyone else... to 
"º T/º(' Leader (Allahabad), 19 October 1919. CS: AS. 
Q The Inc/ehendt'cºt (Allahabad), II March 1920, OIOC; The Leader, -1 Nl. ºrch 
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be a Caliph... will thereby be totally excluded from the pale of 
Shi `ism. ' g 
The hukum prompted similar declarations from lesser-known `ulama85 and from some 
secular Shi'a organisations. Almost simultaneously the Anjuman ul-Irkan, an 
organisation which represented the former royal family and the old aristocracy of 
Lucknow, issued a similar statement: `though we sympathise with the Sultan of Turkey 
as our co-religionist... the severing of our connection with the British Government is 
detrimental to the interests of the Muslims of India. '86 The Governor of the Provinces 
reminded the organisation that `your objects are loyalty to the British throne and 
protection of the rights and welfare of the late kings of Oudh... you have given 
expression to your loyalty in many ways... I am glad to hear that you condemn in the 
strongest terms the non-cooperation movement. ' 87 
Thus bolstered in no small way by the support of Government, the mujtahids and Shia 
conservatives again managed to formulate a co-ordinated defiance of pan-Islamism. 
Predictably, this intervention apparently raised `resentment among Sunnis. '88 Tracts were 
printed from Lucknow accusing Nasir Husain of propagating false information on the 
Sunni Caliphs. 89 One newspaper asked how Indian Shi`as could oppose the Khilafat 
movement while the great mujtahids of Iraq were so vehemently advocating jihad. 90 
However, disputes between variant Shi'as on the Khilafat question were often equally 
pronounced. One sarcastic Lucknawi Shia wrote of the pronouncements of his co- 
religionists that their `voice... is not at all in harmony with public opinion [and]... fell 
from their mouths like a bolt from the blue... let them rest assured that we do not require 
84 The Leader, 21 March 1920, CSAS. According to one commentator, the fatwa showed that 'some clever 
man has been working from behind the scenes. ' Haqiqat (Lucknow), 9 April 1920, UPNNR. 
85 One individual, for instance, offered a lengthy instruction against participation in the Khilafat movement 
which gained considerable space in Aligarh Institute Gazette, perhaps on account of the pro-government 
orientation of most of the University's trustees. Aligarh Institute Gazette (Aligarh), 29 November 1920, 
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their valuable services. '91 
Shia quietude was maintained in Lucknow until a sudden entry into the Khilafat 
movement in March 1921, when rumours circulated that the shrine of 'Ali in Najaf had 
been bombarded by the British occupying forces in Mesopotamia. These were 
compounded with stories that the recent deaths of two venerated Iraqi mujtahids were due 
to British actions: Muhammad Taqi was said to have been poisoned in August 1920, and 
his successor Fateh-Ullah Isphahani to have died of despair following the bombing of the 
holy shrine. 92 Protests were also launched that the mosque of Kufa had been occupied by 
Sikh troops, an allegation brought back from Mesopotamia by returning soldiers. 93 It 
seems that such rumours were drawn from an Afghan paper and subsequently circulated 
in the vernacular papers of north India. 94 Shi'a members of the United Provinces 
Legislative Council warned Government of the 'great excitement among the Shi'a 
community. '95 The Government claimed that `intense feeling prevails throughout the 
province, ' especially in Lucknow; the Shi'as were said to be 'in a fanatical mood over the 
religious question' and despite having been `loyal throughout... are now very much 
excited. '96 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the emerging agitation among Shi'as was 
the sudden change in decision of Lucknow's mujtahids, who had opposed such action just 
one year before. Nasir Husain, after communications with other mujtahids in Lucknow, 
led a deputation to the Lieutenant Governor. 97 Aqa Hasan, still the highly-influential 
peshnamaz of Lucknow' s Asafi mosque, delivered a speech in front of a crowd of 20,000 
in Asaf-ud-daula Imambara urging that the Shi'as had kept aloof from the Khilafat for too 
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long and should now join with the other sects of Islam. 98 This determined intervention bv 
such rnujtahids in contradiction of the hukum they had issued just a year before 
represented a significant reversal of their previous decision. 
Despite these interventions from the Lucknow mujtahids, however, the momentum 
behind the Shia agitation lay elsewhere, in a number of actors and anjunnans onl\ 
recently apparent in public life. In April 1921 a new Shia association, Anjuman-i- 
Khuddam-i-`Atabat-i-`Aliyat ('The Organisation of the Servants of the Shrine Cities*), 
was founded and resolved to lead an investigative deputation to Mesopotomia. 99 The 
anjuman's president was Mirza Muhammad Rahim Bulbula, a religious authority from 
Baku who had arrived in India in 1917. Basing himself in Bombay and later in Lucknow, 
he was described as an `extremist and... confirmed pan-Islamist, ' conferring with 'Abdul 
Bari and `mixed up with the `Ali brothers. ' loo He managed to establish his influence 
among not only the 'Isna `Ashari Shi'as of U. P., but the Bohras of Bombay and other 
multifarious Shia communities of only tenuous denominational congruence with the 
former. 
The establishment of this anjuman had great implications upon structures of religious 
authority in Lucknow, representing a key moment in the transfer of authority away from 
the city's established civic Shia elite and the exalted tnujtahids towards a younger, 
reactionary and more populist leadership. None of Lucknow's senior rnujtahids were 
selected as members of the deputation to Mesopotamia. ' 01 Also absent were pro- 
government former Shia Conference figureheads such as Fateh 'Ali Khan Qizilbash; 
v" 'Extract from the newspaper "Siasat, " Lahore, ' dated 10 March 1921, ihid. 
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instead, dominant were Khilafatist activists such as Hyder Mehdi and Mirza Muhammad 
Rahim himself, the latter of whom apparently achieved such popularity in U. P. that plans 
for his deportation were shelved for fear of `stir[ring] up feelings unnecessarily' among 
the public. 102 It thus seems that, as in Iraq where a qualified jihad was launched despite 
the opposition of the chief mujtahid Muhammad Taqi, the Khilafatists gained the upper 
hand over longer-established religious figureheads in India. The mass-mobilisations of 
the Khilafat movement momentarily eclipsed both Shia sectional instincts and traditional 
social and religious authorities. 
However, despite the appearance of triumph for Shia Khilafatists and so-called 
`progressives' over the former Lucknawi headship, this burst of enthusiasm at the peak of 
the Khilafat movement began to dissolve. As early as June of 1921, the Shia agitation 
was described as `half-hearted. ' 103 A month later, the U. P. Government predicted that 
`excitement will soon subside' so long as Mirza Muhammad Rahim was tactically 
ignored, 104 and the government responded to the openly anti-British deputation with 
numerous delays in the granting of permission to the deputation and in the issuing of 
passports to its members, eliciting protests from the anjuman. The death and 
imprisonment of two key supporters of the deputation further served to dampen the will. 
Come October, the Shi'as were `at present not in a state of ferment, '' 05 and at the 
beginning of 1922 the Raja of Mahmudabad offered the opinion that the deputation 
would never be realised, and the Shia agitation was `nearly dead. ' 106 Mirza Muhammad 
Rahim, meanwhile, retired into relative obscurity, working in Shia orphanages and 
charities in Bombay. 
Momentary participation in the Khilafat movement, therefore, does not constitute 
evidence of prolonged support. Shia engagement came late and was brief in duration. 
Furthermore, it was only initiated through the framing of the agitation according to 
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exclusively Shia concerns. There is little specific evidence that the Shi'as of Lucknoww, 
were motivated in any great degree by the fate of the Khilafat or even b` wider pan- 
Islamic concerns such as the standing of the Islamic world or the fate of the holy places; 
rather, they were responding to the specific question of the Shia shrine built up by an 
efficient rumour machine. Just as many north Indian Shi'as came late to the Khilafat 
movement, they departed early. In certain other Shia-dominated towns in U. P., 
participation in the Khilafat movement was even less than momentary, with many Shi'as 
opposing it absolutely. Muzaffar `Ali Khan renewed his opposition to such agitation by 
forming an Aman Sabha in Muzaffarnagar district, advocating an end to such rebellion. 107 
In Amroha tehsil (administrative district), local Shi'as presided and joined in some 
numbers the so-called Amroha Liberal Federation, a foundation which lent support to the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms Scheme and pronounced that progress would not be 
gained through nationalist reaction. 108 
Like pan-Islamism more generally, this story of Shia resistance to the Khilafat 
movement is a necessary corrective to that scholarship which has argued that, in the 
Middle East as well as in India, pan-Islamism and the Muslim encounter with colonial 
rule were two experiences which fostered urges for sectarian reconciliation. In India, both 
incurred increased disagreement between some Shia and Sunni communities, and were a 
source of enhanced differentiation. Additionally, Shia abstention from the Khilafat 
movement could be used to further demonstrate the indigenisation of Shia Islam during 
this period. Indeed, it seems to reveal that by the early twentieth century Indian Shi'as 
had the organisational structures and institutional basis in Lucknow to make their own 
social and political rulings independently from the supposed Shia heartlands of Iran and 
Iraq. 
Interestingly, the response of the Shia inujtahids of Lucknow to the issue of the Khilafat 
movement seems to represent an unprecedented diversion from the decisions of their co- 
religionists to the west. It is tempting to speculate that the mcujtahids actively relished the 
1 07 The Leader, 29 April I921. CSAS. 
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opportunity presented by the Khilafat movement in 1920 to reach such diversionary 
verdicts, attempting to demonstrate their autonomy and augment their prestige through a 
deliberate confrontation with both Shia nationalists in India and the religious leadership 
in Iraq-109 It was a confrontation in which, ultimately, they failed. They were forced to 
capitulate to the initiative of secular nationalists and formerly-unknown niacdavis, albeit 
in a way which presented unqualified enthusiasm for the new cause. It was a capitulation, 
however, with far-reaching implications in Shia public life in the 1920s-30s. Perhaps 
partly on account of the reconfiguration of public influence around 1921, the formerly 
inviolable supremacy of the senior mujtahids of Lucknow at the head of public Shia 
organisations was newly questioned over subsequent decades. As is demonstrated in the 
next chapter, newly-appearing maulavis and spokesman were increasingly free to style 
themselves as fresh leaders, and the Shi'a public sphere became less restricted and more 
crowded. These were developments with important implications for subsequent notions 
of community among Shi`as, and for relations between Muslim communities more 
widely. 
Conclusion: Muslim `unity' and the failure of Muslim nationalism 
`This is not the time to go to all ends to cancel out each other's 
works... Shi'as and Sunnis must stand on one platform and try to 
effect change in worldly affairs. In the meantime, we must give up 
religious debates until the Imam Mehdi appears and himself resolves 
these questions. ' º'o 
This author, writing in 1913, represents the existence and extent of severe Shia-Sunni 
political differences during this decade. During the same era, those Khilafatist 
newspýlpers which continued to advocate the great benefits of 'Muslim' unity published 
articles which similarly reflected frustration at the perceived undermining of the cause of 
unity by the persistence of sectarian dialogues. A member of Aligarh's Shia cli, iivat 
''"' "Phis perspective on the South Asian 'lclcl na reaching diversionary verdicts on social and political 
questions in order to uphold their distinction and modern relevance is comparable with the t'rame\\ or'l: 
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department contributed an article to Abu] Kalam Azad's newspaper Al-Hilal in 1913. 
imploring readers to strive urgently for ittehad-va-ittefaq (unity and agreement) between 
the sects. He re-states an often-repeated prescription for the removal of sectarian 
differences: the surrender of the practices of »iuna: ara, tabarrah and excessive praise of 
the Caliphs, a recapturing of shared veneration of the Prophet, and an open discussion 
upon the urgent national questions of Muslim politics and education. These questions 
must be dealt with now, he argues, so as not to poison relations for generations to 
1l come. 
In such a climate in the 1910s, what became of the much-lauded discourse of itteliuc/, or 
Muslim unity? Calls for Muslim unity seemed at best distant from the pervasive 
alternative discourse of Shia-Sunni differentiation, which had been entrenched in recent 
years. During the 1910s sectarian bases of mobilisation seemed to have expanded to a 
level of provincial and perhaps even national visibility, and often seemed to carry a 
momentum that those more unitary causes often failed to equal. Prominent Shia 
exponents of Muslim nationalism such as the Raja of Mahmudabad, Wazir Hasan and 
Sayyid Raza 'Ali, despite their national prominence, were widely interpreted by many of 
their sectarian kin as unrepresentative: `by fate the Shi`as decide against them, and 
together separate off from them. ' 112 Alternative Shi'a spokesmen instead earned their 
credibility through recourse to exclusivity, and the crafting of an entirely separate 
sectarian platform. In an era marked by a language of niwiazara and competition on the 
public street, those public spokesmen who dared to advocate the cessation of sectarian 
disputations were often interpreted by one community as capitulating to the other rather 
than attempting to effect reconciliation. ' 13 
Some attempts were even made to set up organisations during the 1910s explicitly to 
reconcile Sunnis and Shi`as in a wider unitary cause. In Lucknow in 1911, the AnjUnlan- 
i-Ittehad was formed in response to Shia-Sunni tensions, successfully enlisting various 
tU' Husain, Risýäla-i-kifiin-pös/r lidaran, p. 19. 
112 
. 41-/-/ilul (Calcutta), , September 1913, Nehru Memorial Library. tic'. 
Will (NM1L). 
11' Husain, RisJla-i-kifan-p55slr lidararr, p. 20. 
113 Nlian. The prisorrc'rs cýl. l/alta, pp. 109-10. 
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maulavis, `u/amu (including even Aqa Hasan and several Firangi Nlahallis) and secular 
dignitaries, and 'afford[ing] good opportunities to the two sects to meet on a common 
platform. ' 4 However, with low attendance and a failure to recruit popular speakers, 
Lucknow's Anjuman-i-Ittehad failed to achieve its aspired unity. ` Its call for itteliacl 
was clearly inconsistent with the mindset of many Muslims in contemporary Lucknow, 
the atmosphere of which remained schismatic over the subsequent decade. In contrast 
with the failure of Lucknow's Anjuman-i-Ittehad, the success of Amroha's like-named 
Shia newspaper Ittehad in the same short period says much about the shift in the 
meaning of `unity' during this decade. It was an illuminating fact that the newspaper's 
name changed from Ittehad-i-Islam upon its foundation in 1910 into, simply lttehml, 
accompanied by its increasingly sectional outlook. The ittehad propounded by this 
newspaper was not the cross-sectarian, pan-Islamic unity striven for in many 
contemporary Urdu vernaculars, but was unity among and between Shi'as themselves. 
Ittehad was projected inwards, used less to evoke Muslim unanimity and more to urge 
cohesion within particular sects and factions. 
The findings of this and the previous chapter together present a number of important 
conclusions on the nature of collective Shia identity and sectarianism in the colonial 
period. Most striking perhaps is the consolidation of a political expression of Muslim 
sectarian differences. Increasingly through the colonial period, the consolidation of 
religious and cultural distinctions transmuted into an articulation of Shia-Sunni political 
difference, one which elevated sectarianism to a level of provincial and national 
visibility. In contrast to the narrative of Islamic 'modernism' discussed above, these two 
chapters reveal how concerns and questions around which Shias and Sunnis had 
previously been able to collaborate gradually transmuted through the late nineteenth and 
114 For a brief moment it had even appeared that the reunion of the Shias and Sunnis of Lucknoww does not 
seem to he an impossible task. ' Note dated 25-6 April 1910, GAD File No. 366 of 1911, UPSA. Such 
movements were not confined to Lucknow. By \\, a), of comparison, the Anjuman-i-Tauhid emerged in 
Allahahad in 1917 at the behest of a local Muslim neww spaper. This organisation maintained that Hindus 
had weakened Muslims by exploiting Shi'a-Sunni differences, such as over the pan-Islamic movement and 
local dispute., and as such advocated increasing cooperation of Sunni and Shia leaders in order to re-e\ert 
'Muslim' political power and cultural dominance. Like its Lucknawi equivalent, however, it failed to gain 
ýi-Inificant long-standing support.: Vur Roshni (Allahabad), 23 October and November 1917, UIINNR. 
W, 'History of the Shia-Sunni contro\ ersy subsequent to the 7`r' Januar) 1909, ' S Jul), 191 1, GAD File No. 
366 of 191 1, UPS A. 
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early twentieth centuries into issues of divergence. During and after the 'shock' of the 
Mutiny, matters such as the sanction of jihad, the foundation of Aligarh College and the 
reflection upon the trans-national Islamic millat, all appeared to contribute to the public 
or political relegation of sectarian distinctions under colonial rule. Howw ever, all of these 
causes of unity were gradually transmuted into issues of differentiation. The dissociation 
by many Shi'as from the causes of Aligarh College, jihad and pan-Islamism together 
demonstrate how early attempts at Shia-Sunni partnership gradually shifted into a 
parting of the ways on these issues during the colonial period, and particularly in the 
twentieth century's first two decades. 
In turn, this analysis of new manifestations of sectarian politics illustrates the need for a 
re-dress of the traditional narrative of Muslim community-formation and 'separatism. ' 
The often-told story of the enormous contribution of the colonial system of governance to 
the singular categorisation of Indian Muslims and the consequent organisation by many 
on the grounds of shared Islamic faith is in need of reconsideration. The evocation of a 
'Muslim community' in politics did little to ease the multifarious differences among 
Muslims, including the distinction of Shia and Sunni. Indeed, Shia-Sunni political 
antagonisms appeared to be at their most pronounced during the eighteen-year period 
commonly perceived to be the height of Muslim 'separatism' between the foundation of 
the Muslim League and the collapse of the Khilafat movement. 116 Census pressures, 
demands for Muslim electorates and colonial political systems which have commonly 
been interpreted as actualising a form of consensual 'Muslim' politics1'7 were less 
successful in enjoining Shia and Sunni communities than has often been supposed. 
Somewhat contradicting the solidification of the `Muslim' category in politics through 
the colonial system of control, the last two chapters have both demonstrated how British 
political machinations played a surprisingly direct role in the widening and politicisation 
of Muslim sectarian difference. While not comparable with the formal political 
Robinson, Separatism among Indian 11uslims; Hasan, Nationalism and communal politics 
in 
Indio. 
117 Robinson, CIMI'Catisrrº among Indian Muslims-, David Page. Prelude toi partition: the 
Indian Muslims 
and the imperial system of (orºtrOl, 1920-1932 (Delhi, 198_' 
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institutionalisation of `Muslim' or caste identities through separate enumeration and 
electoral representation, there is no doubt that, in certain municipalities of U. P. and 
especially Lucknow, the British informally pulled closer to Shi'as at times when 
`Muslim' politics was moving in a more reactionary and anti-governmental direction. As 
Muslim organisations and political parties fell under the control of 'Young Party' 
activists, the British tended to initiate communication with Shia organisations, whether 
the Shi'a Conference, Shia educational associations or congregations of the former- 
Lucknawi nobility, pensioners and royalty. Just as it was previously shown that Meston's 
strong involvement in the Shia College campaign was an attempt to cultivate Shia 
loyalty and diffuse some of the attention conferred upon the increasingly volatile campus 
of Aligarh College, then the clearly thriving correspondence between the Lieutenant 
Governor's compound and Shi'a political and religious leaders in the 1910s alludes to a 
similar attempt by the British to diffuse some of the virility of the jihad and pan-Islamic 
agitations. Inculcating Shi'a resistance to these causes, the British attempted, with some 
success, to expose the vacuity of the notion of Muslim unity at a time when this had been 
rallied in protest at colonial governance. 
Finally, it is worth remarking upon one of the most notable absences running through the 
previous two chapters: the absence of reference to north India's Hindu majority. As in 
Shi'a religious disputations and polemical writings, references to non-Muslim 
communities in discourses of Shia organisation, social betterment and political activity 
were rare indeed. Allusions to British rule, moreover, seem to have been confined to 
those occasions when the British had become involved in 'Muslim' religious questions 
and issues. Rather, it was the wider process of unitary Muslim communal organisation 
against which Shia social and political organisation was projected, self-consciousl` 
crafting a space for Shi'as separate from broader 'Muslim' activity. , -fis Such, the 
organisational efforts discussed in these two chapters often appeared to be 
directly 
comparable retorts to similar 'Muslim counterparts. The Shl'a Conference was 
established finally in 1907, within a year of the emergence of the All 
India Nlu"lim 
League. The Shia orphanage in Lucknow emerged alongside the financial campaign' 
for 
the relief of the orphans and widows of the Ottoman Empire. 
The campaign for a Shia 
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College paralleled the campaign for a Muslim University. The development of ideas of 
jihad were answered with a reinforcement of the notion of taglid and declarations of 
loyalty to the Government, while increasing Sunni interest in pan-Islamism wý as met with 
powerful assertions of independence by some Shia `ulama. The `other' against which 
Shia organisation was conducted, then, was the hegemonic `Muslim' gqaum. and the 
provision of separate sectarian institutions permitted the internal self-governance and 
autonomy of a supposed Shia qaumik alternative in national life. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A DECADE OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
SECTARIANISM IN LUCKNOW, 1930-1939. 
Introduction: Shia-Sunni relations in the years of Muslim-Hindu communalism 
In comparison with the Shia-Sunni disputations which were widely apparent in religious, 
social and political dialogues in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the years 
after 1921 showed a comparative ebbing of the presence of such themes in public life. 
The ascendant Hindu-Muslim communalism in the period 1923-1927 seemed to edge 
sectarianism within Islam out of the spotlight. In Lucknow, for instance, conflictive 
energies within Lucknow were apparently redirected into the violent Hindu-Muslim 
conflagrations of 1924 provoked by disputes over the timings of namaz (prayers) and arte 
(Hindu ceremony of worship) in Aminabad, an issue dominating local politics for several 
years. ' This Muslim-Hindu dispute momentarily brought Lucknow's communal 
configurations into line with those of other major cities in the province. 2 There were even 
signs that the common enemy of the Hindu shuddhi and sangathan menace prompted a 
partial Shia-Sunni reconciliation; some religious leaders even attempted to organise 
mutual participation in to `ziva processions during Muharram. 3 Moreover, following the 
precedent of the collaborations of 1921, Shi`as and Sunnis intermittently restored a 
cooperative stand on affairs relating to the wider Islamic world. In 1922, Shi'as organised 
campaigns in objection to the British extradition of Shia inujtahids from Iraq, a further 
` 
cause which they shared with many former advocates of pan-Islamism. This was also 
I 
.\ discussion of this riot, which ýý as centred upon uý-ti ritual, can he 
found in David Pa`gc" Prelude to 
/)artition: the Indian Muslims and the imperial system of control, 1920-1932 (Delhi, 1pp. 7ý-, S(). 
Shi'as did not take prominent part in these riots. Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 
?. ) September 1924, 
General Administration Department (GAD) File No. 479 of 19224, Uttar Pradesh State Archi%es. Lucknow 
(11I S A). 
TI'o Lambert, 19 September 1924. ibid. 
4 Oudh Akhbar (Lucknoww ). 28 July 1922, United Provinces \atiýc Newspaper Rehorts (UPNNR), Oriental 
and India Office Collections, London (()IOC); Hnmdarn (Lucknow). IS August 1922. 
ihid; , 4l I3,. slrir 
(Etavv ah), 15 September 1922. ibid. 
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seen in the involvement of Shi'as in Lucknow in protests at Ibn Sa'ud's declaration of 
sovereignty over the Hejaz and holy places and desecration of Shia shrines, 5 causes 
broadly shared by many wider post-Khilafat Muslim associations 
However, the absence of overt conflict during this period does not signify a significant 
narrowing of the distance between Shi'as and Sunnis. Shi'a leaders were isolated from 
and suspicious of the tanzim and tabligh campaigns among reactionary lay Muslims 
during this period, whose attempts at religious revival and ceremonial purification were 
conducted along definitively Sunni lines. Ex-Khilafatists, stated one Shia newspaper, 
could not be trusted with the fate of Shi'as, as seen from their disrespect towards 
to `ziyas. 6 Moreover, while many Sunni `ulama of schools such as Deoband and Firangi 
Mahal continued to engage with the nationalist movement as a means of maintaining the 
`izzat of Islam under a conquering power, 7 it is of note that their Shi'a equivalents were 
for the most part invisible in the subversive political stirrings of the same period. As has 
been shown above, the Shi'a mujtahids of this period were increasingly engaged with 
public and political issues of direct significance for Shi`as in cities such as Lucknow; 
however, at least by comparison with some Sunni `ulama, they remained to a large extent 
disengaged from wider nationalist political activism, whether through their association 
with the colonial administration or their desire to preserve their elevated personal prestige 
by remaining above the fray of politics. This was a fact pounced upon by their critics. 
One polemicist, writing in 1925 on the current evocation of the Gandhian notion of 
swaraj ('self-rule'), suggested that Shi'as were unable to focus upon the nationalists' 
interpretation of this term since they were preoccupied instead with the 'Shi'a swaraj, ' 
the bountiful reality which would emanate from the return of Imam Mehdi to his 
` Some Shi'as accused the British Government of having sympathies for Ibn Saud, and 
deputations of 
Lucknawi Shi'as on this matter even reached the Viceroy. 'Fortnightly report 
for the first half of May 
1931' and 'Fortnightly report for the second half of February 1932, ' Public and 
Judicial Files (L. /PJ). 12/34, 
OIOC. 
6 Shia College News (Lucknow), 31 March 1923, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports (UPNNR), 
OIOC. 
7 The foremost example of Deobandi participation in the nationalist movement was 
the formation of the 
Jami`at-ul-'Ulama-i-Hind in 1919. Barbara Metcalf, 'Reinventing Islamic politics in interwar India: the 
clergy commitment to composite nationalism, ' in Mushirul 
Hasan and Asim Roy eds, Living together 
separately: cultural India in history, and politics (New Delhi, 
2005). pp. 389-404. 
210 
followers. 8 While buried in a typical sectarian polemic, this particular criticism likely 
reflects the comparative invisibility of prominent Shia religious leaders in the organs of 
the nationalist movement. 
Alongside these divergent approaches of certain `Mama towards involvement in political 
issues, sectarian disagreement further emerged in the political sphere following the 
drafting by many Muslim politicians of schemes for the expansion of separate Muslim 
representation in the wake of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. Many Shi'as 
claimed that their community could not gain adequate representation within the electoral 
model of separate Muslim representation owing to `the selfishness and bias of the Sunni 
majority, ' and claimed that through the merciless use of sectarian propaganda Sunnis had 
gained all but one of the thirty-six reserved Muslim seats in the Legislative Assembly. 9 It 
was on account of such claims that calls were made for the establishment of a `Shi `a 
League, ' a political organisation in opposition to the Muslim League. Wazir Hasan, the 
former Congressite and Muslim Leaguer, his son Sayyid 'Ali Zaheer, the former 
Khilafatist Hyder Mehdi of Allahabad and a few Shia taluqdars corresponded and held 
meetings in the wake of the collapse of the Congress-League accord and 'decided that we 
should start a movement among the Shi'as and should wean them away from the Muslim 
League fold. "° Out of this communication emerged the All India Shia Political 
Conference in 1925. The organisation remained benign rather than active until the late 
1930s, but more significant was the foundation of its affiliated newspaper, Sarfaraz, in 
1925. Taking advantage of the further expansion of the printing industry in Lucknow in 
the 1920s, edited by Mirza Shamar Lucknawi and managed from its own printing press in 
Lucknow, the newspaper eclipsed Ittehad as the most influential and widely circulated 
Shia periodical, starting as a bi-weekly and quickly becoming a daily. This said, rather 
than publishing the poetic and prosaic novelties and the frequent diatribes frequent in its 
forerunner, Sarfaraz was essentially from the outset a Congressite newspaper, carrying 
" He argues that 'there is no doubt that such swaraj, God forbid it ever be forgotten, will 
bring the fortunes 
of restfulness to non-Shia sects. ' Conversely, since the Shi'as obsessed over the coming of the absent 
Imam and the 'tire and brimstone' awaiting Abu Bakr and Uniar, 'moments of trial and tribulation 
always persist from all sides in the lives of Shi'as, more so than in us. ' Shi'a sº+wäräj 
ör is At vdgi'at gäbil- 
indiräj (Qadian, circa 1925), pp. 491-492. 
9 Saºfaraz (Lucknow), 20 February and 27 November 1926. UPNNR. 
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news of national events within the independence movement and for the most part 
eschewing religious polemic. 
Together with the sustained publication of virulent sectarian tracts in Lucknow, there are 
thus ample reasons to assume that the Shia-Sunni nexus consolidated in public life in the 
191 Os was perpetuated into the subsequent decade, less dramatic but similarly ubiquitous. 
However, it was in the 1930s that the expansion of sectarianism in the early twentieth 
century discussed in the previous chapters found its ultimate expression. It culminated in 
the tabarrah agitation of 1939, when some 18,000 Shi'as in Lucknow were jailed over a 
matter of months for the organised and collective recitation of the long-banned curses of 
the early Caliphs. 
Discussing the sectarian confrontations of the 1930s, this chapter completes the thesis in 
the same arena in which it began: the old city of Lucknow, the birthplace and the main 
theatre of Shi `a-Sunni sectarianism in north India. In contrast to the earlier manifestations 
of sectarianism discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, the heightened levels of 
Shia-Sunni tension manifested in the madh-i-sahaba and tabarrah agitations and the 
violence that accompanied them have received significant attention in scholarship. " 
However, these studies have been somewhat limited in their focus. Some have for the 
most part discussed the connection of these conflicts with the period of Congress 
government from 1937-912 and, in some cases, as simply variations of the same process 
of community-formation as the ascendant Hindu-Muslim communalism in 1930s U. P.. 13 
Attempting to offer a more thorough and detailed assessment of the sectarian conflicts of 
the 1930s than hitherto available, this chapter will seek to analyse these conflicts on their 
1" Syed Kazim Zaheer ed., The memoirs of Syed Ali Zaheer (New Delhi, 2004), p. 19. 
11 Imtiaz Ahmad, 'The Shia-Sunni dispute in Lucknow, 1905-1980, ' in Milton Israel and Narendra K. 
Wagle eds., Islamic society and culture: essays in honour of Professor Azi: Ahmad, (Delhi, 1983), pp. 335- 
50; Sandra Freitag, Collective action and community: public arenas and the emergence of coin in una lism in 
colonial north India (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 249-80; Nandini Gooptu, The politics of the urban poor in earl Y 
twentieth century India (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 301-3; William Gould, Hindu nationalism and the language 
of politics in late colonial India (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 213-8; Mushirul Hasan, 'Sectarianism in Indian 
Islam: the Shia-Sunni divide in the United Provinces, ' The Indian Economic and Social History Review 
(27,2 1990). 
12 Gould, Hindu nationalism and the language of politics, pp. 213-8. 1.1 Freitag, Collective action and community, pp 249-80. 
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own terms, rather than as an extension of other contemporary processes of community- 
formation. Moreover, rather than looking at the momentary events of the late-1930s, this 
chapter seeks to interpret the origins of these sectarian conflicts according to the process 
charted throughout this thesis: namely, the formation of increasingly numerous and 
competitive sectarian anjumans in the civic arena of Lucknow, and the continual 
construction and elaboration of Shia-Sunni differences in religion, society and politics. 
Finally, the question will be asked of whether the struggles of the 1930s represented the 
culmination of sectarianism, the fulfilment of the process discussed throughout this 
thesis, or whether instead they represented a new phenomenon, a re-working of older 
conflicts in a fresh environment. As a background to this analysis, it is first necessary to 
give a chronological account of unfolding events in Lucknow, leading up to the agitations 
of 1939. 
The origins of the tabarrah agitation 
The decisions of the Piggott Committee of 1909, appointed in the wake of the sectarian 
riots in Lucknow, had proscribed the public recitation of the Sunni madh-i-sahaba verses 
on certain days of religious significance and the Shi'a tabarrah curses of the Caliphs 
were similarly restricted. The arrangement had been perceived from its implementation 
onwards as a quasi-victory for the Shi'a side, and attributed by its opponents to the better 
networking abilities of Lucknow's Shi'as and their friendly relations with government. 
Nevertheless, the verdict rested firm for some twenty-five years without organised 
challenge. 14 Serious opposition to the verdict was freshly raised in the early 1930s, when 
a number of Sunni maulavis began to campaign for the lifting of restrictions on praising 
the Caliphs. 15 The issue was adopted by the Majlis-i-Ahrar, an organisation founded in 
the 1920s by a group of ex-Khilafatists and informally allied to the 
Congress. Drawn 
14 There were some challenges to the verdict in the 1910s from Sunni 'u/ama, 
discussed in GAD File No. 
366 of 1911, UPSA. However, they were neither sustained nor successful. 
's While the demand for a public recitation crystallised around 1935, elementary 
disputes over the 
legitimacy of these verses had been present through the first half of the 
decade. See 'Fortnightly report for 
the second half of June 1930, ' IJPJ/12J22, 'Fortnightly report 
for the first half of July 1933, ' UPJ/12/56, 
OIOC. 
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primarily from the urban middle and lower classes of Punjab and U. P., the movement 
worked on the loose basis of, on the one hand, advocating the reform of Islamic practice 
and the purification of indigenous bid `ah (innovation) from Islam, and on the other, the 
awakening of a political consciousness among Muslims in opposition to the dar-ul-barb 
of colonial rule. 16 Following a sustained campaign against the Ahmadi community in 
Punjab, they transferred their attentions to the dissenting Shi'as of Lucknow in the mid- 
1930s. 17 They quickly became highly visible figures in Lucknow where they espoused 
the cause of the Sunnis and with their powerful oratory succeeded in creating a good 
atmosphere for themselves. ' 8 Their spokesman here was Zafar ul-Mulk, an ex-Khilafatist 
Congressite maulvi skilled in effective public speaking and inflammatory journalism. He 
had played a prominent role in the tanzim campaigns of the 1920s, during which he had 
campaigned against the influence upon Islam by indigenous `Hindu' cultural activities. 19 
A decade later, it was the comparable campaign for the removal of Shia interpolations in 
Muslim practice and custom which became his prime concern. 
In 1936, responding to government's refusal of permission for a madh-i-sahaba 
procession to be carried out, the Ahrars launched a civil disobedience movement, during 
which activists recited the controversial phrases. The rnadh-i-sahaba agitation focused 
upon the Tila mosque where activists would collectively take out a madh-i-sahaba 
16 No substantial monograph about the Majlis-i-Ahrar exists. Much information, however, is contained in 
the following: Y. B. Mathur, Muslims and changing India (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 109-119; Chaudhry 
Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), pp. 150-1; Ayesha Jalal, Self and sovereignty: 
individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (London, 2000), pp. 356-382. Jalal emphasises 
their political aspect, describing the organisation as an attempt to advance the political ambitions of urban 
middle-class Punjabis. This perhaps underemphasises the extent to which the organisation drew from local 
support and emphasised religious as much as political rhetoric. 
P Interestingly, this is comparable to modern anti-Shi'a organisations in Pakistan, whose main protagonists 
had previously been followers of anti-Ahmadi agitations. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in 
Pakistan: the radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni identities, ' in Modern Asian Studies (36,3,2000), pp. 689- 
716. 
ý" Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p. 15 1. 
19 Ideologically, he was of note for his fear of orthodox Sunnism being infiltrated by secular education or 
indigenous influence; in 1931, for instance, he had cautioned attempts to foster Hindu-Muslim unity 
through cultural harmonisation, noting that 'for the Musulmans... the idea of keeping their general 
features 
distinctively separate from those of other nations and communities is as old as Islam 
itself. ' See 'Note of 
dissent' on Congress committee for investigation into Kanpur riot, 24 October 
1931, in N. Gerald Barrier, 
Roots of Communal Politics (New Delhi, 1976), p. 267. Adopting the Sunni cause 
in Lucknow. it ý%as the 
perceived pollution of 'Islam' by Shi'ism rather than Hinduism against which 
he rallied defence. 
W 
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procession after weekly Friday prayers and court arrest. 2(' An All India Madh-i-Sahaba 
Day, ' organised in August 1936, recorded large gatherings in cities as diverse as `Ieerut, 
Aligarh and Allahabad. 2' Over the next three years, Government held talks and appointed 
enquiry committees in order to bring the issue to a close, but with little success. 22 . ýs 
Sunni recitations of madh-i-sahaba became ever more sustained, so the resultant 
recitations of tabarrah became more frequent in Shia neighbourhoods. Government 
restrictions had to be applied to Shi'a processions during Muharram of 1937 in order to 
maintain peace and were met with organised resistance, with Shi'as wearing the black 
garbs of Muharram courting arrest. 23 Despite all efforts, public recitations of tabarrah 
sparked Sunni-Shi'a riots in May 1937, the most serious since the 1900s. 24 
In 1938 the principal of the dar-ul-'ulum at Deoband, Husain Ahmad Madani, assumed 
spokesmanship of the madh-i-sahaba campaign. This brought the madh-i-sahaba cause 
in Lucknow greater national prominence and legitimacy, while Husain Ahmad's leading 
role in the United Provinces Congress Committee made government reluctant to 
discipline him. In the latter half of 1938, the call for a inadh-i-sahaba procession 
intensified. 25 With increasing signs that the Congress Ministry of U. P. was contemplating 
concessions to the Sunni demands, civil disobedience was vigorously revived in March 
1939.26 The government's policy in response gently but tangibly shifted from the 
continuation of the prohibition of madh-i-sahaba to the recognition of this right under 
appropriate conditions. 27 Attempting to halt the persistent Sunni civil disobedience, the 
20 For instance, The Leader (Allahabad), 2 and 17 August 1936, OIOC. 
1 The Leader, 1 September 1936, OIOC; Gould, Hindu nationalism and the language of politics, p. 215. 
The The most notable Government attempt to resolve the question was its appointment of the Allsop 
Committee in 1937. It largely upheld the conclusions of its predecessor, the Piggott Committee Report, 
arguing that In 1935 and 1936... the desire to recite Madh-i-sahaba arose out of a feeling directed against 
the Shias, ' and thus should not be permitted in the context. For a copy of the report, sec 
Got-ernment 
Gazette of the United Provinces, 28 March 1938, Quaid-i- Azam Collection. lor. 
Neg. Pos. 10773, OIOC. 
`i The Leader, I April 1937, OIOC. 
24 Indian Annual Register: July-December 1937 (Delhi, 1938). Centre of South Asian Studies. Cambridge 
(CSAS), p. 142; Haig to Linlithgow, 7 June 1937, Haig Collection, Mss. Eur. 
F. 115/17. OIOC, The Leader, 
23 May 1937, OIOC. 
'` Haig to Brahourne, 10 October 1938, and Haig to Linlithgow, 23 October 1938, 
Linlithgow Collection, 
Mss. Eur. F. 125/10 1, OIOC. 
'`' Gwynne to Puckle, 26 March 1939, L/PJ/5/267, OIOC. This civil disobedience movement rc\calcd new 
levels of support, including the help of jathas from other districts. 
Gwy nne to Puckle, 7 March 1939, ibid. 
27 During these negotiations, the emphasis shifted away from the conclusions of 
the Allsop Report, which 
declared madh-i-sahaba to he forbidden as a deliberately provocative act, 
to claiming in March 1938 that 
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Congress Ministry capitulated and gave permission for a madh-i-sahaba procession on 
the day of Bara-Wafat. 28 
The first major confrontation occurred on 31st March 1939, the day on which permission 
for the procession had been granted. The Sunni recitations of madh-i-sahaba outside the 
Tila mosque were responded to by the congregation of Shi'as in the adjacent grounds of 
the Asaf-ud-daula Imambara, who recited tabarrah and themselves courted arrest. This 
pattern repeated itself in subsequent months, during which Shi `as would time the shouts 
of tabarrah from the roof and balconies of the imambara compound to coincide with 
Friday prayers in the adjoining Sunni mosque. 29 Fresh batches of Shi'as conducted this 
agitation in ever growing numbers. The tabarrah agitation persisted against all attempts 
at a settlement and movements towards conciliation, and dragged on for months. A look 
at the numbers alone shows the scale of the reaction; while the number of Sunnis courting 
arrest before March 1939 was around 3000,30 the equivalent number of Shi`as reached up 
to 14,000 in the next four months. 31 
The most important organising force in the tabarrah agitation was a new Shia anjumant, 
the Tanzim-ul-Mominin, founded in May 1938. Controlled from offices in Chowk, it was 
headed by the retired judge Asghar Husain and the Patna lawyer Sultan Ahmad. 32 The 
organisation was the informal leader of the tabarrah agitation, frequently accused of 
organising groups of volunteers to recite tabarrah, and even bringing together a military 
corps known as the Sipah-i-`Abbasiya to identify recruits and cultivate a `martial spirit, ' 
which was said to have 650 members. 33 Ultimately, it was responsible for organising 
'the Sunnis' right of public or private recitation... is not in dispute. ' Ibid. This shift of tone effectively 
committed the government to granting the Sunni wish. 
'" The Leader, 3 and 4 April 1939, OIOC. 
29 Communique from the District Magistrate of Lucknow, 5 July 1939, Political Department File No. 65 of 
1939, UPSA. 
iQ The Leader, 6 April 1939, OIOC. 
31 Mirza Sajjad All Khan ed., Wh1,14,000 Shias went to jail? U. P. Congress Government and justice, 
"Fundamental rights of people overthrown ", severe repression of the Shia minority 
(Lucknow, circa 1939), 
? assim. 
' Ibid, pp. 3-7. j' District Magistrate of Lucknow to Chief Secretary, 25 March 1939, Political 
Dept File No. 65 of 1939, 
UPSA; `Note, ' Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, 8 April 1939, ibid. Khan ed.. 
Why 14,000 Shia. N went to 
jail?, p. 3. 
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daily civil disobedience, 34 and together with the Shia Political Conference it built up a 
so-called `War Council' for the orchestration of the agitation. tm The support of the 
inujtahids was a further crucial factor. Nasir Husain and Najm ul-Hasan. both of whom 
have been a constant presence throughout this thesis, resisted attempts at a cessation of 
the tabarrah agitation and urged their muqallidin (followers) to defend Shia rights, to the 
frustration of those trying to bring it to a close. 36 
The tabarrah agitation seemed to induce a condition of `intense emotional hvsteria''7 
across the Shia community of Lucknow. As claimed one Lucknawi citizen, 'all the Shias 
collectively and individually are devoting their mind and money. energy and resources, to 
the tabarrah agitation. '38 Participation in tabarrah in April-May 1939 notably 
transcended all boundaries of muhalla, family, class, political affiliation, as well as the 
ubiquitous religious-secular divide. Many Shia `ulaina courted arrest, including the son 
of Nasir Husain, as did members of the ex-Royal family of Lucknow, including the 
grandchildren of Wajid `Ali Shah. 39 Many Shia taluqdars of Awadh participated, and the 
Sayyids of Bilgram led deputations of Shi `as to Lucknow in support of the cause. 40 The 
politicians of the Shia Political Conference also joined the tabarrah agitation; Mirza 
Jafar Husain, Sayyid Kalb-i-`Abbas and Sayyid `Ali Zaheer, together with other members 
of the A. I. S. P. C., handed themselves over. 4' The president of the Shia Political 
Conference Wazir Hasan facilitated the participation of the Lucknow Shia Students' 
14 Jashir Singh to Harper, 2 April 1939, Political Department File No-65 of 1939, UPSA. 
;5 Jashir Singh to Harper, 11 May 1939, ibid; 'Note, ' Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, 8 April 1939, 
ibid. Reflecting other volunteer movements of the era, it apparently carried a socialist leaning and 
eschewed the support of the rich and noble; it was even accused of deliberately discrediting aristocratic 
Shia leaders. Jashir Singh to Harper, 25 August 1939, ibid; Syed All Zaheer cd., The dead past (Lucknow, 
1950), Private papers of Kazim Zaheer, New Delhi, p. 1 15. 
"' For instance, 'it is well known that after discussing the situation and consulting people from other 
pro inces our Mujtaheds came to the conclusion that the agitation should not he suspended under the 
circumstances, for the reasons best known to them. ' Khan ed., Wh\ /4,000 Shies 1i'ent to jail?. p. 98. 
17 'The N1ailhe Sahaha controversy. ' Haig to Linlithgow, 18 April 1939, L/PJ/7/2587,0100. 
The Leader, 20 May 1939, OIOC. 
Ihid, 13,24,2-5 and 27 April 1939. "' Ihi(, 22 and 25 April 1939. For details and photographs of Shia ru'i. s and taluydars courting arrest. sec 
llukumara i, 27 : April 1931), Proscribed Publications 13 (Urdu), 010C. 41 The 1-can/er. 24-0 April 1931), OIOC; National Herald (Lucknow), 23 April 1939. CSAS: `Who is 
responsible for the ShialSunni dispute?, ' by Say viel . -\khar Ali, member of 
Central Standing Committee of 
, All India Shi'a Political Conference. 
UPJ/7/25$7. Leaders of provincial and district branches of the 
orkanisation also courted arrest. The Leader, 15 April and 3 \laý 1939,010C. 
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Federation , 
42 while Lady Wazir Hasan organised the remarkable movement of purdah 
ladies. This alliance of the begams (wives) of prominent figures such as Nawabs. 
descendents of the royal family and `ulama shed their purdah, shouted public recitations 
of the Karbala tragedy and even planned to lie in the road blocking the Barawafat 
procession, many subsequently courting arrest. 43 Indeed, the Governor remarked with 
surprise upon the presence of `Skias of the most respectable families' within the 
agitation, and the consequent `gentlemanly lines' along which it was conducted. 44 A, 
claimed one Shia Congressman, `the cream of the Shia community is behind bars. 45 The 
elite basis of the tabarrah agitation perhaps explains why it remained so well ordered and 
for the most part peaceful, in contrast to many of the riots which had accompanied 
Muharram in previous years. 
Given the many elements participating in the tabarrah cause, among them local 
preachers and senior mujtahids, artisans and aristocrats, lawyers and politicians, young 
and old and those from in and outside Lucknow, it is futile to try to posit a single or 
dominant explanation for the sudden rise in Shia-Sunni conflict throughout the decade. 
The motivations for an individual courting arrest in a religious cause are likely to be as 
numerous and diverse as the individuals themselves, with simple, uncomplicated 
religious ardour by no means least among them. However, it is the task of this chapter to 
describe some of the factors contributing to sectarian animosities in Lucknow throughout 
this decade. Focusing firstly upon movements of religious renewal within Indian Shi'ism, 
the chapter will then move through political and socio-economic change to underscore 
the interaction between these currents, and will ultimately identify a gradual shift in the 
42 The Leader, 4 and 11 May 1939, OIOC. The Shia Political Conference, or more precisely «'azir Hasan 
and 'his army of Congressitc Shias. ' were blamed by some for some of the force of the tabarrahh agitation. 
Statement by Abdul `Vahced Khan, Joint Secretary of Provincial Muslim League, The Pioneer (Luckno'\ ). 
22 June 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Collection, Ior. Neg. Pos. 10773. OIOC. 
r' On this mov cement, see The Leader, 14 April, 4 May and 3 June 1939, OIOC: National Herald, 25 and 
28 April 1939, OIOC; Haig to Linlithgow, 26 April 1939, Linlithgovv Collection. Niss. I-ur. F. 125/102, 
OIOC: Member of the Legislati\ e Assembly for Shahjahanpur to Jinnah, 27 April 1939, Quaid-i-: Bain 
Collection. Ior. Ncg. Pos. 10773. OIOC. 
44 'The Madhe Sahaha controversy, ' Haig to Linlithgow, 18 April 1939 and 12 June 1939, L/PJ/5/26", 
OIOC. 
45 Statement by Sav yid Hyder Nlehdi. The Leader. 1 May 19 39, OIOC. It is even tempting to speculate that 
the rclativ e comforts allowed to the Shi'a prisoners vv as in part due to a lack el' willingness to 
keep the 
gentlemanly and political classes in such conditions. Shia prisoners had access to ne spapers and tobacco 
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character and central markers of Indian Shi`ism. As such, this chapter is an attempt to re- 
evaluate the nature of Lucknow's conflict itself, and the evolution of Muslim 
sectarianism in India through the fifty-year period discussed in this thesis. 
The `jihad of the pen': the Imamiya Mission of Lucknow 
As during earlier decades, the key to understanding efforts towards Shia religious 
renewal and solidarity lies in the formation of numerous public anjumans expressedl\ for 
this purpose. Indeed, several small and informal Shia associations of this nature were 
already in place in the muhallas of Lucknow from the beginning of the 1930s, among 
them the Anjuman-i-Jafariya, Anjuman-i-Baqariya, Anjuman-i-Mehdiviva, Anjunian-i- 
Pinjatani and Anjuman-i-Maqbool-i-Husaini. 46 However, by far the most important of the 
Shia anjunians to be established and the apex of this trend was the Imamiva Mission of 
Lucknow, which quickly established itself as the most organised and successful 
proselytising movement of Indian Shi'ism. In its appropriation of the language of tabligh 
and its emphasis upon proselytisation, the Imamiya Mission was also the successor of 
many of the religious formations discussed earlier. Moreover, it encapsulates succinctly 
the character of many other religious and socio-culturalist associations in the early 
twentieth century that, alongside their reflection upon the history of their communities 
and their recourse to text-based religious traditions, appropriated media and 
communicative methods of recent origins in the public arenas of colonial north India. The 
existence of detailed proceedings of the Imamiya Mission's first two years and the 
continuous re-publication of many of its key writings allow the opportunity for an 
analysis of the history and workings of the anjunian unequalled by any other Shia 
religious Organisation of the sane period. 
The anjiiman was the creation of Maulara Saiy}, id 'Ali Nagi (also known as Si yý id ui- 
; end wcrc not hand utfcd/ i'c. "tterrccl. Ibid. IO Rh iv and 8 lurlL" 19. "9, OIOC. 
'Abdul Shakoor Farooqi, Tehrif ki khäna . cri,. 
buchgar kI jawäb (Luc know, It) 3), p. 4. 
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`Ulama), a descendent from both sides of the Nasirabadi family of ulanu,. 4' Born in 
1905, he demonstrates the extent to which young `ulamu became active and influential 
during this period, supplanting the now-elderly religious authorities who dominated 
previous chapters. `Ali Naqi returned to Lucknow in 1932 from Najaf after , c\ oral \ ears 
of education from which he gained ijazat, and immediately set about a renewal of the 
Shia religion in Lucknow. 48 His education in Najaf was cited by the Imami}a \Ikksion's 
members as part of the justification for the organisation's authority, the president 
declaring that `the distinctive feature of our teacher's writings to my mind is that they are 
from that very time when he was gaining perfect wisdom in Najaf-i-Ashraf. '49 
Although much of the organ's legitimacy came from 'Ali Nagi's ija;, at and reputation, 
the immediate context out of which the organisation grew was the straining of Shi'a- 
Sunni relations in Lucknow in the early 1930s. The Imamiya Mission emerged 
subsequent to a flurry of activity among Sunni reformists. The key moment emerged 
around the turn of the 1930s when `Abdul Shakoor Farooqi, the namesake of his famed 
Kakorvi father discussed in Chapter 2, established a Sunni madr-asa and publishing house 
in Lucknow. The Dar-ul-Muballighin seminary, it was said, excelled in the practice of 
inunazara and aimed solely at the contradiction of Shia doctrines, 50 and clearly echoed 
the Shia Madrasa't ul-Wa'izen in its emphasis upon public oratory and its recruitment 
and training of niaulan'is and wawa `ixen. Like the Madrasa't ul-Wa'izen, furthermore, the 
school worked in tandem with a publishing house, Jama'at ul-Tahaffuz-i-Nlillat, which 
printed many of 'Abdul Shakoor's writings. Like those of his father, his arguments were 
oriented around the central theme that the Shia faith and its doctrines could not be 
justified from the Qur'an. 
It was this atmosphere of sectarian vitriol in Lucknow to which ', -\li Nadi returned. 
Nlaulana S. Ali Nag, Nad\ i, History of Islam, transl. Nlurtaza Husain (. \li`ý. rrh, 2002), p. i. 
I'moogli. ]'Chi-if ki khämu, pp. 1-3. 
49 lmamiva Mission, Sýi(aico rapört-i-I ithniva . 
1lishan Lºuckiru'tc häbta-i-sil-i-uºº'al (Luckncýý. I933), 
3. 
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2(1O5). p. 57. Peter 
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Sectarian relations became particularly tense during Muharram of 1932, when certain 
unspecified Sunni preachers and newspapers circulated claims that it was the Muslims of 
Kufa, in other words Shi'as, who were responsible for the death of Imam Husain. As `Ah 
Naqi recalls: 
`It is lamentable that certain people, who take pleasure in inciting 
and furthering division and stirring up troubles within the [Muslim] 
community, give much importance to the opinion that the killers of 
Husain were themselves Shi'as, and these claims are forever being 
perpetuated with great noise and force. ' 51 
This prompted a further straining of Shia-Sunni relations. Muharram of that year was 
marked by the convening of separate Shi'a and Sunni meetings and assemblies, and the 
conducting of public munazaras. 52 In response to these rumours, `Ali Naqi wrote the 
important tract Qätilän-i-Husen kä mazhab ('The Faith of the Murderers of Husain'), 
undoubtedly one of the most influential and widely-distributed Shia writings of colonial 
South Asia. Originally serialised in seven instalments in Sa, faraz, the treatise offered a 
series of so-called `historical demonstrations and proofs' seeking to prove that: 
`Referring blame for the murder of Imam Husain upon the community 
of the city of Kufa is completely without foundation, and to say that it 
was in fact these Shi'as is far from the reality of these events. Thus, 
there is a pressing need to clarify these ideas, so that the principles of 
world history are not in hindsight distorted, and proper consideration 
is fully made. '53 
At this point, moves were made for the publication of this and other religious writings of 
`Ali Naqi perceived as worthy of public distribution. The organisational initiative 
appeared to come from Jalal-ud-din Haider, formerly the founding member of the 
Anjuman-i-Wasifa-i-Sadat-va-Mominin of Amroha association discussed in Chapter 3, 
who retired to Lucknow and became the Imamiya Mission's first president. Arguing that 
Qätilän-i-Husen kä mazizab should be published in book-form in order to be more widely 
distributed, he met with the manager of the Sarfara press to make arrangements 
for its 
publication. 54 Money for the publishing of such texts was drawn from the management of 
51 Syed `Ali Naqi Naqvi, Qdtilän-i-Husen kä mazhab (Lucknow. 1932-3), p. 16. 
`2 Imamiya Mission, Säläna rapört-i-lmämia Mishan Luckna'a, p. 2'. 
53 Naqvi, Qätildn-i-Husen kä mazhab, p. 5I .' 34 Imamiya Mission, Säläna rap6rt-i-1m, 5ä iVa Mishan Luckna'u, pp. 23-4. 'This tract was produced 
for the 
public good, and has been serialised in seven instalments 
in the Sarfara: national nc%%spaper. But, since 
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Sarfaraz and the auqaf of the Husainabad Trust and Shah Najaf imambaras. 55 
At first, the Imamiya Mission was little more than an aegis under which the publication 
of religious treatises could be conducted, but the twin pillars of the newspaper Sarfara: 
and the Imamiya Mission's tracts together quickly developed into a singular 
organisational project which earned the Imamiya Mission its reputation as a powerful 
publishing organisation. 56 The Mission represented a new application of the print media 
with unprecedented skill and focus; the `effort of the pen (jihad-i-galain)' as it was 
described by the Mission's managers, was responsible for its growth and influence. 57 Few 
examples demonstrate more clearly than the Imamiya Mission the decisive role of the 
printed word in disseminating a religious consciousness among lay Muslims, as well as in 
broadening the audience reached by religious authorities. 
Within the first year of its existence the Mission was able to publish an impressive 
fifteen-thousand individual tracts of twenty-five titles, the majority written by 'Ali Naqi, 
the most successful of which were re-printed in further editions. 58 A `modern' mujtahid 
in more than simply his youth, `Ali Naqi understood intently the promulgatory power of 
Urdu. While `Ali Naqi's references allude to his classical Arabic and Persian education in 
Najaf, his fluent use of the vernacular was perhaps unprecedented for a mujtahid of his 
stature. `Urdu is the language of the writings of the Mission and it will remain so, ' the 
Mission's secretary claimed; the use of the vernacular was perceived as a necessary 
adjustment to the often-cited `needs of the times. '59 `Ali Naqi's authority was drawn as 
much from the maximisation of his readership through the vernacular as his erudition. In 
complete contrast to the contingency of religious authority upon a knowledge of Arabic 
clearly the aim of this piece was to be further circulated, it should be printed in future in the 
format of a 
hook, and we ourselves felt this need and for this purpose the Imamiya Mission was founded, so that the 
propagation of this kind of literature may be successfully conducted. ' Naqvi, Qatilän-i-Husen 
kä mazhab, 
2. 
Imamiya Mission, Sälcna rapört-i-Imämiva Mishan Luckna'u, pp. 24-7. 
"` 'Because of the newspapers, the Prophet cannot remain unheeded. Sarfaraz 
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disseminated, and many tracts relating to religious and holy knowledge have been 
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writings were ordered to be printed, of two or even three editions. ' Ibid, p. 16. 
57 Ibid, p. 45. 
`H Ibid, p. 80. 
59 Ibid, p. 16. Additionally, the Mission published the books Husen ör Islam and 
The Martyrdom of Husain 
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and Persian was `Ali Nagi's occasionally evident view that meaning is best conveyed in 
the native tongue. He argues, for instance, that the meaning rather than the word of the 
Qur'an is the source of benefit, this being part of the reason why the perceived lack of 
hafiz among the Shi'a community is an irrelevance. 60 
An examination of some of `Ali Nagi's treatises helps us to understand the Mission's 
own contribution to Shia faith and practice, and to interpretations of community and 
religious leadership in Shi'ism. They were most commonly examinations of Islamic 
history, referencing hadis and ancient histories and, frequently, authoritative Sunni as 
well as Shia texts. 61 While these tracts tended to discuss long-standing religious 
questions and apply the findings of classical Arabic and Persian texts, the immediate 
trigger for the writing of each text was often identified as a necessary clarification of a 
rumour or slander recently created, through either the spoken or printed word. Like 
Qätilän-i-Husen kä mazhab, the origin of which is traced to verbal rumour on the streets 
of Lucknow, many of his writings were produced in response to perceived falsehoods 
recently circulated in public discourse. 62 For instance the second publication of the 
Mission, Tehrif Qur `än ki hagiqät, an attempt to outline the Shia perspective upon the 
Qur'an, was a response to certain contrary claims which had been recently propounded in 
a hostile newspaper that Shi'as regarded the Qur'an as 'created' and liable to failure. 63 
While subscribing to belief in the inimitable authority of the Qur'an, the work blames the 
wills of the early Caliphs and Companions for the admission of innovations into the 
revelation: the loss of the surahs' (chapters of the Qur'an) order, the changing of words 
and the rejection of particular passages. Wherever the Qur'an is unchanged and authentic, 
in Hindi and English. 
6d Imamiya Mission, Tazkira-i-hi äz Shi'a, hesa-i-aval (Lucknow, 1933), pp. 15-27,101. 
61 Where these are used, 'Ali Naqi is careful to emphasise the fact and at point chooses even to 
congratulate Sunni historians on their grasp of fact. Naqvi, Qätildn-i-Husen kä mazhab. p. 5- 
62 Tazkira-i-hifäz Shia was also a response to perceived Sunni slurs that no hafiz (those able to recite the 
Qur'an) existed within the Shi'a community. The work denies the claim, arguing instead that any 
deficiency in Shia religious knowledge in India was due to their constant persecution; moreo'er, religious 
development also took place under tagiva, and has been more than compensated by the o%errs helming 
Shi'a contribution to religion and literature in recent generations. Imamiya Mission, To: kira-i-hiic, z Shia, 
passim. ET Syed 'Ali Naqi Naqvi, Tehrif-i-Qur'an ki hagiqät (Lucknow, 1932-3). pp. 2.7. 
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he infers, is due to the custody of Shi'as. 64 
Additionally, some of the Imamiya Mission's publications had a more contemporary 
focus, and identified the organisation's agenda as one of fresh social and economic 
modernisation. 'Ali Nagi was known as a pioneer of reform, and this is ably 
demonstrated by the Imamiya Mission's twelfth publication, Tijärat or Is/-ml 
('Commerce and Islam'), compiled from a series of lectures delivered by the Maulana. 
Referring implicitly to the economic poverty and educational decline of many of the 
Shi'as of Lucknow, the tract unfolds as a long metaphor comparing the Shi'a community 
to one who does not realise himself to be in the early stages of an illness, demanding a 
successful diagnosis and cure for the community's ills. 65 The author rejects the view, 
evident among certain Shi'as of the day, that worldly enterprise represents a neglect of 
Islam. Arguing that `Ali rejected the divorce (talaq) from the world, he suggests that the 
sayings and deeds of neither the Prophet nor 'Ali demonstrate that worldly enterprise 
contradicts Islamic principles. For this reason, the solution was distinctly secular; 
progress in agriculture and industry, and the development of trade. The readership was 
encouraged to save wealth, and to initiate or participate in commercial enterprise. 66 
Indeed, 'Ali Naqi's petition that Shi'as should support Shi'a businesses and trade to 
facilitate the community's betterment was more than fulfilled; it was complained that 
Shi'as in 1930s Lucknow ceased conducting transactions with Sunni traders. 67 These 
brave assertions made the Imamiya Mission the main successor to organs such as the 
Shi `a Conference and educational organisations of earlier decades, picking up their 
efforts where the latter had been unsuccessful in instigating substantial change. 'Ali Naqi 
assigns the 'u /ama to the forefront of attempts at secular reform, describing the duty of 
Shia inau/ai'« as the endeavour to give instructions to the community, and to respond to 
practical concerns with teachings from the Qur'an and hw is. 68 Rather than upholding 
traditionalism or resisting modernisation, it was their duty to bring about regeneration in 
the modern world. 
h, 
Ibid. passim. 
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A solid trade in religious publications offered the Imamiya Mission a base from which it 
could expand beyond its centre at Lucknow and ingratiate itself among wider Shi `a 
communities. Members of the Imamiya Mission were instructed to distribute these texts 
and assigned with the task of dispensing them in their towns and among relatives and 
acquaintances. 69 Members sometimes maximised readership by distributing books freely 
among those who could not afford them, and attempted to release books at reduced 
prices. 70 Yet no less important to the Imamiya Mission were the various Shia 
newspapers emerging at this time. Sarfaraz was not the only newspaper affiliated to the 
Imamiya Mission: other papers described as `working for' the Mission included Shi'a 
(Lahore), Dar-i-Najaf (Sialkot) and Al-Wa'iz (Lucknow). 71 The Mission thus gave 
something of a centre to localised printing projects in U. P. and Punjab, attaching local 
editors to a national network of Shi'a publishing organisations. As such, from its initial 
status as an informal agreement among a few Lucknawis managed from a side-room of a 
house in Chowk, with no furniture and no salaried employees, 7` the Mission quickly 
evolved into a national organisation with multiple offices, full-time staff and some 270 
active enrolled members around the country. 73 It boasted a highly regulated structure with 
a central organisational committee, regional and district branches, membership schemes, 
publicity campaigns and affiliations with other Shi'a organisations. 
As the Imamiya Mission grew, so it developed beyond the scope of a publishing 
organisation. Having enlisted the support of locally eminent individuals in Lucknow who 
were most able to provide support, funding and meeting places, the Mission thus proved 
adept at utilising networks of family, profession and local reputation in the consolidation 
N" Naqvi, Tijdrat 5r /sIdm, pp. 71-2. 
69 'I realised that in every single district, should just one or two people to whom we could dispatch from 
[Lucknowj an appropriate number of tracts acquire a sympathetic faith, they could distribute them amongst 
their relatives and friends... in this way our output of texts could be great in number. ' Imamiya Mission, 
SdIdna rapört-i-JmämlI'a Mislhan Lucrina'u, pp. 34-5. The first non-Lucknawi member of the Mission was 
asked to distribute texts around his locality, while it was said that many other members of the Mission 
bought books for distribution among their friends and by post. Ibid, pp. 29-33. 70 Ibid, p. 40. 71 All of these newspapers 'have supported the propagation of the Mission's aims and essence in every 
possible way, and will remain and contribute to the service of the community. ' Ibid, p. 84. 2 Ibid, pp. 72-6. 
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of its influence. In addition to cultivating local Shi'a urban and rural nobilities, it also 
made efforts to train a volunteer corps, mimicking many populist religious and political 
anjumans during the period. 74 With the clear aim of building up a body of young 
activists, a camp was convened in Delhi to engage young activists and train them in work 
for the Mission. The Mission further established a so-called `Comrades of Action' 
scheme, advertised in Sarfaraz, for appropriate volunteers who could travel to the 
districts and disseminate the message and tracts of the Mission. 75 Through all such means 
the Mission was able to reach beyond the confines of old Lucknow, explaining the 
organisation's remarkable expansion in terms both of membership and geographical 
reach. 76 It established a wide presence through its engagement with local networks and in 
this way carried its tracts and message to Shi'as in cities as distant as Delhi, Lahore, 
Patiala, Jabalpur and Peshawar. 77 This said, an overall majority originated from U. P., the 
districts of Lucknow, Hardoi, Allahabad, Meerut and Bareilly especially. 78 Donations 
flowed in from such places, with U. P. and Hyderabad unsurprisingly the most fruitful 
sources of revenue. 79 
The Imamiya Mission did not itself openly instigate Shia-Sunni antagonism. Indeed, 
while it was concerned primarily with Shi'as rather than wider Muslim communities, the 
Imamiya Mission positioned itself in conjunction with wider causes of Muslim welfare in 
' Ibid, pp. 47,80. 
74 This style of politics in 1930s north India is described in Gooptu, The politics of the urban poor, passim; 
Gould, Hindu nationalism and the language of politics, passim. 75 Imamiya Mission, SdIdna rapört-i-Imämrya Mishan Luckna'u, pp. 34-5. Alongside publishing and the 
construction of networks, a further way in which the Mission was able to establish credence beyond 
Lucknow was through its intervention in affairs within local Shia communities. This is clearly shown in 
the intervention of Jalal-ud-din Haider in Sialkot in July 1932, another town where the Mission was able to 
establish its roots. A quarrel amongst the town's Shi'as over Muharram rites during 1932 in Sialkot had 
caused divisions, prompting Jalal-ud-din Haider to place `an appeal for the preservation of the essential 
faith above the local schism. ' The Imamiya Mission, thus, was credited with the halting of the quarrel. It 
seems that the Mission, drawing from the credentials of its Lucknawi basis, was permitted to resolve local 
difficulties. Ibid, pp. 33-4. 76 As the secretary described: 'on the one side the books and printing work... continued, and on the other 
side I occupied myself in [the exchange of] letters and books from powerful Shia organisations, and 
frequently individual supporters of the community, from all over India. ' Ibid, pp. 32-3. 77 Ibid, p. 42. 
7" Ibid, pp. 36-7. The large membership from Hardoi district may indicate the support of the Sayyids of 
Bilgram, although this cannot be proven. 79 Through a number of large donations from members, the organisation raised a revenue of 1600 rupee,, in 
its first year. Ibid, pp. 80-2. 
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much of the language of its proceedings and the tracts it published. It pledged to act for 
`the preservation and propagation of Islam' and to 'work together with all Muslim 
missionary organisations with a unity of principles, ' although of course giving particular 
prominence to Shia organisations. 80 Some of its tracts, such as Ittehüd crl-fciricj ('Unity 
of the sects') advocated the harmonisation of Shi'a-Sunni relations, albeit through a 
process asking more from Sunnis than Shi'as. 8' Despite such pledges, the Imamisa 
Mission both emerged from and contributed to a wider context of the consolidation of 
religious difference between Shi'as and Sunnis in the early 1930s. Its published treatises 
restated time and again the historical controversies at the heart of sectarian differences, 
and built upon themes of past and present victimisation of Shi'as at Sunni hands. There 
can be little doubt that the texts of the Imamiya Mission, many invigorating long-standing 
Shia-Sunni debates and attempting to arouse Shi'as out of their supposed intellectual 
slumber, may have contributed to the arousal of tensions, or at the very least have been 
used to this end by certain activists. 
As such, rather than an affiliate of wider schemes for Muslim unity, the Mission is better 
understood as the successor of earlier Lucknawi sectarian organisations. Like the city', 
Sunni and Shia printing presses and inadrasas of the previous forty years, it initiated 
further sectarian closure and the tightening of religious boundaries. Moreover, 
newspapers affiliated with the Imamiya Mission, such as Sarfaraz and Al-Wa'1:., were 
widely accused of inciting sectarian conflict. It is also worth noting that the Iman-riya 
Mission had a great influence upon the character of Saifara:. Initiallti a broadly 
Congressite newspaper with a particular focus upon Shia politicians, after its contact 
with the Imarniya Mission in the early 1930s it began to print religious discussions and 
invectivcs. The Imamiya Mission, then, converted the most widely read Shia organ in 
India from a broadly nationalist political publication into a serialised outlet for Shia 
religious polemic. As such, the Imamiya Mission can be understood as an 
important 
contributory factor to the heightening sense of Shia-Sunni religious difference. 
Milch 
ultimately blended with the social and political tensions bet\\ cc» the communities 
Ibid. 1,. s. 
ti)cd 'Ali Naqi NAlN i. Ittchjd ul-i, ii qM (LucLnow. I9;; ), 11 1,1 . 
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manifest in the decade. 
The political and socio-economic roots of sectarianism in the 1930s 
The successive Sunni and Shia agitations of the late-1930s differed in important \\ a`, " 
from the earlier campaigns in the 1900s to imprint the identifying religious practices of 
each community onto the rites of Muharram, as discussed in the second chapter. Each 
was more systematised, more ordered, headed by more a more eminent and prominent 
leadership and, in part in consequence of these, embracive of wider proportions of the 
Shia and Sunni population in Lucknow. All these factors distinguished the sectarian 
conflicts of the 1930s from their forerunners. While their 1900s precursors had appeared 
to be the religious campaigns of a minority of religious orators and leaders, and were 
viewed with scepticism by wide sections of the communities that they aspired to 
represent, these later agitations were actualised as mass-mobilisations. couched in the 
language of government-petitioning and highly resonant of the political activism which 
typified north India from the 1920s. Indeed, distinctive to the 1930s \\ as the extensive 
interaction between sectarian frictions and the municipal transformation of Lucknow, and 
additionally, the overt politicisation of the Shi `a-Sunni conflict. The sheer force of the 
tabar-rah as a source of popular and public mobilisation must be understood with regard 
to this intertwining of manifestations of Muslim sectarian conflict in the 1930s with such 
wider socio-economic and political transformation. 
lt has been shown over previous chapters that pre-1920s Lucknow had been slow to 
modernise and remained largely stagnant both economically, and in terms of population, 
leaving in place enduring social and economic structures which were broadly 
fa\ oAirable 
to the city's traditional elites and authorities. However, Lucknow's lan,, uishnlent was 
reversed from the 1920s onwards. It very quickly after 1921 became a centre of 
industry 
and trade, and its 'increasing commercial and industrial importance' resulted 
in 'the 
movement of labour to the city in the closing years of the decade. and , hirallling 
lev-cl,, of 
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immigration. ' 82 In the decade after 1921 Lucknow's population grew by some 34.000. or 
15.6%. 83 Even more startling was Lucknow's 54.17c population increase in the 1930s. 54 
bring the population from some 217,000 to 387,000 in just twenty years. This sudden 
population increase, exceeding even Kanpur, stemmed partly from the wider trend of 
urban immigration'85 and partly from the re-establishment of Lucknow as U. p. 's political 
centre following the establishment here of the Legislative Council and seat of the 
Governor, attracting to the city increasing numbers of politicos, officials and investors. "' 
This massive numerical growth not only transformed the character and composition of 
Lucknow, but had particular impact upon the Shia-Sunni balance, since a 
disproportionate number of these immigrants were Muslims, 87 while the predominantly 
Muslim neighbourhoods in western Lucknow appeared to bear the brunt of this 
immigration. 88 
The tremendous growth of Lucknow could be construed to have contributed to Shi `a- 
Sunni animosity in various ways. On the one hand, the sudden numerical expansion of 
the Sunni population may well have been felt to compromise the traditionally 
disproportionate public influence of Shi'ism in Lucknow and cemented the impression of 
fresh Sunni dominance. Furthermore, it seems likely that this massive immigration to the 
older inuhullas contributed to the influence of Muslim religious organisations, as these 
anjunians came to offer immigrant populations a means of offsetting a sense of alienation 
and displacement in a new environment. Shia and in particular Sunni organisations in 
1930s Lucknow exhibited a prominent contingent of Muslims of qasba-U. P. rather than 
82 For instance, Census of India, 1931, United Provinces, Part I: Report (Allahabad, 1933), pp. 86,39? -1, 
429. 
83 C'e'nsus t! f India 1921, United Provinces of .a 'ra and 
Oudl1, Part I. Report (Allahabad, 1923), pp. 34-6: 
Census of India, 1931, United Provinces, Part 1: Report, pp. 141-2. 
84 Census of Indict, 1951, Volume II Uttar Pradesh, Part 1-. 4, Report (Allahahad, 1953), p. 169. 
"` Gooptu, The holitic. c of the urban poor, pp. 34-47. 
"6 See Peter Reeves, 'Lucknow politics: 1920-1947, ' in Violette Graff ed., Lucknotit": memories of'a city 
(Ne' Delhi, 1997), pp. 2I6-9. 
Muslims would have been Sunnis. The "' Almost certainly, an overwhelming proportion of these incominýT 
population oi' Muslims grew taster than the Hindu population, rising by 21.5CI rather than the average 
I5. (ß` (' in the I920s. Census of India, 1931, United Provinces, Part I: Rehort, pp. 5-)'- 3. 
SS II'here was, for instance, an increase In the 1930s of the density of population in the \ward of Yahiyaganj. 
a crucial quarter nestled heth\ccn Nakhhas, Patanala and the Madrasa't ul-\\'a'izcn in Mhich , c%cral 
incidents of sectarian ' iolence occurred. R. Mukerjee and B. Singh, Social pro files (t a , netropoliý: social 
and cconoifiiee structure of Lucknotit, capital of Uttar Pradesh, 1954-50 (London, 100 1 ). 1,32- 
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Lucknawi origins, perhaps attesting to this theory that such religious organisations 
offered outsiders a powerful means of integration and orientation. 89 
No less importantly, the mass resettlement of outside-populations in Lucknow seemed to 
exacerbate social and class rivalries, which tied up with the Shia-Sunni conflict. As was 
described of the sectarian conflicts in the 1900s, the karbala battleground was perceived 
as offering an outlet for innumerable personal and social conflicts. Those municipal 
landowners and lawyers deemed to be representing the Shi `as conflicted with those lower 
and middle-class Sunnis who pushed for a broader assertion of their civic authority and 
relevance through the imposition of reforms onto the character of Muharram. This said, 
these relatively confined undertones of class struggle are not as extensive as the more 
overt social rivalries on display within the religious strife of the 1930s. For instance, there 
was a clear polarisation between the lower class background of many of the Ahrar 
volunteers who requested the right to recite madh-i-sahaba and the privileged, 
aristocratic Shi `as who petitioned against it. The Ahrar organisation `contained no man of 
even a moderate social position within its ranks' and drew its support from the 'lowest 
strata of Lucknow's Muslims, '90 allowing the British to characterise them as degenerates: 
`those offering themselves for arrest were generally the riff-raff. '91 This was in total 
contrast to the Shia tabarrah campaign, which was often most surprising to the 
government for the participation of Shi'a notables, professionals and aristocrats. A 
further issue fuelling Sunni disaffection was the apparent stranglehold by Shi'as over 
posts in government service, a fact highlighted by the Public Services Commission of the 
early 1930s and referenced by Sunni agitators. 92 As such, the Sunni agitation has 
sometimes been interpreted in the context of contemporary political assertion by artisan 
X9 As is insinuated throughout this chapter, Sunni organisations in Lucknow such as the Majlis-i-Ahrar and 
Dar-ul-Muballighin, and to some extent even Shi'a organs such as the Imamiya Mission, drew large 
sections of their support from outside of Lucknow, especially in both cases from neighbouring 
districts 
such as Rae Bareili, Hardoi and Barabanki. 
'° Haig to Linlithgow, 7 June 1937, L/PJ/5/267, OIOC. 
91 'The Madhe Sahaba controversy, ' Haig to Linlithgow, 18 April 1939, L/PJ/7/2587. OIOC. 
BN contrast, it 
was often noted that 'educated and responsible Sunnis [have] kept aloof of the Madhe 
Sahaba agitation. ' 
Member of Legislative Assembly for Shahjahanpur to Jinnah, 27 April 1939, Quaid-i-Azam 
Collection, Ior. 
Neg. Pos. 10773, OIOC. Moreover, according to one Lucknow citizen, 'responsible and wise 
(Sunni] 
leaders did not take any active part in the madh-i-sahaba affair. ' The Leader, 20 
May 1939. OIOC. 
9` Zafar ul-Mulk, Shia-Sunni dispute: its causes and cure, a critical analysis of the presidential address of 
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groups, as an `attempt by the poor to seize political control and initiative, even in a place 
such as Lucknow with a history of established religious leadership.: 93 
Of more novelty in the 1930s, however, was the ascendancy of political divisions 
between Shi'as and Sunnis. Despite Shi'a engagement in an adversarial dialogue with 
such burning issues in Muslim politics as the Aligarh movement and pan-Islamism as 
discussed above, party-political divisions did not formally open up between Shi'as and 
Sunnis until the inauguration of the 1935 Government of India Act and the devolution of 
provincial power to the Indian National Congress administration. The provincial elections 
in 1937 were widely seen to have inflamed Shi'a-Sunni rhetoric, as contests for 'Muslim' 
seats often encouraged the raising of issues of sectarian affiliation. It was argued by many 
Shia politicians that the decade's ascendant sectarian issues had entered the elections, 
and rallied the Sunni majority against any standing Shi'a candidates. Sayyid 'Ali Zaheer, 
figurehead of the All India Shia Political Conference, claimed that 'during elections for 
Muslim seats, it is a very common experience... that appeal is made to the religious 
fanaticism of the majority of voters, and a Shia is defeated merely because he is a Shia. '94 
This he certainly claimed of his own failed attempt at election in 1937: the madhe- 
sahaba issue was raised to defeat me... and I was called Rafizi [heretic]. Other Shia 
candidates had also to face similar propaganda. '95 
Whatever the level of truth in claims of disappointment at the number of Shi`as willing to 
stand in these circumstances, or the defeat of prominent Shi'as on religious grounds, 96 97 
Sir Sultan Ahmed (Badaun, circa 1940), pp. 14-5. 93 Gooptu, The politics of the urban poor, pp. 302-3. 94 Indian Annual Register: July to December 1944 (Delhi, 1945), CSAS, pp. 230-1. 
Y's Speech by Sayyid Ali Zaheer, The Moonlight (Lucknow), 27 October 1945, L/PJ/8/693. OIOC. 'Ali 
Zaheer eventually entered the Provincial Assembly through a by-election in 1939. J. M. Goodman, B. D. 
Graham, P. D. Reeves, Handbook to elections in Uttar Pradesh, 1920-1951 (Delhi, 1975), p. 314. Even prior 
to the 1937 elections, there were claims that Shi'as were losing seats on sectarian grounds. Wazir Hasan 
contested election to the Viceroy's Central Legislative Council in 1934: his son wrote, 'My father was 
fighting this election on a Muslim League ticket, and yet it made no difference: he lost because he was a 
Shia. ' 'Memoirs of Syed Ali Zaheer, ' manuscript, private papers of Kazim Zaheer. New Delhi. % The Leader, 18 October 1936, OIOC, claims that six Shi'as stood for the 66 seats in the Prop incial 
Assembly, and that only three stood across the 17 seats in the Legislative Council; while precise statistics 
are difficult to ascertain, this seems to be have been a slight underestimate. 97 Including: Sayyid Asghar Husain, K. B. Shah Nazar Husain, Agha 'Ali Khan, Sayyid 'Ali Zaheer. 
Goodman et al. Handbook to elections in Uttar Pradesh, pp. 293,294,298,302. Successful Shi'as included 
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the elections convinced many of the hazards of separate electorates for Shia". Opposing 
the Muslim League's central cause of separate Muslim representation, the Shi'a Political 
Conference moved during its 1930s sessions towards advocacy of joint electorates, albeit 
under a vague scheme of quotas for Hindu, Sunni and Shia seats, and was hence pulled 
closer towards the National Congress. Congress' mass-contacts' campaign to enrol 
Muslim support met with only sporadic successes, one of which was among the Shi'as of 
Lucknow. 98 The president of the Shia Political Conference, Wazir Hasan, offered a 
speech in 1937 in which `he vehemently opposed the ideology of the Muslim League to 
form a separate Muslim block, and opined that the Muslim League alone did not 
represent all the Muslims of India, ' formalising the organisation's support of Congress. 9 
Thus during the late-1930s, when political disagreements in elite circles tended to find 
violent expressions in the streets, there was a clear political polarisation in Lucknow 
between Shi'as and Sunnis. Whether independently or on the urges of the Shia Political 
Conference, Shi'as cautiously yet consistently aligned themselves with Congress. Mille 
Sunnis largely rallied to the local Muslim League candidate, Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman, 
who was a member of what was described as the most orthodox Sunni family in 
Lucknow. ' 100 
Why, in these circumstances, Congress actively saw fit to re-open the Shia-Sunni 
conflict is a matter of some debate. It may have been a tactical plo} to expand the 
flagging sympathies for Congress among Sunnis. Alternatively, it may have been an 
attempt to meet the wishes of Husain Ahmad Madani, who was at this time Vice 
President of the United Provinces Congress Committee. Rumours floated that he had 
promised to reward Congress with Sunni votes for allowing the nlucl/T-i-su/icrhu 
procession, and in 1938 the Ministry certainly believed that 'they should meet the 
demand of Maulvi Husain Ahmad. ' 101 Alternatively, it has been suggested that the 
the followin : Ja'far Hasan Khan, and the Kapas of SadcrnFur, Pirpur and Hasanpur. Ibid., pp. 297.302-5. 
98 For instance, Nlushirul Hasan, 'The N1u,, hni mass contacts campaign: analysis of a'lrategy of political 
mohif isation. ' in Mushirui Hasan cd., India's partition: process, strutegv and mobilisation (Delhi, 1993), 
pp. 140-I. 
Zaheer c: d., The memoirs of vcd Ali Znheer, p. 19. IM Note by Sir Hasan Suhrawardv. 2(' October 1942. Information Department Files (UI). ]/, -, So. OIOC; 
Khaliquiraman, Path, av to Pakistan, p. 3. 
1°t Haig to Linlithgo\v. 23 October 1938. Linlithgo Collection. N1.,. Eur. F. 125/'101. OIOC. Additionall\. 
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Congress actively encouraged the dispute in order to `split the Muslims' 102 and expose 
the vacuity of the Muslim League's ideological platform. This was certainly the 
perspective of Muslim League activists. Khaliquzzaman suspected Congress 
machinations, while Jinnah emphasized that `those responsible for leading, rather 
misleading, sections of both the Shi'as and Sunnis in a fratricidal struggle are prominent 
Muslim Congressites. ' 103 The secretary of the U. P. Muslim League similarly claimed that 
many of those alliances at the centre of the madh-i-sahaba and tabarrah agitations, 
including the Shia Political Conference and Majlis-i-Ahrar, would `dance like puppets to 
the tune of the Congress High Command and can be made to do anything if it is to 
weaken the Muslim League. ' 104 Such an interpretation would suggest that the Congress 
administration handled Shi'a-Sunni relations with the same manipulative skill as had 
their British predecessors during their earlier attempts to find gaps in Muslim unity 
during the Muslim University and pan-Islamic campaigns. 
Evidence that the tabarrah agitation had a motivation of political protest can be found in 
the explanations of the Shia political leaders who courted arrest. Wazir Hasan, president 
of the Shi'a Political Conference, instructed his comrades that `the present Shia 
satyagraha (civil disobedience) is in no sense a sectarian agitation but is directed only 
against the Government. ' los Sayyid Hyder Mehdi, another prominent Shi `a Congressman, 
claimed that the agitation was `in the nature of a defiance of government order, ' stating 
that, `I have not been able to find any other front from which Shias can give a fight to the 
Government. ' 106 Often the Congress party specifically suffered the vitriol of the tabarrah 
Congress' support of the Sunni side may have been because the two serving Muslim members of the 
U. P. C. C., both of whom were Sunnis, sympathised with the madh-i-sahaba cause. Hafiz Muhammad 
Ibrahim, who headed the negotiations on the madh-i-sahaba issue, was of a family from which other 
members courted arrest. `Who is responsible for the Shia/Sunni dispute?, ' by Sayyid Akbar All, member of 
Central Standing Committee of All India Shi'a Political Conference, L/PJ/7/2587, OIOC. 1o2 `Shia-Sunni trouble, ' Haig to Linlithgow, 18 April 1939, ibid. 
10; Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p. 213; The Leader, 10 May 1939, OIOC. 105 Khan ed., Why 14,000 Shias went to jail ?, p. 39. 105 The Leader, II May 1939, OIOC. 
ýýý Ibid, I May 1939. Importantly, many such political figures were careful to stress that the present 
question is more political than religious and it is carried... without any disrespect to the Sunnis. ' Sad N Said 
Shibli Ali to Liaquat Ali Khan, 15 April 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Collection, Ior. Neg. Pos. 10773. OJOC. It 
was frequently claimed that should the right to tabarrah be granted, it would be given up: some 'u/ama 
even pronounced that the recital was only obligatory while it was prohibited. The Leader. I May 1939. 
CSAS; The Statesman, 3 June 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Collection, Ior. Neg. Pos. 10773. OIOC. Some played 
233 
agitation, a remarkable example being the inclusion of the names of Congress leaders 
alongside the Caliphs in the tabarrah during Muharram. 107 Shi'as. the government 
predicted, were likely to `indulge in anti-Ministerial slogans and lend their support to any 
organisation that is carrying on an agitation against Government. ' 108 
Further evidencing the political tones of the Shia-Sunni conflict in Lucknow is the fact 
that the madh-i-sahaba and tabarrah agitations came to adopt the militant styles of many 
of the era's nationalist and communal `volunteer movements. ' Both frequently resembled 
ordered political protests, and were evoked in the Gandhian language of satvagraha. 
Moreover, given the ubiquitous hand of the British government and municipal authorities 
in attempts to bring the troubles to a close, the Shi `a-Sunni conflicts were appropriated by 
many participants as a means of demonstrating their defiance of government orders at 
various levels. This is perhaps a more sophisticated explanation than the thesis of a 
`divide and rule' tactic on the part of Congress for the presence of many quasi-nationalist 
individuals and Congress-affiliated groups in both the madh-i-sahaba and tabarrah 
agitations. 
While studies of communal conflict in north India have arguably tended on occasion to 
portray religious conflict as simply an expression of economic and political competition 
between opposing communities, this recognition of the important temporal dynamics is 
not intended to discount the importance of the renewal of religious consciousness for 
understanding the conflict, as previously discussed. It is, instead, an attempt to convey 
something of the depth of the interaction of religious conflicts with socio-economic and 
political divisions, one unprecedented in earlier decades. As has been argued in previous 
chapters, a defining feature of Shia-Sunni disputes after 1900 as opposed to, 
for instance, 
before 1890 was their escaping the boundaries of exclusively religious conflict, and their 
tendency to instigate wider social segregation and find expression through political 
differentiation. However, the extent of the overlap between religious, social and political 
down sectarian differences altogether, Lady Wazir Hasan, for instance, described 
both the madh-i-sahaba 
and tabarrah agitations as political movements under 'religious garb, ' even stating that 
the communities 
had found a unity in 'making life difficult for the Government. ' The Leader, 
27 May 1939.010C. 
107 Lall to Conran Smith, 22 August 1939, IJPJ/5/268, OIOC. 
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conflicts among Muslims in 1930s Lucknow suggests that this was not so much a 
culmination of a process of sectarian consolidation reaching back over previous decades, 
but a tangibly novel formation reflecting the severe societal anxieties of north India in a 
context of social and political unrest. These numerous antagonisms would increasingl\ 
become expressed and consolidated through ritual demonstrations of religious difference 
in the public spaces of Lucknow. 
Establishing a sectarian battleground: the re-fashioning of Muharram 
Many scholars have demonstrated how entire religious communities came to be 
represented in the urban public arenas of north India by a series of increasingly ritualised, 
expansive and competitive symbols. In particular, Sandra Freitag has suggested that the 
exhibition of increasingly conflictive manifestations of religion in the public arena after 
the 1920s meant that certain standard features of religious life, such as in the case of 
Islam prayer, the mosque and other `public' expressions of allegiance, were isolated and 
then used as a `shorthand vocabulary' to represent the meanings of the religion as a 
whole. 109 In other words, a new symbolic language developed. which compacted the 
expansive themes and fluidities of religious thought and custom into a finite list of' 
recurring images and emblems. 
For Lucknow's Shi`as, Muharram had long been perhaps the most important symbol of 
the wider meaning and vigour of their faith. The weight put upon Muharram as an 
expansive representation of Shi'ism was by no means new, as was shown abo%e, 
Muharram was adapted in Lucknow from the Nawabi period onwards as the primary 
means of demonstrating Shia rule and, subsequently, the sustained presence of 
Shi'ism 
in Lucknow's public life. Similarly, it was shown that in the car1ý twentieth centur` 
'gis, Jasbir Singh to Harper, 11 October 1939. Political Department File No. ()", of 
1939. UPS. \. 
109 Sandra Freitag, 'Ambiguous public arenas and coherent personal practice: 
Kanpur Muslims 1913-19', l .' 
in Katherine Ewing ed., Shari'at and ambiguity irr South Asian 
Isiwn (New Delhi, 1988), p. 1-t5. Cf.. 'given 
the nature cif public arenas, this religious idiom became the vocabulary 
in 'ý hich competition ý% a, cxprev\ed 
and through \w hich adjustments were made in the social and cultural 
fabric. This process was heightened 
during periods of change, particularly change initiated by alterations 
in the reLttion"hip het\kccn the state 
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Muharram became the chief target for those seeking the amendment of Shia custom or 
the tighter definition of Shia-Sunni differences. However, the weight placed upon the 
recurring motif of Muharram seemed to take its own momentum in the 1930s. The bulk 
of the numerous anjumans materialising and functioning in Lucknow on both Shia and 
Sunni sides had as their primary objective the correction of Muharram practice. It was 
thus the festival of Muharram, and attempts by all sides to guard against the bid `alp of 
rivals, which became the focus around which these rival campaigns of religious renewal 
were manifested. Essentially, the six-week period of Muharram was appropriated as a 
canvas for the transformation of a religion and its followers in their entirety. The 
evolution of the meanings and customs associated with Muharram, therefore, offers a 
strong basis for understanding the shift in Shi'ism and in Muslim sectarian conflict 
during the 1930s. 
As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, Muharram was often the starting-point from 
which new Shi'a anjumans attempted to make their mark more widely upon Shia 
society; conversely, religious change in Shi'ism and sectarian conflict tended to find their 
first expressions in transformations within Muharram. This was as true of Muslim 
anjumans in the 1930s as in the 1900s. For instance, 'Ali Naqi and his comrades in the 
Imamiya Mission sprung into action annually during this period. The Imamiya Mission 
adhered rigorously to the seasonal publication of its du'as, mar-siyas and other tracts, and 
it is in the 1930s that we locate the origins or at least the maturation of the practice of 
setting up temporary bookstalls in the proximity of the best-attended imambaras during 
Muharram. This was not confined to Lucknow, but extended to other towns where the 
Imamiya Mission was able to establish its influence. In Fyzabad, seemingly one of the 
first towns to be 'Imam-ized' according to the agenda of the Mission, the organisation's 
secretary visited the town. Despite an initially apathetic reception, the secretary was able 
to gain the support of a local zakir and the majalis held during 
Muharram became 
essentially occasions of recruitment for the Imamiya Mission, with the 
Mission's 
publications openly distributed. 
10 
and its constituent communities. ' Freitag, Collective action and community, pp. 
51-2. 
110 Imamiya Mission, SdIdna rapört-i-Imämn"a Mishan Luckna'u. pp. 60-4. 
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Furthermore, the Imamiya Mission proved adept at working with those local anjumans 
which organised Muharram commemorations and ta'civa processions in the mulzallas of 
Lucknow, in effect making them its own branches. One such example ww as the prolifically 
active Anjuman-i-Nasir-ul-'Aza, run from the private home of a Lucknawi Shia, Abu 
Tarrab, an organisation which organised majalis, supervised the ta'ziva and tabut (in 
which the steed of Husain is represented) processions to the Talkatora karbala and 
recruited volunteers to conduct azadari. 111 This organisation had a close working 
relationship with the Imamiya Mission. Also affiliated to the Imamiya Mission were 
similar associations including the Darbar-i-Husaini and the Idara-i-Yadgar-i-Husaini, 
both additional organisations professing the will to preserve the true greatness of Husain 
and involved in the local regulation of Muharram practice. ", Through these local 
organisations, the Imamiya Mission could surpass its status as a mere publishing body, 
working in conjunction with the regulation of Muharram practice. At the same time, the 
affiliation with a wider structure of religious activity offered these local associations the 
opportunity to transcend their limitations, gaining affiliation to the Imamiya Mission and, 
by extension, to similar anjumans springing into action during Muharram. 
As Muharram developed as the prime marker of Shia presence and distinctiveness, and 
as the practice of azadari was elaborated and systematised, so the nlajlis tradition that 
accompanied Muharram was subject to a similar process of evolution. From periodic 
religious gatherings, /najalls evolved into significant arenas in which illujtahids and 
tivc1'i , cal could attempt 
to rectify and rehabilitate the Shia community according to their 
proposed designs. 'Ali Naqi used the nlajlis gatherings of Muharram, taking to the 
müllbar before the large crowds accommodated in the grounds of the Husainiya Ghufran- 
i-Ma'ab, to speak widely and systematically on a number of subjects well beyond the 
boundaries of the customary reflections upon Imam Husain. It was during Muharram of 
1932, for instance, that he offered a series of sermons calling for Shi'as to seek their 
Nlclhdi Husain. `. tit Cl"ýntýýn.. 1iºjunýun-i-: 'ý'ýi. cir u! -'clýýý. (Lucknoýw. 1942), Private papers of Sultan "Ah 
Sudiy. Luc kno\\ , pp. 
8-10. 
112 lhid. pp. ti-9, 
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economic betterment and participate in commercial enterprise. 113 
`Ali Naqi's expansion of the majlis into an occasion for public communication and 
reflection upon wider issues seemed to play into the hands of those who administered 
smaller, local majalis, and often came to appropriate them to stir religious animosities. 
This tendency is reflected in an observation of the Raja of Mahmudabad. A figure well- 
versed in traditional adherence to azadari who had long presided over the elaborate and 
cross-communal observance of Muharram in his own qasba in Sitapur district, he 
lamented in 1938 what he saw as the precedence of the majlis' theatrical elements over 
pious reflection. The traditional large majalis given by 'men well versed, ' he argued, had 
declined in favour of `many small majalis, ' lacking an orienting centre and offered by 
preachers who lacked the learned eminence of the senior nurjta/iids. As such, he argued, 
majalis became increasingly antagonistic in nature and there was an evident tendency in 
Lucknow to convert these majalis into a debating society for attacking the beliefs of 
people of other sects. ' He commented upon: 
`The recent tendency of the Majalis to develop into a munazara.... 
This tendency is neither good nor natural for Majalis. It is merely a 
reaction to the unhealthy communal strife raging in Lucknow... 
Majalis are sacred institutions, and they should not be dragged down 
from their high pedestals to serve such low ends. ' 114 
Some of the increasingly combative tendencies of Muharram can be directly or indirectly 
assigned to the influence of new, confrontational anjuinans on both sides of the conflict. 
The Tanzim-ul-Mominin, while professing to work for the 'safeguarding the economic, 
social, religious and political rights of the community, ' 11-5 focused its attention upon the 
defence of ta'zivadari and the use of tabarrah as a fitting response to the inadh-i-sahaba 
procession. Come 1939, the Tanzim-ul-Mominin was consistently at the forefront of the 
sectarian disturbances. Early in the year, it convened celebrations on the anniversary of 
Umar's murder. 116 Simultaneous with these Shia efforts was a responsive rise in the 
activity of Sunni maulavis and seminaries during this period, in particular 'Abdul 
Thee ý\ ere published as Nagv i, Tijärat ör Isläm, passim. 
114 Zaheer ed.. The clcad past, pp. 112-113. 
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Shakoor and the Dar-ul-Muballighin, which focused upon sustained condemnations of 
Shi'a customs. Shakoor's proselytising machine and the Ahrars alike were united in the 
belief that Shi `a `innovations, ' particularly the custom of to `ziyadari, should be ceased 
entirely among Sunnis. Their attempts to withdraw their followers from the Shi'a-led 
practices of Muharram were met with increasing success. By 1937, Sunnis had ceased 
almost completely the taking out of to `ziyas, following instructions from 'Abdul Shakoor, 
the vast majority instead observing a hartal while Shia azadari conversely became more 
elaborate and better attended. ' 17 
Interestingly, however, `Abdul Shakoor's desire to purge what he saw as excessive 
populist ritualism was also compounded with a somewhat contradictory re-casting of 
devotional and commemorative activity away from the Shia martyrs and towards the 
Sunni Caliphs. In 1936 `Abdul Shakoor ordered that the virtues of the Caliphs should be 
narrated during the first ten days of Muharram, and in subsequent years narrations of the 
achievements of Abu Bakr were consistently held during the first ten days of 
Muharram. 1 8 Attempts by Sunni reformists to abolish ta'ziyadari were similarly 
compounded with efforts to essentially convert Muharram processions into madh-i- 
sahaba rallies, using many of the same ritual displays of Shi `ism upon a different subject. 
By the end of the decade, anti-Shi'a polemicists went beyond the rejection of the 
authority of the Imams to actively assail them and eulogise their murderers. An 
organisation known as Anjuman-i-Tahaffuz-i-Namoos-i-Sahaba extended the lead set by 
the Majlis-i-Ahrar, condemning Shi'a beliefs and personages alongside defending the 
rights of Sunnis. 119 A further example of an incredible departure from normative religious 
belief and practice was a group calling themselves 'Kharijis, ' who reviled 'Ali and praise 
his murderer. 120 Such positions exceeded the beliefs of mainstream Sunnis who had long 
held the family of the Prophet in high esteem despite their belief in the Khilafat. '2' 
117 The Leader, 26 March and 4 May 1937, OIOC. 
118 Census of India 1961, Monograph serie, no. 3: Moharram in two cities, Lucknow and Delhi (Delhi, 
1962), pp. 22,38; Jasbir Singh to Harper 22 Feb 1939, Political Department File No. 65 of 1939, UPSA. 
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As the years passed, there was a gradual shifting away from a criticism of Shia 
Muharram practices as heretical interpolations, and towards the claim that Shi'as %\'ere 
appropriating Muharram as a tool for the tacit conversion of their Sunni brethren. Such 
tensions were heightened yet further when Zafar ul-Mulk referred to to `;, ivadari as the 
`main plank in the Shia tabligh, ' and described it as an effort for the ignorant Sunni 
masses to be absorbed and converted by the Shias' through participation in their- 
practice. 122 In this context, madh-i-sahaba and displays of veneration for the Caliphs was 
elevated from the role of a customary observance into the defence of the Sunni creed and 
an `antidote' to Shia attempts to convert Sunnis through to `civadar"i. 123 This rhetoric of 
the threat from religious conversion openly drew from the themes of tabligh and shuddhi 
which had characterised Muslim-Hindu conflict in earlier years. As such parallel azadcrri 
and madh-i-sahaba processions, each with its respective forms of praise for its subjects, 
were consolidated as the inherently comparable but entirely contradictory practices of 
Muharram, pulling the two communities in separate directions. Religious leaders on both 
sides were able to expand beyond their limited role in the historical and ritualistic 
instruction of their lay adherents, and assumed credence as guardians of their tradition 
against outside enemies bent on proselytisation on their own terms. 
From this description of activity among Shi'as and Sunnis respectively, it is clear that 
Muharram acted as the stage upon which the conflict between religious communities 
could be defined and played out, and provided religious activists and reformists with a 
focus for their endeavours. Previous chapters of this thesis have somewhat played doýw n 
the significance of Muharram and have charted instead the manifestation of sectarian 
differences in various spheres of public life, social interaction and political debate in the 
United Provinces. However, moving back to the level of popular activity within the 
boundaries of the locality and nuthalla, this examination reminds us of the essentiall\ 
seasonal character of Muslim sectarianism as experienced in colonial north India',, cities. 
Sectarian violence and reformist activity were largely restricted, in terms of time and 
(Washing, ton. 2002), p. 343. 
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geography, by the boundaries of Muharram. Shia and Sunni anjumans would spring to 
life for a number of weeks, and then return to a largely benign condition while 
developing resources, recruitment and strategies for the commemorations the following 
C 
year. 
The renovations of Muharram in 1930s Lucknow demonstrate not only the natural 
malleability of the ritual performance of Muharram in north India, but the equal 
adaptability of the meanings attached to it. From a symbol of Shia dominance as the 
religion of state, it had evolved subsequently into an expression of Lucknow's cultural 
resilience and the amicable relationships between its religious communities. In the 
twentieth century, reforms to Muharram in Lucknow for the most part attempted to assign 
to it insinuations of exclusivity to particular communities. In other words, Muharram 
adapted from a representation of cohesion to one of separation and conflict. The violent 
uprisings accompanying Muharram in 1906-1909, and then again in the late 1930s, were 
similar in regard to the appropriation of markers of sectarian difference and the 
embracing of practices unacceptable to the other sect. 
A further significance of this centrality of Muharram is the apparent reconfiguration of 
the Shi'a religion itself, through the idiomisation of particular tenets and customs. 
Whether on account of the need to offer easily understood markers of faith, or the 
pressures to establish a visible presence in north India's public arenas, a finite list of 
expansive symbols associated with Muharram came during this decade to denote the 
traditions of Shia and Sunni Islam as a whole for their exponents. Customs associated 
with Muharrarn such as to `zivadarl processions and the recitation of tabarra/h and the 
niadh-i-sahaba verses increasingly came to be interpreted not simply a,, religious acts but 
as representations of the religions in their entirety, and as the badges icicrntit'ving the 
adherents of that religion. Despite all of the processes of religious communication and 
negotiation discussed in previous chapters, such as the attempts of religious leaders to 
impart religious knowledge more widely. we perhaps see in this period a contraction of 
the scope of Shia or Sunni Islam. Multifarious practices and meanings ýýcre condensed 
1 '' Ibid. 
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into a finite series of standardised symbols. This process of religious symbolisation, 
moreover, surely contributed to Shi `a-Sunni conflict. Practices and recitations which 
stirred tensions between the communities were increasingly standardised as indicators of 
the religion themselves, and hence as essential religious obligations. This symbolic 
language was not one suitable for communicating the nuances and fluidities between 
related Islamic traditions; rather, it established equivalent symbols as polar opposites, 
increasing markedly the acrimony between those who upheld them. 
The changing role of a city: 1930s Lucknow 
The enhanced definition of Muharram according to a partial condensation of its meaning 
into the most controversial and antagonistic of its practices led to a prolonged period of 
mayhem in old Lucknow. It is clear from the above discussions that the sectarian 
animosities of 1930s Lucknow drew from a combination of social transformation, 
political disputes, religious renewal and the development of popular, volunteer activism 
in the public spaces of north Indian cities in the inter-war period. The city was within just 
a few years transformed from a city of relative communal harmonies, at least by the 
standards of the period, into a so-called `powder magazine of bigotry. ' 124 
Looking beyond the momentary factors in the conflict, however, it is important to 
emphasise the longer-term history of Lucknow, in particular, the process of sectarian 
community-formation which has been the basis of this thesis. In contrast to the 
cosmopolitan capital lauded by its older families and literati throughout the colonial 
period, Lucknow was reworked throughout this period into a city awash with separate 
Shia, Sunni and Hindu public associations, printing houses and volunteer movements. 
Within each religious community, all such institutions possessed somewhat interlocked 
and cooperative leaderships and memberships and all together pushed a popular project 
of religious enthusiasm. In the Shia case, the process of anjunian-building evident in 
1930s Lucknow is analogous in many ways to the styles of public Shia activity current 
124 The Times of India, 17 May 1939, Public Information Department File No. 133 of 1939. UPSA. 
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in this city since 1890 as discussed throughout this thesis. 
The important question remains, then, of the extent to which the modern manifestations 
of Shi'a organisation and religious renewal discussed in this thesis were co-extensive 
with Lucknow, or were rather wider phenomena which simply impacted upon Lucknow 
more than most other towns. Connected with this, is Muslim sectarianism best understood 
as a Lucknawi, or an all-India experience? Using the example of the conflicts of the 
1930s, it is worth evaluating the implication of much of this thesis that Lucknow 
frequently represented both the starting-point and the epitome of sectarian organisation 
and conflict. 
On the one hand, the sectarian agitations of the 1930s took the shape of an all-India 
struggle. The controversy spread to other districts, notably Rae Bareili, while Sunnis in 
towns including Kanpur newly demanded permission to recite madlyi-sahaba. 12 
Moreover, while unravelling within Lucknow, the madh-i-sahaba and tabarrah agitations 
were increasingly sustained by outside players. New members of the Majlis-i-Ahrar 
flooded in from so-called `outstations, ' neighbouring qasbas such as Kakori and 
Malihabad, to support their co-religionists in Lucknow, as well as from U. P. and Punjab 
more widely. 126 No less was the tabarrah presented as an all-India movement, taken to 
demonstrate the existence of the shared concerns and aspirations of the national Shia 
qaum. The agitation secured the direct participation of Shi'as from across the regions of 
U. P. and Punjab, and hopeful predictions that the tabarrah agitation would cease after the 
arrest of a substantial portion of Lucknow's Shia population were dashed by an influx of 
Shi'a activists from outside Lucknow. Shi'a volunteers came from Rampur and districts 
of U. P. such as Agra, Fyzabad, Barabanki and especially Rae Bareili. It was this influx of 
activists from outside Lucknow which appeared to keep the tabarrah agitation afloat after 
its first two weeks. 127 Within a month, Punjab was supplying a growing number of Shia 
activists, making the possibility of a resolution of the conflict by religious or political 
''` The Pioneer, June 13 1939, Political Dept File No. 65 of 1939, UPSA. 
126 Jasbir Singh to Harper, 16 May 1939, ibid. 
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leaders of U. P. ever more 128 Moreover, the increasing `social estrangement' 
resulting from the conflicts was not confined to Lucknow. `9 Other centres in U. P. 
exhibited a no less tangible breakdown of even public interaction between the two 
communities. In Rae Bareili, Sunni faqirs, tailors and barbers refused to nerve Shia 
clientele, 130 while in Kanpur, Shi'as protested against the torments inflicted upon their 
co-religionists in Lucknow by observing a coordinated protest, raising black flags on the 
roofs of their homes. ' 31 
No less significantly, the tabarrah agitation attracted the interest of a number of Shia 
organisations from far afield. Organisations which came to express their contempt for the 
Congress lifting of the madh-i-sahaba ban and sympathy with their Lucknow brethren 
included the Anjuman-i-Shi `a-i-Bengal, Calcutta; the Anjuman-i-Mustafavi, Bengal; 
Anjuman Shamsher-i-'Abbasiya, Calcutta; the Shia Tanzim Committee, Bareilly; the 
`general Shia public' of Benares; the Shia Association, Shahpur; as well as Maulanas of 
places as diverse as Meerut, Sonipat and Murshidabad. 13 The existence and activities of 
such anjwnans seem to confirm one of the central arguments of this thesis: the foundation 
in the colonial period of a network of Shia organisations and societies, able through their 
communications with Lucknow to achieve some form of coordination. Despite their roots 
in families and apparently localised and disparate networks, they were apparently able to 
work in conjunction with wider Shia communities across India. 
Nevertheless, while the network of intertwined and synchronised Shia activity in the 
1930s at first glance appears to elevate India's Shia gauni above the municipal 
particularities of Lucknow, it was in fact a process that cemented the centrality of 
Lucknow in the identification of India's Shi'as. As was implied in earlier chapters, the 
12' 'Fortnightly report for the second half of May 1940, ' Mudie to Conran Smith, 22 June 1940. L/PJ/5/2('9. 
OIOC. 
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new consciousness of Shia distinctiveness as a clearly delineated community represented 
less the crossing of regional and municipal differences, and more the impartation of 
Lucknow's communal configurations to wider arenas. Clearly demonstrating this is the 
Imamiya Mission discussed above, an organisation whose ambitions for national 
proselytisation sat at some distance from its distinctly municipal roots in the , nicrl1callas 
and Balis (lanes) of old Lucknow. Despite its pretensions and the rhetorical importance it 
attached to the existence of a membership outside of Lucknow, the membership of the 
Mission was mostly contained within Lucknow and a few districts of the United 
Provinces. The composition of its committee further reflected its Lucknawi foundation. 
The original ten full-members of the anjuman's management committee were all men of 
Lucknow. Reforms exercised in the first full meeting of the Mission, aiming to make the 
organisation more representative of Indian Shi'as in general, extended these ten to twenty 
four places on the committee of management, of which still half the seats were reserved 
for Lucknawis. '33 Therefore, the Mission's expansion across the country was less as an 
attempt at the establishment of autonomous local branches, and more of a case of 
expanding the influence of the Lucknawi Shi'as across India. The management 
committee declared that while the Imamiya Mission may establish 'many branches 
(shakhen)... in all the great centres of India... its presidential office [in Lucknow] may 
continuously provide supervision (nigrani) over all its branches, provision for all their 
needs and advice in occasions of difficulty. ' 134 The local branches of the Mission were 
described as naqul daftar (secondary or imitative offices), implying their status to he 
imitative of Lucknow rather than independent affiliates. ' 35 At heart very much Lucknaww i 
in its style, language and aims, the Mission remained essentially an attempt to standardise 
wider religious organisation according to the will of a small and characteristically 
Lucknawi elite. The Imamiya Mission did not, as it claimed, so much carry its evoked 
spirit of Najaf' to Lueknow'36, rather, it was a campaign to carry the spirit of Lucknoww 
to the rest of India. 
133 Imanil a Mission, SXjIra rapört-i-Inrämiva Alishan Luckna'u. pp. 5.10. 
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Similarly, the disputes over religious customs remained firmly focused upon Luck-now, 
and such innovative practices had little currency or popular support outside the cit\. 
While there was in 1939 an initial spread of sectarian tensions to neighbouring districts, 
often with the help of Lucknawi religious leaders, '37 there were signs that the inno\ative 
practices recently introduced in Lucknow were greeted with some unease in other V. P. 
qasbas. In 1940, for instance, `Sara-Wafat processions were taken out in several other 
places but they were confined to the honour of the Prophet, ' 138 while attempts by activists 
to instigate conflict in neighbouring districts often failed. 139 One observer even wrote that 
no Sunni has as yet recited madh-i-sahaba outside Lucknow, and when an attempt was 
made by the Ahrars to do so at other places, it was the Sunnis who discouraged it. ' 14" In 
spite of all attempts to widen and essentialise the religious conflict, the disputes of the 
1930s remained as intrinsic to Lucknow in their focus and style as many of the Shia 
public activities discussed in previous chapters. 
Few examples better represent the interconnection of sectarianism and the city of 
Lucknow than an assessment of the changing topography of Lucknow, which reveals 
how a sense of religious and cultural distinctiveness was accompanied by the social and 
spatial segregation of communities. While it cannot be definitively asserted, it seems 
likely that the civic restructuring of the city in this decade appeared to reflect and in turn 
cement the increasingly marginalised relations between Shi'as and Sunnis. Those central 
areas adjacent to Victoria Street which had survived the traumas of 1857 and the 
nineteenth-century British re-structuring of Lucknow, such as parts of Chowk and 
Nakhhas, often had a close mix of Shia and Sunni populations, while those parts of the 
city constructed or reconstructed during the 1920s seemed to be much more exclusive to 
one or other community. These include Husainabad and the areas below the Gonmti river, 
which had been largely demolished in the early colonial period and were substantially 
17 Jashir Singh to Harper, 4 April 19 39, Political Department File No. 65 of 1939, UPSA. 
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rebuilt during the 1920s, and the neighbouring outer inuhallas such as Sadatganj and 
Rustamnagar, which re-appeared as heavily populated residential quarters when Luck-now 
expanded outwards. As Lucknow enlarged, it unravelled according to a sect-determined 
topography rather than the traditionally-envisaged cosmopolitan melting-pot. '41 
Moreover, as Lucknow's structure changed, so did the character of the violence between 
Shi'as and Sunnis. In the 1900s, the violence had accompanied Muharram and had been 
confined to those mixed localities such as Chowk through which Shia and Sunni 
processions would pass. By the 1930s, momentary violence between the two sects 
became increasingly commonplace in western Lucknow. It was not confined to 
Muharram or to mixed neighbourhoods, but could occur in any proximity, primarily in 
the vicinity of prominent mosques, madrasas, imambaras and the houses of the public 
and religious leaders of each community, far from the main procession routes where it 
had earlier been focused. Such a development did much to divorce Shia-Sunni ill-feeling 
from the episodic limits of Muharram, and from the boundaries of local rivalries. 
Indeed, so co-extensive were Lucknow and sectarian conflict that the fate of each was 
somewhat bound up with the other. It could be argued that the widening of the realms in 
which Shia-Sunni questions were discussed, from local mehfils and civic vernaculars to 
provincial assemblies and the national press, was dependent upon the simultaneous 
expansion of Lucknow's size and significance. Lucknow's inauguration as the political 
centre of U. P. after the establishment of the Provincial Assembly here, together with the 
city's expansion in the 1920s, threw new light upon Lucknow's religious conflict and 
gave it a novel position on the national stage. The unprecedented volume of British. 
Congress, Muslim League and other political activity and the accompanying increase in 
journalistic output gave wider resonance to municipal events. Issues which appeared 
entirely local in the 1900s were now presented as questions of national significance and 
reached national newspapers, a fact which prompted the involvement of wider 
141 Aziz Ahmad Khan to Jinnah, 11 June 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Collection, Ior. Net-,. Pos. 10773, OIOC. 
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movements such as the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Deobandi combine of Husain Ahmad 
Madani and the Jami`at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. 142 Efforts to resolve the controversy, involving 
senior Congress leaders including Nehru, Gandhi and Abul Kalam Azad as well as the 
Governor of U. P. and Viceroy, brought more attention to the controversy. The Governor 
and others involved in the negotiations over the dispute expressed concern that tabarruh 
should become `a general question between Sunnis and Shias all over India. ' 143 
The steady spread of the significance of Lucknow's religious controversies across the 
Gangetic belt and Punjab, accentuating its intensity and intransigence, thus mirrors the 
growing significance of Lucknow as metropolitan centre and provincial capital. As has 
been consistently emphasised throughout the thesis, Shia-Sunni conflict was a 
phenomenon inextricably connected with Lucknow, and its presence in other centres 
indicated the export of Lucknawi traditions as much as the autonomous configurations of 
these towns. From the 1930s, Indian Shi `as were defined as such through their 
involvement with the tabarrah agitation in Lucknow, rather than through separate 
activities in alternative towns. Moreover, this thesis has indicated that the transformation 
of Muslim sectarianism in India, from particular local and ritual conflicts to broad 
disputation over social and political questions, coincides definitively with the shifting 
character of Lucknow, from a talugdari backwater of secondary importance in the later 
nineteenth century to the important commercial and political centre of U. P. from the 
1910s onwards. The national fate of Lucknow and sectarianism in the life of the nation 
were inextricably intertwined. 
11' 
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Conclusion: religious leadership and sectarian conflict in Indian Shi'ism 
The tabarrah agitation was frequently trumpeted by its advocates and participants as the 
pinnacle of Shia unity, and a vindication of Shia cooperation. The sheer numbers of 
participants from so many classes and regions, and their differing religious and political 
persuasions, were used to demonstrate remarkable unanimity within the supposed Shia 
qaum, which was articulated through the organisational efforts discussed in previous 
chapters. With unprecedented success, the tabarrah agitation linked together diverse 
communities on the sole ground of their religious commonalty, using a fabricated Sunni 
`other' as a mirror in which to shape an agenda for the Shia community. 
The 1939 tabarrah agitation is a fitting conclusion to this thesis, since it marks in some 
senses the culmination of the process of sectarian consolidation of previous decades. The 
agitation was the end-point of the fruits of earlier efforts at Shia organisation, in that it 
remained characterised by an intertwined network of anjun ans and co-ordinated efforts 
among them. Conversely, the agitation represented the close of the development 
dominating earlier chapters. More than the several previous decades, the 1930s had 
witnessed significant alterations of Shia leadership. The emergence of powerful bodies 
such as the Shia Political Conference and the Tanzim-ul-Mominin was compounded 
with the even more significant development of the diminution of earlier social and 
religious authorities. The late-1880s had marked the beginning of a forty-year period 
during which the mujtahids of Lucknow evolved from isolated, somewhat reclusive 
scholars of a trans-national faith into active public spokesmen, reinforcing their authority 
through their role in public organisations and their public involvement in the religious 
and social life of Indian Shi'as. It was these niurjtahids, together with established 
aristocrats, who were persistently at the summit of the organisational efforts discussed in 
earlier chapters. However, the 1920s-30s began to witness the rev erne of' the earlier 
consolidation of their stature. The tense conditions of the 1930s marked hý municipal 
transformation, spiralling population and reactive politics, all conspired to force the 
waning of traditional religious and social elites. Moreover, several of the most 
influential 
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Lucknawi rnujtahids died just before or during this period, 144 arguably giving a sense of 
discontinuity that elevated alternative religious leaders to accelerated prominence. While 
Nasir Husain and Najm ul-Hasan remained bulwarks of reverence and influence during 
the tabarrah agitation, they remained in their old age distant from the immediacy of 
events. Contrasting with their powerful public interventions in earlier decades, they crc 
described as merely `swimming with the tide. ' 145 All such factors aided in undermining 
the authority and influence of those senior religious leaders and secular aristocrats of 
Lucknow who had hitherto been dominant in Shia public life. 
Earlier chapters have demonstrated how Shi'a-Sunni conflict at particular moments 
fulfilled the role of facilitating internal reforms within one or other community. For 
instance, as was argued in an earlier chapter, religious disputation consistently used the 
castigation of a Sunni or Shia `other' as a basis for crystallising more clearly the tenets 
of one's own grouping. It was, thus, often in the interest of aspiring Shia and Sunni 
leaders alike to sustain such sectarian dialogues and consolidate religious boundaries. The 
agitations of the 1930s demonstrate most clearly a further internal modification enacted 
through sectarian conflict: the competition between alternative Shia spokesmen and 
organisations for religious leadership. All of the major anjunians discussed above were 
new, tracing their origins back no further than the 1930s. The spokesmen of new 
institutions such as the Dar-ul-Muballighin and Tanzim-ul-Mominin were all 
inexperienced participants in Lucknow's public life, who had been largely invisible 
before the establishment of their organisations. It seems that such leaders aspired to assert 
their own authority and independence from traditional Shia and Sunni leaders alike, 
using public disturbance and the impedance of negotiations as a demonstration of their 
authority. 146 
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38,257,49-4. 
145 Jashir Singh to Harper, 11 October 1939, Political Department File No. 65 cri 1939. UPS. .V 
14`' Such a proposition links with Nanclitti Gooptu's discussion o1' volunteer movements and other ar-tisan- 
haseci associations as the attempts by poorer classes to seize initiatives 
from traditional leaderships. The 
maeffi-i-. Nah rhu is cited as an example of one of the 'efforts at political assertion 
h\ the poorer \luslims 
through public religious expression. ' Gooptu, Thcpolitics of the arbor poor, pp.? 
01-2. 
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As in the earlier period, the number of Shia anjurnans may have done much to e\ oke the 
sense of a cohesive Shi'a religion and community, but they did just as much to 
manufacture differences and promote diversity within them. The multifarious and 
disordered appearance of a plurality of sectarian anjunians under the guise of 
organisation in the 1930s is perhaps best evoked in the observations of the Raja of 
Mahmudabad. He argued that such organisations reflected not so much the organisation 
and tight discipline of a well-guided community, but the self-interested bids for 
leadership by individual Shi'as and the purposeless generation of organisations and 
alliances. `It is open to everyone to start as many Anjumans as he chooses, ' he declared, 
`if he considers this to be the only vehicle for gaining popularity and fame. ' New 
anjumans were constantly emerging, he said, and were forced to call up 'irrelevant and 
unnecessary' questions in order to `justify the[ir] existence. ' 147 Moreover, the process of 
anjuman-building was argued to be dissipating rather than constructing unity among 
Shi'as. `The best course for the Shias of Lucknow will be to cooperate with and 
strengthen the social and political organisations that are already in existence, ' he 
continued, while the creation of numerous new Anjumans will only imperil the solidarity 
of the community of a whole. ' 148 
Thus, underneath the Shi `a-Sunni conflict the tabarrah agitation gave rise to a series of 
important disputes between Shi'as themselves. The demonstrative practice of azaclari 
advocated by some activists was long contrary to the instruction of many more traditional 
'u/aria, and the recitation of tabarrah was variably pronounced as compulsory, forbidden 
or inadvisable in the circumstances by alternative authorities. In fact, the Tanzim-ul- 
Mominin and its affiliated organisations eclipsed the influence of two alternative 
prognoses: that of the Shia Political Conference, and that of the nmujtahuds. The Shia 
Political Conference at the beginning of the tabarrah agitation had urged restraint and 
compromise. '`'' However, with the Tanzim-ul-Mominin carrying off the tabarrali 
agitation and thwarting attempts to negotiate a resolution, the Shia Political Coni'crencc 
141 Zahccr cd., The dead past, p. 116. 
141 Ibid. 1). 1 15. 
"' The Leccclcr, 13 April 1939. OIOC. 
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within a month or two had little option but to throw its weight behind the agitation. '-' 
The mujtuhids were in a similar position. While always spokespersons of the Shi'as' right 
to perform their distinct practices, it appears that they did not unequivocally back the 
tabarrah agitation until it was already at its height. The Tanzim-ul-Niominin and 
mujtahids, with the exception of a month or two at the peak of the agitation, enjoyed a 
highly antagonistic relationship. Their contestation for leadership peaked towards the end 
of 1939, when the mujtahids issued instructions for Shi'as to halt the agitation, while the 
Tanzim-ul-Mominin directed that these be ignored. The Tanzim-ul-Mominin even went 
to `the length of suggesting that their ulamas are useless persons and are not worthy of 
the positions they hold' in an attempt to frustrate the object of the Ulamas' and deprive 
them of a following. '51 A similarly competitive relationship was apparent between 
alternative Sunni leaders and organisations, among whom an apparently united front 
against Shi'as disguised a climate of maneuvering and mutual antagonism. 152 
These examples all imply that the production of conflict with Sunnis was used by some 
Shi'a leaders and organisations as a means of enforcing competition between different 
and competing Shia factions. By the 1930s, aggressive sectarian conflict was no longer 
simply a means of allowing an internal process of negotiation within each party, stifling 
internal divisions through the formulation of an outside opponent, but was a means of 
initiating competition between alternative leaders from within one's own sect. This facet 
of sectarian conflict in India explains a further interesting point: that conflict between 
Shi'as and Sunnis was often most intense when internal debates among and between 
Shi'as were most vociferous. The case could easily be made that the various 
15" Ihid, 15 May 1939. Politically, the Tanzim-ul-Mominin flitted between supporting the Muslim League 
and Congress, and sometimes advocated unity between the two. Such contradictory policies gav c it a 
sonmetinmes complimentary and sometimes adversarial relationship with the Shia Political Contference, 
which was clearly allied with Congress. Khan ed., Why 14,000 Shins ºr'ent to jail', p. 41. 
isi Jashir Singh to Harper, 20 October 1939, Political Department File No. 65 of 1939, UPS: A. He 
continues: 'the Tanzim-ul Mominin were not desirous that the lead given the Shia divines should he 
followed by members of their community in general and had decided to create trouble ii" necessary in order 
to frustrate the object of the Ulamas and their and their adherents. ' Jashir Singh to Harper, 3 November 
1939, ibid. 
[52 In April 1939, Husain Ahmad Madam and the Majlis-i-Ahrar tried to call off civil disohedicnce, but 
local Sunni '-'roups such as the Anjuman-i-Namoos-i-Sahaha and Jama'at-i-Tahafl'ui-i-', lillat persisted. It 
was observed that, in spite of the sporadic moments of cooperation, 'good l'eelin gs between the Ahrarn and 
local Sunni associations interested in the , 11cu/lr-i-sahnhu 
have never existed. There has been constant 
ýý, 
transformations of the I 930s had provoked internal disagreements among Shi'as in a «a\ 
unprecedented in earlier times. The economic and topographical transformations of 
Lucknow, together with the enormous questions of the devolution of political power and 
the best means of securing political representation, and the competition het%ý ecn 
alternative religious leaderships and organisations, all caused ruptures bet» een 
Lucknow's Shi'as which were apparently more intense than in preceding decades. At 
moments when Shia unity was put under pressure, Shia-Sunni conflict became more 
intense as alternative leaderships stoked antagonism in order to vindicate their own 
authority and sideline adversaries. 
However, despite all these internal conflicts within both Shia and Sunni communities, 
and the manifestation of such disputes as broader sectarian conflicts through the 
machination of particular factions, it was in the 1930s that the meaning of being a `Shi'a' 
or a 'Sunni' in colonial India was most clearly elaborated. The notions of 'Shi `a' and 
'Sunni' and what it meant to belong to one or other of these fixed and inviolable 
categories, it could be argued, were more closely defined by their mutual conflict than at 
any previous point. On the Shia side, the tabarrah agitation provided a rare opportunity 
for overt unanimity among a collection of individuals who often struggled to find any 
cause to unite them. Religious leaders and political figures managed to cooperate. 
Elevated mujtahids, who for the most part had accepted the right for distinctive Shia 
praises of 'Ali and the Imams and the taking out of to `;, ivadari during Muharram, but 
who had long eschewed some of the more elaborate displays of mourning and violent 
vilifications of the Caliphs, managed to find cause with younger, less disciplined 
inaului'is who championed those very customs. 
If this manufacturing of a single 'Shi'a' canon of practice in spite of traditional 
differences seems surprising, then it was perhaps all the more so among Sunnis, %\ ho in 
India had long been scattered among a multiplicity of schools and traditions. Nothing, had 
previously managed to locate common ground among Sunni,, as successfully as the 1')3ft 
vituperation of Shia practice and the campaign for mach-1-suluiha. A,, %% 
ith 
jealousy between them and each has tried to outdo the other. ' Jasbir Singh to rpe r. 
I . ýhril Iýý ýýI, ihici. 
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contemporary Shia organisations, there was a strong interconnection between the various 
Sunni actors at work. The Majlis-i-Ahrar, composed largely of lay : Muslims, often acted 
upon the commands of the `cdama of the Dar-ul-Muballighin, who themselves \ýere often 
branded as `Wahhabis. ' Moreover, these `Mama sometimes put themsel\ e, In 
subservience to Husain Ahmad Madani, who was located firmly within the Deobandi 
tradition, and who himself sometimes associated himself closely with the former toto 
groups. This interchangeable leadership of the madh-i-sahaba cause did more to present a 
functioning `Sunni' Islam than any of the debates between Sunni groups %%ould normall\ 
allow, and was seemingly immune to the normal disagreements bet%\ ecn Deobandik, 
Bareilvis and Ahl-i-Hadis, and the usual discrepancies between the tenets of the 'idams 
and the folk-laden practices of artisan Muslims. Further giving the sense of a cohesive 
`Sunni' unity was the fact that some `Mania of Firangi Mahal and Nadv a't ul-'Llama, 
both schools which had hitherto resisted involvement in Luckno%ý's municipal quarrels, 
became involved. 
Thus it was only really in this period, through the constant repetition of particular 
inventories of religious personages, phrases and practices in the public sphere, and the 
constant circulation of languages of community by religious leaders and organisations. 
that distinct and clearly delineated notions of a 'Shi'a' and 'Sunni' Islam were brought 
into being. In notable contrast to earlier decades, the conflicts of the 1930s ere endlessly 
described in stark terms of Shia and Sunnis. In earlier years, the two acting agencies 
within Muslim sectarian conflict had proven somewhat more negotiable and open to re- 
definition, and could be variously demarcated according to the wills of their witnesses. 
For instance, the quarrel had been discussed by some as one between the disinterested 
Muslim majority, of whom even most Shi`as showed little interest in the practice of 
violently cursing the Caliphs, and the most zealous of the Shia i a'icen. 
No less 
frequently, it had been described as a conflict of the majority of Niuslims, both of whom 
indulged in customs such as to zivadari, against 'puritanical' 
\Vahhabis who desired toi 
prohibit such acts: the latter, of course, were again interchangeably classed as 
Sunni or 
as a grouping of their own, depending on the beholder. 
In this way, and individual 
involved in the conflicts had been able to portray himself as ascribing to 
the reasonable 
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`norm' in a conflict pushed by radical elements on the opposite side. It was only reall. \ in 
the 1930s that Muslim sectarian conflicts became set down so essentiall\ and repetitivel\ 
in the bare dichotomy of Shia and Sunni. A full explanation of Muslim sectarian conflict 
in India, whether in the 1930s or through previous decades, therefore cannot he 
ascertained simply through evidence of religious renewal, or novel social and political 
differentiation. Rather, it demands a further reflection beneath such outward events upon 
the most elementary religious change in Islam, and the shifting nature attached to being a 
Shi'a, a Sunni or a Muslim in colonial India. 
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CONCLUSION 
SECT AND SECTARIANISM IN INDIAN ISLAM 
This thesis has set out to document and investigate the substantial religious and social re- 
conceptualisation of Indian Shi'ism, in the fifty-year period from the late-1880s. It has 
argued that Indian Shi`ism was gradually redefined from a doctrinal group within Islam 
into the basis of a cohesive, autonomous religious community. Shi'ism was not simply 
reconstructed as a religion but also as a sense of communal or even national 
commonality, encompassing separate provision for education, charity, politics and even a 
language of citizenship. Shi'as were evoked not as a firga or jama 'at, a sect or party 
implying their incorporation into a wider Islamic brotherhood, but as a gauuni: an 
independent and self-determining community. Influenced by Hindu nationalist and 
Muslim separatist constructs of the nation, this language of Shi'as as a 'community' or 
`nation' was appropriated to delineate the distinctiveness, self-determination and 
solidarity of Shi'as in India, on the basis of mutual religious identity. 
Chapter 1 introduced the structure through which this gaulnlk identity of Shi'ism was 
generated: the constant production of exclusively Shia public organisations or anjumans. 
Among these were included religious institutions such as madrasas, together with a 
functioning network of welfare and charitable institutions, such as schools, orphanages 
and endowment funds. The All India Shi'a Conference, while an independent institution 
in its own right, functioned primarily as a means of incorporating or creating anew many 
smaller, local Shia anjumans, thus providing a far-reaching organisational structure 
which was able to span localities and include wide and disparate regional population', in 
the cities and qasbas of north India. Despite their often different or even divergent 
approaches, all these organisational efforts shared the assumptions that 
Shi'as needed to 
remain distinct, or even separate, from other Muslim communities, and that the agenda 
for religious renewal, cultural awareness and social betterment 
for Shi'as would be one 
conducted on lines of exclusivity. This creation of voluntary 
Shia public organisations in 
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some senses mimicked the process of `institution-building' within Shi'ism during the 
Nawabi period, replacing state support with a vigorous appropriation of the new methods 
and media provided by the developing public sphere and printing presses in the cities of 
U. P., primarily Lucknow. Indeed, one result of this organisational activity was the 
enhanced centrality of Lucknow, a city that increasingly developed into the religious, 
cultural and political hub of wider Indian Shi'ism, and that has been consistently 
identified throughout as the city in which attempts at Shia organisation were initiated 
and epitomised. Indeed, the further implication of the existence of a workable Shia 
organisational network in India was its contribution to the indigenisation of Indian 
Shi'ism, as religious leaders and secular reformists alike were increasingly able to turn 
inward to local traditions rather than endlessly looking to their international co- 
religionists. 
Additionally, these diverse organisational efforts reinterpreted and invigorated the 
authority of the Shi'a `ulama, particularly the esteemed nlujtahids of Lucknow, who were 
re-cast from guardians of the doctrines of the Shia religion into active and visible public 
spokesmen through their frequently pivotal role, both active and inspirational, in such 
anjumans. Chapter 2 demonstrated how the foundation of Shia religious organisations, 
printing presses and the fresh public role of the `ulama contributed to a tangible religious 
renewal within Indian Shi'ism. Public exhibitions of this new religious vigour included 
the dissemination of religious knowledge, strong trade in religious publications, and the 
instigation of more universalistic, explicitly Shia observances during Muharram. This 
religious renewal was often conducted in strongly antagonistic tones, which drew from 
the wider context of religious proclamation among Muslims, Hindus and Christians in 
colonial India. This ensured that the reinvigoration of Shi'ism often intertwined with an 
elaboration of religious differences and demarcation of religious boundaries, and often 
ignited local religious conflicts between differing Muslim communities. 
In contrast with the rather restrictive vision of some scholarship, this thesis 
has 
demonstrated that the defining feature of sectarianism during the given period is that it 
was not simply encapsulated by religious disputations and 
Muharram violence, but was 
-I ý 
consolidated in wider public and political life. As an increasing number of nýrjcý, ýrcr, 1., 
religious and welfare institutions emerged among particular Muslim communities. Shi'a- 
Sunni differences were articulated, systematised and institutionalised through separate 
organisational networks and various forms of public differentiation. Discussing Shia 
reactions to the Aligarh movement, which has long been assumed to has e laid the 
foundations for broader Muslim social and political organisation in colonial t'. P., Chapter 
3 demonstrated how Muslim sectarianism was expanded and politicised in colonial India. 
Shia ambivalence or opposition to the Aligarh movement in varying degrees prompted 
the formalisation of Shia-Sunni difference from religious or cultural discrepancies into 
matters of acute public and political relevance. The novel gaumik identity of Shi'as was 
positioned as an alternative to, rather than an extension of, the Muslim 'nation' in 
discourses of social and political reform, leading to the withdrawal of Shi'as from 
`Muslim' organisations. This was further elaborated upon in Chapter 4, which suggested 
that reactions to colonialism and the jihad and pan-Islamist campaigns, long assumed to 
have cemented the presence of a progressive, inclusive Islam in public and political life, 
were similar subjects of divergence between Shi'as and Sunnis. As such, sectarianism 
existed as a powerful alternative discourse to that of Muslim unity, rather than as its 
weak, localised subsidiary as has sometimes been implied. 
This new forum of annjunian-based sectarianism, ascendant until the 1920s, was once again 
re-interpreted and re-negotiated in the 1930s, as an array of intertwined socio-econonlic 
and political turmoils contributed to conflict both between and within tiluslim 
communities. Despite its semblance of organisation and co-ordination, Chapter 5 
demonstrated how the Sunni'nudh-i-sahaba and Shia tabarrah agitations both expressed 
the multifarious anxieties and grievances of their participants, and ww ere used as a way of 
instigating internal transformations within Indian Shi'ism itself. 
In fact, considering the thesis as a whole, it can be seen that , cctariankm periodically 
fulfilled a number of functions. Somewhat sinlplisticall>, 
Shia-Sunni differences 
sometimes appeared to be manufactured and institutionaiiýed 
hN aspiring Sou a leaders, 
\\'lictlhCF religious. social or political. in order to vindicate the , cparatencti,, cat the 
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population they sought to represent. However, this thesis has also shown host the 
production of Shia-Sunni conflict was often focused inwardly, as a tool with which Shia 
leaders could attempt to exercise reform within Shia communities themselves. Religious 
disputation was, as shown above, often deliberately manufactured as a means of 
communicating religious doctrines and enabling religious instruction. Simply put, the 
`otherisation' of an external community was adapted as a method for negotiating internal 
reform. Furthermore, Shi'a-Sunni conflicts were on occasion stirred by particular Shia 
religious leaders, politicians and activists in attempt to rebuff alternative leaders from 
within their own community. This argument raises the interesting possibility that Shi'a- 
Sunni conflict was most severe during those times at which debate and disagreement was 
most rife among Shi'as themselves, as alternative sections sought to consolidate their 
own positions or negotiate mutual opinions through the vituperation of external 
communities. As is demonstrated by the intense debates over alternative programmes for 
Shi'a reform and betterment between Shi'a factions in the 1910s, and the jostling for 
influence among alternative individuals and organisations in the 1930s, Shia-Sunni 
conflict was most frequent at times of great internal change among Shi'as. ' 
The description of the process of Shia community formation and the evolution of Shi'a- 
Sunni divergence in India discussed in this thesis provides a starting point for a wider 
consideration of identities of sect and sectarianism more generally within South Asian 
Islam. This final evaluation seeks to provide a few additional reflections upon the nature 
of Muslim sectarianism in colonial India, offer a reappraisal of current scholarship upon 
Indian Islam, and outline the implications of this study for further research on the subject. 
1 This process has parallels in modem times. Serious Shi'a-Sunni riots 
during htuharram in Lucknow in 
2005 were widely linked to the recent formation of the All India Shia 
Personal Law Board, a subject of 
some contention among Shi'as. It was widely argued in the press that the violence was stirred 
hý Shia 
opponents of this organisation as a means of demonstrating and securing 
their influence among the 
community. Additionally, a distant comparison can here he made with the wad 
in \%hich Hindu-Muslim 
communalism has often been discussed. By some interpretations, 
for instance, a , cries of , ocial and 
political divisions among different Hindu castes in the 1980s \ýere channeled 
into a conflictive form of 
Hindu nationalism which generated conflict with Muslims. 
This per,, pecti\e informs Sarnepalli Gopal cd.. 
. 4natanv of a confrontation: 
Avodhva and the rise of communal politics in 
India (tic %% Delhi. 1991 ). 
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System and singularity: reflections on sect and sectarianism in South Asian Islam 
As was discussed at the outset, analysts of Islamic reform in colonial India have 
doubtless recognised the great diversity among reformist movements of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries such as the Deobandis, Ahl-i-Hadis, Bareilvis, Nadva't ul- 
'Ulama, Tablighi Jama'at and educational modernists. However, such studies have often 
tended to frame these as broader `Muslim' movements, responses to questions such as 
Muslim political subjection to the colonial administration or numerical domination by 
other religious communities. As such, scholarship has tended to emphasise those 
common elements running through these movements: the heightening of religious 
consciousness, the vigorous dissemination of religious knowledge, the promotion of Urdu 
and the articulation of Muslims as a clearly-demarcated community. Less has been made 
of the way in which many Muslim reformist movements were actually primarily directed 
against alternative Muslim groups. As is indicated by this thesis, north India was 
simultaneously awash with controversies between Shia and Sunni and other Muslim 
groups. The focus on the common elements of Islamic reformist campaigns, it could he 
argued, has somewhat obscured the high degrees of antagonism and combativeness which 
characterised inter-Muslim relations during the colonial period. Rather than being 
characterised as an era of `Islamic' revivalism, then, the colonial period is better 
characterised as one of a plurality of campaigns of religious renewal among diversionary 
Muslim groups, better described as a series of independent 'sectarian revivals. ' 
Scholarship needs to take closer account of the immediate experiences of munazaras, 
fatawa wars and ritualised conflicts that seemed to typify the 
interactions of Islamic 
reformist campaigns. 
This thesis implies that much scholarship, long obsessed with the question of 
Hindu- 
Muslim communalism and thus implying sectarianism within 
Islam as either an offshoot 
of the former or an occasional distraction from 
it, has underestimated the scope and 
significance of Muslim sectarianism in colonial 
India. Much the same could be said about 
many contemporary observers in the colonial period; even at 
the height of the sectarian 
controversies in the 1930s, while the Urdu press was saturated 
with the issue, it was 
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remarked that the Hindi press paid it very little attention. 2 However, this does not so 
much indicate the insignificance of sectarian conflict, but instead reflects the way in 
which conflicts were commonly interpreted. This thesis has described how sectarian 
dialogues often functioned simultaneously on various levels, conveying alternative 
meanings inwardly and outwardly, and this perhaps explains the relative lack of 
importance assigned to sectarianism by many non-Muslims, who perceived a monolithic 
Islamic renewal where Muslim reformists themselves observed a series of sectarian 
contestations. An illuminating study of the Ahl-i-Hadis community in Benares in more 
recent times has shown how, in a local context, the development of sectarianism between 
different clusters of reformist Muslims could offer different impressions to those 
observing the process, and those participating directly in it. The resurgence of religious 
activity within the Ahl-i-Hadis, it is argued, `set in train a competitive process among 
other Sunni Muslims in the city... in asserting their separateness. '3 Alternative groups 
engaged in the funding and construction of new religious institutions, schools and 
mosques, in order to counter the influence of their competitors. While many Muslims 
thus experienced this as something of a sectarian confrontation, it is argued that the 
ensuing increase in public Muslim religious observance 'inevitably [became] more 
conspicuous to the Hindu population of the city who, often unable to distinguish one 
Muslim section from another, interpret the process as being general. '` 
Expanding this framework for understanding Muslim sectarianism beyond the context of 
one city, it is evident how the process which surfaced outwardly as a wide and multi- 
layered 'Islamic revival' in colonial India may have functioned most imminently as a 
combative process of sectarian rivalry between Muslim individuals and groups. The 
example suggests that a series of interconnected conflicts between north India's religious 
communities could be understood in different terms by alternative audiences and in 
certain spheres as `sectarian' or 'communal'; the processes often understood as a 
2 See for instance, United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports (UPNNR), week ending 5 June 1937, 
Oriental and India Office Collections, London (OIOC). It is pointed out that only two 
Hindi newspaper 
commented on the Shi'a-Sunni riots at a time when the Urdu press was awash with 
detailed coverage. 
Searle Chatterjee, Mary, "'Wahabi" sectarianism among Muslims of Banaras' in Contemporary South 
Asia (3,2,1994), p. 88. 
Ibid. 
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`Muslim' religious reinvigoration, social renewal and political awakening simultaneousl\ 
functioned as `sectarian' movements. It also raises the possibility that \Iuslinm 
sectarianism was, for certain audiences, of far more immediate and expansive 
significance than has often been recognised in scholarship hitherto concerned ww ith 
Hindu-Muslim communal relations. 
Furthermore, the conclusions of this thesis demand not only a reassessment of the scale 
and scope of Muslim sectarianism during the colonial period, but an elaboration upon its 
very nature. This thesis has attempted to challenge the assumption previously discussed, 
one common to colonial British observers, Muslim reformists and some academic studies 
alike, that Islamic sectarianism was somehow a pre-modern or 'traditional' phenomenon. 
Such a view discusses sectarianism, both in South Asia and more widely, as a throwback 
to the elementary controversies of Islamic history, and contrasts it with a more unitary 
`modernist' or 'liberal' Islam which emerged out of colonial-era reformist movenments. 
The chapters of this thesis have interpreted sectarianism in Indian Islam not as an 
expression of intrinsic historical antagonism within Indian Islam rooted in some form of 
essentialist or primordial schismatic consciousness, which was merely expanded or 
consolidated during the colonial period; rather, sectarianism has been explained as a 
phenomenon in some senses newly created in the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, a wholly novel expression of alternative doctrinal groups as entirely separate 
communities and as markers of modern public identity. Sectarianism did not exist in a 
vacuum, but was borne of a wider negotiation of identities in the colonial context. It was 
a phenomenon intimately bound up with the societal transformations in urban north India 
through the colonial period, and institutionalised through the deliberate manufacture and 
public display of religious contestation and the anjunian- based organisational structure of 
social and religious reform. 
Rather than a simplistic disputation over religious tenets and practice" as 
has sonletllT'c 
been implied. Muslim sectarianism in colonial India spas, through 
its adoptHii of it,, 
gaiiniik language and styles, gradually transformed 
from a religion, debate into a process 
by which a Shia community was defined, negotiated, and presented as 
a basis for 
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citizenship and modernisation. Of use in this regard for understanding Muslim 
sectarianism in India is a study of `sectarianism' in a different context as one vision of 
modernity, ' emerging out a multitude of competing discourses of nationhood. 5 One 
central deduction to be inferred from this thesis is that the evocation of Shi'as as an 
autonomous qaum suggests that sectarianism was, to some extent, a struggle between 
alternative constructs of the nation. The Shia community emerged in the colonial period 
alongside and in interaction with a series of alternative discourses of nationhood in India, 
such as colonial modernity, secular nationalism and various religious nationalisms, as one 
framework for communal modernisation. The Shia `nation' was defined and framed 
against all these alternatives, in particular that of Muslim nationalism or 'separatism, ' and 
there is a tangible correlation between those moments at which the evocation of a Shia 
qaum was at its most vigorous and the competing rhetoric of the `Muslim community' 
was at its loudest. 6 This is evidence that Shia solidarity, as defined and expressed 
through sectarian conflict, was used by particular individuals or groups as a means of 
undermining numerous possible alternative constructs of the modern nation. As can be 
shown through many instances described in this thesis, opposition to any form of secular 
or religious nationalism could be countered with a retreat into what were perceived, or 
were in reality formulated, as primordial or essentialist religious identities. 
However, the constant juxtaposition between these alternative constructs of 'Shi`a' and 
`Muslim' communities suggest the most elementary re-conceptualisation of Islam itself, 
and demand a reconsideration of the nature of being a Shia, a Sunni or a Muslim in 
5 Ussama Makdisi, The culture of sectarianism: community, history and violence in nineteenth-century 
Ottoman Lebanon (London, 2000), p. 174. 
6 Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: the politics of the United Provinces' ; 
ttuslims, 
1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974); David Lelyveld, Aligarh's first generation: Muslim solidarity, in British 
India (Princeton, 1978); David Page, Prelude to partition: the Indian Muslims and the imperial system of 
control, 1920-1932 (Delhi, 1982), etc. Indeed, the thesis has shown 
how the most significant surges in 
Shia-Sunni sectarianism largely correlate with the most intensive attempts to rally 
Muslim unity, for 
instance: the end of the 1880s, as the Muhammadan Educational Conference attempted 
to set up a scheme 
for national Muslim reform; the years in the aftermath of the revocation of the partition of 
Bengal and the 
foundation of the All India Muslim League in 1905-1908; the 
decade between 1911-1920 which witnessed 
the growth of pan-Islamism, the entry of 'ulama into politics, the campaigns 
for a Muslim University and 
the furtherance of Muslim electorates in the 1919 Reforms; and, of course, the revisal 
of the Muslim 
League and concerns of Hindu-majority rule in the late 
1930s. Needless to say, this is an inference with 
important implications for the long-standing assumption that a pragmatic communal unity was consolidated 





colonial India. One implication of this thesis is that Sect and Islam were, from the late 
eighteenth century onwards but after 1880 in particular, construed not as mutually 
supportive affiliations, or simply different ways of referring to the same religion in 
different contexts. They were instead often antagonistic points of reference, one 
countering rather than complimenting the other. The frequent description of sectarian 
conflicts as fratricidal struggles among Muslims is perhaps misleading. given its frequent 
articulation as a conflict between entirely separate communities. 
A useful framework for understanding sectarianism is set by Eickelman, who describes 
how Islam has in the twentieth century been objectified as a self-contained 'systcm' or 
`curriculum' (minhaj). Reformists and modernists, he argues, have increasingly moved 
away from a so-called `generic Islam, ' a non-sectarian and fluid corps of' belief's and 
practices, towards the evocation of Islam through a self-referential inventory of' 
universalistic and interconnected beliefs, practices and personages: 
`The formal principles of Islamic doctrine and practice are 
compartmentalised and made an object of study... this pervasive 
notion of system is a profoundly new element in modern religious 
thought... the overall trend has been one of turning away from 
situating meaning in local and immediate ritual and symbolic 
contexts... instead, meaning becomes situated in explicit statements of 
belief. '7 
Eickelman links this development of the objectification of Islam to a number of factors 
which this thesis has established as evident in colonial India, such as the impact of print 
and the expansion of formalised education. It eloquently describes the nature of that 
religious modernisation which this thesis has identified in Indian Shi'ism during this 
period, namely, the location of religious meaning not in diverse local or 
lived 
experiences, but in an idiomatic, universalistic registry of particular tenets, personages 
and ritual practices. 
Furthermore, this understanding of Islam as a 'system' perhaps 
fore`hado%\ cd 
polarisation between alternative groups: 'treating Islam as a system of 
belief's and 
= Dale F. [ickelman, 'M1a"" higher education and the religious imagination 
in ý«ntýmýcýrarý : krah 
soot iet ics, ' in .1 rnrric ciýý 
Ethnologist (19. -4.19c)1), pp. 64 -8. 
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practices, ' Eickelman argues, `implicitly highlights differences M thin the Muslim 
community. '8 Alternative constructions of Muslim identity, previousl` concei\ed aý 
variations within the same myriad collection of Islamic beliefs and practices, were 
increasingly construed to represent alternative and opposing systems. Diversionar\ 
beliefs and practices previously perceived as on the periphery of Islam were now 
positioned outside it, and the awareness of dissimilar religious beliefs and practices 
among other Muslims was reconceived as a conflict between the adherents of opposing 
`systems. ' As has been shown in this thesis, religious disputes were increasingly 
projected not at the singular adversarial `alim or controversial text or custom, but at entire 
alternative religious systems themselves. 
It can be seen how this sense of the objectification of Islam in India post-1800, or the 
expression of particular beliefs or practices as components of entire systems. contributed 
to one theme seemingly consistent through the work of many major Indian Muslim 
reformists: the absolute unity (tauhid) of God. It was a theme elaborated upon by such 
important pioneers as, among others, Shah Wali Ullah, 'Abdul 'Aziz, Sayyid Ahmad 
Bareilvi, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Shibli Numani. 9 However, it could be further argued 
that the evocation of God's indivisibility went hand-in-hand with the articulation of the 
singularity of Islam. In complete contrast to that scholarship which has emphasised the 
diversity and adaptability of Indian Islam, 1° Muslim reformists themselves more often 
evoked themes such as the essential oneness of the Islamic inillat and aspired to 
perfection located in the unity of the community and uniformity of practice. In other 
words, the increasing evocation of Islam as a 'system' meant that the normative 
differences of sect, culture and custom were seen as a privation of perfection, rather than 
its fulfilment. The underlying conviction of all doctrinal groups of the singularity of 
Islam, and by extension the rightness of their own interpretation over that of other ,, cct., 
meant that religious reformist,,. speakers and protagonists positioned themselves not 
8 Ibis, pp. 6 O-cis I. 9 Sec especially Christian W. Troll, Savvid . -1hrnad Khan: a reinterpretation ref' . Muslim tlieoýloýv i 
. Nc%% 
Delhi, 1978), pp. 194-8. 
10 As has been discussed above, such s\ncretic aspects have long been -'i\cn prominent place in scholarship 
can Indian Islam. For instance, Imtiaz Ahmad. 'Introduction, 
' in Imtiaz : \Iunuad cd., Ritual and relit, 'iun 
among Ilusli, iis in India (Delhi. 1981), pp. I-2ft 
NIii hirul Hasan. Frone pluralism to separatism. gashas in 
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simply as spokesmen for a particular sect, but for the entirety of Islam. " Sectarianism 
was not a debate between actors mutually incorporated into the millat of Islam, but rather 
a battle between different `systems' claiming the single mantle of legitimacy. Religious 
disputation was generally less a debate on the correctness or otherwise of particular Shia 
or Sunni tenets, more an attempt to assert one entire system against another. 
Only by understanding that during the colonial period Shi'a and Sunni Islam were 
increasingly conceived less as doctrinal groups within the same Islamic millat and more 
as singular systems, with separate and unconnected tenets and traditions, can we 
understand the passion with which sectarian disputations were often fought. Opponents 
were denounced not as merely misguided but as un-Islamic; the `alim or anjcunan entered 
into disputations not merely to debate the minutiae of belief and practice, but to rebut 
those who sought to eject them from the pale of Islam. Instances of fluidity and 
negotiation in thought and practice were increasingly severed, and clearly delineated 
religious boundaries separating alternative religious systems erected in their place. 
Debates and conflicts within Islam were abstracted and standardised, redirected from 
details towards the whole system itself. Indeed, the description of conflicts and 
disputations between Muslims under the term `sectarianism' is somewhat misleading, 
since it implies that the wrangling sects are, ultimately and essentially, encompassed into 
a common and greater whole. By contrast, according to these modern understandings, 
Shia and Sunni Islam in colonial India were understood not as variations within a 
common Islamic tradition, but independent, singular religious systems themselves. 
Sectarianism in the Indian context should perhaps be interpreted less as a fratricidal 
conflict within Indian Islam, and more as a conflict between alternative religious 
colonial Awadh (New Delhi, 2004). 
To give one example, even such a responsible scholar as 'Ali Nag, describes the murderers of Husain ass 
`non-Muslims, ' rather than as Sunnis. He writes: `These so-called "Muslims" threw ugly defamations upon 
these people under the guise of Islam, yet in ultimate fact there is absolutely no connection between them 
and Islam. This is historical truth... and after this the occasion for the question of whether these people 
were Sunni or Shia no longer exists. Once the Sunni-Shi'a division is replaced by the shared facts and faith 
of Islam, and when the veil has itself been lifted from Islam, then it \k ill be realised this i,, not an 
opportunity for division of Sunni and Shi'a. ' Sayyid 'Ali Naqi, Qätilann-i-Husi'i kä mazhab (Lucknovv. 
1932-3), p. 16. While this was perhaps meant as a reconciliatory move to Lucknow's Sunnis, it could well 




Epilogue: sectarianism in South Asian Islam after 1939 
By suggesting that the religious conflicts between Muslim doctrinal groups in colonial 
India were not simply revivals of primordial passions, and by revealing why religious 
conflict became a crucial component of the construction of alternative visions of 
modernity, this thesis demands a more vigorous investigation of inter-Muslim conflict in 
South Asia than has hitherto often been current. That this thesis has discussed the 
foundational period of sectarianism in Islam from the close of the 1880s until the 1930s is 
intended in no way to underplay the significance or impact of sectarianism after this 
point, and it is worth concluding with a brief assessment of the implications of this study 
for studies of Islam and Muslim sectarianism for the later period. 
The volumes written on the `Pakistan movement' of the 1940s, constantly evoking the 
unity of the Islamic `nation' in India, have often given the impression that Shi'a-Sunni 
quarrels were vanquished, or at the very least indefinitely postponed pending the creation 
of the new state. In such a vein, one author writes that `issues of sectarian significance 
were not prominent in the course of the Pakistan movement, ' 
12 while another writes that 
Shi'as `hitched their fortunes with the League bandwagon. ' 13 In the light of the depth of 
Shi'a-Sunni tension in the Muslim League's supposed heartland of Lucknow described in 
this thesis, especially in the 1930s, the assumption that Shi'a-Sunni differences were so 
efficiently buried by the Pakistan demand seems increasingly improbable. 
'4 By contrast, 
Shia aversion to the Muslim League apparently remained strong from around 1937 and 
appeared to increase further during the 1940s. This may, as discussed 
in the previous 
chapter, owe to the visible role of prominent local Muslim Leaguers such as 
Chaudhury 
12 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: the radicalization of Shi'i and 
Sunni identities. ' in 
Modern Asian Studies (36,3,2000), p. 691. 
1; Mushirul Hasan, 'Sectarianism in Indian Islam: the Shia-Sunni divide in the United 
Provinces, in The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review (27,2,1990), p. 
222. 
14 I have discussed Shi'a political responses to the Muslim League and 
Pakistan mo' ement, in far more 
detail than is possible here, in my M-Phil thesis, 'Sectarianism and 
identity politics among the Shi'a 
Muslims of Lucknow in late-colonial India, ' (unpublished 
M. Phil thesis. Cambridge. 2003), passim. 
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Khaliquzzaman in the call for madh-i-sahaba in the late-1930s. It may have owed to the 
Shi'a Political Conference's constant rebuke of the Muslim League's claim to represent 
all Muslims, and their demand for separate Muslim representation at the centre. No less 
important, it may reflect the influence of afatwa issued by the mujtahid Nasir Husain in 
1939 enjoining all Shi'as to break links with the Muslim League, a move that prompted 
some other Shi'a `ulama to denounce the organisation and which was said to be 'far 
reaching in effect. ' 15 Central to Shia antipathy towards the party, however, was the 
Muslim League's deliberate abstention from efforts to bring the madh-i-sahaba or 
tabarrah controversies to a close. Fearing the damage the dispute could inflict upon his 
party's principle of Muslim unity, Jinnah and some leaders of the provincial Muslim 
League chose to remain entirely disengaged from the dispute and blame Congress 
machinations, a decision which did little to earn any confidence from Shi'as. At the 
session of the Shi `a Political Conference at the end of 1939, the Conference declared that 
`as a sect, [Shi'as] have never considered the Muslim League to be their representative' 
and that `the Muslim League... has always trampled upon the feelings and susceptibilities 
of the Shia minority. ' 16 
No significant rapprochement was seemingly achieved between Shi'as and the Muslim 
League in subsequent years. In 1945, a council of numerous Muslim anjumans was 
convened in Lucknow under the title of the All Parties' Shia Conference, closely linked 
with Lucknow's Shi'a Political Conference and presided over by Husain-bhai Laljee of 
Bombay. Around 800 religious, social and political organisations were invited, 17 and the 
meeting was widely identified as the most representative Conference of the Shia 
community ever held in the political history of this country. ' 18 The meeting agreed that 
the Muslim League should be pressed to outline its recognition of the need for Shia 
15 Mariaj Husain to Jinnah, 10 April 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Collection. Ior. Neg. Pos. 10773. OIOC; 
National Herald (Lucknow), 11 April 1939, CSAS. As with many contemporary Sunni 'Mama, the fativa 
perhaps reflected suspicion of the secular professionals and landowners at the heart of the organisation 
in 
U. P., as well as the additional concern that the Muslim League was Sunni-dominated. 
16 Indian Annual Register, July to December 1939 (Delhi, 1940), p. 355. 
17 `Statement issued to the press' by Hosseinbhoy Laljee, 13 October 1945. Public and Judicial Files (UPJ) 
8/693, OIOC. Of these, it was claimed that almost 600 attended. 
1" Statement by Mirza Ja'far Husain, General Secretary of All India Shia Political Cont'erence, in The 
Moonlight (Lucknow), 27 October 1945, ibid, 'Resolutions passed at meeting of All Parties Shia 
Conference, Lucknow, ' 14-16 October 1945, ibid. 
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representation, something which the Muslim League persistently refused to do. Muslim 
League disrespect for Shi'as was described, with instances such as the alleged conversion 
of to `ziya processions into Muslim League victory rallies interpreted as 'clear 
indication[s] that the Shias should not... hope that their religious rights would be safe in 
Pakistan, which is going to be Sunnistan. "9 
The 1945-6 elections perhaps offer the best barometer for testing Shia political opinion 
preceding the creation of Pakistan. Sayyid `Ali Zaheer, long-term president of the Shia 
Political Conference, stood for the Lucknow seat against Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman 
while, complementing this attempt to `emphasise our separate identity and policy. ' 
Husain-bhai Laljee stood against Jinnah for election to the Viceroy's Central Legislative 
Council in Bombay. 20 It was perhaps inevitable that the 1946 elections in Lucknow 
should be `contested mainly on the Madhe Sahaba issue'; the issue was revived during 
the election campaign and Sunnis recited the proscribed verses. 21 Khaliquzzaman, aware 
of his associations with the Sunni cause, 22 attempted to run the League's campaign on a 
platform of Muslim unity, even meeting with Shia religious leaders in an attempt to 
persuade them that the League stood on a fully unitary platform. 23 However numerous 
Shi'a organisations, among them the Shi'a Political Conference, Shi'a Students' 
Federation and the Tanzim-ul-Mominin, all united in issuing similar declarations of 
mistrust. 24 Khaliquzzaman's ultimate victory in the Muslim seat was predictable, but the 
fact that Zaheer won 17% of the Muslim vote25 perhaps exposes the vacuity of 
19 Statement by Sayyid Zahirul Hasan Rizvi, National Herald (Lucknow), 17 January 1946, CSAS; 
Directive by Hosseinbhoy Laljee, ibid, 21 January 1946. 
'0 Syed Kazim Zaheer ed., The memoirs of SaI, vid Ali Zaheer (New Delhi, 2004), p. 20. 
2' `Fortnightly report for the second half of November 1945, ' Frampton to Porter, and 'Fortnightly report 
for the first half of December 1945, ' Frampton to Porter, Frampton papers, CSAS; c. f., National 
Herald, 13 
December 1945 and 11 March 1946, CSAS. On the eve of elections, one member of the Ahrars even 
suggested that the organisation could 'retard Muslim League propaganda 
by creating internal religious 
differences. ' Ayesha Jalal, Self and sovereignty: individual and commumity in South Asian Islam since 1850 
(London, 2000), p. 458. 
22 `It is gathered that Ch. Khaliquzzaman wanted to avoid contesting the 
Lucknow , cat. which he 
represented in the last Assembly, in view of the general resentment among the 
Muslim public against the 
art he played in the Madhe-sahaba dispute. ' National Herald, 
10 January and 11 March 1946, CSAS. Fart 
Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore. 1961), p. 339. 
National Herald, 17,21,31 January 1946, CSAS. 
2 J. M. Goodman, B. D. Graham. P. D. Reeves. Handbook to elections in ( War 
Pradesh, 1920-1951 (Delhi. 
1975), p. 345. 
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Khaliquzzaman's claim that `Skias voted in good numbers for the League, '26 and the 
truth of Zaheer's that he secured a `large percentage' of the Shi'a votes. 27 While the 
absence of appropriate Census statistics make it difficult to ascertain the proportion of 
Shi'as who ultimately made the hijrat to Pakistan, many have assumed that Shi'as moved 
to Pakistan in approximately similar proportions to Sunnis. 28 Some accounts, however, 
indicate that certainly in Lucknow the great majority stayed behind. 29 The creation of 
Pakistan was evidently an event greeted with considerable uncertainty by many Shi'as 
who feared Sunni domination, a fact little acknowledged but one with an important 
bearing upon our knowledge of the Pakistan movement and of post-colonial South Asia 
more broadly. 
Henceforth, sectarian rivalries dragged on in Lucknow long after the transfer of power. 
While the political formations involved have changed, sectarian differences have 
continued to hold a bearing on Muslim society and politics in Lucknow. Sunnis during 
the 1950s-70s largely allied with Congress, the latter winning their support by making 
several concessions including a 1969 ban on to `zivadari. Accordingly, during the 1970s 
the Bharatiya Jan Sangh made efforts to infiltrate Shia voting constituencies by 
upholding the right to to `ziyadari, a tactic continued by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
today. 3° Thus, locally focused sectarian differences have continued to shape wider 
political allegiance, and parties have continued to exploit the sectarian fissure in order to 
gain a foothold in the key constituency of Lucknow, solidifying further sectarian tensions 
as a political issue. 31 
Perhaps even more interesting is the implication of this thesis for current work on Islam 
`c' Khaliquzzaman, Pathway' to Pakistan, p. 339. 
27 Zaheer ed., Memoirs of Sved Ali Zaheer, p. 22. 
'x E. g. Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of north 
Indian Shd'ism in Iran and Iraq: religion and state in .4 wad/i, 
/722- 
1859 (California, 1988), p. 289. 
29 Moharram in two cities, Lucknow and Delhi, Monograph Series, Census of India 
/96/ (Allahahad, 
1963), p. 9. 
;° Imtiaz Ahmad, 'The Shia-Sunni dispute in Lucknow, 1905-1980, ' in Milton Israel and Narendra K. 
Wagle eds., Islamic society and culture: essays in honour of Professor 
Azit. 4hmad (Delhi, 1983), pp. 14-8; 
Keith Hjortshoj, 'Shi'i identity and the significance of Muharram in Lucknow, India. ' in Martin Kramer 
ed., Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, (London, 1987), pp. 300-5. 
This is the perspective of Theodore P. Wright, 'The politics of 
Muslim sectarian conflict in India, ' in 
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in Pakistan. A thriving body of literature has considered the growth of Muslim 
sectarianism in Pakistan between Shi'as, Sunnis and Ahmadis. However. such studies 
have tended to explain these occurrences in terms of fresh, momentary developments in 
the modern history of Pakistan. Some have interpreted sectarianism as a consequence of 
the state's flirtation with Islam as a potential source of national legitimacy, especially the 
Islamisation programme of Zia-ul-Haq, and Shia resistance to its perceived 
standardisation of society according to a narrow interpretation of Sunni Islam. 32 Others 
have interpreted sectarianism as an abstracted manifestation of the social and political 
rivalries between, for instance, landed Shia aristocracies and urban Sunni commercial 
entrepreneurs in Punjab, or between immigrant muhajirs (immigrants from north India) 
and indigenous populations. 33 Still other studies have related the conflicts to the proxy- 
war between Saudi Arabia and Iran after 1979, contested within Pakistan through the 
patronage of Shia and Sunni madrasas and other religious institutions by these powers . 
34 
Without denying the importance of any such factors, all these explanations share the 
assumption that `it was... after the creation of Pakistan that [sectarian issues] forcefully 
'3s surfaced. 
This thesis has perhaps demonstrated that such sectarian conflicts did not simply newly 
arise in Pakistan but, perhaps surprisingly considering this interpretation of the recent 
national origins of sectarianism in Pakistan, possess a powerful continuity with the 
formative period of sectarianism in colonial India. Muslim sectarianism in Pakistan has 
continued to bear the mark of the expansive religious polemical traditions fostered in 
colonial U. P.. For example, the Sunni renewal in Pakistan can be attributed in no small 
part to the so-called `Madani Group' of Deobandi 'ulama, named after the 'alien who 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Spring, 1980), pp. 67-73. 
'12 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: the changing role of Islanusm and the 
ulama in society and politics, ' in Modern Asian Studies (34.1,2000), pp. 139-80; Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The radicalisation of Shi'i and Sunni identities, ' in , tIoierºn Asian 
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played a central role in the radh-i-sahaba agitation and consequent counter-Shi'a tone of 
the Deobandi school during the following decade. After 1947 and especiall\ during the 
1970s, this group sought to craft a space for itself in Pakistani politics as the conscience 
of Islamic discourse, and focused upon the exclusion from Islam of numerous ý1usliný 
minority groups, including Shi'as, in an attempt to isolate other traditions and establish 
its own hegemony. 36 The hand of U. P. is perhaps even more visible in the rise o1 
sectarian organisations in the 1980s. The Sipah-i-Sahaba, an organisation directed against 
the society and polity of Shi'as and founded out of Deobandi anti-Shi'a polemic. was 
influenced in its early years by a continuing anti-Shi`a discourse flowing out of Deobandi 
and Nadvi propagandists in Lucknow. 37 Simultaneously, Shi'a sectarian organisations 
alluded to similar attachments to colonial Lucknow. Ja`far Husain, the founder of the 
Shia organisation Tehriq-i-Nifazi-i-Fiqh-i-Ja'fariya, received his education in colonial 
Lucknow, while it is widely acknowledged that immigre niuliajirs composed a prominent 
section of the membership of such organisations. 38 In other words, the connection 
between sectarianism in colonial India and post-colonial Pakistan was perhaps not simply' 
intuitive or thematic, but shared a tangible continuity of personages and organisations, 
and perpetuated the institution-building style of Shia and Sunni organisation established 
in the colonial period. 
International events in the twenty-first century are likely to generate a continuing wealth 
of literature on the subject of Muslim sectarianism, much of it vindicating the conclusion 
of this thesis that sectarianism in its modern manifestations has been fabricated as an 
alternative discourse of modernity, a clash not between doctrinal groups but bete een 
alternative self-encompassing Islamic systems, each possessing its own narrative ( 
religious renewal and modernisation. However, the perspective of much of the 
contemporary media and literature. depicting the world stage as being shaped by a 
conflict between a monolithic `Shia revival' and Sunni counterpart and focused in the 
is Muhammad Qasim Zanian. 'Sectarianism in Pakistan, ' p. 691. 
Nasr, 'The rise of Sunni militanc\ in Pakistan, ' pp. 169-79. 
. 37 Ihid, pp. 1(, 1- ;. 
Z, ý /.. anian. 'Scetarianisni in 1', ikistan. ' pp. O9.1-5. 
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Middle East and the Gulf, 39 runs the risk of oversimplifying a phenomenon which, a" 
described in this thesis, is one of consider local and regional di\ersit\. Such a focus 
falsely depicts manifestations of Muslim sectarianism in South Asia as directed by events 
in the regions to the west, with India and Lucknow especially placed on the very 
peripheries of relevance. This thesis has consistently, in contrast to sonic studic1, 
assessed Shi'ism not according to the cross-national supra-structures of a 'Shi'i 
International, ' but within the borders set by the locality and nation, in which the religion 
was most immediately experienced. It was Lucknow, it has been steadil\ argued 
throughout, that provided the closest thing to a `centre' of Indian Shi'ism as lived in 
innumerable towns in colonial north India. A final implication of this thesis, then, is that 
modern Muslim sectarianism in South Asia deserves to be understood according to a 
tradition which was nurtured, first and foremost, in the nnuliallus, rnadru. vas and meetin, _- 
halls of colonial Lucknow. Given Nawabi Lucknow's association with its esteemed 
historical tehzib, communal assimilation and cosmopolitanism, it is perhaps one of the 
ultimate ironies of Lucknow's twentieth-century decline that this construction and 
ordering of Shia-Sunni difference and polemical discourse, originating here and 
imparted throughout the subcontinent, has instead become one of the city's most 
enduring legacies. 
39 \'ali Nasr, The Shia revival: hmt' conflicts w ithin Islam ºt"ill shape 
the future (\c%% York. '_(X)h). 
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SELECT GLOSSARY 
(words are written as they appear in the text) 
ajlaf - the indigenous castes of Muslims, as opposed to ashraf. 
Akhbari - one of the two main branches of 'Isna 'Ashari Shi'ism. most associated with 
the Safavid era. It asserts that only the two recorded sources of Qur'an and hadi. ý 
(collectively known as akhbar) can be used as sources for jurisprudential reasoning. 
akhlaq - moral or mannerly correctness. 
'alehda - separate, exclusive. 
'aiim (pl. 'ulama) -a learned man, a scholar of Islamic knowledge. 
'amal - action, custom, practice. 
Amir-ul-mominin - `leader of the people, ' a title used by Shi'as to refer to the first Imam 
`Ali and by Sunnis to refer to the supposed successors of the Khilafat, among them 
the Ottoman Sultan. 
'aql - reasoning, the intellect. 
arti - form of Hindu devotional worship. 
'atabat-i-`alivat - the Shia holy shrines in Iraq at Karbala, Najaf, Kazinlain and 
Samarra. 
anjuman -a voluntary public association or society. 
ashraf - the high-caste, respectable Muslims, consisting of Sayyids, 
Sheikhs, Mughals 
and Pathans, descended from the Prophet's family or from Muslim ruling classes. 
'Ashra - the first ten days of Muharram. 
'Ashura - the tenth day of Muharram and the central moment of the festival, upon which 
the death of Husain is commemorated and tu'ziyas buried. 
asl - principle, root of religion. 
augaf - see wngf: 
azadari - the practice of mourning for Imam Husain observed during Muharranl. 
a: wi - the call to daily prayer. 
baradari - brotherhood. 
Bure-Wafut - the anniversary of the death of the Prophet. 
ba; ni - meeting. 
begani -a married sharif'Muslim woman. 
bid'ah - innovation. 
hila f isil - 'without interruption, ' a phrase used periodically 
b\ Shi'as to describe 
succession of Muhammad. 
Caliph (Khalifa) - the personages charged with rightful succession of the 
Prophet 
according to Sunni Islam, the first and most important of whom are Abu Bakr. 
'Umar, Usman and 
char van - 'four comrades, ' the names of the 
first four Sunni Caliphs. 
chowk - often denotes the central market area of a city . 
dattur - office. 
dar-ul-Khilufcrt -a term often used to 
denote an Islamic state. 
dar-eel-'ulrým - an `abode of know ledge, 
' a madrasa. 
darhar - in the colonial context. a public audience \\ 
ith the \'iceroý or (jov ernor. 
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dargah -a Sufi shrine or tomb of a pir. 
dars-i-Nizamiya - the curriculum of learning of many nzadrasas in north India, as"k)ci, Ited 
primarily with Firangi Mahal of Lucknow, with a particular emphasis on rational 
disciplines and sciences. 
din, dini, diniyat - religion, religious, religious studies. 
du'a - prayer, recitation. 
duldul - effigy of the steed upon which Husain was mounted at Karbala. 
dunya, dunyawi - world, worldly. 
ftitwa (pl. fatawa) a binding legal pronouncement issued by a mufti. 
fazil (pl. afazil) - distinction, glorification, often denoting the degree gained from 
education within a madrasa or under an elevated 'alirn. 
fiqh - the science of Islamic jurisprudence. 
firqa - sect, faction. 
gadda'i - backwardness. 
gall - lane. 
ghaib - absence or concealment, used to describe the state of the twelfth Imam. 
ghair - non-, un-. 
hadis - the written traditions of the Prophet and his Companions or, in Shi'ism, of the 
Imams. 
hafiz - one able to recite the Qur'an from memory. 
Hanafi - the branch of Sunni jurisprudence dominant in South Asia, encapsulating 
schools such as Deobandi, Bareilvi, Firangi Mahal and Nadva't ul-'L'lama. 
Karam - forbidden. 
hashr- - congregation. 
hazrat - Muslim notables, elites. 
hijrat - exodus in the name of religion to the dar-id-Islam, the abode of the faithful. 
huukuni - order, dictat. 
husainivva - alternative term for an i, nambara. 
idfuh -a qualified form of jihad, which can be practised in the absence of the 
Imam. 
ijaza (pl. ijazat) - certificate authorising its recipient to transmit hadis on the authority of' 
his teacher and/or exercise ijtihad. 
ijnia' - consensus, one of the roots of figh according to some schools. 
ijtihad - the autonomous religious effort of a qualified inurjtahid on a point of shari'at. 
ikhraj - expulsion, exclusion. 
ikhtilafat - contradiction, disputation, opposition. 
Win (pl. 'ulcrnt) - religious knowledge. 
Innani - in Shi`ism, one of the descendants and 
legitimate successor of the Prophet, 
beginning with 'Ali and ending with the twelfth Inmam, the personages at the 
doctrinal and devotional heart of Shi'ism. 
irnani-i just 'a - leader of Friday congregational prayers. 
imarna 
- 'turban, ' denotes the qualification of a nncrjrahid. 
imnainbara - the edifices in which 
\luharram is observed, and culogic,, I. r Imain I lusain 
recited. 
intizam 
- arrangement, organisation. 
lslah - guidance. 
ý^ý 
_i_ 
'Isnu `Ashari - 'Twelver, ' the branch of Shi'ism that subscribes to the authorit\ of the twelve Imams, the two major branches of which are Usuli and Akhbari Shi'lýnl. istiftah - binding legal declaration issued by a qualified niujtahid. 
ittefaq - agreement. 
ittehad -unity. 
`izzat - honour, respect. 
jadid - modern, modernity. 
jalsa - meeting. 
jama `at - party, group, community. 
janaza - funeral. 
jatha - deputation. 
jhanda - flag, standard. 
jihad - effort or struggle, often used in the context of holy war in defence of IbJam. 
juda/ judagana - separate/ separateness. 
julous - to `ziya procession enacted during Muharram. 
kafir- unbeliever, infidel, non-Muslim. 
kalam - the discipline of dialectical theology. 
karbala -a piece of ground symbolic of the land in Iraq where Imam Husain ww aý 
martyred, where to `z i_yas are buried during Muharram. 
khanaqah -a Sufi order. 
khatib - one who delivers the khutbab from the miinbar after Friday prayers. 
Khilafut - office of the Caliph. 
khuthah - the sermon or oratory delivered together with Friday prayers, and on other 
occasions. It generally contains Arabic exaltations of God, the Prophet and other 
personages, after which its content is left to the discretion of the khatih delivering it, 
kifun - burial shroud. 
mnadh-i-sahaba - 'praise of the Caliphs, ' a distinctly Sunni incantation. 
madrasa - an educational institution of the Islamic sciences, training 'irlaina. 
nlajlis (p1. majalis) - council or gathering, or in the case of Shi'ism congregation', of 
mutual mourning for Husain. 
inaktab - an institution of elementary religious education. 
nla'mum - congregation. 
mantiq - the discipline of logic. 
Muija' / Maija' id-Taglid - 'pole of emulation, ' one who is singularl\ qualified in 
Shi'isnl to be followed in all points of religious practice and law by ordinar` 
individuals. According to some interpretations, only one individual at any one time 
is entitled to this status, and becomes a universalistic leader. 
nlarsllva -a mostly Shi'a genre of poetry associated with \tuharranl and especi, ill\ 
famous in Lucknow. in which the glories of Husain are recited and hi,, suffering 
evoked. 
nius `uni - 'sinless, ' an attribute of the Imams. 
mnashk -a replica of the empty leather vvater-carricr slid to 
have been carried hti I luýain' 
daughter Sakina at Karbala, a replica of which ww as a feature of . \luharram 
possessions in some t1. P. towns, carried upon a tll'. 
nia. sjid - mosque. 
inataht - on behalf of, subordinate to. 
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mutum - the practice of self-flagellation in mourning for Imam Husain. 
mauled - see milad. 
maulvi (pl. maulavis) - religious speaker or preacher; learned man. 
Maulana - designation of religious distinction and authorit\. 
mazhub - religion, faith. 
medan - ground. 
Mehdi - in Shi'ism, the absent twelfth Imam, whose revelation is awaited. 
mehfil - social or literary gathering, congregation. 
melu - fair. 
mi `raj - the ascension of the Prophet. 
milad (p1. muulud) - predominantly Sunni tradition of congregation to celebrate the birth 
of the Prophet Muhammad. 
! Millet - denotes the global Islamic brotherhood or 'nation. ' 
mimbar - the stand from which preachers speak in a mosque. 
minhaj - system, curriculum. 
nloinineen - `followers, ' often used in juxtaposition with the leading snclat of Shi'is m. 
mu'afidur -a holder of revenue-free grants of land. 
lnubuhusu - verbal disputation. 
mubulligh (pl. mubullighin) - missionary. 
mufti - one entitled to issue a fatwu. 
muhajir- - one who performs hijrat. 
nilr/lullcl - quarter of a city. 
Mithat-rum - the first month of the Muslim calendar, observed by both Shi'as and 
Sunnis 
in distinct ways, during which the martyrdom of Imam Husain and other personages 
is commemorated. 
inujullid - one who engages in jihad. 
lnujtullid - one qualified to perform ijtihad. In Shi'ism, the title 
denotes the leading 
religious authorities, qualified to make ruling,, on the . shari'a and subject', of 
allegiance for the Shia community. 
inumtaz - 
distinct. 
inunazuru - religious disputation or debate. 
111uns1 f -fudge. 
nluejallid - the individual adherent of a chosen nllrjtclllid or llrulja'. 
! llut'a -a form of contractual temporary marriage sanctioned 
by Shia religious la's 
nlutati alli - the trustee of aw aqf or. sometimes, of another reli(-ious 
institution. 
numaz - Islamic prayer. 
! lame,, -i julll'a - Friday congregational prayers. which according 
to L'suli Shi'ism can 
only be conducted in one mosque in each city. 
llcrql (pl. nciqul) - imitation. 
nechri/ nechri at - atheist, materialist/ atheism. materialism. 
nig1Y1111 -- supervision. 
nisab - the curriculum of an institution 
of Islamic learning. 
l)eslillunlu,. - leader of congregational prayers. 
perdu - the veiling or seclusion tof women. 
qasba - the Muslim-dominated rural 
to\1 ns and settlement,, of the North Western 
Provinces and . -Aww adh. 
, ii 
gaum/ qaumik -a collectivity of individuals, usually translated as 'community' or- `nation' / the adjectival form, `communal' or `national. ' 
ra `is - rural landholder. 
risala (pl. rasa `il) - treatise, tract. 
sadat - see Sayyid. 
sadr - president, principal. 
sahaba - denotes the Companions of the Prophet, including the Caliph. 
sajjada nashin - successor to the leadership of a religious establishment. 
satyagraha - form of civil disobedience, practised by Gandhi and evoked durin- the 
tabarrah agitation of 1939. 
Suyvid (p1. sadat) -a descendant of Muhammad or of the Imams. the ashraf conlnlunit\ 
from whom all Shia mujtahids and most Indian Shia elites oricinate. 
shahid/ shahadat - martyr, martyrdom. 
shakh (pl. shakhen) - branch. 
shari `a - the law of Islam. 
s'harif '- denotes ashraf status. 
shikast - defeat. 
shirk - idolatory, polytheism or other contradiction of the oneness of God. 
shuddhi - Hindu proselytising movement of the 1920s. 
Sufi/ Sufisn2 - respectively a Muslim mystic, and the strand of mystical Islam associated 
with the pies and khanaqahs. 
surah - chapter of the Qur'an. 
su araj - independence, self-rule. 
tabarrah - the Shia cursing of the Sunni Caliphs and their denunciation for their 
usurpation of `Ali. 
tabligh - dissemination/ proselytisation of Islamic knowledge. 
tabut -a Shi'a procession performed in some towns such as Lucknow, in ww 
hich a horse is 
adorned as the steed of Husain and led in the juloos. 
tafsir- - the science of Qur'anic exegesis. 
tajdid - Islamic religious renewal or reform. 
takhlus - the name of authorship. 
talaq - divorce. 
talib - student. 
to `lif - compendium of the writings of exalted past scholars, 
distinct from taslllf. 
talugdar -a large-scale landowner whose proprietary rights were established 
bi the 
British after 1857. 
tainasha - show, spectacle. 
tan,. im (pl. tan; imat) - organisation or regulation of religious doctrine, practice or 
community. 
tagivv'cr - in Shi'ism, the concealment or 
dissimulation of' true religious beliefs in 
circumstances of potential danger or humiliation froth other religious communities. 
taglid - in Shi. 
'rsm, the emulation of or subservience to a chosen mit. tahicl in matter,, of' 
religious law, the forsaking of personal ijtillad in preference tur that 
of other,,. 
tagvim (pl. tadari! n) - order, organisation. 
tcrr/unlah - translation. 
tasalt'itf - 
Islamic mysticism! Sufism11. 
-ý 
tasnif - newly authored tract, distinct from ta'lif. 
tauhid - the oneness of God. 
to `z iva/ ta'ziyadari - an effigy of the tomb of Imam Husain, symbolical l\ revered and 
sometimes interred during Muharram/ the practice of carrvinL, the ta', ivva in a 
procession to its site of burial, conducted during Muharram. 
ta'ziya-khanah -a smaller structure in which the martyrdom of Imam Husain IN 
commemorated, differing from an imambara. 
tazkirah -a genre of biographical writing in Arabic, Persian and Urdu. 
tehrif- alteration, corruption. 
tehsildar - collector, revenue collector. 
tehzib - culture or etiquette, a term heavily associated with Lucknow. 
tir - see mashk. 
`ulama - see `alim. 
'ulum - see `ilm. 
ummah - worldwide Muslim community. 
`urs - the death anniversary of a Muslim pir. 
ustad (pl. ustaden) - religious teacher. 
usul - see asl. 
Usuli - the dominant branch of `Isna 'Ashari Shi'ism since the eighteenth century. It 
differs from Akhbari Shi `ism in that it accepts forms of intellectual and analogical 
reasoning as legitimate methods of jurisprudence, and in consequence has come to 
imbue its religious leaders with a greater degree of legal and charismatic authorit\ . 
vatan - homeland, often denoting one's ancestral region or gasbah. 
Wahhabi -a reformist school dating from the eighteenth century, renowned for their 
zealous and uncompromising opposition to any custom deemed to undermine the 
oneness of God. 
U'cl'iz (pl. wa'izen) - the preacher of sermons in a mosque. 
wajib - compulsory. 
wagf (pl. augaf) -a religious endowment directed to the upkeep of institutions such as 
mosques, madrasas and innambaras. 
ur'asifa - scholarship 
tir, asiga/ wasigadar - pension offered by the Government of India/ 
in Lucknow, the 
disenfranchised former nobility of the Nawabi Court. 
ut'aza'if - charity. 
zakir - one who remembers God 
by reciting his names and praises; in Shi'isnl, the ter-nm 
often refers to a preacher who recites the glories of the Imans during %Iuharram. 
zamindar - landholder. 
ziarat - 
in Shi'ism, most commonly denotes pilgrimage to the shrine cities, or a visitation 
to other sacred ground. 
: ikr - the 'remembrance' of 
God; the practice of re iting the name of God and, in the 
case of Shi`isnm, of the Imams. 
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